Au carrefour de la phénoménologie française contemporaine Depuis la fin des années ’90, la réflexion sur l’événement a permis de compter Claude Romano parmi les protagonistes de la phénoménologie française contemporaine. Sa proposition phénoménologique s’est ensuite nouée (grâce à l’endurante lecture des romans de Faulkner) à l’inouï débordement de l’événement de la vie que le récit est censé redonner, pour ainsi dire, "en elle-même" et à l’abri de toute sorte de réduction. L’enjeu de ces pages – consacrées à l’ouvrage de (...) Claude Romano paru en 2010, Au cœur de la raison, la phénoménologie – sera la même répétition de la phénoménologie que Romano nous a livrée dans cet ouvrage. En effet, notre avis est que Romano, en 2010, a pratiqué une Wiederholung de la phénoménologie et qu’il l’a fait situant celle-ci au centre d’un carrefour où confluent les questions historiques (Husserl, Heidegger), les libres variations de la phénoménologie en France (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas), la philosophie analytique. Or par cette répétition il s’est installé au carrefour de la phénoménologie française contemporaine , et cela pour deux raisons : premièrement, parce qu’il a donné une contribution décisive à l’alternative "réduction vs intentionnalité" qui ne cesse de représenter l’alternative de la réception française de la phénoménologie. Deuxièmement, parce que par sa répétition il a ouvert aussi un chemin nouveau et original qui maintenant demande à être phénoménologiquement questionné. (shrink)

This collection of essays is a response to a challenge that is undoubtedly paradoxical: to introduce in Italy an author who is already known and appreciated by scholars who have encountered his work, and, often, followed his teachings. While the transmission of knowledge has traditionally been through both exoteric and esoteric teachings (the former intended for the general public, and the latter for a small group of researchers), this divide is reproduced constantly through the distinction between ‘institutionalised’ knowledge found even (...) in ‘philosophy manuals’, and the knowledge that animates the research and discussions of researchers. If we keep in mind this distinction, we will undoubtedly better understand the influence and role of the work of Jean Greisch (born in 1942), within the Italian hermeneutical tradition from the second half of the last century. If on the one hand, the work of this philosopher is still not much known to the general public (owing to the lack of Italian translations), on the other hand it is difficult, if not impossible, to meet a scholar in the field of hermeneutical tradition who has not been engaged with at least some of Greisch’s works, and who has not suggested or not recommended their reading to junior researchers interested in acquiring hermeneutical reason. This gradual dissemination of Greisch’s work has led to the building of a growing community of scholars gathered around his work, a community that goes beyond all pretentious ‘Rubicon’ divide between German and French hermeneutics. (shrink)

La genèse de l’œuvre de Levinas montre en acte comment cette pensée a pris sa forme, commençant par une sorte de renversement de la philosophie. Un renversement qui se dit au moins en deux sens, en tant que renversement thématique (donc une relecture renversante des thèmes philosophiques principaux) et un renversement proprement philosophique, visant cet envers que la philosophie n’a pas encore su atteindre, son « soi » mouvant incessamment la pensée. En ce renversement il y va du nouveau questionnement (...) des thèmes classiques de la philosophie, donc du moi et de l’être, de l’activité et de la passivité, de l’horizon et de la phénoménalité possible, renversés afin d’atteindre leur impensé. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that the “attestation of evil and testimony of hope” are characterized by the genitive that accompanies them. This places them both, each no less than the other, in two different horizons: while the horizon of attestation is Heideggerian, the horizon of testimony is a legacy of Jean Nabert. Both of these horizons are present in the thought of Ricœur, and characterize the entire spectrum of his work. However, we are not dealing here (...) with a syncretism resulting from the co-presence of a hermeneutic source and of the philosophy of reflection. On the contrary, I attempt to show that the co-presence of attestation and testimony results from the fact that Ricœur never stopped “walking on two legs,” given what he writes in a conversation published in the Critique and Conviction, and that this presence is rooted in Ricœur’s formation, which is at the same time philosophical, literary and biblical, as he never renounced either the former one, or the latter ones. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that the “attestation of evil and testimony of hope” are characterized by the genitive that accompanies them. This places them both, each no less than the other, in two different horizons: while the horizon of attestation is Heideggerian, the horizon of testimony is a legacy of Jean Nabert. Both of these horizons are present in the thought of Ricoeur, and characterize the entire spectrum of his work. However, we are not dealing here (...) with a syncretism resulting from the co-presence of a hermeneutic source and of the philosophy of reflection. On the contrary, I attempt to show that the copresence of attestation and testimony results from the fact that Ricoeur never stopped “walking on two legs,” given what he writes in a conversation published in the Critique and Conviction, and that this presence is rooted in Ricoeur’s formation, which is at the same time philosophical, literary and biblical, as he never renounced either the former one, or the latter ones. (shrink)

Dossier: L’humilité Présentation du dossier. Coordonné par Elisa Grimi. Essays and contributors: L’intelligence de l’humilité, Carla Canullo; La virtù dell’umiltà e l’eudemonismo, Mario Micheletti; Humility – A work of love?, Katharine Opalka; L’humilité intellectuelle, la foi et l’épistémologie, Roger Pouivet; L’irriducibile ragionevolezza di un paradosso. L’umiltà secondo Tommaso d’Aquino e Gilbert K. Chesterton, Marco Salvioli, O.P.; L’Humilité, une ontologie de l’identité, Elisa Grimi.

The tension between the sense-content of the idea and its scientifically proven objectivity reaches its climax in the plainly expressed claim. However, science is free neither from metaphors nor from rhetorical figures that provide a framework for interpretation, such as paradigm, model, analogy, and so on. In other words, the findings need to be accommodated in order to be received and are not otherwise communicated. [...] The hope of the editors is to offer the reader, thanks to all the contributors, (...) a textbook of quality and relevance, and perhaps a particular input to challenge and find what is given by revealing itself and/or oneself. (shrink)