Xunzi

Xunzi’s philosophy provides a rich resource for understanding how ethical relationships between humans and nature can be articulated in terms of harmony. In this paper, I build on his ideas to develop the concept of reciprocal harmony, which requires us to reciprocate those who make our lives liveable. In the context of the environment, I argue that reciprocal harmony generates moral obligations towards nature, in return for the existential debt that humanity owes towards heaven and earth. This can be used (...) as a normative basis for an environmental ethic that enables humanity and nature to flourish together. (shrink)

This paper investigates virtue cultivation in the Xunzi《荀子》, paying particular attention to the early formation period. I first give a brief survey of the usage of the character de 德 in the Xunzi and the corresponding understanding of virtue cultivation. With the identification of some of the most controversial questions regarding Xunzi’s ethical thought, including how a person with a bad nature comes to be attracted to virtue, recognize the value of virtue cultivation, and embark on the path of virtue (...) cultivation, I then review the efforts that have been made to address these questions and evaluate what challenges remain. I go on to argue that such challenges can be met and articulate how a petty man can be attracted to and also recognize true virtue. Finally, borrowing some resources from Aristotle’s idea of habituation of virtuous actions, I argue that it is possible for a person to embark on virtue cultivation, even though he is without prior moral dispositions and internal motivation for virtue. (shrink)

The classical Confucian philosopher Xunzi proposed a naturalistic virtue ethics account of ritual: rituals are practices that channel human emotion and desire so that one develops virtues. In this paper I show that William of Auxerre’s Summa de Officiis Ecclesiasticis can be understood as presenting a similar account of ritual. William places great emphasis on the emotional power of the liturgy, which makes participants like the blessed in heaven by developing virtue. In other words, he has a virtue ethics of (...) ritual closely aligned with that of Xunzi. Xunzi’s writings on ritual illuminate and enrich one’s reading of the Summa de Officiis. But unlike Xunzi, William is not a naturalist with regard to ritual: although much of William’s language about the causal power of liturgy can be explained in Xunzian terms, Christian liturgy has an irreducible supernatural element. (shrink)

While the early Confucians were largely content to maintain the rituals of ancient kings as the core of moral education in their time, it is not obvious that contemporary humans could, or should, draw from the particulars of such a tradition. Indeed, even if one takes ritual seriously as a tool for cultivation, there remains a question of how to design moral education programs incorporating ritual. This essay examines impediments faced by a ritualized approach to moral education, how they might (...) be overcome, and how a ritual method could be developed in modernity. I contend that a Confucian notion of ritual, particularly as elaborated in the Xunzi, is both compatible with modern moral education and capable of making a distinct contribution to moral education in terms of how rituals can be used to structure and inculcate a shared climate of respect and humaneness both in- and outside the classroom. Specifically, the ritual education method includes emphases on inculcating moral fluency via symbolic practices and distinctions, training and appropriately associating promoral dispositions, enhancing moral imagination, and developing awareness of other minds. The model is thus a multifaceted approach to moral education through (meta)cognitive development. (shrink)

Totalitarianism is perhaps unanimously regarded as one of the greatest political evils of the last century and has been the grounds for much of Anglo-American political theory since. Confucianism, meanwhile, has been gaining credibility in the past decades among sympathizers of democratic theory in spite of criticisms of it being anti-democratic or authoritarian. I consider how certain key concepts in the classical Confucian texts of the Mencius and the Xunzi might or might not be appropriated for ‘legitimising’ totalitarian regimes. Under (...) an Arendtian approach to understanding totalitarianism, it is precisely an unproblematised relation to a normative History and Nature that underlies the potential compatibility or incompatibility. I argue against a longstanding prejudice that if any form of Confucianism would be totalitarian, it would have to be Xunzian. Against this, I hope to show that if any form of Confucianism would be totalitarian, it might well be a naturalistic Mencian Confucianism instead of a constructivist Xunzian one. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore Xunzi’s 荀子 problem, which was originally proposed by David S. Nivison. The problem revolves around a tension in Xunzi’s writings about human nature. In his chapter “Human Nature is Bad,” Xunzi states that humans have inborn selfish desires and natural feelings, and if they do not control or regulate these desires and feelings, there will certainly be chaos. However, in the chapter “The Regulations of a Sage King,” Xunzi argues that human beings possess yi 義, (...) which is an important feature distinguishing them from other creatures. I try to analyze how yi should be understood in the Xunzi by focusing on the relationship of yi with fen 分 and li 禮. In the process, I also consider Hall and Ames’s understanding of yi as “meaning-bestowing,” and pay attention to Xunzi’s mention that yi is something that enables human beings to jump from natural to social divisions. (shrink)

One of Han Feizi’s most subtle criticisms of Confucianism targets a central feature of its moral cultivation program, namely an appeal to modelling oneself on ancient sages. According to Han Feizi, this ideal of model emulation is doomed to failure due to imperfect knowledge of past exemplars, the fact that certain ideals of practice may not be applicable to (or catastrophic for) some practitioners, and the additional fact that one cannot always rely on past examples to provide good guidance for (...) future events. As Eric Hutton points out, this line of critique bears striking similarities to one offered by Bernard Williams against virtue ethics. Accordingly, this emulation problem poses difficulties not only for Confucianism, but also more generally for virtue ethics. This paper argues that the emulation problem can be overcome by appealing to the Confucian Xunzi’s account of the role of ritual (li) in moral cultivation. Specifically, the ways in which ritual promotes moral development provide the Confucians (and, by association, virtue ethics) with the means of devising a sufficiently sophisticated account of emulation to meet the challenge lobbied by Han Feizi and Williams. (shrink)

A fair amount of recent Xunzi scholarship has focused on the problem of moral transformation. The problem being addressed supposedly arises this way. According to Xunzi, human nature is innately or...

There is [that which is controlled by] Heaven, and there is [that which is within the power of] man, and each has its separate lot. Once one has examined the division between Heaven and man, one will know how to act.1Since the discovery of the Guodian 郭 店 manuscripts in 1993, the Qiongda yi shi 窮 達 以 時 has gathered much attention, mainly thanks to this opening line, which practically invalidates the previously widely held belief that the division between (...) Heaven and humanity was Xunzi's original idea.2 Consequently, much effort was spent on analyzing similarities and differences between the Xunzi and the QDYS, focusing on their concepts of Heaven.3 But... (shrink)

There are a number of recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to the ethical analysis of technology. These works, however, have not attended sufficiently to one central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to Confucian ethics, and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is what distinguishes it from other ethical traditions. Any discussion of Confucian ethics for technology, therefore, remains incomplete without accounting for Li. This chapter aims to elaborate on the (...) concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance to ethics of technology. Particularly, by referring to Li’s communicative, formative, and aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of technology with an emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and demonstrate how this approach proceeds with the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of technology. (shrink)

This essay examines the role that the the ethical plays in early Confucian political philosophy. By focusing primarily on the political thought of Xunzi, I argue that there is a necessary relationship between ethical ideas and political ideas in texts such as the Analects, Mengzi, and Xunzi. In particular, I argue against a more ‘realist’ reading of the tradition which argues that for early Confucians political order was not only a goal independent of ethical goals but also one in which (...) morality had no role to play. In doing so, I show that interpreting the early Confucians constructing their political thought on top of the scaffolding of their ethical views allows us to make more sense of the broader array of ideas on the political realm appearing throughout these texts. (shrink)

Chapter 15 of the Xunzi stands as the most comprehensive account of the early Confucian analysis of warfare. Unlike a range of other early, non-Confucian discussions on warfare, particular strategies and tactics are taken to be of secondary importance. Thus, Xunzi refuses to discuss practical military strategy without framing it within a much broader ethical, social, and political context. On his account, a well-ordered, flourishing state necessarily rests upon a particular set of rituals and social norms in which people can (...) cultivate themselves morally. Such a state has nothing to fear from any enemy, no matter how tactically sophisticated or militarily skilled. -/- To many, such a view seems overly. However, given that Xunzi is anything but Pollyannaish in other parts of the text and is quite pessimistic about human nature in general, it behooves us to dig a bit more deeply into his ideas about military affairs and examine whether they can be understood in a more plausible light. This article provides a reading of Xunzi’s views on military affairs that is internally consistent and corresponds with Xunzi’s broader ethical and political views, while also showing why someone of Xunzi’s obvious intellectual acumen might hold such a view. (shrink)

This essay introduces ideas from Confucius, Xunzi, the Six Dynasties, and Kant about beauty, music, morality, and what we might today call “aesthetic education.” It asks how beauty and morality are related and how they ideally should be related to each other. We know that beauty and morality can drift apart, and we may wonder how aesthetic education might work best. Should the arts be a means for developing morality? Or should it be the other way around? These questions are (...) still relevant today. But our world has changed, not only since Confucius, but also since Kant. We may ask what to make of their ideas in our present time. I argue that there are good reasons for keeping morality and aesthetics apart, somewhat in the spirit of Kant, and in opposition to the idea of “fusing” the two. (shrink)

Surprisingly little is known about what ancient Confucian thinkers struggled with in their own social and political contexts and how these struggles contributed to the establishment and further development of classical Confucian political theory. Leading scholar of comparative political theory, Sungmoon Kim offers a systematic philosophical account of the political theories of Mencius and Xunzi, investigating both their agreements and disagreements as the champions of the Confucian Way against the backdrop of the prevailing realpolitik of the late Warring States period. (...) Together, they contributed to the formation of Confucian virtue politics, in which concerns about political order and stability and concerns about moral character and moral enhancement are deeply intertwined. By presenting their political philosophies in terms of constitutionalism, Kim shows how they each developed the ability to authorize the ruler's legitimate use of power in domestic and interstate politics in ways consistent with their distinctive accounts of human nature. (shrink)

In Confucianism, ritual propriety 1 is commonly understood as an instrument for guiding people's actions. In this essay, however, I argue that taking ritual propriety merely as an instrument external to human beings fails to appreciate important aspects of Xunzi's conception of ritual propriety. Drawing on suggestions from Martin Heidegger's philosophy, I argue that ritual propriety in the Xunzi is analogous to language in Heidegger in important ways. For Heidegger, language is the "house of Being." For Xunzi, ritual propriety could (...) also be described as the house of the being of humanity. "House" refers to the medium in which human beings dwell. As the "house" of the morally refined person, ritual... (shrink)

This paper aims to produce a defense of the ethical significance of Confucian ritual. An adequate defense must explain how these conventions are based in a culturally-neutral, objective ground. After a brief account of how Confucians view the relationship between rituals and moral goodness, I consider three sorts of justification. Mencian naturalism appeals to a conception of flourishing that is grounded in human nature. Xunzian consequentialism looks to how ritual brings about social order. I argue that both of these approaches (...) fail because they are unable to account for the normative fineness of rituals, which refers to the precision and detail of ritual propriety. Instead, I look to Xunzi for a justification of rituals in terms of their role in beautifying human nature. I argue that this view provides a sort of objective ground for ritual, while also preserving their normative fineness. I conclude with remarks on how Xunzian aestheticism may be useful for understanding other areas of moral life. (shrink)

This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” and not “institutional rules” are the proper sources of good governance and social order, as well as some notable Confucian objections to this position. It takes Xunzi 荀子, Hu Hong 胡宏, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 as the primary representatives of the “virtue-centered” position, which holds that people’s good character and not institutional rules bear primary credit for successful governance. And it takes Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 as a major advocate for the “institutionalist” (...) position, which holds that institutional rules have some power to effect success independently of improvements in character. Historians have often called attention to this debate but left the major arguments and positions relatively unspecified. As I show, the Confucian virtue-centered view is best captured in two theses: first, that reforming people is far more demanding than reforming institutional rules; second, that once the rules have reached a certain threshold of viability, further improvements in those rules are unlikely to be effective on their own. Once we specify the theses in this way, we can catalogue the different respects and degrees to which the more virtue-centered political thinkers endorse virtue-centrism in governance. Zhu Xi, for example, turns out to endorse a stronger version of virtue-centrism than Hu Hong. I also use this account of the major theses to show that Huang Zongxi, who is sometimes regarded as historical Confucianism’s foremost institutionalist, has more complicated and mixed views about the power of institutional reform than scholars usually assume. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as a philosophical end in (...) itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers. (shrink)

I defend a solution to the puzzle of petitionary prayer based on some ideas of Aquinas, Gregory the Great, and contemporary desert theorists. I then address a series of objections. Along the way broader issues about the nature of desert, what is required for an action to have a point, and what is required for a puzzle to have a solution are discussed.

In the early 2000s, some scholars suggested integrative ethical education as an approach to reconcile the gap between cognitive-development education, based on rule ethics, and traditional character-ethics education, inspired by character ethics in Western ethical education. Darcia Narvaez also tried to establish a comprehensive and systematic model. Nonetheless, she has indicated four questions that need further research. This paper aims to respond to Narvaez’s project and its questions from the angle of Xunzi’s ritual education. It argues that Xunzi’s thought may (...) provide some insights for Narvaez’s approach. To present this, it begins its discussion with an introduction of the main ideas of Xunzi’s thought. Later, it tries to show the insights from certain notions and elements, such as Junzi, reasoned judgment, of Xunzi’s ritual education for Narvaez’s project of integrative ethical education. Some relevant questions are also discussed. (shrink)

Xunzi’s 荀子 advocacy for moral education is well-documented; precisely how his program bolsters moral development, and why a program touting study of ritual could be effective, remain subjects of debate. I argue that these matters can be clarified by appealing to the theory of learning and development offered by Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky posited that development depends primarily on social interactions mediated by sociocultural tools that modify learners’ cognitive architecture, enabling increasingly sophisticated thought. Vygotsky’s theory is remarkably similar to Xunzi’s account (...) of how studying and practicing ritual restructures learners’ moral psychology. Specifically, both Vygotsky and Xunzi offer nonnativist accounts of psychosocial development that emphasize the centrality of sociocultural tools for learning. This comparison yields a more nuanced and empirically supported interpretation of Xunzi’s account of moral education, as well as an account that has applications in contemporary work in moral education and development. (shrink)

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind (...) of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽, which includes zhi知 and neng 能, is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to (...) xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts. This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual works and political (...) behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi's view on ritual as a specific core element of his ethical thought.1 One of the main questions concerns the source of ritual. Is ritual something that humans discover in the world, or is it instead something they create? That is, does Xunzi offer a realist or a conventionalist view of ritual? The answer to this question is of great import for understanding the thought of (...) Xunzi in general, as it will suggest certain readings of his views on language, human nature, and moral self-cultivation. Part of the problem, however, is that although Xunzi says quite a bit about the... (shrink)

According to a dominant line of interpretation in recent Anglophone Xunzi scholarship, Xunzi conceived of Heaven along impersonal rather than personal lines, and regarded Heaven—together with Earth—roughly as the orderly and indifferent forces of Nature, as opposed to a deity who is aware of and takes an interest in the affairs of human beings; who rewards virtue and punishes vice; whose ways can be known through divination; and who can be propitiated through sacrifice.1 This general view of Xunzi's philosophy has (...) been espoused by a number of leading scholars of Chinese philosophy over the last three decades, including Angus Graham, Benjamin Schwartz, Henry Rosemont, Jr., Roger Ames, Robert Eno, P.J.... (shrink)

Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi had different views of good government. Due to their different understandings of good government, Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi formulated their different approaches to achieving a good government. Confucius argued for li and allowed some room for fa in achieving a good government. However, since Mencius’ view is that a good government results from the moral cultivation of the ruler, ministers and people and moral persuasion, he neglected li as the approach to achieve a good government. In (...) this case, Xunzi developed Confucius’ teachings of li and fa and not only regarded li as necessary for achieving a good government, but also, beyond Confucius, regarded fa as an indispensable way in cultivating the people to be moral. (shrink)

Against the background of modern academic study, this article consciously uses Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a tool to theoretically analyze Xunzi’s ethical philosophy. This article tries to briefly analyze the basic structure of Xunzi’s moral philosophy and to reveal its unique rationalist theoretical character by exploring the following three topics: “the understanding of human beings,” “the establishment of a moral foundation,” and “the accomplishment of virtue in practice.” From the perspective of comparative philosophy, this article can also be viewed as (...) a model for bringing about communication and synthesis between two philosophical traditions, namely Confucian ethics and Western virtue ethics. (shrink)

Christian B. Miller has noted a “realism challenge” for virtue ethicists to provide an account of how the character gap between virtuous agents and non-virtuous agents can be bridged. This is precisely one of Han Feizi’s key criticisms against Confucian virtue ethics, as Eric L. Hutton argues, which also cuts across the Aristotelian one: appealing to virtuous agents as ethical models provides the wrong kind of guidance for the development of virtues. Hutton, however, without going into detail, notes that the (...) notion of rituals in the Confucian tradition may be able to sidestep Han Feizi’s criticism. In this essay, I wish to explore not only how the notion of rituals, alongside its corollaries in Xunzi’s Confucian program for ethical cultivation, indeed addresses Han Feizi’s criticism, but also observe that Aristotle’s tragic poetry plays functionally equivalent roles in his own understanding of ethical upbringing. I will begin by considering Han Feizi’s critique of ethical cultivation in virtue ethics as such and how it poses a specific problem for the acquisition of the ‘constitutive reasoning’ shared by Aristotle and Xunzi. I will then briefly note that this problem trades on the synthetic structure of human nature found in both Aristotle and Xunzi (the rational/irrational parts of the soul and the heartmind/five faculties), which grounds the way they understand ethical action and agency. Finally, I will suggest how both Aristotle and Xunzi understand the role of the arts in their extensive programme of ethical cultivation, allowing them to respond to Han Feizi’s attack as too narrow a construal of their respective ethical projects. It is hoped that, through this, we may gain a better sense of how more recent virtue ethicists may similarly draw on aesthetic resources for ethical development. (shrink)

Given that moral reasoning is directed towards providing well-supported answers to moral questions, our understanding of what it means to be a normative reason that speaks in favor or against a line of conduct largely informs our conception of moral reasoning. This article focuses on this relationship between moral reasoning and normative reasons and tries to clarify how the early Confucian conceptions of moral reasoning we find in the Mengzi and the Xunzi are conditioned by their underlying accounts of normative (...) reasons. This enables us to better locate and synthesize the remarks concerning moral reasoning we find in these texts. (shrink)

The classical Confucian thinker Xunzi is often characterized as a hard-nosed realist, and stands out in the early Chinese canon for his uncompromising materialist cosmology. Xunzi sees the actions of Heaven in terms of natural material forces rather than supernatural theistic ones, and this view leads him to reject various forms of supernaturalism. Xunzi's cosmological concept of the Triad formed by Heaven, Earth, and Humans also places humans at the center of the cosmos, and as such makes his stance very (...) literally anthropocentric.Anthropocentric thinking has been blamed, most famously by Lynn White, Jr., for the attitudes and prerogatives that authorize the human exploitation of nature.1 Indeed, some... (shrink)

In this highly original work, Mathew A. Foust breaks new ground in comparative studies through his exploration of the connections between Confucianism and the American Transcendentalist and Pragmatist movements. In his examination of a broad range of philosophers, including Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Charles Peirce, William James, and Josiah Royce, Foust traces direct lines of influence from early translations of Confucian texts and brings to light conceptual affinities that have been previously overlooked. Combining resources from (...) both traditions, Confucianism and American Philosophy offers fresh insights into contemporary problems and exemplifies the potential of cross-cultural dialogue in an increasingly pluralistic world. (shrink)

This essay examines whether an invocation of an epistemological privilege on the part of supposed moral experts prevents potential students from being able to evaluate among potential candidates for the role of plausible moral teacher. Throughout, it works to demonstrate that it is possible for even the untutored student to distinguish between a fanatic and a moral expert. In particular, this essay focuses on the version of virtue ethics espoused by the early Chinese philosopher Xunzi. It argues that by reflecting (...) on the attributes of fanatics, as well as on Xunzi's ideas and arguments about students and teachers, it is possible to arrive at a general set of principles that provide beginners with the tools necessary to distinguish dangerous fanatics from plausible moral teachers, even given the fact that both claim for themselves an epistemological privilege. (shrink)

This article discusses two interpretations of musical harmony around the 3rd century BCE based on the Xunzi 荀子 and the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋, comparing the concepts of resonance between sound and qi 氣 in each interpretation. The Xunzi supports the moral influence of the sage kings’ music where ethical resonance between sound and bodily qi serves as firm ground for musical harmony begetting social harmony. In contrast, the Lüshi Chunqiu advocates the idea of physical resonance between sound and cosmic qi (...) whereby musical harmony acts as a contributor to cosmic harmony. In discussing resonance between sound and qi, the Xunzi restricts its scope to the human realm while the Lüshi Chunqiu extends it more broadly to the cosmic realm, which indicates that humans foster cosmic harmony. This broader perspective is an adequate reflection of the germinating idea of a resonant correlation between the human and cosmic realms. (shrink)

Unlike Kongzi 孔子, Xunzi 荀子 emphasizes that serving the dead is as important as serving the living. This is best shown in his emphasis on simu 思慕, or “appreciative mourning.” Xunzi views simu as an important component of self-cultivation. In mourning deceased parents, one deeply reflects on their kindness and develops further respect and appreciation for them. Through mourning rituals and processes, one strengthens the family relationship that seems to have been broken and continues to become a more filial and (...) noble person. (shrink)

This is my contribution to a symposium on David Wong’s paper, “Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion.” I simply grant Wong his reading of the relevant texts and consider the merits of the ideas about ethical development on their own terms. In particular, my aim is to see how fruitful these ideas might be in the contemporary philosophical landscape.

Li 禮 (translated variously as “ritual”, “etiquette”, or “propriety”) plays a central role in early Confucianism, but its complexity is not always fully understood. At first glance, it may seem as if li behaviors are merely attempts to promote conservative practices from the idealized Chinese past. However, by examining the nature and function of li, as described the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Xunzi 荀子 (two key texts in the early Confucian tradition), it becomes overwhelmingly apparent that li is a (...) much more complicated phenomenon. Li actually plays key roles within the interconnected fields of Confucian ethics, religion, and politics and often adds aesthetic elements to these areas of thought. As such, it is as much a source of Confucian innovation as it is a tool for promoting reverence for the past. (shrink)

Xunzi's 荀子 essay, "A Discussion of Rituals" is the earliest attempt in early China to theorize at length about the nature and importance of rituals. This essay is crucial to understanding the importance of ritual in Xunzi's philosophy of self-cultivation, of which there is no shortage of analysis.1 Most of this analysis centers on the notion of ritual in general, but Xunzi's essay also reveals his reaction to several criticisms to specific ritual practices, especially mourning rituals and ancestral sacrifices, that (...) can be found in the Mozi 墨子 and the Zhuangzi 莊子.2 In response to these challenges, Xunzi not only develops a theory of ritual, but also begins to sketch a method of ritual performance that... (shrink)