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Sydney Shoemaker [173]Sydney S. Shoemaker [2]
  1. Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, (...)
  2. Causality and properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
     
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  3. Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
  4. Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Blackwell.
    What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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  5. The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  6.  83
    The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
  7. Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
  8. Phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.
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  9. The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
  10. Persons and their pasts.Sydney Shoemaker - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
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  11. Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker (ed.) - 1963 - Cornell University Press.
    Provides links to Internet resources in the field of international relations. Includes resources on diplomacy, history, and politics; economics and international management; international law; international organizations; regional studies; research institutes; United States government resources; and more.
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  13. Realization and mental causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  14. Some varieties of functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  15. Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
  16.  69
    Realization and Mental Causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  17. Time without change.Sydney Shoemaker - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (12):363-381.
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  18. Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
     
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  19. The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.
     
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  20.  17
    Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philiosophical Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
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  21. Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This is an expanded edition of Sydney Shoemaker's seminal collection of his work on interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. It reproduces all of the original papers, many of which are now regarded as classics, and includes four papers published since the first edition appeared in 1984. Themes include the nature of self-knowledge and self-reference, personal identity, persistence over time, properties, mental states, and perceptual experience.A number of the papers, including 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness', 'Persons and Their Pasts', (...)
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  22. Qualia and consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):507-24.
  23. First-person access.Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214.
  24. Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...)
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  25. On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.
  26. Absent qualia are impossible -- a reply to Block.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99.
  27. Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
  28.  48
    Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
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  29. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):275-277.
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  30. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind?Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131.
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  31. On knowing one’s own mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.
  32. Kim on Emergence.Sydney Shoemaker - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1):53-63.
    Emergence requires that the ultimate physical micro-entities have “micro-latent” causal powers, which manifest themselves only when the entities are combined in ways that are “emergence-engendering,” in addition to the “micro-manifest” powers that account for their behavior in other circumstances. Subjects of emergent properties will have emergent micro-structural properties, specified partly in terms of these micro-latent powers, each of which will be determined by a micro-structural property specified only in terms of the micro-manifest powers of the constituents and the way they (...)
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  33. Persons, animals, and identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
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  34. Identity, Properties, and Causality.Sydney Shoemaker - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):321-342.
  35.  64
    Rationality and Self-Consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - In Keith Lehrer & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Opened Curtain: A U.S. Soviet Philosophy Summit. Westview Press.
  36. Personal identity and memory.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (October):868-902.
  37. Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture I: The Object Perception Model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
    Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counterexemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three (...)
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  38. Intersubjective/intrasubjective.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  39. The first-person perspective.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.
  40. Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
    I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience—especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
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  41. Introspection and phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  42. Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
    Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties (...)
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  43. Introspection and the self.Sydney Shoemaker - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):101-120.
    The absence of identification of oneself tells against the view that introspection is a form of self-perception.
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  44. Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker, Richard Swinburne, David Armstrong, Norman Malcolm & Richard Bernstein - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):567-569.
     
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  45. I_– _Sydney Shoemaker: Self, Body, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287-306.
    A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by (...)
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  46. Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
  47. Content, Character and Color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-278.
    The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...)
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  48. Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Ethics 96 (3):641-643.
     
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  49. Self and body: Sydney Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties (...)
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    Introspection and Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247-273.
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