The argument presented by Jeffrey Bishop that “tradition” justifies female circumcision is grounded on the assumption that reason is always situated within traditions and that traditions are the foundational source of values. I argue that the concept of tradition is inherently vague and, as such, cannot support the weight of the argument that makes it the final arbiter of moral values. The concept especially does not justify intense pain and suffering inflicted on children.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychological CourageDaniel Putman (bio)AbstractBeginning with Aristotle philosophers have analyzed physical courage and moral courage in great detail. However, philosophy has never addressed the type of courage involved in facing the fears generated by our habits and emotions. This essay introduces the concept of psychological courage and argues that it deserves to be recognized in ethics as a form of courage. I examine three broad areas of psychological problems: (...) destructive habits; irrational anxieties; and psychological servitude in which one individual emotionally controls another. Psychological courage is the strength to confront and work through these problems. Such courage involves facing our deep-seated fear of psychological instability. I conclude that the development of psychological courage is essential to the well-being of many people.Keywordscourage, Aristotle, habits, dependency, rashness, cowardice, anxiety disorders, patienceThe virtue of courage exhibits different forms in human life. Types of courage can be broadly differentiated in terms of the fear which must be faced and the goal to be attained. Two forms of courage have been discussed at some length in the history of ethics. “Physical courage” is characterized by overcoming a fear of death or physical harm. The goals to be achieved by its exercise are traditionally defined by society or by the requirements of survival. The paradigmatic example is Aristotle’s (1987) brave soldier who faces death to defend his city (1115a25–35). Another example would be bravely defending self and family against a threat from nature such as a flood or dangerous carnivore. The second form, “moral courage,” also has some allusions in Aristotle (1115a12–13; 1115b1–2), but Plato’s portrayal of Socrates is in many ways the archetype for moral courage in Western philosophy. While Socrates is also said to have displayed physical courage in defending Athens, it is his fearlessness in defending a deeply held greater moral good against society which has inspired untold numbers of Plato’s readers, from the Stoics to today’s students. 1 In moral courage the major fear is loss of ethical integrity or authenticity, but moral courage is also tied to dealing with social disapproval (Martin 1986, ch. 4; Walton 1986). The person confronting her peer group over a racist joke displays moral courage. In acting courageously the individual maintains moral integrity while at the same time overcoming the fear of being rejected by friends. Other examples abound: the whistle-blower facing ostracism from colleagues for calling attention to injustice in the workplace, or the Quaker or Buddhist protesting against a manufacturer of armaments. Examples of physical and moral courage often overlap. Gandhi (as well as Socrates) exhibited moral courage while facing death, and a soldier in battle may have to deal with peer rejection of his heroic actions. However, the distinction, while imprecise, does speak usefully to quite different forms of courageous experience. [End Page 1]In this paper I want to introduce a third form of courage almost never discussed in the literature. Best called “psychological courage,” it is a form of the virtue which millions of human beings have to possess and exercise on a regular basis. The fear to be faced is not usually that of physical harm, nor is it fear of social ostracism. Nor is loss of moral integrity a major concern. The fear centers around a loss of psychological stability. I speak of the courage it takes to face our irrational fears and anxieties, those passions which, in Spinoza’s terms, hold us in bondage. These can range from habits and compulsions to phobias. Aristotle would have classified many of these under lack of temperance. A drinking habit or an irrational fear of open spaces reflects a lack of proper balance regarding the pleasures of life. But facing and working through these habits or anxieties can involve courage for several reasons. First, to admit the problem is to face the possibility of being stigmatized by society. In this sense psychological courage has some similarities to moral courage. Second, a great deal of pain, physical and psychological, can be involved in confronting the anxiety or changing the habit, and the individual knows this beforehand. Third, and most significant to this form of courage, the stability... (shrink)

In ‘Virtue and Character’ A. D. M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to ‘effective and intelligent action’ and that a virtue ceases to exist if ‘it leads to violation of the minimal requirements of any other virtue’. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring (...) for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. ‘He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness’. (shrink)

Gewirth has argued that rights are justified by their role in the “generic features” of action. Simply by virtue of being a purposive agent capable of voluntary action, one must accept the logic that all persons with such characteristics have certain moral rights. But the language of rights theories does not deal with the process by which rights are acknowledged. How do we go about recognizing those characteristics of human life that underlie the logic Gewirth claims is necessary? By what (...) process do I recognize, for example, your “right” to be told the truth? Acknowledging someone else's right involves two elements: a recognition of the content of the right and a recognition of the binding power of the right which is experienced by the agent as a sense of obligation. Analyzing the process by which these two factors are recognized and examining the foundation for that process will clarify some of the assumptions utilized in rights theories. (shrink)

The question, what a given statement is “about,” often occurs in philosophic discussion. I shall use this question in the hope of illustrating how a relatively simple application of symbolic logic can clarify a problem which might otherwise turn into a maze of complications.

Selected Logic Papers, long out of print and now reissued with eight additional essays, includes much of the author's important work on mathematical logic and ...

Currently assessment and management of animal welfare are based on the supposition that welfare status is something experienced identically by each individual animal when exposed to the same conditions. However, many authors argue that individual welfare cannot be seen as an ‘objective’ state, but is based on the animal’s own self-perception; such perception might vary significantly between individuals which appear to be exposed to exactly the same challenges. We argue that this has two implications: (1) actual perceived welfare status of (...) individuals in a population may vary over a wide range even under identical environmental conditions; (2) animals that appear to an external observer to be in better or poorer welfare condition may all in fact perceive their own individual status as the same. This would imply that optimum welfare of a social group might be achieved in situations where individual group members differ markedly in apparent welfare status and perceive their own welfare as being optimal under differing circumstances. Welfare phenotypes may also vary along a continuum between self-regarding and other-regarding behaviour; a variety of situations exist where (social) individuals appear to invest in the welfare of other individuals instead of maximising their own welfare; in such a case it is necessary to re-evaluate individual welfare within the context of a social group and recognise that there may be consequences for the welfare of individuals, of decisions made at the group level or by other group members. (shrink)

The concept of tragedy has been central to much of human history; yet, twentieth-century philosophers have done little to analyze what tragedy means outside of the theater. Utilizing a framework from MacIntyre’s After Virtue, I first discuss what tragedy is for human beings and some of its ethical implications. Then I analyze how we use the concept with regard to nonhumans. Although the typical application of the concept to animals is thoroughly anthropocentric, I argue first that the concept of tragedy (...) can be applied directly to nonhumans (a) because the loss of potential for some nonhumans may be as a great or greater than loss of potential for some humans to whom the concept applies and (b) because tragedy depends on what is valued and, for those creatures that do not conceptualize death, the destruction of the present moment through pain and suffeling is the ultimate loss, and second that self-awareness in the human sense is not necessary for tragedy. (shrink)

A complete translation of Aristotle's classic that is both faithful and readable, along with an introduction that provides the modern reader with a means of understanding this seminal work and its impact on our culture. In this volume, Joe Sachs (translator of Aristotle's _Physics, Metaphysics,_ and the _Nicomachean Ethics _)also supplements his excellent translation with well-chosen notes and glossary of important terms. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a (...) glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Aristotle’s immediate audience. (shrink)

Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.

Robert Veatch has claimed that virtue theory is not only irrelevant but potentially dangerous in medical ethics. I argue that virtue is a far more prominent factor in contemporary medical practice than Veatch admits. Even if ‘stranger medicine’ is taken as the norm, proper conduct on the part of physicians depends on certain character traits in order to be maintained consistently over a long period of time and in situations which run counter to the physician's own interests. Right conduct, which (...) Veatch argues is the central moral issue in the physician-patient relationship, is intertwined with certain virtues. Moreover, the virtue of integrity and the concept of a unified lifenarrative are especially useful in analyzing an important factor missing in modern medicine. And since medicine relies necessarily on some concept of human flourishing I argue that virtue theory can play a central role in helping to determine the goals of medical practice. Keywords: virtue, right conduct, character, competence, life-narrative, specialization, human flourishing CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

David Pugmire has argued that secularists can genuinely appreciate religious music because of our imaginative powers combined with the 'Platonic' nature of the emotions expressed in such music. I argue that Pugmire is wrong on both counts. Religious music is 'Platonic' not because it is subject to levels of imagination but because it has a definite object which makes imaginative readings inferior. Moreover, since religious music does have a clear object taken by the believer as real, a gap exists that (...) cannot be bridged by the imagination of the secularist, even imagination of the emotional 'last instance'. (shrink)

Christian Miller's book makes extensive use of the data on human behavior and motivation from psychological studies in the last 50-60 years and applies that information to the analysis of character. The book begins with helping behavior and the analysis is then generalized to other character traits. Miller argues that an analysis of human character as having Mixed Character Traits is superior to the analysis of character using the traditional virtues. The review highlights the great value of combining the research (...) into one place for the purposes of ethics and Miller's initial analysis of the data on helping. But the review questions the usefulness of Mixed Character Traits as a descriptor of human character and its value as a heuristic device in ethics. (shrink)

Kripke has noted that possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered, and that the stipulation of these worlds allows us to separate accidental from essential properties. In this paper I argue that possible worlds theory gives us an important tool for analyzing what Descartes is doing in the Meditations. The first Meditation becomes a thought experiment in which possible realities are stipulated in a search for one or more essential properties. Viewing the doubt in this manner sheds new light on the (...) cogito and sum res cogitans and shows the limitations of some contemporary discussion of the cogito, namely, the positions taken by Ayer and Hintikka. (shrink)

Kripke has noted that possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered, and that the stipulation of these worlds allows us to separate accidental from essential properties. In this paper I argue that possible worlds theory gives us an important tool for analyzing what Descartes is doing in the Meditations. The first Meditation becomes a thought experiment in which possible realities are stipulated in a search for one or more essential properties. Viewing the doubt in this manner sheds new light on the (...) cogito and sum res cogitans and shows the limitations of some contemporary discussion of the cogito, namely, the positions taken by Ayer and Hintikka. (shrink)

I WANT TO EXPLORE in this paper the relationship between ethical decisions, possible worlds, and certain types of emotions that Moravscik has called "Platonic attitudes." I will argue that what constitutes reflection in ethical decision-making involves imagining the possible world of another entity, a world that is contingent on an action that we have the power to perform. Ethical counterfactuals posit materially possible worlds or logically possible worlds and in both cases always include an affective element. That is, along with (...) imagining the properties of a projected world, an ethical counterfactual incorporates a realization of how that world would be experienced. I will argue below that the affective element is present even in deontology. Both the emotional factor and the future orientation of the possibilities distinguish ethical counterfactuals from the purely epistemic possible worlds discussed by Kripke and others. We can make a further distinction between types of emotions and utilize Moravscik's point that emotional states based on properties that can be rationally spelled out possess special characteristics. One of these characteristics is that these states, and only these, serve as focal points for imagining the possible world of another person. (shrink)

Christopher Johnson argued in 'Reconsidering the Ad Hominem' that, in certain exceptional cases, appealing to ad hominem considerations is logically justifiable. My argument is that ad hominem considerations are no different than other evidential considerations. The evidential links may be strong, weak or nonexistent but there is nothing special in itself about considering ad hominem factors when weighing evidence. Like all the informal fallacies, simply because a claim has the signature of being 'ad hominem' does not make it irrelevant. The (...) apparent originality of Johnson's point lies in equivocating 'ad hominem fallacy' with 'ad hominem considerations'.It is not looking to personal characteristics or situations that in itself is illogical. It is when those features have no evidential link to the point at hand. (shrink)

Human Excellence introduces the basic ideas of virtue theory, the branch of ethics that analyzes character. The author accomplishes this by systematically and carefully exploring the role of character in ethics through a series of dialogues. He begins by contrasting virtue ethics with other ethical views such as egoism, utilitarianism, and rights theories. Then he explores issues including the nature of courage, the problem of healthy versus unhealthy self-love, character and parenting techniques, the nature of friendship, and the relationship of (...) virtue to the current debate on the "ethics of care." The advantage of the author's approach is its practicality, making the material not only understandable, but applicable to exploring the self and systems in place in the world. (shrink)

The concept of tragedy has been central to much of human history; yet, twentieth-century philosophers have done little to analyze what tragedy means outside of the theater. Utilizing a framework from MacIntyre’s After Virtue, I first discuss what tragedy is for human beings and some of its ethical implications. Then I analyze how we use the concept with regard to nonhumans. Although the typical application of the concept to animals is thoroughly anthropocentric, I argue first that the concept of tragedy (...) can be applied directly to nonhumans (a) because the loss of potential for some nonhumans may be as a great or greater than loss of potential for some humans to whom the concept applies and (b) because tragedy depends on what is valued and, for those creatures that do not conceptualize death, the destruction of the present moment through pain and suffeling is the ultimate loss, and second that self-awareness in the human sense is not necessary for tragedy. (shrink)