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From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):217-227 (2019)
Abstract
Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpainAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):427-453.
How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.
Modal Inertness and the Zombie Argument.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (3):413-421.
Certainty and Our Sense of Acquaintance with Experiences.François Kammerer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):3015-3036.
References found in this work
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
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