The article examines and extends work bringing together engineering ethics and Science and Technology Studies, which had built upon Diane Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger shuttle accident as a test case. Reconsidering the use of her term “normalization of deviance,” the article argues for a middle path between moralizing against and excusing away engineering practices contributing to engineering disaster. To explore an illustrative pedagogical case and to suggest avenues for constructive research developing this middle path, it examines the emergence of (...) green chemistry and green engineering. Green chemistry began when Paul Anastas and John Warner developed a set of new rules for chemical synthesis that sought to learn from missed opportunities to avoid environmental damage in the twentieth century, an approach that was soon extended to engineering as well. Examination of tacit assumptions about historical counterfactuals in recent, interdisciplinary discussions of green chemistry illuminate competing views about the field’s prospects. An integrated perspective is sought, addressing how both technical practice within chemistry and engineering and the influence of a wider “social movement” can play a role in remedying environmental problems. (shrink)

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. (...) One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation. Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’ because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically. In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments. (shrink)

The fourth choral ode in Seneca's tragedyTroadesends thus (1050–5):tum puer matri genetrixque natoTroia qua iaceat regione monstransdicet et longe digito notabit:‘Ilium est illic, ubi fumus alteserpit in caelum nebulaeque turpes.’Troes hoc signo patriam uidebunt.This ending provides a powerful conclusion to the Chorus’ Epicurean-inspired philosophizing in the ode. The image of the Trojan women ‘seeing’ (uidebunt) the ‘smoke and squalid clouds creep[ing] high into the heavens’ (1053–4) recalls the Lucretian description of the soul, atomic in nature, leaving the dead body: compare (...) especiallyet nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,|crede animam quoque diffundi …(Lucr. 3.436–7) andergo dissolui quoque conuenit omnem animai|naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras(Lucr. 3.455–6). The image and the Lucretian resonance also create an intratextual link with the second ode ofTroades(371–408). In that ode, the Chorus set out to develop a philosophical position about the question of death and the possibility of an afterlife. Their philosophizing is aided by Lucretian language and imagery, and the clear verbal echoes of Lucretius include the soul escaping into air like vapour: ‘the spirit, with fleeing breath, has mingled with the clouds and passed away into air’ (…profugo spiritus halitu|immixtus nebulis cessit in aera, 379–80), which recalls the Lucretian lines above. At the end of the fourth ode, the Lucretian intertext of the smoke image is linked to another startling element that may point to (Epicurean) philosophizing: Seneca's use ofsignum(1055). (shrink)

The fourth choral ode in Seneca's tragedyTroadesends thus (1050–5):tum puer matri genetrixque natoTroia qua iaceat regione monstransdicet et longe digito notabit:‘Ilium est illic, ubi fumus alteserpit in caelum nebulaeque turpes.’Troes hoc signo patriam uidebunt.This ending provides a powerful conclusion to the Chorus’ Epicurean-inspired philosophizing in the ode. The image of the Trojan women ‘seeing’ (uidebunt) the ‘smoke and squalid clouds creep[ing] high into the heavens’ (1053–4) recalls the Lucretian description of the soul, atomic in nature, leaving the dead body: compare (...) especiallyet nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,|crede animam quoque diffundi …(Lucr. 3.436–7) andergo dissolui quoque conuenit omnem animai|naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras(Lucr. 3.455–6). The image and the Lucretian resonance also create an intratextual link with the second ode ofTroades(371–408). In that ode, the Chorus set out to develop a philosophical position about the question of death and the possibility of an afterlife. Their philosophizing is aided by Lucretian language and imagery, and the clear verbal echoes of Lucretius include the soul escaping into air like vapour: ‘the spirit, with fleeing breath, has mingled with the clouds and passed away into air’ (…profugo spiritus halitu|immixtus nebulis cessit in aera, 379–80), which recalls the Lucretian lines above. At the end of the fourth ode, the Lucretian intertext of the smoke image is linked to another startling element that may point to (Epicurean) philosophizing: Seneca's use ofsignum(1055). (shrink)

Sed quid ego Graecorum: nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant. Omnes hoc historici, Fabii Gellii sed proxume Coelius: cum bello Latino ludi votivi maxumi primum fierent, civitas ad arma repente est excitata … Quintus goes on to tell the story of the countryman's dream, with its divine warning about the ominous praesul, which is also related by Livy, Dionysius, Valerius Maximus, and Macrobius.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HOMOGENEOUS OR HETEROGENEOUS DEVELOPMENT? BRIAN T. MULLADY, 0.P. Holy Apostles College and Seminary Cromwell, Connecticut 0 NE OF THE most difficult questions to confront those who hold for a natural-law conception of Catholic moral teaching which does not change with the development of the times is the area of the freedom of religion in the political order. The traditional teaching on this subject is expressed in many (...) places. The most difficult locus for anyone who wants to defend the traditional opinion is found in The Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX. In this document, the following canons are explicitly enumerated : 77. In this age of ours it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other cults whatsoever. 78. Hence in certain regions of Catholic name, it has been laudably sanctioned by law that men immigrating there be allowed to have public exercises of any form of worship of their own. 79. For it is false that the civil liberty of every cult, and likewise, the full power granted to all of manifesting openly and publicly any kind of opinions and ideas, more easily leads to the corruption of the morals and minds of the people, and to the spread of the evil of indifferentism.1 1 " 77. Aestate hac nostra non amplius expedit, religionem catholicam haberi tamquam unicam status religionem, ceteris quibuscumque cultibus exclusus. 78. Hine laudabiliter in quibusdam catholici nominis regionibus lege cautum est, ut hominibus illuc immigrantibus liceat publicum proprii cuiusque cultus exercitium habere. 79. Enimvero falsum est, civilem cuiusque cultus libertatem, itemque plenam potestatem omnibus attributam quaslibet opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi conducere ad populorum mores animosque facilius corrumpendos ac indifferentismi pestem propagandam." Denizinger -Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 1777-1779 (2977-2979), hereafter refered to as DS. 93 94 BRIAN T. MULLADY, O.P. In this text, freedom of religion is clearly condemned. Yet one finds about one hundred years later the issue of religious freedom discussed by Vatican II. Here the conclusion reached seems quite different. The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right.2 These two documents seem to represent a significant change in the teaching of the church. Beyond the obvious change in attitude towards religious freedom, many moral theologians also see another change : the very language of the decree signals a departure from the traditional basis of the law of nature by a reference to the dignity of the human person. One example will suffice: It may also be a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional concept of ' nature ' which has contributed in recent years to the focus of moral attention moving from ' human nature ' to ' human person ' 2 " Haec Vaticana Synodus declarat personam humanam ius habere ad libertatem religiosam. Huiusmodi libertas in eo consistit, quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cuiusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus iuxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos limites. Insuper declarat ius ad libertatem religiosam esse revera fundatum in ipsa dignitate personae humanae, qualis et verbo Dei revelato et ipsa ratione congnoscitur. Hoc ius personae humanae ad libertatem religiosam in iuridica societatis ordinatione ita est agnoscendum, ut ius civile evadat." Vatican II, Declaratio de Libertate Religiosa: Dignitatis Humanae, n. 2. Translations are taken from Vatican Council II, The Conciliar and Post Conciliar... (shrink)

We provide a semantics for relevant logics with addition of Aristotle's Thesis, ∼(A→∼A) and also Boethius,(A→B)→∼(A→∼B). We adopt the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics but include in the model structures a regulatory structure for all interpretations of formulae, with a view to obtaining a lessad hoc semantics than those previously given for such logics. Soundness and completeness are proved, and in the completeness proof, a new corollary to the Priming Lemma is introduced (c.f.Relevant Logics and their Rivals I, Ridgeview, 1982).

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's rationale for supporting the development and approval of BiDil for heart failure specifically in black patients was based on under-powered, post hoc subgroup analyses of two relatively old trials , which were further complicated by substantial covariate imbalances between racial groups. Indeed, the only statistically significant difference observed between black and white patients was found without any adjustment for potential confounders in samples that were unlikely to have been adequately randomized. Meanwhile, because the accepted (...) baseline therapy for heart failure has substantially improved since these trials took place, their results cannot be combined with data from the more recent trial amongst black patients alone. There is therefore little scientific evidence to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients, and the FDA's rationale fails to consider the ethical consequences of recognizing racial categories as valid markers of innate biological difference, and permitting the development of group-specific therapies that are subject to commercial incentives rather than scientific evidence or therapeutic imperatives. This paper reviews the limitations in the scientific evidence used to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients; calls for further analysis of the V-HeFT I and II data which might clarify whether responses to H-I vary by race; and evaluates the consequences of commercial incentives to develop racialized medicines. We recommend that the FDA revise the procedures they use to examine applications for race-based therapies to ensure that these are based on robust scientific claims and do not undermine the aims of the 1992 Revitalization Act. (shrink)

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geologic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we (...) project the upper surfaces of the geological cube onto the plane of probabilistic credal states by means of standard, linear perspective, which may be interpreted as an extension of the classical condition of indifference. Finally, we apply the geometrical/logical methods developed in the paper to prove a series of trivialization theorems against question-invariance as a constraint on acceptance rules and against rational monotonicity as an axiom of conditional logic in situations of uncertainty. (shrink)

Background: SNOMED CT is a large terminology system designed to represent all aspects of healthcare. Its current form and content result from decades of bottom-up evolution. Due to SNOMED CT’s formal descriptions, it can be considered an ontology. The Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a foundational ontology that proposes a small set of disjoint, hierarchically ordered classes, supported by relations and axioms. In contrast, as a typical top-down endeavor, BFO was designed as a foundational framework for domain ontologies in the (...) natural sciences and related disciplines. Whereas it is mostly assumed that domain ontologies should be created as extensions of foundational ontologies, a post-hoc harmonization of consolidated domain ontologies in use, such as SNOMED CT, is known to be challenging. Methods: We explored the feasibility of harmonizing SNOMED CT with BFO, with a focus on the SNOMED CT Clinical Finding hierarchy. With more than 100,000 classes, it accounts for about one third of SNOMED CT’s content. In particular, we represented typical SNOMED CT finding/disorder concepts using description logics under BFO. Three representational patterns were created and the logical entailments analyzed. Results: Under a first scrutiny, the clinical intuition that diseases, disorders, signs and symptoms form a homogeneous ontological upper-level class appeared incompatible with BFO’s upper-level distinction into continuants and occurrents. The Clinical finding class seemed to be an umbrella for all kinds of entities of clinical interest, such as material entities, processes, states, dispositions, and qualities. This suggests the conclusion that Clinical finding would not be a suitable upper-level class from an BFO perspective. On closer inspection of the taxonomic links within this hierarchy and the implicit meaning derived thereof, it became clear that Clinical finding classes do not characterize the entity (e.g. a fracture, allergy, tumor, pain, hemorrhage, seizure, fever) in a literal sense but rather the condition of a patient having that fracture, allergy, pain etc. This gives sense to the current characteristic of the Clinical Finding hierarchy, in which complex classes are modeled as subclasses of their constituents. Most of these taxonomic links are inferred, as the consequence of the ‘role group’ design pattern, which is ubiquitous in SNOMED CT and has often been subject of controversy regarding its semantics. Conclusion: Our analyses resulted in the proposal of (i) equating SNOMED CT’s ‘role group’ property with the reflexive and transitive BFO relation ‘has occurrent part’; and (ii) reinterpreting Clinical Findings as Clinical Occurrents, i.e. temporally extended entities in an organism, having one or more occurrents as temporal parts that occur in continuants. This re-interpretation was corroborated by a manual analysis of classes under Clinical Finding, as well as the identification of similar modeling patterns in other ontologies. As a result, SNOMED CT does not require any content redesign to establish compatibility with BFO, apart from this re-interpretation, and a suggested re-labeling. Regarding the feasibility of harmonizing terminologies with principled foundational ontologies post-hoc, our results provide support to the assumption that this does not necessarily require major redesign efforts, but rather a careful analysis of the implicit assumptions of terminology curators and users. (shrink)

Semantic blindness is the inability to recognize semantic features of terms one can competently use. A theory that implies semantic blindness incurs a burden to explain how one can competently use a term without realizing how the term works. An argument advanced in favor of epistemic relativism is that its main competitors, contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism, imply that speakers suffer from semantic blindness regarding ‘knows’ while relativism has no such implication. However, there is evidence that relativism also implies semantic blindness (...) regarding ‘knows,’ apparently crippling the case for relativism. In this paper I argue that the semantic blindness that affects relativism is not a problem at all. First, the blindness is not as widespread as it appears. It does not prevent ordinary speakers from expressing important epistemic truths. Further, I provide an error theory for relativism that has three features that render it unproblematic: there is evidence independent of relativism that people make this error, relativism predicts this error; it is not an ad hoc rescue, the error only occurs in rare and obscure situations. People are fallible and finite, and assuming relativism is true, they make mistakes exactly where we should expect them to. (shrink)

Over the past century or so, questions concerning the word ‘meaning’ have been understandably prominent in the field of the philosophy of language. There is, however, a historical aspect to the debate that is of especial interest to literary critics – the fact that verbs and expressions of meaning have been applied to different kinds of things in a number of languages spanning the western literary tradition. I shall introduce the topic by focussing on the Latin expressionsibi uelleand on how (...) Roman authors exploited its ambiguities for the purposes of humour (§§ I and II). I shall then move on to a discussion of a later Latin phrase familiar from the pages of the Virgilian commentator Servius,hoc uult dicere, and argue that the assumptions we have about expressions of meaning may lead us to adopt a particular interpretation of it (§§ III and IV). In the final part of the paper (§§ V, VI and VII) I shall proceed to a discussion of why it is important for modern literary critics to pay attention to how they use verbs such as ‘to mean’: I argue that the different functions of the verb facilitate a personification of the text that allows us to equivocate about the role of the author. (shrink)

A sign of Sartre’s belated "coming of age" in professional, English-speaking philosophical circles is the recent shift from exposition to dialogue as analytic authors regard his contribution to current Anglo-American philosophical discussion. One of the interests, not to say obsessions, of analysis has been the philosophy of mind. The literature is vast, and alternative positions have been charted in detail. It is a virtue of Professor Morris’ book that she has mastered a respectable portion of the analytic terrain. Her treatment (...) of Sartre is limited to the writings up to and including Being and Nothingness. The statement of the question is analytic, the response Sartrean. Her assessment of the exchange is that "the concept of a person to be found in Sartre’s early work is not only intelligible but significant. He has led us away from some of the idle considerations in much contemporary analytic discussion of persons qua perceivers and has offered important and probably correct solutions to some of the most pressing and central problems connected with persons considered as moral agents". Thus the standard criteria for reidentification of persons, viz., memory, character, and bodily continuity, are viewed in terms of accountability, thereby underscoring Sartre’s "new criterion of personal identity," fundamental project or ideal self. Crucial to her general thesis is the ambiguity of the "I" for Sartre. The term denotes the body-subject of conscious relations and possessor of physical properties, on the one hand, and a free unification of acts and experiences over time, on the other, like a melody synthesizing individual notes—a standard simile in nonsubstantial theories of the self. She argues that both aspects of the "I" are required to resolve the matter of accountability as we understand it. The question of other minds is raised in the context of Sartre’s claim that "there is nothing behind the body. The body is wholly ‘psychic'." This problematic assertion not only makes his concept of shame-consciousness appear less ad hoc but helps warrant, as well, her claim that he is leaning toward a physicalism "broad enough to include the intentional properties of consciousness". An indication that analysis may be heading in the same direction is taken as an added sign of Sartre’s relevance. (shrink)

The language of “participant-driven research,” “crowdsourcing” and “citizen science” is increasingly being used to encourage the public to become involved in research ventures as both subjects and scientists. Originally, these labels were invoked by volunteer research efforts propelled by amateurs outside of traditional research institutions and aimed at appealing to those looking for more “democratic,” “patient-centric,” or “lay” alternatives to the professional science establishment. As mainstream translational biomedical research requires increasingly larger participant pools, however, corporate, academic and governmental research programs (...) are embracing this populist rhetoric to encourage wider public participation. We examine the ethical and social implications of this recruitment strategy. We begin by surveying examples of “citizen science” outside of biomedicine, as paradigmatic of the aspirations this democratizing rhetoric was originally meant to embody. Next, we discuss the ways these aspirations become articulated in the biomedical context, with a view to drawing out the multiple and potentially conflicting meanings of “public engagement” when citizens are also the subjects of the science. We then illustrate two uses of public engagement rhetoric to gain public support for national biomedical research efforts: its post-hoc use in the “care.data” project of the National Health Service in England, and its proactive uses in the “Precision Medicine Initiative” of the United States White House. These examples will serve as the basis for a normative analysis, discussing the potential ethical and social ramifications of this rhetoric. We pay particular attention to the implications of government strategies that cultivate the idea that members of the public have a civic duty to participate in government-sponsored research initiatives. We argue that such initiatives should draw from policy frameworks that support normative analysis of the role of citizenry. And, we conclude it is imperative to make visible and clear the full spectrum of meanings of “citizen science,” the contexts in which it is used, and its demands with respect to participation, engagement, and governance. (shrink)

In 2004, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to allow firms that create “effective compliance and ethics programs” to receive better treatment if prosecuted for fraud. Effective compliance and ethics, however, appear to be limited to activities focused on complying with the firms’ internal legal and ethical standards. We explored a potential connection between the firms’ external corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors and internal compliance: Is there an organizationally valid relationship between these two firm activities? That (...) is, when organizations demonstrate CSR with behaviors external to the firm, such as employee volunteerism, are their employees more likely to demonstrate uncompromised legal and ethical compliance behavior internally? We collected data from 164 working professionals enrolled in a top-tier MBA program in the southeastern United States regarding their employer-sponsored volunteer activities and their intentions to comply in various organizational compliance vignettes. We found that employer-sponsored volunteerism is associated with uncompromised compliance choices in one of the three vignettes. This finding indicates preliminary support for further inquiry into the relationship within the firm between external CSR behaviors and policies regarding organizational compliance. Post hoc analyses suggest that employer-sponsored volunteerism is strongly associated with a positive organizational identity, but organizational identity is not associated with the significant compliance vignette. This evidence suggests that the underlying mechanism that connects external CSR behaviors and internal compliance intentions is complex and requires future study. (shrink)

Strategies for improving the explainability of artificial agents are a key approach to support the understandability of artificial agents’ decision-making processes and their trustworthiness. However, since explanations are not inclined to standardization, finding solutions that fit the algorithmic-based decision-making processes of artificial agents poses a compelling challenge. This paper addresses the concept of trust in relation to complementary aspects that play a role in interpersonal and human–agent relationships, such as users’ confidence and their perception of artificial agents’ reliability. Particularly, this (...) paper focuses on non-expert users’ perspectives, since users with little technical knowledge are likely to benefit the most from “post-hoc”, everyday explanations. Drawing upon the explainable AI and social sciences literature, this paper investigates how artificial agent’s explainability and trust are interrelated at different stages of an interaction. Specifically, the possibility of implementing explainability as a trust building, trust maintenance and restoration strategy is investigated. To this extent, the paper identifies and discusses the intrinsic limits and fundamental features of explanations, such as structural qualities and communication strategies. Accordingly, this paper contributes to the debate by providing recommendations on how to maximize the effectiveness of explanations for supporting non-expert users’ understanding and trust. (shrink)

The impact of COVID-19 on chronic pain in non-infected vulnerable South American subjects is unknown. Healthcare workers are at increased risk for CP. During the pandemic, many HCWs with CP kept working. Knowing how cognition is affected by CP in these subjects is an important subject for work safety. The attention domain has a pivotal role in cognition. Previously, the Continuous Visual Attention Test was applied to detect specific attention deficits in fibromyalgia patients. The present investigation described CP prevalence in (...) non-infected Brazilian HCWs during the pandemic and assessed HCWs’ attentional performance with the aid of the CVAT. This study was carried out at a reference University Hospital in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. HCWs of both sexes, aged 20 or older, were interviewed from August to December 2020. A 90-second version of the CVAT was performed. The average reaction time to correct responses and the respective intraindividual reaction time variability for correct responses to target was determined. Omission and commission errors were also calculated. Then, for each participant we calculated the Z-scores of the CVAT variables based on the distribution of CVAT performance of 211 healthy subjects. HCWs with Z-scores > 1.64 were classified as significantly impaired. From the 154 selected HCWs, 72 reported CP during the pandemic. Post hoc ANCOVAs showed that the average correct VRT was significantly higher in the CP group than in the non-CP group. The percentage of participants with impaired VRT performance was 30% in the CP group and 16% in the non-CP group. The difference between these two propositions reached significance. As VRT is associated with the sustained-attention subdomain, our data suggest that this subdomain is disrupted in the CP group. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 277-300 [Access article in PDF] Toward a Fragmatics, or Improvisionary Histories of Rhetoric, the Eternally Ad Hoc Cornelia Wells "Even historical truths are on the move, or truth is not the question." —my self "We don't / know much, and are / professors of it." —from Heather McHugh, "Professional Hazard," in McHugh (1987) In writing a history of rhetoric, we might want to know (...) before anything else both what rhetoric is and why we should care to be writing about it. Or we might begin with a notion of or motive for history or, more precisely, for doing or writing (a) history or histories (as opposed of course to History with a capital H, History proper, the "true whole" story and nothing else) of, specifically, rhetoric. 1 Or we might begin with a notion of subjectivity, of who this we is that concerns itself with this writing activity. Or we might focus on the writing itself, asking the question What is writing? or Who can do it? or What can it do? or What is it about? all of which may be much like answering or debating similar questions frequently asked about/of/through rhetoric. Indeed, rhetoric and writing, rhetoric and discourse, tend to be confused, or ecstatically intermingled, terms.Or fixating, as history so frequently does, on the oxymoronic notion of "final" origins, which function backward(ly) as destinations, we might begin with the question/justification of where or when rhetoric itself geographically/historically began and therefore establish the "proper" beginning place for our story of rhetoric to start. But as the contemporary poet Heather McHugh suggests, "where" may be "a narrow inquiry," and also when, for something always came before and generally from somewhere else, so that, ultimately, when and where never can be finally arrived at. 2 So we might, and probably will, follow the indirection or dereliction (as [End Page 277] opposed to direction) of the goddess Dike to Parmenides: "It is all one to me where I begin, for I shall return again." 3 Like Robert Frost, however, I doubt if I shall ever come back. Or not by the same road, believing with Heraclitus, "One cannot step twice into the same river" (or, perhaps less obviously, twice onto the same road) and that anyway it is "weariness to toil at the same tasks and be always beginning," at least beginning in the same place(s) (1979, Fragments LI and LIII). As they commonly say in Australia, a change is as good as a holiday. And anyway change arrives inevitably.So we may as well (as well as not) change our mind and change our route before it changes itself or us. We may as well turn away, before returning, pause from thinking about writing this particular history of rhetoric, about how or where or why to begin such a task in the "first" place (as if we have never previously occupied any other task or place), and consider instead some of the ways that histories of rhetoric have already been written or told or invented. But why should we make this turn? Well, for reconnaissance, I suppose. To get the lay of the land. To see the other side of the mountain. To show we've done our research. Or because a discipline demands continual recounting. To remain intact or stay in touch. Or for auld lang syne. Or so that improvisionarily, at least, "we shall have agreement on [']known['] premises, and the pursuit of further knowledge" (Rorty 1984, 67). Or to take stock. To see what's missing (as if we could say when the universe is full). Or to justify a point of departure. Or a point of entry into a conversation that preceded and therefore necessarily in some residual sense preempted or determined us. Or for just (only?) or unjust (not only?) cause. Or to establish ethos. Or just because. To show we "know." Auguring or augering (not arguing) a procedure Perhaps the best turn is to turn this essay, literally my attempted say, inside out... (shrink)

[v. 1]. Những triết gia Ý : các bài học được tuyển chọn từ Petrarch đến Bruno.

This paper criticizes the traditional philosophical account of the quantization of gauge theories and offers an alternative. On the received view, gauge theories resist quantization because they feature distinct mathematical representatives of the same physical state of affairs. This resistance is overcome by a sequence of ad hoc modifications, justified in part by reference to semiclassical electrodynamics. Among other things, these modifications introduce "ghosts": particles with unphysical properties which do not appear in asymptotic states and which are said to be (...) purely a notational convenience. I argue that this sequence of modifications is unjustified and inadequate, making it a poor basis for the interpretation of ghosts. I then argue that gauge theories can be quantized by the same method as any other theory. On this account, ghosts are not purely notation: they are coordinates on the classical configuration space of the theory—specifically, on its gauge structure. This interpretation does not fall prey to the standard philosophical arguments against the significance of ghosts, due to Weingard. Weingard’s argumentative strategy, properly applied, in fact tells in favor of ghosts’ physical significance. (shrink)

Nghiên cứu sự phát triển của Nho giáo từ thời kỳ Cổ đại đến khi học thuyết của Khổng Tử ra đời, giới thiệu những bộ sách, môn đồ, tư tưởng của Khổng Tử qua các thời kỳ phát triển của đất nước Trung Hoa. Giới thiệu quá trình phát triển của Nho giáo ở Việt Nam. Mỗi thời kỳ đều gắn với tên tuổi của các nhà Nho hoặc giáo phái lớn.

(from t.p.) qui continet Historiam Regni Henrici Septimi, Regis Angliae -- Sermones fideles, sive, Interiora rerum -- Tractatum de sapienta veterum -- Dialogum de bello sacro -- Et Novam Atlantidem ... -- in hoc volumine, iterum excusi, includuntur Tractatus de augmentis scientiarum -- Historia ventorum -- Historia vitae [et] mortis.

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

Logic; Islamic philosophy; Islam--doctrines.

In this article, the author studies some central concepts in Avicenna's and sī's modal logics as presented in Avicenna's Al-Ish r t wa'l Tan īh t ( Pointers and Reminders ) and in sī's commentary. In this work, Avicenna introduces some remarkable distinctions in order to interpret Aristotle's modal syllogistic in the Prior Analytics . The author outlines a new interpretation of absolute sentences as temporally indefinite sentences and argues on the basis of this that Avicenna seems to subscribe to (...) the Principle of Plenitude. He also shows that he has no valid proof of the modal conversion rules and that he uses some rather ad hoc distinctions to show that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is correct. The author also notes some interesting differences between Avicenna's and sī's approaches to modal logic. (shrink)

Is imagination a source of knowledge? Timothy Williamson has recently argued that our imaginative capacities can yield knowledge of a variety of matters, spanning from everyday practical matters to logic and set theory. Furthermore, imagination for Williamson plays a similar epistemic role in cognitive processes that we would traditionally classify as either a priori or a posteriori, which he takes to indicate that the distinction itself is shallow and epistemologically fruitless. In this chapter, I aim to defend the a priori-a (...) posteriori distinction from Williamson’s challenge by questioning his account of imagination. I distinguish two notions of imagination at play in Williamson’s account – sensory vs. belief-like imagination – and show that both face empirical and normative issues. Sensory imagination seems neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. Whereas, belief-like imagination isn’t adequately disentangled from inference. Additionally, Williamson’s examples are ad hoc and don’t generalize. I conclude that Williamson’s case against the a priori-a posteriori distinction is unconvincing, and so is the thesis that imagination is an epistemic source. (shrink)

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''congruence'' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises (...) the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, ''rationaland practical reliance''.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct, astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general. (shrink)

This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we assume that Humeans are (...) committed to a thesis about the weight of reasons—one I call Proportionalism. In particular, I’ll show how a version of the Humean Theorythat rejects Proportionalism can reasonablyhope to escape both the too many and the too few objections. This will constitute my defense of this version of the Humean Theory. But then, separately, I will argue that this defense of the Humean Theoryis not ad hoc. I’ll argue that Humeans have no reason to accept Proportionalism in the first place. Or at least, no weightyone. There are three parts to the paper. In Part 1 we introduce the Humean Theoryand the too few reasons objection. I’ll first layout the objection, and then layout the basis for a response on behalf of myfavored version of the Humean Theory. There will be an obvious objection to my defense— but it will turn out to depend on the assumption of Proportionalism. This will constitute myargument that the susceptibilityof the Humean Theoryto.. (shrink)

I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness, (...) fruitfulness and simplicity. Carnap proposed his methodology more than a decade before Gettier’s seminal paper appeared, making the present solution to the problem a candidate for being the least ad hoc proposal on the market, one whose independent standing cannot be questioned, among solutions that depart from the usual method of revising a theory of knowledge in the light of counterexamples. As an illustration of the method at work, I reconstruct reliabilism as an attempt to provide an explication of the concept of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nonconceptual theory of mystical ineffability which claims that mystical experiences can’t be expressed linguistically because they can’t be conceptualized. I discuss and refute two objections against it: (a) that unconceptualized experiences are impossible, and (b) that the theory is ad hoc because it provides no reason for why mystical experiences should be unconceptualizable. I argue against (a) that distinguishing different meanings of ‘object of experience’ leaves open the possibility of non-empty but objectless nonconceptual experiences. I show (...) that (b) is a valid objection but can be countered by a new theory of mystical non-conceptuality: mystical experiences are not conceptual because the specific mode of mystical consciousness prevents conceptualization. The dissolution of the subjectivity of consciousness during mystical experiences undermines the very foundation of the possibility of conceptual thought and thus renders them ineffable. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery (...) and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities. The new conditions are elaborated making essential use of two central structuralist ideas, namely T-theoreticity and specialization. I first introduce and qualify the project, then present the new account in detail and assess it vis-à-vis its rivals, and finally discuss some possible objections, concluding that the account fares better than its monistic rivals and well enough to qualify as a promising neo-Hempelian account. Even for those unpersuaded by its monistic goals, it has the merit of calling attention to two new necessary conditions not explicitly emphasized thus far and showing how they serve to answer many of the criticisms addressed against Hempel’s account. (shrink)

The Argument from Vagueness for Universalism contends that any non-arbitrary restriction on composition must be vague, but that vague composition leads to unacceptable count indeterminacy. One common response to the argument is that borderline cases of composition don’t necessarily lead to count indeterminacy because a determinately existing thing may be a borderline case of a presently existing concrete composite object. We can collectively refer to such views as versions of the Status Response. This paper argues that the Status Response cannot (...) handle count indeterminacy about various categories of things, such as events, states of affairs, tropes, holes, shadows, and created abstracta, when these are understood in the right way. This makes the Status Response objectionablfy ad hoc, which should lead us to look for alternative ways of resisting the Argument from Vagueness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS A REVALENT VIEW of St. Thomas Aquinas's position on the logic of propositions has been that according to him propositions of the :form, x is, hold a privileged place, that they are in a special sense " existential," and that such propositions straight.forwardly attribute the act of exi,stence to an individual or to a class of individuals.1 Some texts seem (...) to support such an interpretation. For example, in his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias, Aquinas says: " To clarify this we must note that the verb 'is ' itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in ' Socrates is.' By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is." 2 This passage seems to treat the predicate " exists " or " is " as unproblematical, as though it had a straightforward meaning needing little clarification, at least in the context of a logical treatise. On the basis of such a text, one may be tempted to infer that for Aquinas " Socrates exists " has the same logical form as " Socrates sits," and that " Men exist " is of the same form as " Men are mortal.'' Peter Geach has shown, however, that Aquinas's doctrine here is not as simple as it may first appear. For Aquin,as some of the propositions which have the grammatical form of x is have 'a different logical form.3 Geach points out that for Aquinas the sentence, "Blindness exists," for example, actual1 E.g., Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 190-215. 2 Super Peri, Bk. II, lect. 2, # 212. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 37 at "FJ11J hoc..•." a Peter Geach, in P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers (New York: Cornell University, 1961), 88 ff; Peter Geach, "Form and Existence," in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny (New York: Notre Dame U., 1969), pp. 41-47. 605 606 PATRICK LEE ly means, Something or other is blind. That is, blind is the real predicate rather than exists. Mo11eover, Geach argues, the logical peculiarity of this sentence is equally found in any sentence of the form, "an F exists." Such a proposition, " does not,attribute actuality (existence) to an F, but F-ness to something or other..." 4 And yet Geach will not apply rthis interpretation to all sentences of the form, " x is." He al'lgues that sentences in which " is " or " exists " is. joined to a logically pl'oper name are in a different category. Unlike in general propositions such as "an F exists," in such singular propositions, those using logically proper names, Geach,argues, actual existence is attributed to or predicated of an individual. "We have here a sense of 'is ' or 'exists ' that seems to me to be certainly a genuine predicate of individuals: the sense of ' exists ' in which one says that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists, etc...."5 I believe that, while Geach's position is more accurate than the first interpretation, mentioned above, it is nevertheless still inaccurate on certain key points. While it is misleading to say that for Aquinas exists is never a genuine predicate; nevertheless, I will argue that it is his position that exists or existence is not a genuine predicate in any proposition which does not refer back to a previous proposition (or to what is known in or by previous propositional knowledge). Let us crull a proposition which refers to something known in a previous proposition a " second-order p11oposition," and one that does not thus refer a " first-order proposition." Then, I shall argue that for Aquinas exists is not a genuine predicate in any first-order proposition. Moreover, I believe that these points are crucial to understanding Aquinas's position on existence as well as his position on how knowledge is related,to reality, i.e., his realism. In this article I would like to examine Aquinas's thought on the logic of existential propositions and discuss its significance for epistemology. 4 Geach, " Form and Existence," Zoo. int., p. 45. 5 Ibid., p. 46. EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN AQUINAS 607 In sections... (shrink)

Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 , 189–218] or else it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic (...) without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 ; Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 , 58–78]. Against , I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity. (shrink)

Suppose I make an utterance, intending it to be a command. You don’t take it to be one. Must one of us be wrong? In other words, must each utterance have, at most, one illocutionary force? Current debates over the constitutive norm of assertion and over illocutionary silencing, tend to assume that the answer is yes—that each utterance must be either an assertion, or a command, or a question, but not more than one of these. While I think that this (...) assumption is intuitive, I will argue in this paper that it is not sustainable. I’ll argue that this assumption makes it hard to explain what determines illocutionary force in a consistent and non-ad hoc way. I will demonstrate this is not fatal for the notion of illocutionary force writ large by offering some alternatives. (shrink)

The aim of this study, which is a field reseach, is to determine the level of religiosity and subjective well-being (SWB) of patients with chronic renal failure who are receiving hemodialysis treatment with a descriptive approach and by using socio-psychological methods and to try to determine the relationship between their religiosity and subjective well-being. The sample of the study consists of 205 individuals who were determined by stratified random sampling method from the patients treated in Turkish Ministry of Health, Hitit (...) University Çorum Erol Olçok Training and Research Hospital and Çorum District Dialysis Units. 54.1% (n=111) of the participants are males and 45.9% (n=94) are females. Data was collected via a “Religiosity Inventory”, developed by Kula, and “Subjective Well-Being Scale”, developed by Dost, to determine participants’ religiosity and subjective well-being as well as a personal information form to determine demographic characteristics. Statistical analysis of the data showed significant differences and relationships between demographic variables, religiosity, and subjective well-being. Moreover, a statistically significant relationship between the levels of religiousness and subjective well-being of the participants was found and that religiosity accounts for 31.9% of subjective well-being variance. The findings of the study show that the major hypotheses and sub-hypotheses have statistically been validated and that religiosity is a significant and important predictor of subjective well-being.Summary: Throughout history, existential questions and the answers sought for these questions have remained important for human beings. Human beings have always wondered about life, meaning of life, death, after death and pursued meaning systems that will satisfy this curiosity. While various thinkers and philosophers put forward opinions about the secrets of life; religion has presented the transcendent dimension to the individual as a source of meaning. Thus, the individual has found the definitive answer to many of his questions about existence in religion, and this sense of certainty has contributed positively to his psychological well-being. However, human beings may also face disasters, diseases or adversities in the natural flow of life and sometimes unexpectedly, such situations make them desperate. Desperation creates a feeling of loneliness in the person and this can trigger a sense of meaninglessness for him. The feeling of vacuum in the inner world of the individual who struggles with difficulty or the sense of meaninglessness somehow affects his subjective well-being.From this perspective the subject of the study is the effect of religiosity levels on subjective well-being of individuals who are struggling with chronic renal failure and have experienced a compelling treatment process such as hemodialysis. The aim of this study is to determine the level of religiosity and subjective well-being of these patients. The sample of the study consists of 205 individuals who were determined by stratified random sampling method from the patients treated in Turkish Ministry of Health, Hitit University Çorum Erol Olçok Training and Research Hospital and Çorum District Dialysis Units.The major hypothesis of the study is “The religiosity levels of hemodialysis patients have a significant effect on their subjective well-being.” Further sub-hypotheses are as follows: 1. Women’s religiosity is higher than men’s. 2. There is a significant relationship between the perception of subjective happiness and religiosity levels of the participants. The subjective happiness perception levels of the individuals with high religiosity scores are also high. 3. There is no significant difference between the SWB levels of the participants according to gender variable. 4. There is a significant relationship between the perception of subjective religiosity and SWB levels of participants. According to this; subjective well-being increases as the person’s self-religious perception levels increase.5. There is a significant positive relationship between the religiosity scores of the participants and SWB scores. 6. Religiosity is a significant predictor of subjective well-being. Thus; the SWB level is expected to increase as the religiosity scores increase.The data of the study was obtained by using Personal Information Form prepared by the researcher, Kula’s Religiosity Inventory and Dost’s Subjective Well-Being Scale. The study was conducted in hospitals. After getting the necessary legal permissions and consent of the patients, the patients were informed about the study and the study was conducted on a voluntary basis. The questionnaires were applied by the researcher in person through face-to-face interviews with patients in hospitals, sometimes on weekdays and sometimes on Saturdays. Together with the physician of the hemodialysis unit, district hospitals were visited to reach the target group receiving treatment in these districts.In accordance with the relational screening model, the data of the study was analyzed with SPSS 16.0 package program. The mean (x̄) and standard deviation (ss) scores of the Religiosity Inventory and Subjective Well-Being Scale were calculated according to independent variables and tables were created. The significance of the difference between the two means obtained from two independent sample groups was determined by independent samples t-test for independent samples. One-way Varayns analysis (ANOVA) was used to test hypotheses about whether there was a difference between the means of more than two sample groups. In case of significant differences between means, LSD test and Tamhane’s T2 test from post-hoc multiple comparison tests were usedand the direction of the differences were determined as such. To determine the relationship between two continuous variables, religiosity and subjective well-being, Pearson Moments Correlation Analysis technique was used, and Simple Linear Regression analysis was performed to determine how much religiosity explains the changes observed in the dependent variable. The significance of the obtained statistics was tested at 0.05 level and bidirectional and the analysis values were presented in sequential tables in accordance with the purpose of the research. It is possible to summarize the findings of the study as follows:• 45.9% (n=94) of the sample are women and 54.1% (n=111) are men. According to subjective evaluations, 55.6% of the sample considers themselves as happy and very happy and 79.5% defines themselves as religious and very religious. According to the findings, subjective religiosity perception is higher in patients than subjective happiness perception. • The sample group has a high level of religiosity ( x̄ =4,3713).• There is a significant difference between gender and general religiosity (t=2,933; p=,004; p 0.05). However there is a difference in the SWB averages of male and female participants, women scored higher (x̄=3,8309) in SWB than men (x̄=3,7135). • A significant relationship has been found between subjective religiosity perception and SWB level of the sample (F=12,345; p=,000, p<0.05). SWB levels increased with increasing subjective religiosity. Further, there is a significant relationship between “slightly religious” (x̄=3,3439), “religious” (x̄=3,7737) and “very religious” (x̄=4,1363) groups and SWB level. There is also a steady increase in the mean scores of SWB from “not at all religious” to “very religious”. • A positive and moderately significant relationship has been found between general religiosity and general SWB (r=,565, p<0.01). • According to the results of regression analysis to determine whether total religiosity in HD patients is a significant predictor of subjective well-being; religiosity explaines 31.9% of the variance in subjective well-being. This result shows that one of the important determinants of SWB in HD patients is religiousness. Religiosity is a significant and important predictor of subjective well-being, and increased religiosity directly affects the SWB levels of HD patients. In addition, the basic hypothesis and sub-hypotheses were validated statistically at the end of the study. (shrink)