It’s a commonplace that Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke draws his policies from Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States. With that in mind, this article establishes five points. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, Friedman and Schwartz merely insinuate their claim the Fed caused the Depression in MH. Second, their criticisms of Fed policy during the Depression, which turn on its refusal to adopt open market purchases, repudiate Friedman’s famed libertarianism and market fundamentalism. Third, Friedman (...) and Schwartz don’t refute the practical objections of bankers who opposed OMPs in the 1930s. Consequently, Bernanke’s policies for addressing the financial crisis risk doing precisely what Friedman’s targets warned against—encouraging financial speculation without addressing problems of unemployment. Fourth, Friedman and Schwartz’s prescriptions entail a neoliberal, not a libertarian, state, one governed by technocrats and answerable to financial markets. Finally, what accounts for and unifies Friedman’s contradictions is the beneficiary—finance. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Original and engaging, this exploration of early Western philosophy traces the religious roots of science and systematic speculation. Author F. M. Cornford, a distinguished historian of ancient philosophy, combines deep classical scholarship with anthropological and sociological insights to examine the mythic precursors of enduring metaphysical concepts--such as destiny, God, the soul, substance, nature, and immortality. Cornford illustrates the rise of a new spirit of rational inquiry from traditional beliefs, demonstrating that philosophy’s modes of clear definition and explicit statement were already (...) implicit in the unreasoned intuitions of mythology. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Combining profound classical scholarship with striking anthropological and sociological insight, Cornford rejected the post-Darwinian rationalist assumption ...

“Principium Sapientiae. Los orígenes del pensamiento filosófico griego” fue publicado póstumamente en 1952 y estaba prácticamente acabado, a salvo de algunos aspectos de los capítulos finales, cuando a Cornford le sobrevino la muerte. La edición ha sido preparada por W. K. C. Guthrie, que ha añadido una breve introducción y un apéndice. “Principium Sapientiae” ofrece una perspectiva general sobre el pensamiento de su autor a la vez que añade material nuevo a los trabajos anteriores. Hoy es ya una obra clásica.

As more and more instances of corporate hypocrisy become public, consumers have developed an inherent general skepticism towards firms’ corporate social responsibility claims. As CSR skepticism bears heavily on consumers’ attitudes and behavior, this paper draws from Construal Level Theory to identify how it can be pre-emptively abated. We posit that this general skepticism towards CSR leads people to adopt a low-level construal mindset when processing CSR information. Across four studies, we show that matching this low-level mindset with concrete CSR (...) messaging works to effectively mitigate the negative effects of inherent CSR skepticism on consumers’ attitudes, purchase intentions, and word of mouth. The resulting construal-mindset congruency strengthens the favorability of consumer responses through increased positive elaboration and perceptions of CSR message credibility. Furthermore, this congruency effect is shown to persist over time in skeptical domains but to dissipate in less skeptical domains. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper argues that the non-reductive monist need not be concerned about the ‘problem’ of mental causation; one can accept both the irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties and the causal closure of the physical. More precisely, it is argued that instances of mental properties can be causally efficacious, and that there is no special barrier to seeing mental properties whose instances are causally efficacious as being causally relevant to the effects they help to bring about. It is then (...) shown that the causal relevance of mental properties is consistent with there being no downward causation, so the dilemma of ‘epiphenomenalism or reduction’ can be avoided. Non-reductive monism lives on as a viable position in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge could place its (...) subject in an authoritative position. This paper endorses a standard strategy for dealing with (a). The bulk of the paper is devoted to (b). The aim is to develop an account of first-person authority for a certain class of intentional states that is capable of explaining (1) why knowledge of one's own intentional states is peculiarly authoritative, and (2) why such authority is compatible with externalism. (shrink)

Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.

We agree with Caplan & Waters that there are problems with the single-resource theory of sentence comprehension. However, we challenge their dual-resource alternative on theoretical and empirical grounds and point to a more coherent solution that abandons the notion of working memory resources.

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 Acknowledgment Bibliography.

Most documented extinctions of vertebrates in the last 400 years have been island endemics. In this paper, we focus on the need to develop a historical framework to establish conservation priorities for insular faunas and, in particular, to test the validity of nominal endemics. We use the example of the islands of the North Pacific Coast of North America, a region that includes approximately one-half of all mammals endemic to North American islands north of Mexico. Few of these endemics have (...) been re-evaluated since their original descriptions, although many of these islands have been heavily impacted by habitat conversion, species introductions, over-exploitation, and secondary ripple effects. Evidence from molecular genetics and paleontology suggests that many taxa arrived in the region since the last glacial advance. Some of these nominal endemics show minimal differentiation, while others comprise multiple evolutionary lineages. The NPC may also have played an important role in the in situ diversification of some taxa during the Pleistocene. Evidence, such as new fossil discoveries and numerous described endemics, lends support for refugia hypotheses. However, these ideas cannot be tested until a better understanding of geographic variation and the evolutionary relationships of the fauna and flora of the North Pacific Coast is developed. This framework would provide significant insight into the dynamic biogeographic history of the region and help prioritize conservation efforts. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Wisdom, happiness, and virtue Sin, evil, and theodicy Will and personal agency Reason, understanding, and belief Method in philosophical theology God Soul, mind, and memory.

This paper defends a qualified observational model of authoritative self‐knowledge, which centres on two features of ordinarily observable characteristics that help explain a subject's direct awareness of them. The first is that they are basic, in that one does not have to know of any underlying fact in virtue of which they apply when they do; and the second is that it is generally necessary and sufficient for the application of such a characteristic that it seems to a normal observer, (...) in normal circumstances, that it does apply. The view is defended against two well‐known misgivings about modelling such knowledge on observation: first, that there is a telling structural disanalogy, since observation normally involves three components, namely, the item perceived, an intermediary, non‐conceptual sensation state, and a judgement grounded in that sensation state, whereas self‐knowledge of an intentional state apparently involves analogues of the first and third components only, namely, a first‐order content‐bearing state and the second‐order state that it validates; and second that, whereas the relations between a perceptual state and the item perceived are causal and contingent, those between first‐ and corresponding second‐order intentional states are in general non‐contingent, and so not merely causal. (shrink)

We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is (...) the relation between such states and the world beyond the surfaces of our skins? Specifically, what exactly is the relation between thecontentsof those states, and the world beyond our bodies? (shrink)

The article examines the convergence of studies on the Pastoral Epistles, with greater attention to the theme of education as a key to the purpose of the documents. The close association between the household and education is considered in an effort to shed light on the presentations of Timothy and Titus, emerging leadership roles, intergenerational instruction, and constructions of gender.

This chapter contains section titled: Our Ontological Commitment to Events Three Criteria: Spatio‐temporal Coincidence, Necessary Spatio‐temporal Coincidence, and Sameness of Cause and Effect The Property Exemplification Account of Events (PEE).

This commentary challenges the authors to use their computational modeling techniques to support one of their central claims: that schizophrenic deficits in bottom-up (Gestalt-type tasks) and top-down (cognitive control tasks) context processing tasks arise from the same dysfunction. Further clarification about the limits of cognitive coordination would also strengthen the hypothesis.

Werner et al. (2004) provide an interesting look at the degree to which misrepresentation is condoned by both parties to doctor-patient relationships. We feel that it would be useful, however, to s...