Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral disagreement and widespread moral bias pose a serious problem for moral intuitionism. Seneca’s view that we just recognise the good could be criticised using a similar argument. His approach to argumentation offers a way out, one that may serve as a model for a revisionary intuitionism.

The present paper has a double aim: it attempts to present an aspect of Plotinus’ philosophical and hermeneutical methodology on the basis of relevant remarks in the treatise “On Eternity and Time”; it seeks to connect this attitude with contemporary methodological questions concerning the relation between philosophy and history of philosophy. After an introduction where it is emphasized that the term “Neo-Platonism” is of recent coinage, I exploit David Sedley’s remarks regarding the function of ancient philosophical schools: the quest for (...) the “correct” interpretation of the school’s founder as a philosophical enterprise in itself is not an exclusively Neoplatonic characteristic. Nonetheless, the example of Plotinus’ Enneads III.7, owing to the complexity of its theme, shows that Plotinus does not pay attention only to the Platonic teachings regarding eternity and time, but also to all the other philosophical schools’ theories, including the Epicurean. The aim is the ascertainment of the truth inherent in them and its apt interpretation. Hence, I follow Steven K. Strange, who relates the Plotinian methodology to Aristotle’s endoxic method. After a presentation of similarities and differences between the two philosophers, I conclude that the problematic features posed by several philosophical theories are resolved via an innovative Plotinian reading of Plato. Thus, the non-Platonic theories play a role in the more adequate interpretation of Plato, which is identified with the successful answer to the philosophical problems. This fact makes us wonder as to the best characterization of Plotinus’ enterprise: philosophy or history of philosophy? Although the question is somehow anachronistic, Plotinus gives an explicit response in his aforementioned tractate: to the extent that he is interested in solving philosophical problems, rather than compiling a “catalogue” of past philosophical positions, his enterprise is not historical, but philosophical. Two final corollaries stem from this: to a certain extent, the previous enunciation explains the Neoplatonic reading of Plato; it teaches us that the difference between philosophizing and a historical treatment of philosophy does not lie only on the content, but also on the manner according to which the interpreter approaches past or contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 65 - 94 In his highly influential 1928 article ‘The _Parmenides_ of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic “One”,’ E.R. Dodds argued, _inter alia_, that among the so-called Neoplatonists Plotinus was the first to interpret Plato’s _Parmenides_ in terms of the distinctive three ‘hypostases’, One, Intellect, and Soul. Dodds argued that this interpretation was embraced and extensively developed by Proclus, among others. In this paper, I argue that although Plotinus took _Parmenides_ to (...) contain a sort of outline of the true metaphysical principles, he understood the One of the first hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue in a way importantly different from the way that Proclus understood it. The characterization of this One, especially its identity with the Idea of the Good of _Republic_, has significant ramification for Plotinus’ philosophy that set it apart from Proclus’ philosophy in ways hitherto infrequently noted. The widely accepted reasons for rejecting Proclus’ interpretation do not apply to the interpretation of Plotinus. The two different interpretations help explain why Proclus’ notorious proliferation of entities in the intelligible realm is not found in Plotinus. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)