Reading W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” in evidentialist terms is standard. However, evidentialist accounts face several longstanding interpretive issues over the Shipowner Story and Clifford’s Motto. This article defends an evidentialist reading. But what distinguishes it from others is that it interprets “The Ethics of Belief” according to Clifford’s “first principle of natural ethics”, a principle he articulates in prior writings, and which comes down to social trust. I reorient Clifford’s evidentialism by returning to his core moral principle and (...) argue that doing so can establish coherence across Clifford’s writings on ethics and can help resolve the relevant interpretive issues. (shrink)

Descartes convinced himself that the safest way was to ‘begin’ by doubting everything… Genuine doubt does not talk of beginning with doubting. The pragmatist knows that doubt is an art which has to be acquired with difficulty; and his genuine doubts will go much further than those of any Cartesian.In 1906, while ruminating on the reality of God, Peirce considers again Descartes’ attempt to doubt everything. Such a task is the preliminary to Descartes’ project of first philosophy, and that project (...) aims to discover metaphysical truths or the first causes of things. In response to Descartes, Peirce returns to a claim that he had been defending since... (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, the attempt to make the individual the locus of knowledge, is a dominant theme in his writings. While scholars often mention this critique, there is, surprisingly, a lack of research on the topic. However, it is necessary to know what motivates Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism to know why he aims to turn philosophy into a communal study. In this dissertation, I defend the claim that Peirce’s communal inferentialism allows us to assess the (...) rational merits of his critique of epistemic individualism and to grasp his insights into why philosophy must change its course. The questions that have guided the research are the following. What are the central reasons that support Peirce’s verdict that epistemic individualism is a dead-end for philosophy? What roles do Peirce’s fundamental commitments concerning the notion of the community of inquirers and the patterns of correct inference play in his critique? I defend the central claim in four chapters. In Chapter One, I reinvestigate Peirce’s critique in relation to Cartesianism, while in Chapter Two I take up Peirce’s case against nominalism. I begin with these topics since Peirce claims that these two positions in the history of philosophy are prime examples of epistemic individualism. In Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I show that the problem of epistemic individualism crops up again in Peirce’s two most influential papers, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” I provide a communal inferentialist reading of both papers. In this dissertation, I further show why, according to Peirce, our key epistemic notions, including knowledge and truth, cannot be individualistic but must be communal notions. (shrink)

Death from cancer is usually due to metastasis. Fortunately, most cells that escape from a primary tumor fail to form metastases. Identifying reasons for this failure will help development of anti‐metastatic therapies. Intravital videomicroscopy (IVVM) can be used to observe cancer cells injected into live animals. Co‐injected microspheres can be used to assess cell survival. These techniques have been used to show that circulating tumor cells generally arrest in the microcirculation and may extravasate with high efficiency. While many tumor cells (...) may survive in a secondary site, only a small subset form micrometastases and only a subset of these micrometastases persist to form vascularized macrometastases. Furthermore, solitary tumor cells may remain dormant for long periods of time in secondary sites. These findings suggest that metastatic growth and angiogenesis are prime targets for anti‐metastatic therapy. BioEssays 24:885–893, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The first comprehensive treatment of the relationship between biblical interpretation and Christian ethics.