This paper is an empirical critique of causal accounts of scientific explanation. Drawing on explanations which rely on nonlinear dynamical modeling, I argue that the requirement of causal relevance is both too strong and too weak to be constitutive of scientific explanation. In addition, causal accounts obscure how the process of mathematical modeling produces explanatory information. I advance three arguments for the inadequacy of causal accounts. First, I argue that explanatorily relevant information is not always information about causes, even in (...) cases where the explanandum has an identifiable causal history. Second, I argue that treating theoretical explanations as reductions from general causal laws does not accurately describe the types of "top-down" explanations typical of dynamical modeling. Finally, I argue that causal/mechanical accounts of explanation are intrinsically vulnerable to the irrelevance problem. (shrink)

This dissertation challenges two prevalent views on the topic of scientific explanation: that science explains by revealing causal mechanisms, and that science explains by unifying our knowledge of the world. ;My methodological strategy is to compare our best current philosophical accounts of scientific explanation with evidence from contemporary scientific research. In particular, I focus on evidence from dynamical explanations, that is, explanations which appeal to nonlinear dynamical modeling for their force. Nonlinear dynamical modeling is a type of mathematical modeling which (...) is used by scientists in many different disciplines, including population biology, ecology, physics, and psychology. ;Chapter 1 argues that dynamical explanations are a philosophically important class of explanations, based on their prevalence and their close relationship with the semantic view of theories. ;Chapters 2 and 3 conclude that extant causal and unification accounts encounter serious difficulties when applied to dynamical explanations. Chapter 2 argues that causal relevance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explanatory relevance. Chapter 3 clarifies and evaluates different claims about the unifying power of science. Here, I argue that dynamical explanations provide some support for the thesis that unification is constitutive of explanation. However, dynamical explanations also indicate that some of the intuitions embodied in extant unification accounts are untenable. ;Chapter 4 concludes by advancing diagnostic criticisms of existing causal and unification accounts. I explore the relationships between dynamical explanations and three conceptions of scientific explanation, as well as the relationships between different types of inference and scientific understanding. I suggest that philosophers look to cognitive science and the semantic view of theories for aid in constructing a viable positive account of explanation. ;The technical appendix introduces several key definitions and concepts of dynamical systems theory. (shrink)

A prominent feature of late nineteenth-century psychology was its intense preoccupation with precision. Precision was at once an ideal and an argument: the quest for precision helped psychology to establish its status as a mature science, sharing a characteristic concern with the natural sciences. We will analyse how psychologists set out to produce precision in 'mental chronometry', the measurement of the duration of psychological processes. In his Leipzig laboratory, Wundt inaugurated an elaborate research programme on mental chronometry. We will look (...) at the problem of calibration of experimental apparatus and will describe the intricate material, literary, and social technologies involved in the manufacture of precision. First, we shall discuss some of the technical problems involved in the measurement of ever shorter time-spans. Next, the Cattell-Berger experiments will help us to argue against the received view that all the precision went into the hardware, and practically none into the social organization of experimentation. Experimenters made deliberate efforts to bring themselves and their subjects under a regime of control and calibration similar to that which reigned over the experimental machinery. In Leipzig psychology, the particular blend of material and social technology resulted in a specific object of study: the generalized mind. We will then show that the distribution of precision in experimental psychology outside Leipzig demanded a concerted effort of instruments, texts, and people. It will appear that the forceful attempts to produce precision and uniformity had some rather paradoxical consequences. (shrink)

This article presents a sociological analysis of the changing role of women in the Catholic church over the past twenty years. The theoretical framework is drawn from The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Data are derived from the documents of Vatican II, the revised Code of Canon Law, research from 1965 to the present, and exploratory interviews with Catholic women recently appointed as church administrators. The article concludes with a discussion of future prospects regarding (...) the new social reality for Catholic women. (shrink)

Betr. u.a. Sebastian Brants "Narrenschiff.".

This paper is concerned with the distinction between classical liberalism and libertarianism and in particular with the claim of the latter to offer a theory of the good society which is independent of, and different from, that offered by classical liberalism. My argument is naturalistic in the following sense. A good society is one which delivers whatever is good for people, so that a theory of the good society (to ~ a theory of the good society) must say something about (...) what people are like and what is good for them. That is to say, it must be capable of making such judgments coherently and on its own terms. I shall argue that libertarianism is incapable of making such judgments because it rests on a Hobbesian radical individualism in which, by analogy with classical physics, people exist only as particulars, as individuals. If there are no general classes we cannot say what people have in common; if we cannot say what they have in common, the only "general" good is the negative liberty which enables them to pursue their own goals in their own way. Radical individualism leads by the shortest of routes to moral subjectivism. Thus libertarianism derives such plausibility as it has by drawing illicitly on aspects of classical liberalism which do not depend on radical individualism. In doing so it undermines not only its claim to be a distinct theory with its own foundations, but most of its own claims about what is good for people. (shrink)

We respond to two themes in the comments by Bainbridge, Gratch, and Nishida: first, the importance of embodiment, and second the issue of what should be explicitly modelled as against what should be dynamically generated. Finally, we briefly respond to the ethical questions raised by Bainbridge.

IT IS A COMMONLY HELD VIEW that a clear distinction can be made between what a person does and what happens to him. This distinction is usually assumed, rather than argued for, and it is made to do some work--a load it seems unable to bear--in contemporary philosophy of action. Minimally, the thesis asserts that a man's actions are those things he does. This thesis is used to support the view that it is a conceptual error or otherwise inappropriate to (...) attempt to provide causal explanations of human actions. It is frequently argued that although what happens to a person is an event subsumable under causal laws, a person's action is not amenable to causal explanations. (shrink)

Testing is an effective learning method, and it is the basis of mobile quiz apps. Quiz apps have the potential to facilitate remote and self-regulated learning. In this context, automatized feedback plays a crucial role. In two experimental studies, we examined the effects of two feedback types of quiz apps on performance, namely, the standard corrective feedback of quiz apps and a feedback that incorporates additional information related to the correct response option. We realized a controlled lab setting (n= 68, (...) Study 1) and an unsupervised mobile setting (n= 150, Study 2). In the learning phase, participants used the quiz app and received feedback. They also completed a subsequent test as well as a follow-up test 1 week later by using the same quiz app. Irrespective of feedback type and setting, cognitive outcomes (quiz scores) and metacognitive outcomes (response certainty) increased similarly in the short term and long term. Feedback effects were not moderated by participants' overall response certainty during learning, their prior knowledge, and the difficulty of quiz items. Moreover, we found that participants perceived the quiz app to be similarly attractive, interesting, and enjoyable in both feedback conditions and that they spent slightly more time to process quiz items in the lab setting. We discuss these results in detail, including the role of moderating and mediating factors and prospects for further research and practice. Overall, our results underline that quiz apps are useful and effective tools that can support the acquisition and retention of semantic knowledge in different learning settings. (shrink)

What does decolonising the curriculum (DtC) entail and is it possible in the current context? I distinguish between a thick and thin idea of DtC. Thick DtC acknowledges that alternative knowledge systems exist, other than our western view of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’. Thick DtC calls for recognition of epistemic injustice to indigenous people when their culture is downgraded as inferior, which may amount to epistemicide (De Sousa Santos). The language of colonisation plays a part in this process. Adopting (...) the colonisers’ language can distort indigenous knowledge. Thin DtC is where minor modifications are made to curriculum content to include contributions of indigenous minorities and racialized people and/or an acknowledgement of the wrongs done to colonised people. While thin DtC is to be welcomed, it is not sufficiently radical to combat the wrongs done in repressing or ignoring indigenous knowledge systems and therefore cannot compensate for epistemic injustice. (shrink)

On a hot sleepy summer day an old truck rattles along a dusty road. A turnip falls off the truck, the truck does not stop. Perhaps the old man who drives the truck does not know that the turnip fell off, or perhaps he does not care. He values his time or his ease more than he values the I turnip. We, who know not only that turnips are nourishing but that many people go hungry, may say that the man (...) ought to have stopped to pick up the turnip. (shrink)

Ayn Rand, née Alise Rosenbaum en URSS en 1905 et disparue en 1982 à New York, est aux antipodes de la pensée critique européenne : son éthique de l'égoïsme, son culte de la rationalité doublé d'une ode à la liberté, sa pensée capitaliste intransigeante, sa brutalité intellectuelle en font un personnage controversé. Anticonformiste radicale, elle reste aussi une curiosité en Amérique, puisqu'elle parvient tout à la fois à fustiger l'interventionnisme économique de Roosevelt et Kennedy, condamner la guerre du Vietnam, défendre (...) l'avortement, critiquer la religion et tailler en pièces le racisme. S'il importe de comprendre son œuvre, c'est au moins à double titre. D'abord pour saisir sa popularité aux États-Unis, où son roman La Grève reste considéré comme un des ouvrages les plus influents après la Bible. Ensuite, pour opérer un droit d'inventaire sur une pensée de l'émancipation qui exalte la confiance en l'individu, acteur de son propre destin. Elle réhabilite ainsi la notion d'héroïsme, à la croisée des idées et d'une passion pour le cinéma qui imprègne toute son œuvre. Mathilde Berger-Perrin s'essaie avec brio et empathie à ce difficile exercice d'admiration et de distanciation."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This study in 29 Chinese organizations contributes to our understanding about work-related values in China. Empirical research in Chinese organizations indicates differences in work-related values between different age groups. The authors compared people (older age group) with work experience from the pre-reform period – pre-1978 China, with those who started their work life in a society that had already changed and become open to foreign investments (younger age group). The authors created a model of institutionally sensitive work-related values. The results (...) could help multinational companies achieve competitive advantage. (shrink)

Just as he points to the power of egoism, so Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious for being a critic of pity. This chapter explores the dangers he detects in pity and its cognate emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and benevolence, in the middle period writings. The commonplace view that Nietzsche holds all such drives in contempt is questioned by a careful study of the middle period’s more nuanced portrayals of these emotions. While Nietzsche condemns the Christian-inspired morality of pity, he does (...) not see all manifestations of fellow-feeling as base or spurious. The influence of La Rochefoucauld’s analysis of pity is discussed, and Nietzsche’s reflections of how to react to the suffering of a friend are also explored. (shrink)

Interventions for problematic alcohol use typically focus on clients as individuals even when these clients continue interacting with their social networks. This paper reports a study about young w...

En este artículo se reconstruye el vínculo sistemático entre el tratamiento aporético del conocimiento en el diálogo platónico tardío Teetetos y la definición conceptual del conocimiento en parte de la epistemología analítica contemporánea. A través de dicha vinculación se muestra, por una parte, la presencia de los problemas presentados por Platón en la epistemología actual, así como la persistencia de la aporía del dialogo en cuestión. Con ello, se pretende también iluminar desde una clave histórica aspectos esenciales del debate epistemológico (...) en general. (shrink)

This article engages Friendship: A Central Moral Value by Michael H. Mitias. It questions Mitias’ distinction between friendship as a moral and theoretical concern as opposed to a practical one. It distinguishes the narrow from the wide meanings of philia in Aristotle’s approach. It looks at the resonances of classical approaches in later theories of friendship, while also attending to the innovations of later thinkers. It suggests that the moral paradigms Mitias delineates might not be as hegemonic nor as hermetically (...) sealed as he suggests. Mitias’ contribution is better understood as an addition to moral philosophy than to friendship studies. (shrink)

The middle period works attest to what a careful, sensitive analyst of moral life Friedrich Nietzsche could be, offering a range of nuanced and delicate analyses of the psyche. The exaggeration, extremism, overstatement, and reductionism that characterize some of the later Nietzsche’s thought are far less evident in the works of the middle period. The ancient pursuit of self-knowledge emerges as an ideal in these texts, but it is wedded to a conception of the self as complex, multiple, and changeable. (...) In this chapter’s exploration of the middle period’s analysis of psychology, Nietzsche’s critique of free will is examined, and its link with his aesthetic approach to the self is scrutinized. (shrink)

The middle period represents Nietzsche’s apprenticeship as a genealogist of morals. The appeal to history operates in several ways in these texts — to historicize morality in general, and to show, in particular, the origins of certain current moral values and beliefs. It also has scholarly and practical purposes — Nietzsche believes that his genealogical analysis provides a truer understanding of morality that will also weaken the grip of some moral concepts on human hearts and minds. He argues that traditionally, (...) morality’s function has been to preserve the collective whatever the cost to individuality. The naturalism of the middle period’s accounts of morality is critically examined, and the rationalism of Nietzsche’s approach is drawn out. (shrink)

At times in the works of the middle period, Friedrich Nietzsche accepts that higher friendship is possible between men and women, and holds love and marriage in high esteem. Sometimes, he even models marriage on friendship. While he does say some damning things about love and marriage, this chapter tries to balance his critical comments against his more positive ones to allow for a clearer, albeit more complex, appreciation of his stance to be achieved. This analysis also requires some reconsideration (...) of the commonplace view that Nietzschean free spirits abjure marriage and family life. (shrink)