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  1. Goodman Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and Projects”: (...)
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  2. O velho e novo problema da indução.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.
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  3. The Age of Trickery.Ghislain Guigon - manuscript
    This is partly fictional. It is chiefly a reconstruction (not always faithful) of Hume’s fundamental uses of notions of similarity, mostly based on Enquiry. It is the first part (out of four) of a monograph on the evolution of similarity toolmaking. Histories of doctrines are common in our discipline, not so for histories of tools; this is what it’s about. What’s disturbing: I write as if I were talking about the customs and beliefs of ancient tribes instead of real philosophers. (...)
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  4. Making of the Problem: Induction from Socrates to Popper.John P. McCaskey - manuscript
  5. Coherence of Inferences.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...)
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  6. What if the principle of induction is normative? Means-ends epistemology and Hume's problem.Daniel Steel - manuscript
    I develop a critique of Hume’s infamous problem of induction based upon the idea that the principle of induction (PI) is a normative rather than descriptive claim. I argue that Hume’s problem is a false dilemma, since the PI might be neither a “relation of ideas” nor a “matter of fact” but rather what I call a contingent normative statement. In this case, the PI could be justified by a means-ends argument in which the link between means and end is (...)
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  7. Crossing Levels: Meta-induction and the Problem of Induction.Leah Henderson - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-13.
    Gerhard Schurz claims to have a solution to Hume’s problem of induction based on results from machine-learning concerning meta-induction. His argument has two steps. The first is to establish a justification for following a certain meta-inductive strategy based on its predictive optimality. The second step is to show how this justification can be transferred to object-induction. I unpack the second step and fail to find a convincing argument supporting the transfer of justification from meta-induction to object-induction. My conclusion is that (...)
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  8. The Unsolvability of Hume's Problem and Local Justification of Induction.Ju Sh - forthcoming - Epistemologia. Genova.
  9. Does Meta-induction Justify Induction: Or Maybe Something Else?J. Brian Pitts - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):393-419.
    According to the Feigl–Reichenbach–Salmon–Schurz pragmatic justification of induction, no predictive method is guaranteed or even likely to work for predicting the future; but if anything will work, induction will work—at least when induction is employed at the meta-level of predictive methods in light of their track records. One entertains a priori all manner of esoteric prediction methods, and is said to arrive a posteriori at the conclusion, based on the actual past, that object-level induction is optimal. Schurz’s refinements largely solve (...)
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  10. A Twofold Tension in Schurz’s Meta-Inductive Solution to Hume’s Problem of Induction.Tomoji Shogenji - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):379-392.
    This paper examines a twofold tension in Gerhard Schurz’s (2019) recent proposal to solve Hume’s problem of induction. Schurz concedes to the skeptic that there is no non-circular epistemic justification of the reliability of induction, but then argues for the optimality of meta-induction so that if any prediction method is reliable, then meta-induction is. There is a tension in this proposal between meta-induction and our inductive practice: Are we supposed to abandon our inductive practice in favor of meta-induction? Schurz claims (...)
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  11. Introduction to the Special Issue.Paul Thorn & Stathis Psillos - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):375-378.
    This is the introduction to the special issue “The Meta-Inductive Approach to Hume’s Problem”. The introduction includes introductory remarks and brief comments on each of the papers appearing in the special issue.
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  12. Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction.Marius Backmann - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (64):1-26.
    In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I (...)
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  13. An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction.Andrew Bassford - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (2):205-232.
    The subject of this essay is the classical problem of induction, which is sometimes attributed to David Hume and called “the Humean Problem of Induction.” Here, I examine a certain sort of Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem, which appeals to the concept of natural kinds in its response to the inductive skeptic. This position is most notably represented by Howard Sankey and Marc Lange. The purpose of this paper is partly destructive and partly constructive. I raise two questions. The first (...)
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  14. Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2022 - Heythrop Journal 63 (4):547-552.
    The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 547-552, July 2022.
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  15. Una hipótesis sobre la hipótesis en Hume: el papel de la intuición.Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero - 2022 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 48 (1):51-68.
    En este artículo se sostiene la siguiente hipótesis: si una hipótesis tiene valor epistémico para Hume, este valor tiene que provenir de la intuición. Para ello se consideran las tres posibles fuentes de conocimiento en su pensamiento: la demostración, la experiencia y la intuición. Considerando que Hume presenta su doctrina de la creencia como una hipótesis, se argumenta que el valor epistémico de las hipótesis no puede provenir de la demostración ni de la experiencia y, por tanto, o las hipótesis (...)
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  16. Induction, The Problem of.Stathis Psillos, and & Chrysovalantis Stergiou - 2022 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Problem of Induction This article discusses the problem of induction, including its conceptual and historical perspectives from Hume to Reichenbach. Given the prominence of induction in everyday life as well as in science, we should be able to tell whether inductive inference amounts to sound reasoning or not, or at least we should be … Continue reading Induction, The Problem of →.
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  17. The Pragmatic Justification of Induction.Pappagllo Sergio - 2022 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi Roma Tre
    This M.A. thesis explores the intricate Problem of Induction, contrasting three seminal approaches: Hume's habit-centric view, Reichenbach's emphasis on the Principle of Uniformity of Nature, and Strawson's belief in the innate rationality of induction. While Hume's perspective lays the groundwork for Kant's a priori and Cleve's a posteriori validation, Reichenbach and Salmon present pragmatic justifications, underscoring the methodological and probabilistic underpinnings of inductive reasoning, specifying epistemological ignorance as a guidance for the optimality criteria. Strawson, challenging prevailing notions, posits that induction, (...)
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  18. Hume and the Problem of Induction.Zahra Esmaeili & Mohammad Hakkak - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (34):23-40.
    The scope of this research is the study of Hume's solution for the problem of induction. The philosophers still wonder whether they could determine unobserved instances based upon similar observed ones. However, Hume didn't employ this problem directly in his books but he answered this question within the discussion of causation. According to Hume's point-of-view, the source of universals that is based on particles; is in the human spirit. The nature of human spirit, after frequently observation of successions in the (...)
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  19. Hume and the epistemic status of inductive beliefs.Francisco Pereira Gandarillas - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50:31-49.
    Resumen La filosofía de Hume se ha interpretado tradicionalmente como radicalmente escéptica respecto de la posibilidad de otorgarle justificación epistémica a nuestras creencias inductivas acerca del futuro y lo inobservado. En este artículo me focalizaré en las creencias inductivas originadas en la costumbre y señalaré - contra la tradición exegética- que un análisis riguroso de las características propias de los mecanismos psicológicos involucrados en la formación de esta clase de creencias sí nos permite otorgarles mérito epistémico y atribuirles justi ficación (...)
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  20. Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction.Hsueh Qu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7131-7157.
    This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the (...)
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  21. Induction Ain’t What It Used to Be: Skepticism About the Future of Induction.Mark Walker & Milan Ćirković - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 30 (1):11-28.
    We argue that, in all probability, the universe will become less predictable. This assertion means that induction, which some scientists conceive of as a tool for predicting the future, will become less useful. Our argument claims that the universe will increasingly come under intentional control, and objects that are under intentional control are typically less predictable than those that are not. We contrast this form of skepticism about induction, "Skeptical-Dogmatism," with David Hume's Pyrrhonian skepticism about induction.
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  22. Regularity and certainty in Hume’s treatise: a Humean response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):579-600.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  23. Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological.Aaron Segal - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):905-925.
    Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone’s lot, whether or not they embrace Hume’s metaphysical claim that distinct existents are “entirely loose and separate”. But contemporary advocates of a Humean metaphysic accept a metaphysical claim stronger than Hume’s own. I argue that their view plausibly gives rise to a radical inductive skepticism–according to which we are downright irrational in believing as we do about the unobserved–that we (...)
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  24. Les lois de la nature peuvent-elles changer? Causalité et formulation du problème de l’induction.Julien Tricard - 2020 - Philosophie 146 (3):45-68.
    Julien Tricard criticizes the traditional formulation of the Problem of Induction, and offers to simplify it. Since Hume, he oughts to demonstrate that “the same causes always produce the same effects”, or that “the laws of nature cannot change over time” (uniformity of nature). First, an historical analysis shows, however, that the notion of causality is not needed to set the problem out. Second, the concept of “laws of nature” is analyzed, proving that laws cannot change over time: either there (...)
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  25. David Hume’un Nedensellik Eleştirisi Bağlamında Tümevarımsal Akıl Yürütmeye Yönelik Argümanlarının Yeniden Yapılandırılması.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı (ed.) - 2020 - Ankara, Türkiye: Gece Kitaplığı.
    Gözlemlenenlerden gözlemlen(e)meyenlere diğer bir deyişle genel yasalara ulaşma imkânı veren çıkarım yöntemi olarak tümevarımsal ya da endüktif akıl yürütmenin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin imkanına yönelik soruşturma tarih içerisinde tümevarım sorunu ya da endüksiyon problemi olarak tezahür etmiştir. Bu sorunun temel argümanı tarihsel okumalara baktığımızda İskoç ampirist filozof David Hume tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Hume, tümevarımsal çıkarımlar temelinde, gözlenmeyen meseleler hakkındaki inançlarımıza hangi gerekçelerle ulaştığımızı soruşturmaktadır. Hume soruşturmasının sonucunda gözlemlenenden gözlemlen(e)meyen durumlara ilişkin yapılan olgu meseleleri ile ilgili bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerin dolaylı ya (...)
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  26. Bredo Johnsen. Righting Epistemology: Hume’s Revolution. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  27. Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 63 (4):547-552.
  28. Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  29. How to solve Hume's problem of induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.
    This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...)
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  30. A causalidade e a indução: da crítica de Hume à resposta de Popper.Elan Marinho - 2019 - Pólemos 8 (16):56-74.
    Nesse artigo, apresento a crítica de Hume de seu Tratado da natureza humana contra a garantia de inferência de causalidade a partir de argumentos de cunho psicológico e de um argumento lógico. Em seguida, são esclarecidos os detalhes da crítica que Popper dirige contra Hume em seu artigo Ciência: Conjecturas e refutações, no qual foca em uma solução do Problema de Hume – considerado como uma faceta do Problema da Demarcação. Explicarei que Popper defende que a ciência avança sempre da (...)
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  31. Popper and Hume: Two Great Skeptics.Zuzana Parusniková - 2019 - In Raphael Sassower & Nathaniel Laor (eds.), The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. Springer Verlag. pp. 207-223.
    Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one (...)
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  32. Hume on induction and probability.Frederick Schmitt - 2019 - In Angela Michelle Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), The Humean Mind. Routledge.
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  33. Hume's problem solved: the optimality of meta-induction.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (...)
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  34. Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction: by Gerhard Schurz, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2019, 386pp., $60.00, £50, ISBN: 9780262039727.Tomoji Shogenji - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):229-231.
    Volume 32, Issue 3-4, September - December 2019, Page 229-231.
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  35. In defense of Newtonian induction: Hume’s problem of induction and the universalization of primary qualities.Ori Belkind - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-26.
    This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume’s argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper’s second aim is (...)
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  36. Sellars and Hume on the Ontological Status of Theoretical-Explanatory Entities.David Landy - 2018 - In Luca Cortini, Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 59-78.
    Though Sellars often criticizes Hume, Hume's treatment of theoretical entities turns out to have more in common with Sellars' view of them than with the view of the logical positivists who claimed Hume as their predecessor.
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  37. Review of "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution". [REVIEW]Jared Bates - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    Review of Bredo Johnsen's "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution" (OUP, 2017).
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  38. Hume’s Problem of Enumerative Induction Reconsidered.D. Christopoulou, D. Anapolitanos & M. Alexiadou - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiry 41 (1):86-97.
    This paper addresses Harman’s approach to enumerative induction as a case of inference to the best explanation. Αfter taking under brief consideration Hume’s critique to induction, the paper argues that Harman’s proposal does not improve the situation since the same characteristics of induction and the kind of skepticism associated with it reappear in case of inference to the best explanation. Then the paper questions Armstrong’s attempt to upgrade Harman’s suggestion by regarding a necessitation relation among two universals (a natural law) (...)
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  39. Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation. [REVIEW]Jonathan Cottrell - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):393-398.
  40. Induction and the Uniformity of Nature.Colin Howson - 2017 - In W. H. Newton‐Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 181–183.
    The problem of induction is one of the oldest, and one of the most intractable, of philosophical problems. Possibly its clearest formulation occurs in a celebrated discussion by David Hume, where it is posed as the question of whether there is anything “in any object, considered in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it.” Hume's answer, famously, is that there is not: “we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those (...)
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  41. The Metaphysical Requirement for Models of Prediction and Explanationist Approaches to the Problem of Induction.Jaeho Lee - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):225-242.
    David Armstrong once argued that to solve the problem of induction with inference to the best explanation we need an anti-Humean conception of law. Some Humeans have argued that this argument begs the question against Humeanism. In this paper, I propose a new argument for the same conclusion which is not vulnerable to this criticism. In particular, I argue that explanationist approaches to the problem of induction that are combined with Humeanism is internally incoherent.
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  42. Hume's scepticism regarding reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  43. La posición de John Stuart Mill en relación al problema de Hume: la justificación de la inferencia inductiva y la naturaleza del principio de inducción.Ana Pía León Miranda - 2016 - Discusiones Filosóficas 17 (29):35-51.
    El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar y reconstruir la postura de John Stuart Mill respecto del problema de la inducción. Mostraremos que Mill si bien conoció las objeciones de Hume, no se refiere a ellas en gran medida porque para él la justificación de la inducción es posible. La hipótesis principal será probada por medio de dos tesis: la primera, alude a la evasión de la argumentación circular respecto de la justificación de la inferencia inductiva; y la segunda, refiere (...)
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  44. The Indispensability Argument(s) for Induction.Lukáš Bielik - 2015 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-54.
    Developing the ideas presented in Jacquette (2011), the paper presents an indispensability argument aimed at justification of induction. First, Hume’s problem of induction is introduced via slightly different reconstructions. Second, several traditional attempts to solve Hume’s problem are presented. Finally, Jacquette’s(2011) proposal to justify induction by an indispensability argument is developed. I conclude with presenting a kind of indispensability argument for induction.
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  45. Is Hume an Inductivist?David Landy - 2015 - Hume Studies 41 (2):231-261.
    Across a series of papers and again in her recent book, Graciela De Pierris has argued that Hume is what she calls an inductivist about the methods of science. De Pierris takes Hume to follow Newton in holding that the ultimate aim of science is to seek "assurance concerning objects, which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses",1 and its method therefore to consist in the subsumption of observable particulars under inductively-established universal generalizations. As De Pierris (...)
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  46. In Defense of Hume’s Skeptical Argument against Induction.Jeonggyu Lee - 2015 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 123:153.
    흄이 귀납에 대한 강력한 회의주의적 논변을 제시한 것은 잘 알려져 있다. 많은 철학자들은 흄의 귀납에 대한 기술이 비록 어떤 면에서는 부적합 할지라도, 그의 회의적 논변 자체는 여전히 반박 불가능한 것이라 생각한다. 하지만 오카샤는 이것이 옳지 않다고 주장한다: 일단 우리가 귀납을 적합하게 기술한다면, 흄의 논변은 이러한 귀납에 대한 적합한 기술에는 더이상 적용될 수 없다. 이 논문에서, 나는 오카샤에 반대하여, 흄의 회의적 논변이 귀납에 대한 적절한 기술 하에서도 여전히 적용될 수 있음을 논변할 것이다.
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  47. Hume and Aristotle on Induction: A Comparative Study.Paolo C. Biondi - 2014 - In Louis F. Groarke & Paolo C. Biondi (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. De Gruyter. pp. 51-122.
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  48. Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating?Charles Cassini - 2014 - Heythrop Journal 55 (1).
  49. Hume, Goodman and radical inductive skepticism.Bredo Johnsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2791-2813.
    Goodman concurs in Hume’s contention that no theory has any probability relative to any set of data, and offers two accounts, compatible with that contention, of how some inductive inferences are nevertheless justified. The first, framed in terms of rules of inductive inference, is well known, significantly flawed, and enmeshed in Goodman’s unfortunate entrenchment theory and view of the mind as hypothesizing at random. The second, framed in terms of characteristics of inferred theories rather than rules of inference, is less (...)
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  50. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume: Revised Edition.Galen Strawson - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    In this revised and updated edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in all philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. Strawson challenges the standard view of Hume, according to which he thinks that there is no such thing as causal influence, and that there is nothing more to causation than things of one kind regularly following things things of another kind. He argues that Hume does believe in causal influence, but insists that we (...)
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