A prominent feature of late nineteenth-century psychology was its intense preoccupation with precision. Precision was at once an ideal and an argument: the quest for precision helped psychology to establish its status as a mature science, sharing a characteristic concern with the natural sciences. We will analyse how psychologists set out to produce precision in 'mental chronometry', the measurement of the duration of psychological processes. In his Leipzig laboratory, Wundt inaugurated an elaborate research programme on mental chronometry. We will look (...) at the problem of calibration of experimental apparatus and will describe the intricate material, literary, and social technologies involved in the manufacture of precision. First, we shall discuss some of the technical problems involved in the measurement of ever shorter time-spans. Next, the Cattell-Berger experiments will help us to argue against the received view that all the precision went into the hardware, and practically none into the social organization of experimentation. Experimenters made deliberate efforts to bring themselves and their subjects under a regime of control and calibration similar to that which reigned over the experimental machinery. In Leipzig psychology, the particular blend of material and social technology resulted in a specific object of study: the generalized mind. We will then show that the distribution of precision in experimental psychology outside Leipzig demanded a concerted effort of instruments, texts, and people. It will appear that the forceful attempts to produce precision and uniformity had some rather paradoxical consequences. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay addresses the historiographical question of how to study scientific instruments and the connections between them without rigidly determining the boundaries of the object under historical scrutiny beforehand. To do this, I will explore an episode in the early history of the tachistoscope — defined, among other things, as an instrument for the brief exposure of visual stimuli in experimental psychology. After looking at the tachistoscope described by physiologist Volkmann in 1859, I will turn to the gravity chronometer, (...) constructed by Cattell at Wundt's Leipzig institute of psychology in the 1880s. Taking Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances as a methodological suggestion to travel from one member to another to find out just how members relate to one another, I will investigate part of the family to which both the tachistoscope and the gravity chronometer turn out to belong. A detailed analysis of these instruments, using both historical sources and historical accounts of psychological instruments, may demonstrate that the instrument is not a standard package that, if well applied, will simply secure good results. Each package needs to be assembled again and again; the particular package that is assembled may differ on different occasions. Thus an alternative is developed to an understanding of instruments as univocally functioning material means. (shrink)

The rise of genetic techniques presents a great promise as well as some difficult dilemma's about how genetics will affect the way we will be able to live our lives. For this reason, in many countries, public debates are organized to reflect upon the development of predictive medicine. In this essay we focus on economist A. Hirschman's work on “exit, voice and loyalty” to analyse and enrich these public debates. We first introduce Hirschman's triad of concepts and focus on the (...) concept of “voice,” which refers to an institution's ability to allow clients to give feedback about products or services, and its ability to listen to the feedback given. We argue that voice is particularly important for the health care system in which predictive medicine is developing. Voice is crucial because how predictive medicine will become institutionalised is now in the process of becoming determined. However, in public debates about predictive medicine, voice tends to be reduced to providing people with the option of making a choice whether to use genetic techniques or not. We argue that this reduction of voice to choice is not very informative about predictive medicine and suggest an amendment of Hirschman's concept of voice, which we call “hesitant voice.” Hesitant voice attempts to be informative about the uncertainty people experience in addressing predictive medicine and topicalises the gradual, the embodied, the tentative character of voice in developing situations like that of predictive medicine. (shrink)