Scientists often make surprising claims about things that no one can observe. In physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, scientists can at least experiment on those unobservable entities, but what about researchers in fields such as paleobiology and geology who study prehistory, where no such experimentation is possible? Do scientists discover facts about the distant past or do they, in some sense, make prehistory? In this book Derek Turner argues that this problem has surprising and important consequences for the (...) scientific realism debate. His discussion covers some of the main positions in philosophy of science - realism, social constructivism, empiricism, and the natural ontological attitude - and shows how they relate to issues in paleobiology and geology. His original and thought-provoking book will be of wide interest to philosophers and scientists alike. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program of Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincar\'e to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak (...) K\"onig's Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others. (shrink)

The following categories can be found in the analysis of the prehistory of constitutionalism: the early constitutionalism, the ancient constitutionalism, the medieval or canonical constitutionalism. The usage of these categories raises the question: is constitutionalism the product of the Age of Enlightenment or is it an older phenomenon? The author of the article approaches this problem from another point of view: maybe the usage of the mentioned categories is an anachronism? In this case the elements taken form different contexts (...) are combined into a single unit typical to recent reality. This conjunction, when neither the single entirety nor the alterations of contexts are taken into consideration, distorts the understanding of the past, fits the past to the Procrustian bed straining it to the present standards. The existence of separate elements does not allow the consideration of the phenomenon as a whole. It also suits the category of constitutionalism. In author’s opinion, it is necessary to differentiate between: a) the prehistory of constitutionalism; b) the era of written constitutions as the legal acts of supreme power, the essence of which is expressed by the category of constitutionalism and which began in XVIII century. (shrink)

Philosophy up to now is bound to a chain of tradition that starts with Greek texts about 2,400 years ago: the works of Plato and Aristotle have been studied continuously since then; they were transmitted to Persians and Arabs and back to Europe and are still found in every philosophical library. Plato, in turn, was not an absolute beginning; he read and criticized Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Protagoras, and other sophists; Aristotle read and criticized Plato and everything else he could (...) find, up to Anaximander. Even if philosophy is anything but certain about its own identity, the definition of philosophy is inseparably bound to the Greek fundaments. Nobody has been able to reinvent philosophy because it has always been there. (shrink)

The conventional history of modern scientific peer review begins with the censorship practices of the Royal Society of London in the 1660s. This article traces one strand of the “prehistory” of peer review in the writings of John Amos Comenius and other members of the Hartlib circle, a precursor group to the Royal Society of London. These reformers appear to have first envisioned peer review as a technique for theologians, only later proposing to apply it to philosophy. The importance (...) of peer review was as a technique that would permit a community of theologians or philosophers to resolve disputes internally rather than publicly, since public disputation would (they believed) sow doubt, error, and confusion, and disrupt the social order. (shrink)

The world of the Hindi heroes of the 1970s, while decked in battle gear, largely belonged to the official state apparatus, either as members of vigilante self-defence squads – of which Bahadur was a pioneer – or bonafide members of the police force, like Inspector Vikram. The costumed superhero only emerged at the end of the Nehruvian period, gradually coming to defy its signature science and rationality. My article seeks to explore questions of the political economy of the superhero genre (...) and the affective valences of the supernatural in imaging/negotiating the national and transnational, through this conjunctural moment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. (shrink)

이 글은 『계몽의 변증법』에서 서술된 원역사의 개념에 주목한다. 특히 이 글은 전애니미즘 단계에서 자연의 지배 아래 있던 인간이 어떻게 내적‧외적 자연을 미력하게나마 통제하기 시작했는지를 분석한다. 그리고 그러한 지배가 어떻게 외부(타자성)를 추방하여 동질화된 세계로서 내재성을 창출했는지를 해명한다. 나아가, 이 글은 자연‧인간‧사회를 거쳐 끊임없이 전유하는 지배의 운명을 원역사에서 발생한 지배의 변주로 해명한다. 이를 통해, 지배의 원역사가 다름 아닌 현재의 원역사임을 밝힘으로, 이 글은 삶과 죽음이 위태롭게 얽혀 있는 현대적 야만이 개인의 일탈이나 정치 체제의 오작동이 아닌 지배의 원역사에 기초해 있음을 규명할 것이다.

Throughout the history of philosophy, chemical concepts and theories have appeared in the work of philosophers, both as examples and as topics of discussion in their own right, and scientists themselves have often engaged with theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues that fall within what one would now recognize as philosophy of chemistry. This chapter offers a summary of the history of philosophy of chemistry since Kant, alongside a critical examination of why chemistry has been relegated to the sidelines so frequently (...) in recent philosophy of science. This history offers a unique vantage point from which to consider the interests and assumptions, often implicit, that underlie 20th-century philosophy's view of what science is or perhaps should be. These include the inheritance of logical positivism and empiricism, with its particular focus on theories expressed in the language of mathematics and understood as axiomatic systems, and the widespread acceptance of reductionist views of theoretical explanation. Against this background, much of chemistry disappears. Being perhaps too grounded in laboratory and experimental practice, and often practical in its aims and correspondingly pragmatic in its methods, chemical science seldom resembles an orderly top-down enterprise from fundamental theoretical principles. Many of its central "theories," like molecular structure, are expressed in systems of visual representation rather than mathematical equations. This chapter is further is devoted to brief discussions of historical individuals, both chemists and philosophers, whose work is relevant for contemporary philosophy of chemistry. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Carey leaves unaddressed an important evolutionary puzzle: In the absence of a numeral list, how could a concept of natural number ever have arisen in the first place? Here we suggest that the initial development of natural number must have bootstrapped on a material culture scaffold of some sort, and illustrate how this might have occurred using strings of beads.

ABSTRACT The philosophical tradition approaches to morals have their grounds predominantly on metaphysical and theological concepts and theories. Among the traditional ethics concepts, the most prominent is the Divine Command Theory (DCT). As per the DCT, God gives moral foundations to the humankind by its creation and through Revelation. Morality and Divinity are inseparable since the most remote civilization. These concepts submerge in a theological framework and are largely accepted by most followers of the three Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and (...) Islam: the greatest part of the human population. Holding faith and Revelation for its grounds, the Divine Command Theories are not strictly subject to the demonstration. The opponents to the Divine Command conception of morals, grounded in the impossibility of demonstration of its metaphysical and religious assumptions, have tried for many centuries (albeit unsuccessfully) to devalue its importance. They held the argument that it does not show material evidence and logical coherence and, for this reason, cannot be taken into account for scientific nor philosophical purposes. It is just a belief and, as so, should be understood. Besides these extreme oppositions, many other concepts contravene the Divine Command theories, in one or another way, in part or in full. Many philosophers and social scientists, from the classic Greek philosophy up to the present date, for instance, sustain that morality is only a construct, and thus culturally relative and culturally determined. However, this brings many other discussions and imposes the challenge to determine what is the meaning of culture, which elements of culture are morally determinant, and finally, what are the boundaries of such relativity. Moral determinists claim that everything related to human behavior, including morality, is determined, once free will does not exist. More recently, modern thinkers argued that there is a strict science of morality. However, the scientific method alone, despite explaining several facts and evidence, cannot enlighten the entire content and full meaning of ethics. Morals’ understanding requires a broader perception, and an agreement among philosophers, which they have never achieved. All of these questions have many different configurations depending on each philosophical strand, and start complex analysis and endless debates, as long as many of them are reciprocally conflictive. The universe and the atmosphere involving this thesis are the dominions of all these conceptual conflicts, observed from an objective and evolutionary standpoint. Irrespective of this circumstance and its intrinsic importance, however, these questions are far distant from the methodological approach of an analytical discussion on objective morals, what is, indeed, the aim and scope of this work. We should briefly revisit these prominent traditional theories because this thesis shelters a comparative study, and its assumptions at least differ profoundly from all traditional theories. Therefore, it becomes necessary offering direct and specific elements of comparison to the reader, for the right criticism, dispensing interruptive researches. However, even revisiting the traditional theories, for this comparative and critical exposure purpose, they will be kept by the side of our main concerns, as “aliena materia.” Irrespective of the validity of any or all of the elements of this discussion, and their meaning as the philosophical universe of this thesis, the purpose of this work is demonstrating and justifying the existence and meaning of prehistoric moral archetypes arisen directly from the very first social needs and efforts for survival. These archetypes are the definition of the essential foundation of ethics, its aggregation to the collective unconscious and corresponding logic organization and transmission to evolutionary stages of the human genome and different relations space-time, irrespective of any contemporary experience of the individuals. The system defined by these archetypes composes an evolutionary human social model. Is this a metaethical position? Yes, it is. Moreover, as in any metaethical reasoning, we should look carefully for the best and coherent routes, as the Analytical Philosophy offers them. Thus, this work should reasonably demonstrate that morals are not a cultural product of the civilized men or modern societies and that despite being subject to several cultural relative aggregations and subtractions, its essential foundations are archetypal and have never structurally changed. This reasoning induces that morality is an original attribute of the “homo sapiens”; it is not a property and nor an accident: it integrates the human essence and belongs to the realm of the ontological human identity. The human phenomena is a continuing process, playing its role between random determination and free will, and we need to question how morality began and how did it come to us in the present. (shrink)

This article deals with the concept of “mechanism” from a historical point of view, focusing on its relationship with the evolution of hylomorphism in the 17th century. I try to address the following questions: is mechanism structurally bound to materialism or does it rather represent a form of complete determinism, reconcilable with an “updated” version of hylomorphism? In the first part of the essay, I make the point that the very notion of “mechanism” must be clarified by means of a (...) distinction between Boylean experimental mechanism and what Daniel Garber has called the “pre-history of the Mechanical Philosophy”. My aim is to highlight how the deterministic (and nominalistic) hylomorphism developed in the 17th Century came quite close to mechanism. In this framework, I present the ‘strange case’ of Marin Cureau de La Chambre (1594-1669), which represents a characteristic compromise – based on the possibility of a not bodily extension – between a deterministic mechanization of the lower functions of the vegetative and sensitive soul and Campanella’s panpsychism. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the prehistory of quantum gravity (1916–1930) from two perspectives. First, we investigate how this research field constituted itself and we propose for the first time a red thread to trace its evolution in this earliest period. Second, we focus on a case study: the earliest work of Léon Rosenfeld. In 1927 he tried to merge wave mechanics with general relativity in the context of a five‐dimensional universe. We describe how Oskar Klein, Louis de Broglie, (...) and Théophile De Donder influenced Rosenfeld's work and analyze how and why Rosenfeld attempted to reconcile Einstein's theory with quantum phenomena. We argue that Rosenfeld investigated for the first time the corrections to a classical space‐time metric generated by a quantum source. As far as we know, Rosenfeld's approach has been largely ignored until today: he himself considered it “an accident.” After having reconsidered its connection with de Broglie's ideas and Rosenfeld's interpretation of the wave function in 1927, we argue that Rosenfeld's work can be interpreted as a first attempt to introduce the pilot‐wave theory in the context of quantum gravity and we infer that this was one of the reasons that ruled it out. (shrink)

Central representational problems of Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften are concentrated in the thematic complexes of archiving, preservation, and restoration, which have received little attention to date. Goethe’s engagement with archival discourses and techniques of the late 18th century, as will be shown here, not only illuminates an important historical background of the novel, but also makes clear that his interest in the theory and practice of archives as well as his »archival poetics« described for his late work is already crucial for the (...) time of the Wahlverwandtschaften. (shrink)

The celu of the philosophical literature on the hole argument is the 1987 paper by Earman \& Norton ["What Price Space-time Substantivalism? The Hole Story" Br. J. Phil. Sci.]. This paper has a well-known back-story, concerning work by Stachel and Norton on Einstein's thinking in the years 1913-15. Less well-known is a connection between the hole argument and Earman's work on Leibniz in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn can be traced to an argument first presented in 1975 by (...) Howard Stein. Remarkably, this thread originates with a misattribution: the argument Earman attributes to Stein, which ultimately morphs into the hole argument, was not the argument Stein gave. The present paper explores this episode and presents some reflections on how it bears on the subsequent literature. (shrink)

Prehistory is an invention of the later nineteenth century. It was in this moment of technological progress and the acceleration of production and circulation, that three major Western narratives about time took shape. One after another, these new fields of inquiry delved into the obscure immensity of the past: first, to reckon the age of the Earth; second, to find a point of emergence of human beings; and third, to ponder the age of art. Maria Stavrinaki's Transfixed by (...) class='Hi'>Prehistory considers the inseparability of these accounts of temporality from the disruptive forces of modernity. She asks what a history of modernity and its art would look like if it was considered through these three, at once consecutive and interwoven, inventions of the longue durée? This book attempts to articulate such a history, which turns out to be more complex than that of an inevitable march of progress leading up to the "Anthropocene." Rather, it's a history of stupor, defamiliarization, regressive acceleration and incessant invention, since the "new" was also found in the deep sediments of the Earth. Composed as much of speed as of slowness, as much of change as of deep time, as much of confidence as of skepticism and doubt, modernity is a complex phenomenon that needs to be thought again. This book focuses on this intrinsic tension through major artistic practices (Cézanne, Matisse, De Chirico, Ernst, Picasso, Dubuffet, Smithson, Morris, and contemporary artists such as Pierre Huyghe and Thomas Hirschhorn), philosophical discourses (Bataille, Blumenberg, and Jünger) and the human sciences. This groundbreaking book will attract readers interested in the intersections of art history, anthropology, psychoanalysis, mythology, geology, and archaeology. (shrink)

Prehistory is an invention of the later nineteenth century. It was in this moment of technological progress and the acceleration of production and circulation, that three major Western narratives about time took shape. One after another, these new fields of inquiry delved into the obscure immensity of the past: first, to reckon the age of the Earth; second, to find a point of emergence of human beings; and third, to ponder the age of art. Maria Stavrinaki's Transfixed by (...) class='Hi'>Prehistory considers the inseparability of these accounts of temporality from the disruptive forces of modernity. She asks what a history of modernity and its art would look like if it was considered through these three, at once consecutive and interwoven, inventions of the longue durée? This book attempts to articulate such a history, which turns out to be more complex than that of an inevitable march of progress leading up to the "Anthropocene." Rather, it's a history of stupor, defamiliarization, regressive acceleration and incessant invention, since the "new" was also found in the deep sediments of the Earth. Composed as much of speed as of slowness, as much of change as of deep time, as much of confidence as of skepticism and doubt, modernity is a complex phenomenon that needs to be thought again. This book focuses on this intrinsic tension through major artistic practices (Cézanne, Matisse, De Chirico, Ernst, Picasso, Dubuffet, Smithson, Morris, and contemporary artists such as Pierre Huyghe and Thomas Hirschhorn), philosophical discourses (Bataille, Blumenberg, and Jünger) and the human sciences. This groundbreaking book will attract readers interested in the intersections of art history, anthropology, psychoanalysis, mythology, geology, and archaeology. (shrink)