Kant: Aesthetics

How to interpret autonomy plays a crucial role that leads to different readings in Kant’s moral metaphysics, philosophy of religion and moral psychology. In this paper I argue for a two-layered conception of autonomy with varying degrees of justification for each: autonomy as a capacity and autonomy as a paragon-like paradigm. I argue that all healthy rational humans possess the inalienable capacity of autonomy, i. e. share the universal ground for the communicability of objective basic moral principles. This initial understanding (...) stands for autonomy as a capacity about which we can talk of universal validity and justification. Nevertheless, the way a person fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autonomy, is shaped by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world. Autonomy as an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process concerning one’s actualization of oneself gives way to consider autonomy as a godlike state of the soul even though one cannot provide objective validity for this. (shrink)

Farabi, “the Second Teacher” and the founder of Islamic philosophy is one of the most important philosophers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Like other Muslim philosophers and mystics, he has no independent argument about aesthetic concepts. In this research, one of the main concepts of modern aesthetics, namely the “aesthetic judgment”, is analyzed according Farabi’s perspective, and to achieving this, some of the key concepts of Kant’s aesthetics, as one of the turning points of modern aesthetics, are used. In (...) this paper, concepts such as “second perfection”, in the philosophy of Farabi, and “the ideal of beauty” in Kant’s philosophy are evaluated and then new explanation is introduced of aesthetic judgment in Farabi. The results show that for Farabi the canonical art is that art which has some features, and leads audience toward true happiness. This canon corresponds to Kant’s definition of ideal beauty, and is made clear with combination of the aesthetic normal idea and the rational idea in the philosophy of Kant. (shrink)

This paper addresses a problem about aesthetic normativity raised by Kant. Can aesthetic experiences be appropriate or inappropriate to their objects? And, if so, how is that possible given that, according to Kant, aesthetic experience is not objective? Kant thought the answer to the first question was yes. But his official answer to the second question, in terms of the free play of the faculties, is obscure. The paper offers a clearer answer, inspired by Kant, which invokes Wittgenstein’s notion of (...) “knowing how to go on.” Aesthetic normativity is problematic only on the assumption that claims to the normativity of one’s responses to things must be based on the recognition of objective properties of those things. However, Wittgenstein’s discussion shows that we need not accept that assumption. There can be legitimate claims to the normativity of one’s responses which do not rely on those responses’ reflecting appreciation of objective facts. (shrink)

According to a common misconception, Kant rejects rhetoric as worthy of no respect and neglects popularity as a dispensable accessory. Two recent publications on the communicative dimension of Kant’s conception and practice of philosophy represent a very solid rebuttal of such criticism. The books in question are Kant’s Philosophy of Communication by G. L. Ercolini and A linguagem em Kant. A linguagem de Kant edited by Monique Hulshof and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, especially in light of the long chapter (...) “Kant e a Questão da Popularidade e da Linguagem da Filosofia” by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (pp. 17- 69). What Ercolini’s monograph and Santos’ chapter have in common, is that they both argue that Kant does indeed value and practice both rhetoric and popularity. However, they differ from each other in that Ercolini lets Kant’s reflection on popularity derive from occasional factors, while Santos locates its origin at the heart of Kant’s critical project. In order fully to appreciate their novelty, these two contributions call for an overview of the state of research on the subject of Kant’s conception of rhetoric. Thus, before closely examining them, I will briefly outline the relevant scholarship by dividing it into the three classes of those who interpret Kant (a) as a skillful rhetorician, (b) as dismissive of rhetoric, and finally (c) as according rhetoric a moral function. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...) drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire, I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively. (shrink)

Though the notion of common-sense plays an important role in Kant’s aesthetic theory, it is not immediately clear what Kant means by this term. This essay works to clarify the role that common-sense plays in the logic of Kant’s argument. My interpretive hypothesis is that a careful examination of the way common-sense functions in Kant’s account of judgments of taste can help explain what this notion means. I argue that common-sense names the capacity to discern the relation between the cognitive (...) faculties by means of a feeling, and I conclude that this understanding of common-sense lays the groundwork for an account of the unity of judgments of taste. I conclude that attending to Kant’s notion of common-sense is especially important because it highlights the anthropological significance of Kant’s account of beauty. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment has been extremely influential, prompting extensive discussion of the psychology, affect, moral significance, and relevance to artistic representation of the sublime on his provocative view. I focus instead on Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime in connection to his theoretical critical project, namely his attempt to characterize human cognitive powers and to limit human pretensions to knowledge of the supersensible. I argue, first, that his account of the psychology of the (...) sublime is designed to explain not just its affective character, but also to address challenges concerning the coherence of an experience of something as transcending one’s cognitive abilities. Thereby, I argue moreover, Kant provides an alternative, demystifying account of mystical experiences, in which humans might take themselves to intuit that which is beyond human understanding or reason, and thus to claim that they have special cognitive access to the supersensible, transcending the limits Kant claims to establish for human cognition. Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime is not merely so reductive of mystical experience, however; it also, I suggest, describes the aesthetic of Kantian critique itself. (shrink)

In a series of works published over the last thirty years, Rudolf Makkreel accomplished what can be called a hermeneutical rehabilitation of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Such a rehabilitation has been formulated in explicit opposition to the negative hermeneutical image of Kant’s aesthetics which originated in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and according to which the subjectivization of aesthetics perpetrated by Kant reduced aesthetic judgments to a mere communication of feelings, sanctioning thereby their hermeneutical irrelevance. In this essay I do (...) not intend to evaluate the legitimacy of Makkreel’s considerations about the hermeneutical importance of Kant’s Third Critique. Rather, I aim to question the pertinence of those considerations for Gadamer’s criticism of Kant, specifically in relation to the notion of sensus communis, which plays a central role both in Gadamer’s and Makkreel’s analyses. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give an interpretation of the free and harmonious play of faculties. The dominant interpretations focus on how the imagination is free from the determination of understanding, but say little about the harmony that can exist between imagination and understanding; thus, in this paper an attempt is made to account for the free and harmonious relationship between these two faculties. Some of Kant’s lectures are reviewed to show the inclinations of the power of imagination (...) and understanding, respectively. As the power of imagination is inclined towards making many representations, understanding is necessary to truncate the multitudes of those representations, so that unity of the representation is achievable. Taking inspiration from the traditional board game of Go, it is possible to draw an interpretation of the play of faculties that takes into consideration both the freedom and the harmony that is present within the play. (shrink)

In his lecture on logic, Kant puts forth his most detailed account of concept formation. Here Kant maintains that concepts are the result of a three-step process: comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Though most commentators acknowledge that this particular passage leads to a number of interpretive difficulties, it is almost unanimously accepted that: (1) concepts are composed of features which are shared by a multiplicity of objects and (2) that it is in virtue of these features that concepts apply to a (...) “plurality of objects”. I reject both of these claims. In what follows I will argue that the dilemma is the result of an illicit interpretive slide between the discussion of the form and content of concepts. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative reading of Kant’s account of logical form—universality. I will argue that in the relevant passages, Kant’s account of concept formation is concerned not with a comparison, reflection, and abstraction of sensible features or marks but rather with the apprehension of the manifold (or the mode of bringing the manifold to the unity of consciousness). (shrink)

The article focuses on a chapter of the biography of Angela Davis which, unless mistaken, has not yet received due attention: the training and intellectual experience with her German professors, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno. From the philosophical studies in Frankfurt in the 1960s to the more recent reflections on movements such as Black Lives Matter, there seems to be a continuity in the way she approaches contemporary social reality, a démarche that draws its strength from the original combination (...) of two traditions of radical critical thinking: Frankfurtian and Afro-American. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 182-185.

Building on the theory of humor advanced by Yves Cusset in his recent book Rire: Tractatus philo-comicus, I argue that we can understand the phenomenon in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy, following Roland Barthes, has called the exemption from sense. I attempt to show how the humorous sensibility, understood in this way, is entirely incompatible with the experience of others as contemptible. I conclude by developing some of the normative implications of this, focusing specifically on the question whether it is (...) ever morally permissible to treat others with contempt. (shrink)

: Complex aesthetic perception, according to Mendelssohn’s writings between 1755 and 1771, is most alluring if it showcases a breach in the order of perfection. With this, Mendelssohn introduces a shift in our understanding of the artistic act of imitation: Artistic semblance is always lacking, and a painting that does not point to this fact is, in fact, displeasing. This is also the main reason why we enjoy non-beautiful art: in the artistic rendering of an unpleasant ‘object’ we focus on (...) the artistic act itself, on its formal features, and its effects on us as the perceiver. Thus, a representation that evokes the mixed feelings of pleasure, appreciation, and rejection is superior to ‘pure’ beauty, in that it better refers us to higher forms of perfection: the perfection of the perceiving and creative subject. It is the nagging, near-painful impression of mixed sentiments that, according to Mendelssohn, guides our self-perfection, the highest aim of all human endeavors. (shrink)

it is common to praise the beauty of theories, the elegance of proofs, and the pleasing simplicity of explanations. We may admire, for example, the beauty of Einstein’s theory of general relativity, the simplicity of Darwin’s idea of natural selection, and the elegance of a geometrical proof of Pythagoras’s theorem. Aesthetic judgments such as these have much currency among scientists, and they are employed in the search for knowledge more broadly. But while the use of aesthetic judgments in science is (...) widespread, it is not uncontroversial.1 On one side, such judgments are often inspired by the Platonic vision that beauty and truth are ultimately one. As Henri Poincaré saw it, science is the “disinterested pursuit... (shrink)

This chapter examines the imagination, its relationship to “common sense,” and its recent development in the notion of the social imaginary in Western philosophy and the contributions Miki Kiyoshi and Nakamura Yūjirō can make in this regard. I trace the historical evolution of the notion of the productive imagination from its seeds in Aristotle through Kant and into the social imagination or imaginary as bearing on our collective being-in-the-world, with semantic and ontological significance, in Paul Ricoeur, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Charles (...) Taylor. The two Japanese philosophers, when brought into dialogue with the above contemporary Western thinkers, can contribute to this recent development of the imagination’s creativity into the collective sphere. Miki shows a connection between the imagination and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida. Nakamura in turn points to a connection between imagination and place via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense. Both have implications on how we understand the social imaginary. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s conception of ethics and aesthetics, including his philosophy of judgment and practical knowledge, are widely discussed today among scholars in various fields: philosophy, political science, aesthetics, educational science, and others. His ideas continue to inspire and encourage an ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue, leading to an increasing awareness of the interdependence between societies and people and a clearer sense of the challenges we face in cultivating ourselves as moral beings.Early on in his career, Cavell began to recognize the strong connection (...) between Kant’s aesthetics (as it finds its expression in the Critique of the Power of Judgment) and the claims of ordinary language .. (shrink)

This article considers the reasons Kant rejects the possibility of a science of aesthetics throughout his career. It begins by surveying the background of Kant’s denial, focusing first on the introduction of aesthetics as a new science in the works of Alexander Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier. After showing that there are numerous ambiguities in the way Baumgarten and Meier present their new science, the article considers Kant’s account of the differences between aesthetics and logic in the transcripts of his (...) Lectures on Logic. Because Kant uses the differences between aesthetics and logic to explain why logic is and aesthetics is not a science, these discussions provide a great deal of insight into his conception of science as well as his views on aesthetics. Finally, the article addresses the reasons Kant continues to insist that aesthetics is not a science but “a mere critique of taste” after he announces his discovery of the a priori principles of aesthetic judgment. (shrink)

The unity of aesthetic and teleological judgment, the third and earlier Critiques, is based on Kant′s discovery of a “heuristic method” for applying judgments regarding sense phenomena to abstract thought, a “second attention” which enables an “idea of the whole”. Synthetic judgment, basis for cognition and human action, depends on efficacy of non-empirical insights: the transcendental standpoint, “regulative” ideas, consciousness of “ought” and the reality of freedom, universality of natural mechanism, the principle of “fortuitous” purposiveness. The activity of reflective judgment (...) in the encounter with the beautiful, sublime, living, and two paradigmatic types of explanation, inspired by Spinoza′s distinction of extensio and cogitatio, permit Kant to bridge the gap between freedom and necessity, theoretical knowledge and morality. (shrink)

The Kant-Lexikon is a guide to the philosophical work of Immanuel Kant and incorporates the latest scholarship. This textbook edition presents the most important entries contained in the comprehensive, three-volume lexicon released in 2015.

The overall goal of this article is to show that aesthetics plays a major role in a debate at the very center of philosophy. Drawing on the work of David Bell, the article spells out how Kant and Wittgenstein use reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as a key in their respective solutions to the rule-following problem they share. The more specific goal is to offer a Kantian account of semantic normativity as understood by Wittgenstein. The article argues (...) that Wittgenstein's reason for describing language as a collection of language games is to allow for a perspective that shows those games as internally purposive without any extralinguistic purpose. This perspective also allows for that union of the general rule and its particular application in practice that the original paradox of rule-following is wanting. (shrink)