Themed Section of Bruniana & Campanelliana 2022/1, pp. 85-198 -/- - Simone Guidi, Introduction; - Andrew W. Arlig, Part-Whole Interdependence and the Presence of Form in Matter According to Some Fifteenth-Century Platonists; - Jean-Pascal Anfray, Aux limites de la métaphysique: parties, indivisibles et contact chez Suárez; - Simone Guidi, Indivisibles, Parts, and Wholes in Rubio’s Treatise on the Composition of Continuum (1605); - Dana Jalobeanu, Dissecting Nature ad vivum: Parts and Wholes in Francis Bacon’s Natural Philosophy; - Carla Rita Palmerino, (...) From Active Matter to Inertia, from Celerity to Slowness: the Motion of Atoms and of Compound Bodies in Gassendi’s Physics. (shrink)
In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which (...) are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction, I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness. (shrink)
The Question of Truth in Pedro da Fonseca: the Problem of the simplex apprehensio and the Foundation of Logical Identities. This article deals with the theory of truth in Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) as it is presented in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1577-1612). The first part of the paper is dedicated to Fonseca’s definition of intellective truth within the doctrinal topography of the Aristotelian tradition. The Author especially points out Fonseca’s attempt to justify the notion of a “simple” truth (...) of the “simple apprehension”, based on a specific use of Cajetan’s distinction between “signified act” and “exercised act” as well as on a (partially) nominalist account of the relationship between “simple” and “enunciative” concepts. The second part deals instead with Fonseca’s definition of transcendental truth, understood as the conformity between the intellect and the esse realis of the res, and as the conformity of the latter with exemplars in God’s mind. Here the Author also reconstructs Fonseca’s theory of divine ideas and his theory of logical identities. (shrink)
In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which (...) are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness. (shrink)
A widespread historiographical portrayal represented Descartes' dualism as constituted in direct contrast with Aquinas' concept of soul-form. In the wake of the many studies that have opposed this prejudice in recent decades, this book reconstructs the fifteenth and seventeenth-century debate on psychology, focusing primarily on the Jesuit context and on the intersection between Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Augustinianism in early modern France. Beginning with a rigorous investigation of the theories of the separated soul, particular attention is then given to the indirect (...) derivation of the Cartesian cogito and innatism from angelological themes of the time. Indeed, in the years in which Descartes elaborates his metaphysics, the immediate proximity between souls and angels is somehow a matter of fact, in the light of which many of the argumentative choices of the Meditations, and even the relationship that closely joins the "thinking substance" with the body-machine, appear clear. -/- . (shrink)
Suárez’s primary attempt to rethink angelology can be found in the De Angelis. This work is a mighty commentary on the prima pars of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (qq. 50-64) which Suárez left to his colleagues after his years in Coimbra (1597-1607), and which was published posthumously in Lyon in 1620. The composition of the text is somewhat stratified and it includes many references to the Disputationes Metaphysicae, but Suárez most likely already started writing it during his years of teaching in (...) Spain and Italy (1575-1597), before 1597. Because of its Thomistic inspiration, the De angelis is a fundamentally theological and doctrinal work, the metaphysical core of which is independently treated in the DM 35, entitled De immateriali substantia creata. In this passage, which is eminently theoretical, Suárez grapples with the most important quaestiones concerning angels under a metaphysical point of view, therein offering one of the most interesting overviews of early modern angelology. In this paper, I will refer especially to the DM 35, a more synthetic and peculiar work, with some reference to De Angelis as well. I will focus especially on sections 1-3 of DM 35, and try to reconstruct Suárez’s views on the following points: a) the cosmological necessity of angels, their rational demonstrability and the possibility of man’s knowing them (sections 1-2); b) the immaterial essence of angels (section 3). (shrink)
For Christian theology, the survival of the soul after the death of the body is a matter of fact. However, its philosophical explanation is probably the most peculiar issue of Thomas Aquinas’ radically Aristotelianaccount of body-soul. For both Augustine and Avicenna – who, together with Aristotle, can be considered the main sources of thirteenth century philosophy – the certainty of the immaterial soul’s ability to survive independently from the body was so strong that, coining their very own notions of human (...) spiritual substance, they described it as only partially implied in the act of the body’s information. This account was able to mediate between Aristotle’s idea of the soul as a form of the body and the Neoplatonic theory of the soul as an independent substance.... (shrink)
This chapter deals with Thomas Browne’s most famous work, Religio Medici, and especially with his account of Charity. The first paragraph focuses on Browne’s specific account of the relationship between natural and supernatural. This view is inspired by Bacon, Sebunde, and Montaigne, and is crucial to understand the background of Browne’s view about the virtue of Charity. The second paragraph is about Browne’s specific understanding of Charity, which seems to be a middle stage between the traditional, Scholastic doctrine, and the (...) Kantian idea of moral law, independent from the practical law and the desire of the subject. The third paragraph deals with Religio Medici’s reversal of the traditional “order” of Charity, as well as Browne’s accounts of abnegation and friendship as an effective way for a charity to the self which meets many aspects of Foucault’s ἑπιμέλεια έαuτου. The fourth paragraph is about Browne’s analogical understanding of medicine and morality, as well as his use of the meditatio mortis. (shrink)
In this article, I deal with the role of hypothesis in the scientific methodology of Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon and René Descartes. The first paragraph is about hypothesis in Newton's lexicon, especially trying to understand the meaning of his famous hypotheses non fingo. The second paragraph deals with Bacon's methodology, arguing especially that his epis-temology was the first to propose an artificial way for inductive inferences, also giving up all hypothesis in science. The third paragraph shows how Descartes, following Bacon's (...) traces and reading his methodology in the light of the idea of a Mathesis Universalis based on mental evidence, structures a full hypothetical-deductive methodology, charging metaphysics with the analytical phase and depriving experiments of any role in it. The fourth paragraph, on Newton again, tries to understand Newton's specific account of hypothesis as an auxiliary phase in the scientific discovery, and what really differentiates Newton from his contemporaries, Boyle and Hooke. (shrink)
How are the contemporary conceptions of the living body and health related to numerical systems? Addressing the contemporary practice of quantification of bodies and health, such a question is bound to arise. As a discipline historically positioned amidst natural sciences, technology, and art, medicine has always been sensitive to theories and apparatuses able to quantify and reshape the living body, as well as to the practical possibility of operating on it. This is why, in the era where telecommunication, algorithmic information (...) technology, and data-driven decision making are reaching their apex, new forms of medical practice, and new alliances between medicine and technology are emerging as a direct consequence of the evolution of technology. This is what was particularly aimed at by the International Congress "The Quantification of Bodies. Organism, Health, and Representation", which took place at the University of Coimbra on 28-29 November 2019, organized by the IEF - Institute for Philosophical Studies. The present book collects some of the papers presented there, selected according to their interdisciplinary approach and/or to their more informative nature, suitable even for non-specialist readers. A collection that reflects, in a fragment, many of the potentialities opened by this new field of studies. (shrink)
The use of digital tracking technologies is a widespread phenomenon. Millions of people around the world now track, document, and analyse their physical activities, vital functions, and daily habits through wearable devices, apps, and platforms. The aim is to assess and improve health, productivity, and wellbeing. The current Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the uptake of tracking technologies. At the heart of this trend lies the quantification of the body, deemed as a key element in medical practice and personal self-care. While (...) often couched in positive promotional terms that highlight its value to users' mental, emotional, and physical health, it is also raising a host of issues and concerns that are at once ontological, ethical, political, social, legal, economic, and aesthetic. The Quantification of Bodies in Health aims to deepen understanding of this growing phenomenon and of the role of self-tracking practices in everyday life. It brings together established and emerging authors working at the intersection of philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, and digital culture, while bridging between philosophical and empirical approaches. A timely topic of extreme relevance and significance, The Quantification of Bodies in Health constitutes a useful and unique companion for anyone interested in the study of body quantification and self-tracking practices. (shrink)
The present paper deals with the diachronic evolution of the Cartesian concept of intuitus, focusing particularly on the reasons for its (at least lexical) dismissal in Descartes's mature elaborations of his metaphysics. In section 1, I address the notion of intuitus presented in the Rules, showing that this concept is pivotal in Descartes' early epistemology of evidence. In section 2, I argue that such a concept can be traced back to certain distinctive elements of the Late Scholastic debate on angels (...) and human knowledge, from which Descartes could have drawn some of his early ideas. In section 3, I analyze the reasons behind Descartes' dismissal of the notion of intuitus, arguing for a deliberate choice, due both to epistemologico-metaphysical and theological reasons, on which I dwell focusing especially on Descartes' letters. -/- . (shrink)
This book collects six unpublished and published academic studies on the thought of Francisco Suárez, which is addressed through accurate textual analyses and meticulous contextualization of his doctrines in the Scholastic debate. The present essays aim to portray two complementary aspects coexisting in the work of the Uncommon Doctor: his innovative approach and his adherence to the tradition. To this scope, they focus on some pivotal, but often neglected, topics in Suárez’s metaphysics and psychology – such as his theories of (...) cognition and truth, angelology, continuous quantity – thereby developing an original inquiry into a crucial moment in the development of Western philosophy. (shrink)
This chapter focuses on the question of the specific truth granted to the human intellect’s concepts qua concepts (simplex apprehensio), as it is presented and discussed in Sebastião do Couto’s commentary on On Interpretation, included in his general commentary on Aristotle’s Dialectics (1606), the final volume of the famous and influential Cursus Conimbricensis (1592–1606). Such a topic finds it roots in a large medieval debate that runs through many authors and especially Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, and Ockham, reaching in the (...) Jesuit early modern context, with Pedro da Fonseca and Francisco Suárez, a complete and eclectic account that paved the way for the modern understanding of “mind.” . (shrink)
This article addresses some Late Scholastic accounts (Suárez, Abra de Raçonis, Gamaches, Ysambert, Arriaga), of the “problem of transduction” in angels, as a possible source for the genesis of early modern occasionalism, particularly La Forge’s and Cordemoy’s. Indeed, if the “problem of transduction” is a structural issue of all the Aristotelian gnoseology, the impossibility of interaction between immaterial and material substance concerns, more generally, all spiritual substances, posing the issue about the principle of "transduction" already at the level of angels, (...) entirely immaterial creatures, unable to any relationship with the bodies. In order to answer to this peculiar version of the 'problem of transduction' Late Scholastic elaborate doctrines that are direct antecedents of occasionalist ones, and which likely directly influenced early modern occasionalism. To follow this investigative path, I will intersect three complementary argumentative lines. First, I will focus on Late Scholastic angelology, to point out how the need to solve the 'problem of transduction' in this peculiar context pushes the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Schools to a proto-occasionalist conception of angelic innatism. Secondly, I will identify in the debate on the angelic locutio of the key places for the elaboration of a model that sees God as the only efficient cause and the only guarantor of the mind's communications and contents. Thirdly, I will stress how the Late Scholastic angelological debates could be an important source for early modern dualism and the seventeenth-century occasionalism, notably for La Forge and Cordemoy. -/- . (shrink)
In its literal meaning, the term ἔκστασις (ekstasis) indicates a displacement, ‘being out of immobility’, and ultimately being outside oneself. To some extent, this term takes on a mystical connotation in late Antiquity, notably in book VI.9.11.24 of Plotinus’ Enneads, where ekstasis is described as a non-ordinary way of seeing. The notion of ecstasy, often inseparable from the concept of vision, would keep its mystical role, though altered in some ways, over the centuries, conceptualizing a specific kind of knowledge, which (...) goes beyond the subject-object opposition, addressing the epistemological issues of perceiving and knowing the divine, and often challenging the nature of the self. This issue offers some attempts to track the constant reshaping and migration of the notions of ecstasy and intellectual or spiritual vision over the history of Western thought, unearthing their structural and constant persistence, from the Middle Ages to the contemporary ages, recurrently in many different non-ultimately-dialectical metaphysical systems. The papers in this volume provide some illustrative examples of the tangled history of the divergent meanings that the notions of ecstasy and vision have taken on, and their considerable reassessments and adaptations to constantly evolving conceptual frameworks, often redefining further notions such as those of rapture, prophecy, sleep, dream, and death. -/- . (shrink)
According to one of the most influential definitions, formulated by Michel Foucault in his Les anormaux, the monster is, since the Middle Ages, a violation of a “bio-juridical” order. In critically discussing the historical plausibility of this claim this article explores medical and philosophical conceptions of monsters between medieval and early modern period, addressing in particular the matter of the relationships between first and second causes in nature's errors. The main authors dealt with are Thomas Aquinas, Ambroise Paré, Francisco Toledo (...) and Fortunio Liceti. What emerges is that up to the 17 th century monsters were always conceived as products – and not as real contradictions – of a nature ordered by God's will, goodness and perfection, without a real “bio-juridical” order (as Foucault thinks). (shrink)
This volume publishes the Proceedings of the 1st International Meeting "Thinking Baroque in Portugal" (26-28 June 2017), which dealt with the metaphysical, ethical and political thought of Francisco Suárez. Counting on the collaboration of some of the greatest international specialists in the work and thought of this famous professor of the University of Coimbra in the 17th century, this volume celebrates the 400th anniversary of his death and marks the productivity of his philosophical-theological legacy.
"Lezioni di metafisica" presenta tradotti per la prima volta in italiano due cicli di lezioni tenuti da Henri Bergson presso la classe di khâgne del Lycée Henri-IV, tra il 1893 e il 1894. Per la loro collocazione temporale, a cavallo tra gli anni del "Saggio sui dati immediati della coscienza" (1889) e "Materia e memoria" (1896), queste lezioni risultano di straordinario interesse per gli studi sul filosofo francese, che vi sviluppa un serrato confronto con la storia della metafisica moderna e (...) della psicologia. Aristotele, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Spencer sono presentati e discussi da Bergson, che riflette – con loro e attraverso di loro – sui grandi temi dello spazio, del tempo, della materia, della memoria e dell’individualità. Tra i banchi dell’Henri-IV Bergson mette a punto un vero e proprio studio preparatorio per la sua originale critica al pensiero classico. (shrink)
Il corso sulla Storia dell'idea di tempo, tenuto al Collège de France nel 1902-1903, per la prima volta tradotto interamente in italiano, è dedicato al concetto di tempo nella storia della filosofia antica e moderna. In queste straordinarie lezioni Bergson si confronta con Platone, Aristotele, Plotino, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton e Kant. Nel cuore della metafisica occidentale il filosofo francese intravede una fondamentale negazione del tempo, impropriamente considerato come imitazione e riduzione di un’originaria eternità, inattingibile nell’immediato e esperibile solo (...) per il tramite di un apparato simbolico. Alla luce di questa paradossale “falsa partenza” del pensiero occidentale, Bergson indica nella storia della metafisica la costante riproposizione dei suoi errori fondativi; ma vi intravede anche l’inesorabile cammino concettuale che, progressivamente, riconduce il tempo alla sua natura psicologica, quella della durata. (shrink)
Did Descartes ever develop a political thought of his own? This question, still open in the field of cartesian studies, is maybe doomed to remain without a definitive answer, mainly because of the lack of a specific work dedicated by him to politics. Nevertheless, we have a long letter to Princess Elisabeth in which the French philosopher, starting from his reading of Machiavelli's masterpiece, Il Principe, discusses political matters, and especially the political instruments that a good prince should use in (...) order to guarantee stability to his reign. The present essay deals with it, exploring the possibility that Descartes might have been trying to outline in that text the main features of a political anthropology, founding it on the universal anthropology of passions that he was developing in those years. (shrink)
Rintracciare con esattezza, nelle Meditazioni, la presenza di specifiche fonti letterarie è un'impresa audace e per certi versi poco utile. Considerata la riluttanza di Descartes a sottomettere il proprio pensiero a ogni genealogia e preso atto dello straordinario eclettismo che anima il Barocco (categoria culturale oltretutto sfuggente per definizione), sembra vano un tentativo di fissare definitivamente i richiami e le atmosfere che attraversano l'opera. Il rischio è anzitutto quello di mantenere indistinto ciò che è nell'autore da quanto è nel suo (...) tempo o è la tentazione contraria, forse più grave, di smembrare il pensiero cartesiano in una sequenza di rimandi semplicemente possibili. Non si può negare legittimità alla questione, tuttavia, laddove il campo di indagine sia ristretto all'eventualità di una funzione – narrativa, scenica, simbolica – assegnata da Descartes ad alcuni aspetti della visione barocca del mondo, che sembrano proporre, in decisivi punti di snodo delle Meditazioni, momenti di autentico teatro. Questa impostazione della ricerca ci spinge a considerare il capolavoro cartesiano ancor prima che una dissertazione di metafisica – e difficilmente questa definizione ne esaurisce l'essenza – come un vero e proprio elaborato filosofico-letterario, non privo di peculiarità narrative e stilistiche tipicamente barocche, quali l'uso strategico della “dissimulazione” e una certa vena ermetica. (shrink)
The article introduces Marin Cureau de La Chambre’s theory of light, focusing especially on the treatise Le Lumière (1657). Specifically, the anti-Cartesian and anti-mechanistic side of Cureau’s work is stressed, reconstructing its account of the “essential” nature of light, linking it to the Franciscan and the Platonic tradition and focusing on the peculiar use of the notion of “extensio formalis.” Additionally, Cureau’s theory of color and his theories on irradiance and light’s movement is presented. Finally, the article illustrates Cureau’s qualitative (...) explanation of refraction and reflection, reconstructing his role in the genesis of Fermat’s ‘principle of least time.’ . (shrink)
In this essay I address the debate between Pierre Chanet and Marin Cureau de La Chambre on animal instinct, analyzing and connecting it to the question of the relationship between God and secondary causes. While Chanet considers instinctive actions as the result of direct intervention by God, that would conduct his creatures beyond their natural limits, Cureau places them in the cognitive structure that God has given to the animals, doing of instinctive actions natural actions in the strict sense. Starting (...) from that, Cureau can introduce a bizarre analogy between animal’s innate capability to act in the environment beyond any previous experience and the innate knowledge of angels. This comparison is strongly criticized by Chanet and probably persuades Cureau to change his presentation of the soul in his late masterpiece, "Le Systéme de l’âme". My conclusion is that both Chanet’s and Cureau’s accounts for animal instinct are functional to an anthropocentric metaphysics that keeps the human soul as an intellective, individual and separable substance; but they also provide - especially with Cureau - a good example of a compromise between hylomorphism, dualism and mechanism. (shrink)
This article examines the epistemological role of the fable as used by Descartes in his Monde to present the idea of an entirely mechanical world. Rather than merely a dissimulative-literary device, putting the world into fable form actually turns out to be a real scientific instrument, making it possible for Descartes to re-create the world from a metaphysical and wholly geometrical point of view, based on the changelessness of the divine essence and creation. In this sense his fable du monde (...) goes hand in hand with the ability of the human imagination to think up scientific models, that, by being plausible, can be applied to the interpretation of phenomena. (shrink)
Chi è quel soggetto che nell’autobiografia dice “io”? Raccontarsi non è già diventare altro? L’autobiografia è un esercizio filosofico in cui l’identità si scopre tramata da altre vite e l’io emerge soltanto perché dislocato nei suoi segni. Sono forse proprio le condizioni di impossibilità di un’autopresentazione trasparente e definitiva che rendono possibile una soggettività autobiografica. Scrivere di sé infatti è già trascendenza: insinua il sospetto di un’alterità, di un’alterazione e turba la rigida identità, che si presume autonoma e precedente alle (...) sue iscrizioni. L’intreccio tra autós, bíos e graphein non è dunque una neutra auto-espressione, ma uno specchio in cui il proprio volto è riflesso e capovolto, il sé si racconta e si ascolta, recita e osserva. In che modo quindi l’autobiografia è un luogo di verità? «La verità può essere il cuore dell’autobiografia», afferma John M. Coetzee, «ma ciò non vuol dire che l’autobiografia abbia a cuore la verità». Ogni lettera scritta traccia l’aderenza di sé a sé e alle cose, nell’istante stesso in cui marca una separazione e una distanza. In questo paradosso si infrange ogni pretesa di obiettività o di adeguazione. Qui la trasparenza dell’io viene disdetta, come anche la sua sovranità del discorso. L’autobiografia è, allora, la scrittura impossibile come unica iscrizione possibile: il tentativo estremo di restituire il senso di una vita incompiuta, di dare una verità senza verità, di raccontare di sé da sé. È una messa in scena dell’identità e della propria distanza, un’autosospensione e una torsione tropica dell’io, che si racconta e si espone. Dietro ogni scrittura autobiografica c’è infatti un nome proprio, che sigilla l’autore, il narratore, il personaggio. Ma proprio in questa firma si custodisce, più che il diritto a una proprietà, la promessa di verità per sé e per gli altri: un corpo a corpo con la lingua e con la propria storia. (shrink)
The article examines Marin Cureau de La Chambre's Système de l'âme (1664), highlighting the role played in the work by the tradition of Italian Renaissance naturalism. La Chambre profoundly criticizes the very concept of 'passion of the soul', attacking the Aristotelian doctrine of the possible intellect but, contemporarily, also the direct interaction between body and mind presupposed by Descartes in Les passions de l'âme. The solution adopted by Cureau is based on the doctrine of intermediate substances, which allows him to (...) resume Ficino's model, reconciling it with Descartes' intellec-tualist dualism and integrating the latter with a panpsychism of Campanellian brand. (shrink)
This article addresses the Aristotelian debate in the 17th century on the incorporeality of light and its extension, focusing especially on the Iberian and Italian contexts. The aim of the essay is to show that, while late Aristotelianism unitedly rejected light’s corporeity, many differences arose regarding the way in which this incorporeality should be understood. Relevant perspectives in all of their discussions were Scotus’ teaching of the intentional nature of light, and the Neoplatonics’ claim of its metaphysical provenance. In the (...) Iberian environment, Jesuit scholars/theologians (the school of Toledo, the Conimbricenses, Francisco Suárez, and Antonio Rubio) were especially characterized by their attempt to save Aristotle’s original explanation in De Anima, although theoretical discrepancies on many significant points divide them. Italian intellectuals such as Zabarella, Dandini, Lagalla and Liceti were instead more willing to seek a reconciliation between Aristotle’s statement and the explanation of light posited by Scotus and the Neoplatonists, and more receptive to the need for a new theory of matter. (shrink)
Why do we remember? And, for that matter, what is remembering? Placed between body and mind, the phenomenon of memory simultaneously involves biological, psychological, semiotic, and metaphysical elements. Memory’s place at the heart of our understanding of ourselves is why many of the greatest philosophers of all the time have dealt with the problem – or, better, have had to deal with it. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Russell, and Wittgenstein, are just a few among many who (...) have proffered explanations. While all such proposals have been deficient in their own ways, each has advanced our understanding of the myriad phenomena associated with memory. With recent developments in phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and the empirical sciences interest in memory has intensified. In the 20th century, philosophers were particularly interested in identifying its causes, the ontology of mnemonic traces, the mechanisms of recall, and its epistemic characteristics. Moreover, as philosophy has directed its sight towards social objects and structures, questions involving memory have developed political and social dimensions as well – extending the debate to collective memory. What are the mechanisms of intersubjective memorization and recall of information, ideas, and representations? What are the ethical dimensions and consequences of public memory? (shrink)
The essay deals with Aquinas’theory of person, focusing especially on the relevance of this qualification in Saint Thomas’ theory of the «spiritual substances», on his rejection of Platonism and on his peculiar use of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of the intellecitve substances. We especially stress that Aquinas’functionalist theory of person places the concept of «dignity» as the ultimate foundation of rationality, understanding the latter as a specific assignement and a specific responsibility in the order of Creation.
This article deals with the concept of “mechanism” from a historical point of view, focusing on its relationship with the evolution of hylomorphism in the 17th century. I try to address the following questions: is mechanism structurally bound to materialism or does it rather represent a form of complete determinism, reconcilable with an “updated” version of hylomorphism? In the first part of the essay, I make the point that the very notion of “mechanism” must be clarified by means of a (...) distinction between Boylean experimental mechanism and what Daniel Garber has called the “pre-history of the Mechanical Philosophy”. My aim is to highlight how the deterministic (and nominalistic) hylomorphism developed in the 17th Century came quite close to mechanism. In this framework, I present the ‘strange case’ of Marin Cureau de La Chambre (1594-1669), which represents a characteristic compromise – based on the possibility of a not bodily extension – between a deterministic mechanization of the lower functions of the vegetative and sensitive soul and Campanella’s panpsychism. (shrink)
In this essay, I address Descartes’ medical thought, starting from the years of Le Monde and focus- ing especially on the “ontological” explanation of the dropsy in the Sixth Meditation. I especially consider Descartes’ attempt to ‘reform’ physiology according to the universal methodology of geometrical reasoning, as well as with the importance given by Descartes’ epistemology to the re- lationship between medicine and the mind-body union. The possibility of a coherent explanation of all the embodied phenomena, including illness and passions (...) is, in fact, a strategic opportunity to show the existence of an inner regularity in God’s Creation and so, to reconnect any ‘practical’ order (including medicine) to His essence. This leads Descartes to implicitly face the problem of the monstrous births, retracing what he could find in Toledo’s and Conimbricenses’ Commentaria. (shrink)
Il termine ‘catastrofe’ porta con sé, quasi non tradotte, le origini dal greco καταστροφή, che potremmo rendere con l’espressione “precipitazione degli eventi”, se sapessimo, con ciò, anche alludere al senso di un rovesciamento radicale, di una ‘situazione’ che questo lemma in sé custodisce. Kαταστροφή è, innanzitutto, parte del lessico della drammaturgia antica, dove è utilizzato per indicare un rivolgimento improvviso, l’avvenimento che mette fine alla καταστάσεις dell’azione drammatica e che conclude così la vicenda dell’eroe. Lo ribadisce, ancora nel ‘700, la (...) voce dell’Encyclopédie a cura di Edme-François Mallet, che definisce la catastrofe come «le changement ou la révolution qui arrive à la fin de l’action d’un poëme dramatique, & qui la termine». Catastrofe, quindi, come capovolgimento che sovverte un ordine, portandone alla luce la tessitura narrativa, che offre l’improvvisa conclusione di una vicenda, l’interruzione e il crollo di una continuità; una sovversione catartica che non preclude la possibilità di un nuovo inizio. -/- . (shrink)
This paper deals with Suárez's theory of extension and continuous quantity, as it is discussed in the Metaphysical Disputations and as a possible source for Descartes's concept of res extensa. In a first part of the paper, I analyse Suárez' account of divisibility and extension in a comparison with the Dominicans', Scotus and Fonseca's, and Ockham's. In the light of this analysis, Suárez's most original contribution seems being the claim that material composites have integral parts 'entitatively' extended (partem extra partem) (...) independently from categorial quantity. Such a theory allows Suárez to merge the Dominicans', the Scotists' and the Ockhamists' account, as the integral parts fund the internal but pre-quantitative divisibility of body, which is the source of quantity. In a second part of the paper, I deal with the reception of Suárez’s theory (especially in Rubio, Arriaga, Araujo, Eustachius and Abra de Raçonis), as well as with Descartes’ concept of res extensa. I conclude that Suárez’s account has been mainly criticized by the seventeenth Century Aristotelianism, as well as by Descartes. Despite that, Suárez’s idea of non-quantitatively extended parts had an interesting reception and effect in the debate, and especially in the (dominant) Scotistic context. (shrink)
The issue addresses the relationship between cosmology and ratio, or the dialectical and structural connection which links the same definition of “world” as a uniform, homogeneous, coherent and possible system with the very logical and narrative (and then uniform, homogeneous, coherent and possible) character of our rational description of it. Otherwise, every ratio mundi – understood both in a metaphysical or in an epistemological or in a phenomenological way – amounts, really because it is a ratio, as an explication and (...) an articulation of an object formerly pre-understood and, so to speak, invented, cum discursu, or rather into specific logic and descriptive categories. Because of this structural co-belonging of the concept of “cosmos” to his own narrative dimension, we may can reduce the history of cosmology to a long sequence of depictions, but overall of creations and re-creations of the world, that allow us to distinguish in a only partial way a physical and naturalistic discussion from a theological, a metaphysical or a linguistical-imaginative one. (shrink)