This paper is devoted to the investigation of term-definable connexive implications in substructural logics with exchange and, on the semantical perspective, in sub-varieties of commutative residuated lattices (FL ${}_{\scriptsize\mbox{e}}$ -algebras). In particular, we inquire into sufficient and necessary conditions under which generalizations of the connexive implication-like operation defined in [6] for Heyting algebras still satisfy connexive theses. It will turn out that, in most cases, connexive principles are equivalent to the equational Glivenko property with respect to Boolean algebras. Furthermore, (...) we provide some philosophical upshots like, e.g., a discussion on the relevance of the above operation in relationship with G. Polya’s logic of plausible inference, and some characterization results on weak and strong connexivity. (shrink)

Il s'agit d'un problème combinatoire de logique formelle, formulé par Jevons; il sera expliqué en détails dans ce qui suit (voir no. 1). Jevona luimême n'a traité le problème que dans les cas les plus simples (n= 1, 2, 3); un cas plus difficile (n= 4) a été traité par Clifford; le cas général (nquelconque) a été à peine abordé.Le but de ce travail est de faire remarquer que ce problème de Jevons et de Clifford est contenu comme cas particutier (...) dans un problème combinatoire général que j'ai traité ailleurs. La méthode générale ramène le problème présent à l'étude d'un certain groupe de permutations d'ordren!2n, étroitement lié au groupe symétrique d'ordren!. J'ai fait les calculs nécessaires pourn= 1, 2, 3, 4. Mes résultats numèriques sont complètement en accord avec les résultats de Jevons, mais ils ne s'accordent qu'en partie avec les résultats de Clifford.Une proposition peut être vraie ou fausse. On peut exprimer la même chose en disant que nous pouvons attribuer à une proposition l'une ou l'autre des deux “valeurs logiques” qui s'excluent mutuellement: la “vérité” et la “fausseté.”. (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (A). In (...) order to achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)

Swedenborg's Principles of Usefulness presents a possibly unsuspected historical undercurrent that further evidences Emanuel Swedenborg's pervasive influence on a whole host of historical figures-from poets and artists to philosophers and statesmen-whose contributions to the evolution of self and society have resonated throughout time and into the present. Besides having an impact on individual thinkers, Swedenborg's ideas worked their way into the various social reform traditions that vitalized the American landscape during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. His concept of usefulness, (...) best demonstrated in the competing worldviews of the nation's liberal and conservative traditions, involved a commitment made by Swedenborgians, New Church members, and others to energize the nation and its people by envisaging the possibility of a much-desired Universal Human. (shrink)

v. 1-2. Principles of philosophy and Elements of logic.--v. 3-4. Exact logic (published papers) and The simplest mathematics.--v. 5-6. Pragmatism and pragmaticism and Scientific metaphysics.--v. 7. Science and philosophy.--v. 8. Reviews, correspondence and bibliography.

In recent decades it has become increasingly clear that a substantial amount of cognitive work goes on independent of consciousness. The research has been carried out largely under two rubrics, implicit learning and implicit memory. The former has been concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge independent of awareness and the latter with the manner in which memories not readily available to conscious recall or recognition play a role in behavior; collectively these operations comprise the essential functions of the cognitive (...) unconscious. This paper reviews the recent history of work on these issues, identifies some of the problems confronting researchers, and introduces a theoretical framework based on principles of evolutionary biology within which to view them. The argument is that the cognitive unconscious, despite its apparent sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and antedates conscious cognitive systems by a considerable amount of time. Various entailments of this evolutionary perspective are explored including such issues as phylogeny and ontogeny of implicit processes, the robustness of the implicit functions as displayed by the capacity to resist disruptions from psychological and neurological disorders, the relationship between implicit cognition and intelligence, and individual differences in implicit cognitive abilities. (shrink)

Parkinson schreibt, es sei nicht klar, daß Alexander selbst von Geburt an Merkmale oder Zeichen des Ortes seines zukünftigen Todes in sich getragen haben müsse, weil der vollständige Begriff von Alexander den Begriff des in Babylon Sterbens enthält. Die vorliegende Interpretation des Prinzips der Vorherbestimmtheit der Geschichte verdeutlicht dies mit Hilfe der bildlichen Ausdrücke, Pläne und Dispositionen und mit Hilfe einer aristotelischen Unterscheidung zwischen "going to be" und "will be" , fur welche ein formaler chronologischer Apparat ausgearbeitet ist. Die Arbeit (...) gibt ebenfalls Einblick in den Gedanken, daB die Gegenwart schwanger mit der Zukunft ist, und antwortet auf Reschers Kritik, daß Leibniz' Metaphysik von Grund auf statisch sei. (shrink)

Investigators and institutional review boards should integrate plans about the appropriate disclosure of individual genetic results when designing research studies. The ethical principles of beneficence, respect, reciprocity, and justice provide justification for routinely offering certain results to research participants. We propose a result-evaluation approach that assesses the expected information and the context of the study in order to decide whether results should be offered. According to this approach, the analytic validity and the clinical utility of a specific result determine (...) whether it should be offered routinely. Different results may therefore require different decisions even within the same study. We argue that the threshold of clinical utility for disclosing a result in a research study should be lower than the threshold used for clinical use of the same result. The personal meaning of a result provides additional criteria for evaluation. Finally, the context of the study allows for a more nuanced analysis by addressing the investigators' capabilities for appropriate disclosure, participants' alternative access to the result, and their relationship with the investigators. This analysis shows that the same result may require different decisions in different contexts. (shrink)

The formal systems of logic have ordinarily been regarded as independent of biology, but recent developments in evolutionary theory suggest that biology and logic may be intimately interrelated. In this book, William Cooper outlines a theory of rationality in which logical law emerges as an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary biology. This biological perspective on logic, though at present unorthodox, could change traditional ideas about the reasoning process. Cooper examines the connections between logic and evolutionary biology and illustrates how logical rules (...) are derived directly from evolutionary principles, and therefore have no independent status of their own. Laws of decision theory, utility theory, induction, and deduction are reinterpreted as natural consequences of evolutionary processes. Cooper's connection of logical law to evolutionary theory ultimately results in a unified foundation for an evolutionary science of reason. It will be of interest to professionals and students of philosophy of science, logic, evolutionary theory, and cognitive science. (shrink)

The comprehensive guide to ethics "An excellent blend of case law, research evidence, down-to-earth principles, and practical examples from two authors with outstanding expertise. Promotes valuable understanding through case illustrations, self-directed exercises, and thoughtful discussion of such issues as cultural diversity."--Dick Suinn, president-elect 1998, American Psychological Association "The scenarios and accompanying questions will prove especially helpful to those who offer courses and workshops concerned with ethics in psychology."--Charles D. Spielberger, former president, American Psychological Association; distinguished research professor of psychology, (...) University of South Florida The authors draw on their professional experience, empirical studies, and case examples to examine the ethical responsibilities that confront psychotherapists and counselors in their day-to-day practice. They offer insights into contending with the sometimes competing demands of clients' needs, formal ethical principles, personal values, and evolving legal standards in a range of areas--including fees, informed consent, sexual concerns, confidentiality, documentation, and supervision. (shrink)

In 1824 Sadi Carnot published Réflexions sur la Puissance Motrice du Feu in which he founded almost the entire thermodynamics theory. Two years after his death, his friend Clapeyron introduced the famous diagram PV for analytically representing the famous Carnot’s cycle: one of the main and crucial ideas presented by Carnot in his booklet. Twenty-five years later, in order to achieve the modern version of the theory, Kelvin and Clausius had to reject the caloric hypothesis, which had influenced a few (...) of Carnot’s arguments. Relying on the possibility of studying the history of science by means of logical investigation, in this paper I shall propose an historical/epistemological research on Sadi Carnot’s original thermodynamics theory in which the French scientist presents more than two principles, all of which are expressed by double negated sentences (generally speaking) within non-classical logic. (shrink)

Logic as a subject has existed for a long time. Aristotle and the Stoics identified some of its principles, as did Indian logicians. And this ancient logic underwent an extraordinary mathematical development in the last hundred and fifty years. So logic certainly exists, at least as a branch of mathematics. The question is whether it is anything more than that.

David O. Brink offers a reconstruction and assessment of John Stuart Mill's contributions to the utilitarian and liberal traditions. Brink defends interpretations of key elements in Mill's moral and political thought, and shows how a perfectionist reading of his conception of happiness has a significant impact on other aspects of his philosophy.

Implicit processes almost certainly preceded explicit processes in our evolutionary history, so they are likely to be more resistant to disruption according to the principles of evolutionary biology [Reber, A. S. . The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 1, 93–133.]. Previous work . Knowledge, nerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.]) has shown that implicitly learned motor skills (...) remain stable under psychological pressure and concurrent cognitive demands, and recently [Poolton, J. M., Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. . Passing thoughts on the evolutionary stability of implicit motor behaviour: Performance retention under physiological fatigue. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 456–468.] showed that they also remain stable under conditions of anaerobic fatigue that would have significantly challenged the survival skills of our ancestors. Here we examine the stability of an implicitly learned motor skill under fatigue conditions that primarily tax a different physiological system , but which have equally strong evolutionary connotations. Participants acquired a throwing task by means of an errorless learning method or an errorful method. Motor performance in the errorless condition, but not the errorful condition, remained stable following an exhaustive VO2 max. running test. Our findings replicate and extend the work of Poolton et al., providing further support for Reber’s evolutionary distinction between implicit and explicit processes. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

This article turns one of most cited philosopher's John Dewey's title, How We Think (1933/1998) back upon itself to consider how ‘thought’ or ‘reason’ are cultural practices that historically order and generate principles for reflection and action. The discussion proceeds thusly: (1) Schooling is about changing people; (2) Changing people embodies cultural theses about modes of living, such as that of being a lifelong learner or a Learning Society. The modes of living in modern pedagogy embody changing cultural norms (...) and values about systems of reason that are to express universal cosmopolitan qualities; (3) Pedagogy fabricates the systems of reason to principles for reflection and participation that shreds provincial values in the name of greater universal cosmopolitan values; (4) This ‘making’ of cosmopolitan ‘reason’ forms through cultural practices that have overlapping sets of distinctions and differentiations about agency, the rational planning of one's biography in time, and science as a procedure for action in daily life. The educational sciences and philosophy of education are inscription devices or intellectual tools in the governing practices; (5) The inscriptions of reason, however, are more than mere qualities of thought or the mind. The narratives and images of cosmopolitan reason embody particular sublimes about collective hopes, desires and fears; (6) Further, the distinctions of cosmopolitan reason are comparative in that the very qualities of the ‘reasonable person’ create maps of its opposite: those who do not ‘fit’ the normalized qualities of the cosmopolitan thus stand outside that mode of living; The last section (7) provides three exemplars of the changing notions of the cosmopolitan and its ‘other’ in school subjects (literacy, mathematics, and music). School subjects are viewed as alchemies that transmogrify disciplinary thinking into normalizing pedagogies that fabricate who the child is and should be. The historical sketch has two layers in its educational study. One is to explore the politics of schooling with cosmopolitanism as a comparative method to consider the changing cultural practices that fabricate who child is and should be. The second raises questions about taken‐for‐granted categories and their systems of reason of education and reform. The very categories and distinctions of policy, educational research and philosophy are historicized as cultural practices to order, classify and divide what is ‘seen’ and felt as experience. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether it is possible to develop theoretical methods to reconcile absolute principles on the one hand and relative tenets on the other. I will look at this question through the lens of classical Chinese logic and, more concretely, through the elaborations of the Chinese logician Hui Shi on this relationship. The examination of this problem proceeds from a general introduction of the basic framework of semantically determined classical Chinese logic, through an illumination of (...) Hui Shi’s specific contributions to the field, to a tentative explanation of his conception of the nature of the relation between absoluteness and relativity, embedded in more general structures of his thought and illustrated by his interpretation of the possibility of unifying identity and difference. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the chief responsibility medical professionals bear is patient care and advocacy. The meeting of other duties, such as ensuring a more just distribution of medical resources and promoting the public good, is not considered a legitimate basis for curtailing or slackening beneficial patient services. It is argued that this assumption is often made without sufficient attention to foundational principles of professional ethics; that once core principles are laid bare this assumption is revealed as (...) largely unwarranted; and, finally, that these observations at the level of moral theory should be reflected, in various ways, in medical practice. Specifically, this essay clarifies a tension that exists between different kinds of moral principles and explores the possibility of dissipating that tension by shoring up foundational principles. The paper begins by setting out three alternative models of how best to balance patient advocacy responsibilities with broader social responsibilities. It then turns to critically assess these models and argue that one has several advantages over the others. (shrink)

This article aims to present Cicero and Wang Chong as theorists of divination. While it has already been determined that they advanced both defenses and criticisms, I specifically intend to focus on their significant criticisms of divination, which emerged as corrective for the practice by supporting or disapproving and extending or limiting its underlying principles. I also emphasize that these thinkers have different objectives and emphases in their criticisms. Cicero’s objective is to maintain the fundamental teachings of their forefathers, (...) prompting him to criticize anything that contradicts their teachings. Wang Chong’s objective is to make an appeal and encourage their people to be critical, and he often showed this through his criticism of the old, their classic texts, or even their tradition. In bringing them together, I show a robust and united rebuttal to the old ways of thinking about the divine and its ritualization. In conclusion, I offer an analysis that their critical attitudes, although different and may even be opposed, are complementary and both necessary. (shrink)

A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE that Herder is the founder not only of the modern philosophy of language but also of the modern philosophy of interpretation and translation and that he has many things to say on these subjects from which we may still learn today. This essay will not attempt to make such a case, but it will be concerned with some aspects of Herder’s position that would be central to it: three fundamental principles in his philosophy (...) of language which also play fundamental roles in his theory of interpretation and translation. The essay’s aim is also threefold: first, to describe the principles in question and their roles in this theory; second, to explain their emergence in a way which helps to make clearer the nature of Herder’s contribution ; and third, to give at least a sense of their philosophical subtlety and defensibility. (shrink)

Ethics plays a key role in the normative analysis of the impacts of technology. We know that computers in general and the processing of data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the combination of computers and/or artificial intelligence with robotics are all associated with ethically relevant implications for individuals, groups, and society. In this article, we argue that while all technologies are ethically relevant, there is no need to create a separate ‘ethics of X’ or ‘X ethics’ for each and (...) every subtype of technology or technological property—e.g. computer ethics, AI ethics, data ethics, information ethics, robot ethics, and machine ethics. Specific technologies might have specific impacts, but we argue that they are often sufficiently covered and understood through already established higher-level domains of ethics. Furthermore, the proliferation of tech ethics is problematic because (a) the conceptual boundaries between the subfields are not well-defined, (b) it leads to a duplication of effort and constant reinventing the wheel, and (c) there is danger that participants overlook or ignore more fundamental ethical insights and truths. The key to avoiding such outcomes lies in a taking the discipline of ethics seriously, and we consequently begin with a brief description of what ethics is, before presenting the main forms of technology related ethics. Through this process, we develop a hierarchy of technology ethics, which can be used by developers and engineers, researchers, or regulators who seek an understanding of the ethical implications of technology. We close by deducing two principles for positioning ethical analysis which will, in combination with the hierarchy, promote the leveraging of existing knowledge and help us to avoid an exaggerated proliferation of tech ethics. (shrink)

This article provides empirical evidence of the social context and moral reasoning embedded within a parents’ decision to participate in autism genetics research. Based on in-depth interviews of parents who donated their family’s blood and medical information to an autism genetic database, three narratives of participation are analyzed, including the altruistic parent, the obligated parent, and the diagnostic parent. Although parents in this study were not generally concerned with bioethical principles such as autonomy and the issues of informed consent (...) and/or privacy and confidentiality of genetic information, a critical analysis reveals contextual bioethics embedded within these different narratives. These include the negotiations of responsibility that parents confront in biomedical research, the misguided hope and expectations parents place in genomic science, and the structural barriers of obtaining an autism diagnosis and educational services. Based on these findings, this article demonstrates the limits of a principle-based approach to bioethics and the emergent forms of biological citizenship that takes into account the social situations of people’s lives and the moral reasoning they negotiate when participating in autism genetic research. (shrink)

There is a rich tradition within game theory, decision theory, economics, and philosophy correlating practical rationality with impartiality, and spatial and temporal neutrality. I argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over both times and places, and to times over places. I also show how three plausible dominance principles regarding people, places, and times conflict, so that we cannot accept all three. However, I argue that there are some cases where we should give priority to (...) times over people, suggesting that there is impersonal value to the distribution of high quality life over different times. (shrink)

Hume considered his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to be one of his best works. In it he offers his most elegant and approachable account of the origins and scope of morality. With the hope of reaching a broad audience, he argues that morality is neither rigid nor austere, but is rather a product of sentiments that all human beings share, and which they are naturally inclined to recognize and act upon. In this Critical Guide, a team of (...) distinguished scholars discuss each section of the Enquiry, its place in Hume's philosophy as a whole, and its historical context; their topics include the nature of morals, talents and moral virtues, benevolence, sympathy, and the sources of moral disagreement. The volume will be valuable for scholars and advanced students working on Hume. (shrink)

Skene and Parker1 raise a number of concerns about religious doctrine unduly influencing law and public policy through amicus curiae contributions to civil litigations or direct lobbying of politicians. Oakley2 picks this up in the same issue with an emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church’s interest in preventing the destruction of embryos for embryonic stem cell research. Skene, Parker, and Oakley seem to be concerned mostly with religious views having undue influence on public policy. My concern is the negative effect (...) that such Church influenced public policy may have on the progress of the biomedical research that is itself foundational to the debate. Oakley seems to be particularly incensed that, as he puts it: “Those who support a total ban on embryonic stem cell research sometimes talk as if theirs are the only views based on moral principle”.2 What seems to be at issue here though are not the moral principles of the sanctity and dignity of human life, but the application of those moral principles to biomedical research.The Roman Catholic Church has historically defended the sanctity and dignity of human life to varying degrees at different times. Human life for much of the past 2000 years was defined by the Church as the presence of the soul, which was thought at different times to appear at various different stages during development. Only recently, with the advent of modern biology, has the Roman Catholic Church shifted its position to claim that the fertilised egg also qualifies as the right sort of human life.3 It should be noted that this doctrinal change was fundamentally driven by developments in our understanding of embryology and not the process of ensoulment.The Church’s current position on the embryo is thus based not solely on Church doctrine but also on …. (shrink)

In section 1 of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume claims that those who deny the reality of morals are disingenuous. He also notes that philosophy has had a history of disagreements about whether morals originate in reason or in sentiment. Throughout his book, Hume applies an experimental method to find the “universal principles” from which morality is ultimately derived. Then, in Appendix 1, he then argues for the origin of these principles in sentiment or (...) taste, a product of “the human fabric.” Reason, Hume says, discovers objects “as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution.” Taste “has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” How can the quest for universal principles find a satisfactory answer in taste, a “productive” faculty? How is the notion that morality is a “new creation” consistent with an insistence on the reality of moral distinctions? Are the deliverances of taste, which are prompts to virtue, also judgments that can be evaluated as true or false? This essay shows that, on a proper reading, the elements of Hume’s moral epistemology in the second Enquiry are largely consistent. (shrink)

The topic of happiness is one of the oldest in philosophical researches. Now it is the subject of interest, in particular, for bioethicists, scientists who are looking for the principles of proper treatment of human life, health, and death. The concept of happiness acquires special significance in the quality of life bioethical conception. The author of the article outlines the origins of the understanding of happiness adopted by the supporters of this conception, as well as gives examples of its (...) application by them. The quality of life bioethical conception adopted utilitarian vision of happiness, developed mainly by J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. According to it, happiness is identified with benefit or pleasure, which can be measured and maximized. In the XX century utilitarians began to consider autonomy – the ability of a person to manage his or her own life and death – as an important element of happiness. The influence of the preference utilitarianism is also noticeable. In obedience to it they see happiness in the ability of person to realize his or her rational and autonomous desires. The medical conditions that does not allow it are interpreted as lack of happiness. Thus, they justify not only the admissibility of withdrawing treatment that doesn’t give the expected result, but also of euthanasia. Killing a person, in terms of the quality of life conception, may not be a lack of happiness if the other alternative is to continue living in conditions that do not allow a person to realize his or her preferences, or does not coincide with his or her ideas of a decent life. The lives of persons who do not manifest rationality and autonomy are interpreted as inhuman, as wrongful, and the person as deprived of the right to happiness. Critics of the quality of life conception point to the subjectivity of the criteria by which happiness is measured. The second reproach is the reference to the absence of a hierarchy of values. That is why they give pleasure and absence of suffering too much importance. (shrink)

A conference celebrating the appearance of Leibniz's New System in 1695 was organized by R. S. Woolhouse and held at the University of York, 5-8 July 1995. The opening lecture was given on behalf of the Leibniz Gesellechaft by Hans Poser: “L'ordre supérieur de l'âme raisonnable: On the Leibnizian Concept of Soul.” Other papers: Stuart Brown, “Leibniz's New System Strategy”; Antonio Lamarra, “Substantial Forms and Monads: the Système nouveau in comparison with the Principles of Nature and Grace”; G. H. (...) R. Parkinson, “Substantial Forms in the Système nouveau and Related Work”; Pauline Phemister, “Pre-established Harmony: Nature and Grace, Bodies and Souls”; Robert M. Adams, “The Pre-established Harmony and Its Place in the History of Modern Philosophy”; Christia Mercer, “How New is the New System?”; Roberto Palaia, “The New System of the Nature of Substances in the Philosophical Journals of the Seventeenth Century”; Donald Rutherford, “Est aliquid prodire tenus: The Système nouveau and the Development of Leibniz's Method”; Philip Beeley, “Points, Extension, and the Mind-body Problem: Remarks on the Development of Leibniz's Thought from the Hypothesis physica nova to the Système nouveau”; and Glenn Hartz, “Exactly How Are Leibnizian Substances Related to Extension?” The papers are being edited for publication by Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1938, is based on the Muirhead Lectures given at Birmingham University in February and March of 1937. The first half of this book is mainly devoted to an exposition of the principles of genetics, whilst the second half deals with more controversial topics, with the text providing an insight into the ideology of the time. This title will be of interest to students of politics and history.

In this article, I explore why Hume regarded his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals “incomparably the best” of everything he wrote, while this judgement of his is not confirmed at all by the rankings in popularity of his works. Hume’s main reason for this judgment was the conviction that regarding the principles of morals he had reached the most satisfying, systematical and evidently true results of all his work. I argue that the general rejection of Hume’s own (...) judgement is based on prejudices that fail to take into account the way Hume himself thought that his works should be read. Hume’s wish to explain his “new and distinct notion of moral philosophy” led him to introduce many changes to this Enquiry even until few days before his death. Hume’s intention were to guide the reader thus to an understanding of his system of ethics, for he had become aware of the fact that, instead of using exact definitions, he should rely on natural descriptions and good examples to make his main point come out more clearly. Hume’s appeal to the obvious as a key to understanding seems to suggest that the Scottish philosopher was indeed “very far away from most of contemporary analytic philosophy.”. (shrink)

This book brings together a number of essays that are optimistic about the ways certain neuroscientific insights might advance philosophical ethics, and other essays that are more circumspect about the relevance of neuroscience to philosophical ethics. As a whole, the essays form a self-reflective body of work that simultaneously seeks to derive normative ethical implications from neuroscience, and to question whether and how that may be possible at all. In doing so, the collection brings together psychology, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, (...) ethics, and philosophy of science. Neuroscience seeks to understand the biological systems that guide human behavior and cognition. Normative ethics, on the other hand, seeks to understand the system of abstract moral principles dictating how people ought to behave. By studying how the human brain makes moral judgments, can philosophers learn anything about the nature of morality itself? A growing number of researchers believe that neuroscience can, indeed, provide insights into the questions of philosophical ethics. However, even these advocates acknowledge that the path from neuroscientific is to normative ethical ought can be quite fraught. (shrink)

Principlism, the bioethical theory championed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, is centered on the four moral principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. Two key processes related to these principles are specification—adding specific content to general principles—and balancing—determining the relative weight of conflicting principles. I argue that both of these processes necessarily involve an appeal to human goods and evils, and therefore require a theory of the good. A significant problem with principlism is (...) that it lacks a theory of the good and consequently does not have an adequate solution to the problems of specification and balancing. My conclusion is that principlism must adopt some account of human well-being in order to be a satisfactory bioethical framework. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Appreciating Anorexia:Decisional Capacity and the Role of ValuesThomas Grisso (bio) and Paul S. Appelbaum (bio)Keywordscompetence, consent, anorexia, appreciation, decision makingTan and her colleagues (2006) reported that persons with anorexia nervosa typically manifest no difficulty satisfying the criteria for abilities associated with competence to consent to or refuse treatment. Their results led them to conclude that these patients generally had no problem grasping the nature of anorexia and its possible (...) consequences (understanding), typically did not have difficulty processing information when making treatment decisions (reasoning), and usually neither denied that they had a disorder nor manifested distorted beliefs about the potential consequences of treatment for the disorder.Nevertheless, these authors found, some anorexia patients said that they knew they might die and that they would rather die than suffer the alternative consequences (e.g., loss of identity, feeling of being disgusting). They point out that these beliefs, suggesting questionable competence, were not identified by the usual criteria for competence to consent to treatment. Therefore, they propose that we should consider a modification of the criteria for competence to consent to treatment. They argue for inclusion of "pathological values" as the basis for a finding of incompetence. Their notion of a pathological value (as we summarize it based on their Discussion) includes (a) a personal value (b) on which treatment refusal is based, that (c) is not authentic, and (d) is due to a mental disorder.Second, Tan and colleagues were concerned that the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), currently used widely to assess competence to consent to treatment, did not seem to take values into account when examining deficits related to lack of appreciation or reasoning. They point out that most patients with anorexia nervosa in their study had "pathological values" that influenced their thinking about treatment, yet they did not obtain poor scores on the instrument's appreciation scale, which assesses whether patients deny that they have the illness or offer reasons for accepting or refusing treatment that are based on delusional premises or a serious distortion of reality. Moreover, almost all of the anorexia patients in the study obtained adequate scores on reasoning, which examines the ability to process options and consequences when weighing a treatment decision. [End Page 293]Reasons for Caution in Altering Criteria for CompetenceA fundamental step in considering Tan and her co-worker's proposal is to examine whether it is necessary to add a concept of "pathological values" to the legal construct of competence to consent to treatment. Modifying the legal doctrine of consent is important if that is needed to improve its validity or reliability. But modifications of the doctrine would have considerable costs, including a long process of producing logical and empirical evidence for its necessity, developing methods to assess the new concept, and then a process of debate, persuasion, and education to change laws, ethical guidelines, and medical training. Moreover, principles of theory building urge parsimony. A theory should employ no more concepts or assumptions than are required to account for the phenomena that the theory seeks to organize or explain. So one must be sure that modifications are truly necessary before adding complexity to the theory of decisional competence.In addition, there is an inherent danger in altering a concept like competence to consent to treatment on the basis of the study of any one mental disorder. It is not at all clear how the modification might influence findings of competence when applied to other disorders. Using a study of patients with anorexia nervosa as the impetus for changing the competence concept runs this risk. For example, anorexia is one of a class of mental disorders that is characterized by a failure to abstain from behavior (here, limiting food intake and other behaviors designed to reduce weight) that has negative consequences for the person. Other conditions in this category might include substance abuse disorders and impulse control disorders (e.g., pathological gambling). Even if one concludes that revised criteria for competence would reduce false-positive findings of competence in this group of disorders, one would have to consider carefully its impact on the full range of disabling mental conditions.Moreover, the sensitivity... (shrink)

Veterinary ethics is a coordination of ethical principles that apply morals, values and judgements to the practice of veterinary profession. Veterinary ethics cover its practical application in veterinary practices as well as on its history, philosophy, theology, and sociology. Veterinary ethics combine veterinary professional ethics and the focus of animal ethics. It can be inferred as a critical manifestation on the provision of veterinary services in hold of the profession’s responsibilities to animal kind and mankind. Many ethical issues arise (...) in a business unit in veterinary practice. Whenever such issues arise, it may lead to dilemmas, then proper and well-thought out ethical decision is to be made. Ethical decision making process in a business unit in veterinary practice is the use of ethical theories, principles, and rules by veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals in resolving ethical dilemmas in the veterinary practice. In order to resolve ethical dilemmas, being aware of and revelation to ethical theories is essential. Thoughtfulness of animal welfare and ethical issues is an essential component of a good ethical veterinary practice. This article reviews and discusses the ethics and major steps engaged in the ethical decision-making process in a business unit in veterinary practice. Strong commitment to the role, organization’s commitment to ethics and staff support could lower the levels of moral stress while facing ethical dilemma in a veterinary practice. Though using the ethical frameworks portrayed may not change the actual decisions finally reached by veterinary professionals, a good knowledge of ethical issues is imperative for client communication, better job satisfaction and preserving a positive public outline for both the individual and the veterinary practice. (shrink)

Illustrates various basic principles and unifying concepts in the philosophy of science as the author has discovered them in his career.

The book considers foundational thinking in quantum theory, focusing on the role the fundamental principles and principle thinking there, including thinking that leads to the invention of new principles, which is, the book contends, one of the ultimate achievements of theoretical thinking in physics and beyond. The focus on principles, prominent during the rise and in the immediate aftermath of quantum theory, has been uncommon in more recent discussions and debates concerning it. The book argues, however, that (...) exploring the fundamental principles and principle thinking is exceptionally helpful in addressing the key issues at stake in quantum foundations and the seemingly interminable debates concerning them. Principle thinking led to major breakthroughs throughout the history of quantum theory, beginning with the old quantum theory and quantum mechanics, the first definitive quantum theory, which it remains within its proper (nonrelativistic) scope. It has, the book also argues, been equally important in quantum field theory, which has been the frontier of quantum theory for quite a while now, and more recently, in quantum information theory, where principle thinking was given new prominence. The approach allows the book to develop a new understanding of both the history and philosophy of quantum theory, from Planck's quantum to the Higgs boson, and beyond, and of the thinking the key founding figures, such as Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Dirac, as well as some among more recent theorists. The book also extensively considers the nature of quantum probability, and contains a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, "the statistical Copenhagen interpretation." Overall, the book's argument is guided by what Heisenberg called "the spirit of Copenhagen," which is defined by three great divorces from the preceding foundational thinking in physics-reality from realism, probability from causality, and locality from relativity-and defined the fundamental principles of quantum theory accordingly. (shrink)

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. I consider two benefits of rationalization, once we realize that rationalization is sincere. It allows us to work out, under practical pressure of rational consistency, which (...) are good reasons to act on. Rationalization also prompts us to establish meaningful patterns out of merely permissible options. (shrink)

The author presents a reading of Hume’s theory of passionate self-moderation and explore its application to the question of whether Hume accords any practicality to reason. One of Hume’s well-known arguments concludes that reason cannot exercise control over the passions, many of which cause or motivate action. So, it looks as though actions are inevitable results of unruly passions. Hume’s theory of action, however, embodies principles by which certain passions can moderate the effects of other passions. The goal in (...) this paper is two-fold: (1) to show that many of the details of Hume’s theory of passionate self-moderation are verified in contemporary psychological studies of emotion regulation, and (2) to argue that reason, for Hume, has a kind of practicality, given its role in passionate regulation, one that is often overlooked in discussions of Humean practical reason. -/- . (shrink)