28 essays on all aspects of Nietzsche's thought. The attached file contains the introduction and table of contents.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Volume 25, Issue 5, August 2020, Page 606-608.

The Routledge Companion of Critical Theory is an indispensable aid for anyone approaching this exciting field of study for the first time. By exploring ideas from a diverse range of disciplines "theory" encourages us to develop a deeper understanding of how we approach the written word. This book defines what is generically referred to as "critical theory," and guides readers through some of the most complex and fundamental concepts in the field, ranging from Historicism to Postmodernism, from Psychoanalytic Criticism (...) to Race and Postcoloniality. Fully cross referenced throughout, the book encompasses manageable introductions to important ideas followed by a dictionary of terms and thinkers which students are likely to encounter. Further reading is offered to guide students to crucial primary essays and introductory chapters on each concept. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham is one of the great British philosophers and is known for his influence on theories of politics and jurisprudence. This guidebook explores the main aspects of Bentham's philosophical system and its influence on ethics and philosophy of law. _Bentham on Law and Morality_ provides an accesible and sympathetic introduction to Bentham's main ideas and links them to subsequent debates about the utility, law and morality. Examining his two central works Kelly_ _assesses: the ideas and text of _An Introduction (...) to the Principles of Morals and Legislation_ and _Of Laws in General_ Bentham's life and the background to his works the continuing importance of Betham's work to political theory, ethics and law. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Exploring ideas from a diverse range of disciplines through a series of 11 critical essays and a dictionary of key names and terms, this book examines some of the most complex and fundamental theories in modern scholarship.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Bringing elementary logic out of the academic darkness into the light of day, Paul Tomassi makes logic fully accessible for anyone attempting to come to grips with the complexities of this challenging subject. Including student-friendly exercises, illustrations, summaries and a glossary of terms, _Logic_ introduces and explains: * The Theory of Validity * The Language of Propositional Logic * Proof-Theory for Propositional Logic * Formal Semantics for Propositional Logic including the Truth-Tree Method * The Language of Quantificational Logic including (...) the Theory of Descriptions. _Logic _is an ideal textbook for any logic student: perfect for revision, staying on top of coursework or for anyone wanting to learn about the subject. Related downloadable software for Macs and PCs is available for this title at www.logic.routledge.com. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

For many decades, race and racicsm have been common areas of study in departments of sociology, history, politcal science, English, and athropology. Much more recently, as the historical concept of race and racial categories have faced signifcant scientific and politcal challenges, philosophers have become more interested in these areas. This changing understanding of the ontology of race has invited inquiry from researchers in moral philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. The Routlege Companion to Philosophy of (...) Race offers in one comprehensive volume newly written articles on race from the world’s leading Analytic and Continental philosophers. It is, however, accessible to a readership beyond philosophy as well, providing a cohesive referencefor a wide student and academic readership. The _Companion_ synethesizes current philosophical understandings of race, providing 50 chapters on the history of philosophy and race as well as how race might be invesitaged in the usual frameworks of contemporary philosophy. The volume concludes with a section on philosophical approaches to some topics with broad interest outside of philosophy, like Colonialism, Affirmative Action, Eugenics, Immigration, Race and Disability, and Post-Racialism. By clearly explaining and carefully organizing the leading current philosophical thinking on race, this timely collection will help define the subject and bring renewed understanding of race to students and researchers in the humanities, social science, and sciences. (shrink)

I argue that the rarely discussed Antichrist can serve as perhaps the best guide to Nietzsche’s mature ethical theory. Commentators often argue or assume that while Nietzsche makes many critical points about traditional morality, he cannot be offering a positive ethical theory of his own. This, I argue, is a mistake. The Antichrist offers a substantive ethical theory. It explicitly articulates Nietzsche’s positive ethical principles, shows why these principles are justified, and uses them to condemn traditional Christian morality. The chapter (...) reviews and explains Nietzsche’s ethical theory. It also considers why commentators so often assume that Nietzsche cannot have an ethical theory: I argue that commentators tend to be driven by the assumption that all ethical theories embrace seven commitments. These commitments are, I suggest, definitive of Enlightenment ethical theory, but not of ethical theory as such; Nietzsche’s rejection of them in no way precludes his having a positive ethical theory of his own. (shrink)

The present chapter discusses the implications of virtual reality for the theory and practice of embodied cognitive science. The chapter discusses how recent technological innovations are poised to reshape our understanding of the materially-embodied and environmentally-situated mind, providing us with a new means of studying the mechanisms responsible for intelligent behavior. The chapter also discusses how a synthetically-oriented shift in our approach to embodied intelligence alters our view of familiar problems, most notably the distinction between embedded and extended cognition. The (...) chapter concludes by challenging the idea that virtual worlds ought to be seen as nothing more than a scientific ‘sandpit’ for the study of the embodied mind. Some forms of embodied intelligence can, I suggest, exist solely in virtual reality. In this sense, the ‘Matrix’ is not just a means of testing ideas about the forms of embodied intelligence that inhabit our own physical reality; it is also a means of creating entirely new forms of embodied intelligence. It is by building virtual worlds that we open the door to a new reality—one that is home to a potentially infinite variety of embodied, embedded, and perhaps even extended beings. (shrink)

The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...) a different approach. In addition to objective reality, which is usually understood and explored from an impersonal, quasi-observational and metaphysically realist perspective, we can also explore the nature and structure of subjective reality. The nature and structure of subjective reality is defined by the nature and structure of first-personal, conscious experience. Subjective reality is as real as objective reality, and a metaphysical realist such as myself can endorse the existence of both kinds of ontology. The mental states that, as experienced from the first-personal or subjective perspective, capture the nature and structure of subjective reality, are included in objective reality. The questions to explore in a subjective ontology of the self concern the nature and structure of the self from the first-personal or subjective perspective, that is, the nature and structure of the self from within. This is the subjective self. (shrink)

Chemistry, the science of substances and their transformations with roots in antiquity, provides as rich a source as any of the claims about what is not directly observable in the light of ideas reflecting both constancy and change. An important distinction in chemistry is that between macroscopic and microscopic realms, mistaken by positivists as a distinction between observable and theoretical and later by certain realists as a distinction between the merely superficial and the deeply theoretical. Recent realist themes about the (...) preservation of the extension of substance predicates typified by “water” and the view that 20th century scientific atomism vindicates earlier philosophical speculations about the corpuscular constitution of matter are unjustified. The relation between quantum and general chemistry is vexed. Despite questioning particular realist theses, however, none of this raises doubts about the basic realist stance that science seeks and sometimes achieves knowledge of a world independent of our thoughts. (shrink)

Over the past few centuries the free will debate has largely turned on the question of whether or not the truth of the thesis of determinism is compatible with the relevant form of freedom that is required for moral responsibility. This way of approaching the free will problem was fundamentally challenged by P.F. Strawson in his hugely influential paper “Freedom and Resentment,” which was published in 1962. In this paper Strawson pursues a line of argument that can be found in (...) the work of several major figures in the “moral sense school,” such as David Hume and Adam Smith. The strategy Strawson employs is one that begins with a complex and subtle description of the attitudes and practices that are constitutive of moral responsibility as we observe it in human life. According to Strawson, both sides in this debate fail to identify the real foundations of moral responsibility, which rests with the fabric of our human emotional psychology. When we start from inside these natural, human commitments, Strawson maintains, we are better placed to generate a viable and pertinent theory of human freedom as it relates to the requirements of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion is an indispensable guide and reference source to the major themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of religion. A team of renowned international contributors provide sixty-five accessible entries organised into nine clear parts: philosophical issues in world religions key figures in philosophy of religion religious diversity the theistic conception of God arguments for the existence of God arguments against the existence of God philosophical theology Christian theism recent topics in philosophy of (...) religion. Covering key world religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and key figures such as Augustine, Aquinas and Kierkegaard, the book explores the central topics in theism such as the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments for God's existence. Three final parts consider Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern orthodoxy and current debates including phenomenology, reformed epistemology, religious experience, and religion and science. This is essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy, religion and related disciplines. (shrink)

All morally wrong actions deserve some form of moral condemnation. But the degree of that condemnation is not the same in all cases. Some wrongs are so morally extreme that they seem to belong to a different category because they deserve our very strongest form of moral condemnation. For example, telling a white lie to make a friend feel better might be morally wrong, but intuitively such an act is in a different moral category to the sadistic, brutal, and violent (...) rape and torture of a child. The former act is merely wrong and not evil. In contrast, the latter act seems so morally extreme that we need to call it “evil” and not merely “wrong” if we are to do justice both to the moral seriousness of that act and the strength of our condemnation of it. The task of a theory or substantive conception of evil is to spell out what is an evil action and how it differs from a merely wrongful action. But what does a plausible substantive theory of evil look like? To explore this question, I spell out the concept of evil and illustrate four different types of substantive conceptions of evil actions: victim, perpetrator, spectator, and mixed theories. Of these four options, I argue that mixed theories are the most plausible type of theory, before investigating in detail the promising mixed theory recently defended by Matthew Kramer (2014b). Finally, in light of my analysis of Kramer’s view, I present a reformulated version of my combination theory of evil (Formosa 2008; Formosa 2013). (shrink)

Dependence is the most general notion under which a host of familiar metaphysical relations between entities – causation, supervenience, grounding, realisation etc. – fall. In the first section of this chapter, I offer offer some preliminary clarifications to outline the territory in a little more detail. Some years back this would have primarily involved differentiating kinds of dependence in terms of the strength of the modal operators used, and the other details of an analysis deploying them. Now, there has been (...) a proliferation of non-purely modal accounts of dependence. The second section identifies the various reasons that have been offered for this proliferation. The third section discusses a notion of ontological dependence and grounding, each of which draws on an appeal to the essence of the depending, or depended upon, entities. In spite of their popularity, we will see that such notions are of little assistance in capturing a central case of interest to us: the proper understanding of emergence. In the light of this, the fourth section defends a purely modal treatment of some of the problem cases outlined in the first section and also discussed a non-modal notion of construction. I close with a hypothesis that the combination of three features: a non-dependence account of fundamentality, various notions of construction and purely modal properties remove the motivation for appeal to an independent account of grounding in this, and perhaps any, area. (shrink)