72 found
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  1.  98
    The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10277-10309.
    Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the (...)
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  2.  63
    The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.
    We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look (...)
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  3. Imagining objects and imagining experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  4.  42
    Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (1):1-8.
    Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.
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  5. (1 other version)A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.
    In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into (...)
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  6.  45
    The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury. pp. 87–111.
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  7.  88
    Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) - 2003 - New York: Routledge.
    Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...)
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  8.  33
    A Variety of Causes.Paul Noordhof - 2020 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    The book provides an analysis of a key notion in our lives, causation: what its nature is; how we should characterise it in language, how it relates to laws of nature, how causes differ from their effects and why they tend to occur earlier than their effects.
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  9.  52
    Emergent Causation and Property Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  10.  76
    Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.
    Paul Noordhof; Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1.
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  11. Prospects for a counterfactual theory of causation.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. New York: Routledge.
     
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  12. Expressive perception as projective imagining.Paul Noordhof - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):329–358.
    I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of the properties which constitute the realisation of the expressive properties experienced. I compare this proposal with arousal theories, Wollheim’s Freudian account, and other more closely related theories appealing to imagination such as Kendall Walton’s. I explain why the proposal is most naturally developed in (...)
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  13. Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.
    The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further (...)
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  14. Probabilistic causation, preemption and counterfactuals.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):95-125.
    Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts (...)
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  15.  67
    Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-226.
  16. Imaginative Content.Paul Noordhof - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 96-129.
    Sensuous imaginative content presents a problem for unitary accounts of phenomenal character (or content) such as relationism, representationalism or qualia theory. Four features of imaginative content are at the heat of the issue: its perspectival nature, the similarity with corresponding perceptual experiences, the multiple use thesis, and its non-presentational character. I reject appeals to the dependency thesis to account for these features and explain how a representationalist approach can be developed to accommodate them. I defend the multiple use thesis against (...)
     
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  17.  90
    In pain.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):95-97.
    When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the.
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  18. Wading in the Shallows.Paul Noordhof - 2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-214.
    One understanding of naturalism about perception allows that results in the sciences bearing on the senses may have an impact upon philosophical theorising on perception. Its opponents reject or, at least, are much more wary about this possibility. I consider two cases: the implications of prediction error theories for naïve realism and the latest empirical research on cross modal illusions, and taste, for the traditional division of the senses into five. Although in neither case are the implications straightforward, I argue (...)
     
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  19.  25
    Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):109-114.
    Paul Noordhof; Discussion: Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1.
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  20.  98
    Making the Change: the Functionalist’s Way.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. g. neuroscience. I show (...)
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  21. Self-deception, interpretation and consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  22. The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - In . pp. 87-111.
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  23. Mental causation : ontology and patterns of variation.Paul Noordhof - 2013 - In Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  24.  50
    The Essential Instability of Self-Deception.Paul Noordhof - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):45-71.
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  25. Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent Representation.Paul Noordhof - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 80-108.
    One dimension of the controversy over whether evaluative properties are presented in perceptual content has general roots in the debate over whether perceptual content, in general, is rich or austere. I argue that we need to recognise a level of rich non-sensory perceptual content, drawing on experiences of chicken sexing and speech perception, to capture what our experience is like and our epistemic entitlements. In both cases (and many others), we are not conscious of the precise perceptual cues that are (...)
     
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  26.  24
    (1 other version)More in pain..Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
    made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I'm afraid that Tye's objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point. Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye's reply fail because, although (...)
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  27.  9
    Not Old... But Not That New Either.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. pp. 85.
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  28. In a state of pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that Tye has (...)
     
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  29.  71
    For a (revised) PCA-analysis.Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof & Murali Ramachandran - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):45–47.
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  30. Causation by content?Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.
    Non-reductive Physicalism together with environment-dependence of content has been thought to be incompatible with the claim that beliefs are efficacious partly in virtue of their possession of content, that is, in virtue of their intentional properties. I argue that this is not so. First, I provide a general account of property causation. Then, I explain how, even given the truth of Non-reductive Physicalism and the environment-dependence of content, intentional properties will be efficacious according to this account. I go on to (...)
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  31.  39
    Morgenbesser's coin, counterfactuals and independence.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):261-263.
    In assessing counterfactuals, should we consider circumstances which match the actual circumstances in all probablistically independent fact or all causally independent fact? Jonathan Schaffer argues the latter and claims that the former approach, advanced by me, cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser’s coin. More generally, he argues that, where there is a difference between the two, his account yields our intuitive verdicts about the truth of counterfactuals where mine does not (Schaffer 2004: 307, n. 16). In this brief note, (...)
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  32. Not old... But not that new either: Explicability, emergence, and the characterisation of materialism.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic.
     
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  33.  37
    Tooley on backward causation.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):157-162.
  34.  68
    (1 other version)A coherentist response to Stoneham's reductio.Paul Noordhof - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):267–268.
  35. (1 other version)Something like ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
    One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...)
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  36. Sensory Substitution and the Challenge from Acclimatisation.Paul Noordhof - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy, Oxford University Press. pp. 73-93.
    A refined characterisation of sensory substitution has, as a consequence, that the substituting sense plus sensory substitution device is not always appropriately classified as the substituted sense. As a result, I argue, acclimatisation to a sensory substitution device is plausibly thought of as providing presentations of properties. Externalist accounts of experience together with objectivist characterisations of such properties have the upshot that properties putatively proprietary to a sense modality can be presented in another modality in cases of substitution. I consider (...)
     
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  37.  62
    In defence of influence?Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):323-327.
    there is a substantial range of C1, C2, … of different not-too- distant alterations of C and a range E1, E2, of alterations of E, at least some of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred and so on (Lewis 2000).
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  38.  19
    XII*-Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-266.
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  39. Problems for the m-set analysis of causation.Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):457-463.
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  40.  86
    The overdetermination argument versus the cause-and-essence principle--no contest.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):367-375.
    Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that 'actuality is exhausted by physical reality' (Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all that there is in actuality are those things identified by physics. Rather the thought is that actuality is made up of all the things identified by physics and anything which is a compound of these things. So there (...)
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  41.  27
    Art and Belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Art and Belief presents new work at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of art. Topics include the cognitive contributions artworks can make, the phenomenon of fictional persuasion, and the nature of aesthetic testimony, and the relation between belief and truth in our experience of art.
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  42. Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof & Clark Glymour - unknown
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
     
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  43.  14
    Introduction.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-11.
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  44.  25
    Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for Dretske.Paul Noordhof - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.
    I argue that Fred Dretske's account of the causal relevance of content only works if another account works better, that put forward by Gabriel Segal and Elliot Sober. Dretske needs to appeal to it to deal with two problems he faces: one arising because he accepts that the mere association between indicators and indicated is causally relevant to the recruitment of indicators in causing behaviour, the other from the need to explain how a present token of a certain type of (...)
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  45.  71
    Aspects of Psychologism By Tim Crane.Paul Noordhof - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):676-678.
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  46.  5
    and Patterns of Variation.Paul Noordhof - 2013 - In Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 88.
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  47. Dependence.Paul Noordhof - 2019 - In Sophie Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-54.
    Dependence is the most general notion under which a host of familiar metaphysical relations between entities – causation, supervenience, grounding, realisation etc. – fall. In the first section of this chapter, I offer offer some preliminary clarifications to outline the territory in a little more detail. Some years back this would have primarily involved differentiating kinds of dependence in terms of the strength of the modal operators used, and the other details of an analysis deploying them. Now, there has been (...)
     
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  48.  48
    Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  49.  45
    Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation.Paul Noordhof - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):551-575.
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  50.  26
    Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain.Paul Noordhof - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):173-182.
    : Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of the conditions required (...)
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