Concerns about threats to human autonomy feature prominently in the field of AI ethics. One aspect of this concern relates to the use of AI systems for problematically manipulative influence. In response to this, the European Union’s draft AI Act (AIA) includes a prohibition on AI systems deploying subliminal techniques that alter people’s behavior in ways that are reasonably likely to cause harm (Article 5(1)(a)). Critics have argued that the term ‘subliminal techniques’ is too narrow to capture the target cases (...) of AI-based manipulation. We propose a definition of ‘subliminal techniques’ that (a) is grounded on a plausible interpretation of the legal text; (b) addresses all or most of the underlying ethical concerns motivating the prohibition; (c) is defensible from a scientific and philosophical perspective; and (d) does not over-reach in ways that impose excessive administrative and regulatory burdens. The definition is meant to provide guidance for design teams seeking to pursue responsible and ethically aligned AI innovation. (shrink)

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...) it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control. (shrink)

It is common in political theory and practice to challenge normatively ambitious proposals by saying that their fulfillment is not feasible. But there has been insufficient conceptual exploration of what feasibility is, and very little substantive inquiry into why and how it matters for thinking about social justice. This paper provides one of the first systematic treatments of these issues, and proposes a dynamic approach to the relation between justice and feasibility that illuminates the importance of political imagination and dynamic (...) duties to expand agents’ power to fulfill ambitious principles of justice. (shrink)

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that (...) the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort. (shrink)

Human dignity: social movements invoke it, several national constitutions enshrine it, and it features prominently in international human rights documents. But what is human dignity, why is it important, and what is its relationship to human rights? -/- This book offers a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of human rights. First, it clarifies the network of concepts associated with dignity. Paramount within this network is a core notion of human dignity as (...) an inherent, non-instrumental, egalitarian, and high-priority normative status of human persons. People have this status in virtue of their valuable human capacities rather than as a result of their national origin and other conventional features. Second, it shows how human dignity gives rise to an inspiring ideal of solidaristic empowerment, which calls us to support people's pursuit of a flourishing life by affirming both negative duties not to block or destroy, and positive duties to protect and facilitate, the development and exercise of the valuable capacities at the basis of their dignity. The most urgent of these duties are correlative to human rights. Third, this book illustrates how the proposed dignitarian approach allows us to articulate the content, justification, and feasible implementation of specific human rights, including contested ones, such as the rights to democratic political participation and to decent labour conditions. Finally, this book's dignitarian approach helps illuminate the arc of humanist justice, identifying both the difference and the continuity between the basic requirements of human rights and more expansive requirements of social justice such as those defended by liberal egalitarians and democratic socialists. -/- Human dignity is indeed the moral heart of human rights. Understanding it enables us to defend human rights as the urgent ethical and political project that puts humanity first. (shrink)

I will examine the first of Thomas Kuhn’s Thalheimer Lectures delivered in 1984, with the purpose of establishing a connection between Kuhn’s historiographical thought and his criticism of the traditional distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, or, as I call it, the DJ distinction. In order to do this, I will start by exploring the Kuhnian view of the so-called static approach in philosophy of science, taking as my main reference the work of Bacon, Descartes, (...) and foundationalist epistemology. I will continue by examining the relationship between Kuhnian historiography and the DJ distinction, comparing the first Thalheimer Lecture with other texts published by Kuhn. Finally, I will assert that Kuhn’s rejection of the DJ distinction is the result of adopting a historiographical matrix whose philosophical consequences are irreconcilable with the static approach in history and philosophy of science, for which the DJ distinction is essential. (shrink)

This paper offers an exploration of the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.” The Abilities/Needs Principle is arguably the ethical heart of socialism but, surprisingly, has received almost no attention by political philosophers. I propose an interpretation of the principle and argue that it involves appealing ideas of solidarity, fair reciprocity, recognition of individual differences, and meaningful work. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I analyze Marx’s formulation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Second, (...) I identify the principle’s initial plausibility, but show that it faces serious problems that cannot be addressed without developing a fresh interpretation of it. Third, I provide an interpretation of the principle that highlights demands concerning opportunities for self-realization in work, positive duties of solidarity, sensitivity to individual differences, and mechanisms of fair reciprocity. Fourth, I discuss a possible institutional implementation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Finally, I identify some normative puzzles about the transition from capitalism to socialism, and suggest how the Abilities/Needs Principle might gain motivational traction by mobilizing the powerful idea of human dignity. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of human dignity based on a discussion of Kant's moral and political philosophy and then shows its relevance for articulating and developing in a fresh way some normative dimensions of Marx’s critique of capitalism as involving exploitation, domination, and alienation, and the view of socialism as involving a combination of freedom and solidarity. What is advanced here is not Kant’s own conception of dignity, but an account that partly builds on that conception and partly criticizes (...) it. The same is the case with the account of socialism in relation to Marx’s work. As articulated, Kantian dignity and Marxian socialism turn out to be quite appealing and mutually supportive. (shrink)

This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an (...) analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. (shrink)

This paper offers a justification of labor rights based on an interpretation of the idea of human dignity. According to the dignitarian approach, we have reason to organize social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable capacities of human beings that give rise to their dignity. That dignity is a deontic status in virtue of which people are owed certain forms of respect and concern. Dignity at work involves the treatment of people in accordance to (...) the ideal of solidaristic empowerment as it pertains to their life as workers. This requires that we generate feasible and reasonable social schemes to support each other as we pursue the development and exercise of our valuable capacities to produce in personally and socially beneficial ways. The spectrum of dignitarian justice goes from basic rights to decent working conditions to maximal rights to flourish in working practices that are free from domination, alienation, and exploitation. (shrink)

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss (...) concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off. (shrink)

This paper offers a normative exploration of what exploitation is and of what is wrong with it. The focus is on the critical assessment of the exploitation of workers in capitalist societies. Such exploitation is wrongful when it involves a contra-solidaristic use of power to benefit oneself at the expense of others. Wrongful exploitation consists in using your greater power, and sometimes even in making other less powerful than you, in order to get them to benefit you more than they (...) ought to. This account of exploitation is appealing because it simultaneously captures three morally significant dimensions of exploitation—its material and social background, the relational (interpersonal and systemic) attitudes it enacts, and the final distributive results it generates. Exploitation is indeed a multidimensional social process. The flipside of the proposed critical characterization of this process is a positive ideal of solidaristic empowerment in the allocation and use of economic power, which the paper articulates in terms of the socialist Abilities/Needs Principle (“from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs”). The Abilities/Needs Principle is grounded in human dignity. (shrink)

The current legal and political practice of human rights invokes entitlements to freely chosen work, to decent working conditions, and to form and join labor unions. Despite the importance of these rights, they remain under-explored in the philosophical literature on human rights. This article offers a systematic and constructive discussion of them. First, it surveys the content and current relevance of the labor rights stated in the most important documents of the human rights practice. Second, it gives a moral defense (...) of these rights arguing that their support involves an appropriate response to important human interests and to the human dignity of workers. Finally, it explores central normative issues about the relation between labor rights and human dignity. It responds to some objections about the importance of work, explains why labor human rights may not exhaust the demands of dignity regarding labor and arbitrates a common tension between independence and solidarity within our practical affirmation of human dignity. (shrink)

What is a duty of justice? And how is it different from a duty of beneficence? We need a clear account of the contrast. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the philosophical literature as to how to characterize it. Different articulations of it have been provided, but it is hard to identify a common core that is invariant across them. In this paper, I propose an account of how to understand duties of justice, explain how it contrasts with several proposals (...) as to how to distinguish justice and beneficence, respond to some objections and suggest further elaborations of it. The conceptual exploration pursued in this paper has practical stakes. A central aim is to propose and defend a capacious concept of justice that makes a direct discussion of important demands of justice (domestic and global) possible. Duties of justice can be positive besides negative, they can be imperfect as well as perfect, they can range over personal besides institutional contexts, they can include multiple associative reasons such us non-domination, non-exploitation and reciprocity, and they can even go beyond existing national, political, and economic associative frameworks to embrace strictly universal humanist concerns. We should reject ideological abridgments of the concept of justice that render these possibilities, and the important human interests and claims they may foster, invisible. (shrink)

¡El Guernica es un Belén, un Belén reventado por las bombas!

The paper discusses certain discrepancies between The Copernican Revolution (1957) and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) by Thomas Kuhn. It shows that they present a different consideration of extra-scientific factors, that in the former have a higher explanatory weight. It states that in 1957 Kuhn applies a casuistical historiography, focused on the Copernican revolution, and in 1962 a structural historiography, focused on the invariable features of scientific revolutions. The paper concludes that the differences between these two works are significant (...) enough so as not to be considered an expression of the same view of science. (shrink)

Intervención en los XIV Encuentros de filosofía, Oviedo 13-14 de abril de 2009.

Resumen: Janet Folina ha propuesto una interpretación del convencionalismo de Poincaré contraria a la que ofrecen Michael Friedman y Robert DiSalle. Ambos afirman que la propuesta de Poincaré queda refutada por la relati-vidad general pues supone una noción restrictiva de los principios a priori. Folina sostiene que el convencionalismo de Poincaré no es contradictorio con la relatividad general porque permite una noción relativizada de los princi-pios a priori. Intento mostrar que la estrategia de Folina es ineficaz porque Poincaré no puede (...) explicar el papel de la variedad de Riemann en la rela-tividad general. Concluyo que la tentativa de reconstruir el desarrollo de la relatividad general a partir de la filosofía de Poincaré puede constituir un obs-táculo para comprender la radicalidad del cambio que la relatividad generó en las relaciones entre física y geometría.: Janet Folina has proposed an interpretation of Poincaré’s conven-tionalism against Michael Friedman and Robert DiSalle. They both state that Poincaré’s proposal is refuted by general relativity, since it implies a restrictive notion of a priori principles. Folina claims that Poincaré’s conventionalism is not in conflict with general relativity because from Poincaré’s proposal it is possible to extract a relativized notion of a priori principles. I intend to show that Folina’s strategy is ineffective due to Poincaré’s inability to explain the role of Riemann manifold in general relativity. I conclude that the attempt to reconstruct the development of general relativity from Poincaré’s philosophy may be an obstacle to understanding the radical nature of the change that relativity brought to the relationship between physics and geometry. (shrink)

Frecuentemente se atribuye al empirismo apelar a principios no empíricos para defender el conocimiento empírico, por ello se le ha acusado de incurrir en cierta clase de autorrefutación. Con el advenimiento del empirismo lógico, esta objeción tomó la forma de cuestionamiento al criterio empirista de significado, señalando que, al no tratarse de una proposición lógica ni empírica, no cumple con sus propias condiciones de significatividad. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que dentro del empirismo lógico se desarrollaron respuestas a estas críticas, (...) lo suficientemente consistentes como para resistir la objeción de autorrefutación. Asimismo, defiendo que la afirmación de autorrefutación del criterio empirista de significado parte de comprensión inadecuada de los niveles lingüísticos involucrados en su formulación, así como de algunos supuestos no explícitos respecto de su estatus. Empiricism has frequently been said to appeal to non-empirical principles to defend empirical knowledge, which is why it has been accused of falling into some form of self-refutation. With the advent of logical empiricism, this objection became a questioning of the empiricist criterion of meaning, noting that since it is neither a logical nor an empirical proposition, it does not fulfill its own conditions of meaningfulness. This paper intends to show that responses to this criticism, consistent enough to resist the objection of self-refutation, have been developed whithin logical empiricism. In addition, the article claims that the assertion that the empiricist criterion of meaning is self-refuting is based on an inadequate understanding of the linguistic levels involved in its formulation, as well as on some unspecified assumptions regarding its status. (shrink)

In this introduction, we argue for a basic idea. Community-based spaces for promoting forgiveness and memory-making bear the promise of promoting some of the cultural transformations needed for thick, structural reconciliation. As we show by discussing some recent examples taken from the Colombian context of the past decade, these spaces do not compete, but actually complement a pragmatic, thin institutional design for reconciliation. This idea, as we discuss here, serves as the common thread connecting the articles in this special issue. (...) The texts reflect on the practice of forgiveness and some of its specific contours in the context of the Colombian conflict. (shrink)

Introducción: mito y conocimiento.--La crisis del hombre en la "sociedad de masas."--El hombre y la masa.--El camino de Marx.--Los "proyectos" del humanismo cristiano.--Los humanismos en disputa.--El humanismo socialista.

Aproximación al pensamiento de Rodolfo Kusch -- Canto e identidad en el Martín Fierro según Carlos Astrada y Rodolfo Kusch -- Donde el barro se subleva -- La rehabilitación del saber seminal como camino hacia una mística popular -- Kusch y el impulso social de nuestra época -- La barbarización de la civilización, una grieta de antaño -- ¿De dónde pensarnos?

El objetivo de este estudio es interpretar la relación entre el modelo anatómico de Descartes y el régimen disciplinario que M. Foucault propone en su tesis sobre el poder en la Modernidad. Se muestra cómo Foucault sitúa a Descartes como el iniciador de una medicina que convertiría el cuerpo humano en una máquina y al igual que esta, pasaría a concebirse como un sistema mecánico susceptible de ser explorable, controlable y manipulable.

Can we develop a definition of power that is satisfactorily determinate but also enables rather than foreclose important substantive debates about how power relations proceed and should proceed in social and political life? I present a broad definition of agential power that meets these desiderata. On this account, agents have power with respect to a certain outcome (including, inter alia, the shaping of certain social relations) to the extent that they can voluntarily determine whether that outcome occurs. This simple definition (...) generates a surprisingly complex agenda for substantive research. It is quite fruitful for both descriptive and normative purposes-or so this paper argues. The broad account of agential power offered here is partly developed through a critical engagement with Rainer Forst's important recent account of "noumenal power.". (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted in-person dispute resolution proceedings, leading to the rapid adoption of digital technologies for remote hearings in international arbitration. The use of these technologies has opened up new possibilities for enhancing procedures, improving efficiency, and streamlining processes. However, it also raises concerns about transparency and authenticity in virtual hearings. This paper explores the impact of digital technologies on the semiotics of law and legal communication in international arbitration, considering the intersections between new technologies and persuasion. Based on (...) practices like the use of e-evidence, debates surrounding remote hearings, and the formulation of standards for stakeholders’ behavior, the study takes a practice-based approach, exploring cognitive processes, such as memory and attention, and their influence on the behavior of counsel, arbitrators, and witnesses in remote hearings. It highlights the key issues, findings, challenges, and future research opportunities arising from the introduction of digital technologies in this field, including considerations on how stakeholders of a virtual hearings are affected by the unique features of the digital environment. (shrink)