On the powerful qualities view, every fundamental property is both dispositional and qualitative. Identity theory is the standard account of the view, which makes the stronger claim that a property’s dispositionality and qualitativity are identical to each other, and identical to the property itself. Recent defences of the powerful qualities view have involved novel theories of powerful qualities which are not also variants of identity theory. Giannotti (Erkenntnis 86:603–621, 2021a) has suggested a novel theory of his own, the dual aspect (...) account, which makes use of a particular notion of aspects. For Giannotti, dispositionality and qualitativity are each an aspect of a property, and an aspect is a property’s way of being. The importance of aspects is twofold. Firstly, by introducing aspects to identity theory, the theory becomes more precise. Secondly, aspects allow for a novel theory of powerful qualities, the dual aspect account, which maintains that dispositionality and qualitativity are aspects, but rejects the identity claim. Giannotti’s aim is to show that even if identity theory is false, the dual aspect account remains an available theory for advocates of powerful qualities. This paper will be a critical examination of Giannotti’s ideas. Firstly, I will clarify Giannotti’s notion of aspects, explaining how it involves a misunderstanding of supervenience, and why it does not offer the advantages that he claims it does. Secondly, in light of my discussion of aspects, I will argue that the dual aspect account lacks relative advantages over the compound view of powerful qualities. (shrink)

This essay aims to analyse the theoretical and epistemological foundations of the symbol and their representations. First of all, we have explored its ontological scope. Secondly, we have highlighted its presence in everyday life. Thirdly, we have underlined the importance of the interpretation when addressing their multiple senses. And fourthly, we have expressed its social and cultural importance. The thesis here is that the symbolic is a structural condition of humankind, such as a being of mediation. Therefore we claim an (...) epistemological perspective that takes into consideration this notion, key to understanding human being and psychosocial reality. El presente ensayo tiene como objetivo principal analizar los fundamentos teórico- epistemológicos del concepto de símbolo y sus formas de representación. En primer lugar se delimitó el alcance ontológico de esta noción. En segundo se destacó su presencia en la realidad cotidiana. En tercero se subrayó la importancia de la interpretación a la hora de abordar sus múltiples sentidos y, en cuarto, se manifestó su relevancia social y cultural. La tesis que aquí se sostiene es que lo simbólico es una condición estructural del ser humano, como ser de mediaciones. Por ello reivindicamos una perspectiva epistemológica que tenga presente esta noción, clave para comprender al ser humano y la realidad psico-social en la que se inserta. (shrink)

This essay aims to broaden the understanding of the nature of the physician–patient relationship. To do so, the concept of medical philia that Pedro Laín Entralgo proposes is analysed and is considered taking into consideration the relational trait of the human being and the structure of human action as a story of the permanent tension that exists between freedom and truth, where the ontological foundation of the hermeneutic of the "Gift" and the analogy of “Love” as the central dynamic of (...) this action, helps explain the nature of the doctor-patient relationship as a "friendship relationship". This understanding offers a perspective differing from just the utilitarian considerations of current "patient-centred" approaches and proposed the redirection of the teaching of medicine to more humanistic approaches. The dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship proposed here in its most genuine essence is effectively expressed in physician concrete attitudes that the patient usually captures and relates as the “the doctor’s way of being”. Goya's painting, Self-portrait with Dr Arrieta (1820), can be taken as an outstanding artistic representation of this expanded dimension of the medical act, capturing the “medical friendship” in action. (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch a new model for the format of the content of understanding states, Compressible Graph Maximalism (CGM). In this model, the format of the content of understanding is graphical, and compressible. It thus combines ideas from approaches that stress the link between understanding and holistic structure (like as reported by Grimm (in: Ammon SGCBS (ed) Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemollogy and the Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, 2016)), and approaches that emphasize the connection between (...) understanding and compression (like Wilkenfeld (Synthese 190(6):997–1016, 2018)). I argue that the combination of these ideas has several attractive features, and I defend the idea against some challenges. (shrink)

Designing an ontology that meets the needs of end-users, e.g., a medical team, is critical to support the reasoning with data. Therefore, an ontology design should be driven by the constant and efficient validation of end-users needs. However, there is not an existing standard process in knowledge engineering that guides the ontology design with the required quality. There are several ontology design processes, which range from iterative to sequential, but they fail to ensure the practical application (...) of an ontology and to quantitatively validate end-user requirements through the evolution of an ontology. In this paper, an ontology design process is proposed, which is driven by end-user requirements, defined as Competency Questions. The process is called CQ-Driven Ontology DEsign Process and it includes activities that validate and verify the incremental design of an ontology through metrics based on defined CQs. CODEP has also been applied in the design and development of an ontology in the context of a Mexican Hospital for supporting Neurologist specialists. The specialists were involved, during the application of CODEP, in collecting quality measurements and validating the ontology increments. This application can demonstrate the feasibility of CODEP to deliver ontologies with similar requirements in other contexts. (shrink)

The problem of ontological determination of the historical being, inHeidegger’s words, can´t be developed in the historiografic ground as anhistorical science; further, the right conceptualization of epistemologicalproblems about historiografy, mains depends on a previous resolution of thehistorical..

Loughlin’s (2018) uses Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations to motivate his ‘wide’ view of cognition. In opposition to other accounts of extended cognition, his view presents a negative solution to the location problem. Here, I argue that, if we consider Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of ability, the support for the wide view is not as straightforward. The criteria for using the concept of ability are highly context-dependent, and there is not a single account for them. This shows that at (...) best, a moderate form of anti-individualism for cognitive capacities can be defended on Wittgensteinian grounds. Furthermore, the suggestion that ontological questions can be bypassed is questioned. (shrink)

Through the concept of enjoyment in Levinas, this paper examines the phenomenological and ontological dimension of everyday aesthetics. Enjoyment, in Levinas, forms an essential element in the constitution of the subjectivity of the human being and is no longer to be seen as a moment of ‘inauthenticity’ or ‘alienation’. The experience of the objects of everyday experience is not related to that of objects of representation or of tools, but rather to that of a system of nourishment into which the (...) subject is integrated, as in an ‘element’ or ‘atmosphere’. This constitutive closeness of enjoyment indicates the fundamental difference between what we understand as everyday aesthetics and other aesthetics characterised by contemplation or disinterest. (shrink)

Through the concept of enjoyment in Levinas, this paper examines the phenomenological and ontological dimension of everyday aesthetics. Enjoyment, in Levinas, forms an essential element in the constitution of the subjectivity of the human being and is no longer to be seen as a moment of ‘inauthenticity’ or ‘alienation’. The experience of the objects of everyday experience is not related to that of objects of representation or of tools, but rather to that of a system of nourishment into which the (...) subject is integrated, as in an ‘element’ or ‘atmosphere’. This constitutive closeness of enjoyment indicates the fundamental difference between what we understand as everyday aesthetics and other aesthetics characterised by contemplation or disinterest. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo señalar el procedimiento, que Jean Paul Sartre lleva a cabo en su primera obra filosófica, La trascendencia del ego. A nuestro juicio, esta obra al igual que El ser y la nada tiene como fundamento metodológico la llamada “ontología fenomenológica”. Con el fin de fundamentar esta tesis señalamos que el ego trascendente y el cogito tienen el mismo sentido ontológico que el ser-en-sí y ser-para-sí.

Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

Our ordinary moral practices not only suppose that some people ought to perform some actions, and that some outcomes are morally better or worse than others, but also that there are rights, duties, goodness, and other apparently abstract moral entities. What should we make of these entities, and the talk of these entities? It is not straighforward to account for these entities in other terms. On the other hand, this paper will argue that talk of such entities is (...) not easily eliminated from good moral theorising. Nor are the prospects for paraphrasing apparent talk about these entities into less committal terms very promising. We should either find a place in our ontology for these creatures of ethics, or explain how they can be employed as a convenient fiction. (shrink)

Heidegger's Moral Ontology offers the first comprehensive account of the ethical issues that underwrite Heidegger's efforts to develop a novel account of human existence. Drawing from a wide array of source materials from the period leading up to the publication of Being and Time, and in conversation with ancient, modern, and contemporary contributions to moral philosophy, James D. Reid brings Heidegger's early philosophy into fruitful dialogue with the history of ethics, and sheds fresh light on such familiar (...) topics as Heidegger's critique of Husserl, his engagement with Aristotle, his account of mortality, the role played by Kant in the genesis of Being and Time, and Heidegger's early reflections on philosophical language and concepts. This lively book will appeal to all who are interested in Heidegger's early phenomenology and in his thought more generally, as well as to those interested in the nature, scope, and foundations of ethical life. (shrink)

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the (...) very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:189 HUME'S MORAL ONTOLOGY* My concern here is the claim, made in my recent book, that Hume is a moral realist. In general terms I would describe this book as one of several that represent a sustained effort to consider Hume within an eighteenth-century context, an effort to see him not as a timeless figure, or to treat him as a brilliantly successful contemporary of ourselves, (...) but as a brilliant eighteenth-century philosopher responding to eighteenth-century issues with, for all his timelessness, eighteenth-century conceptual tools and 2 from an eighteenth-century perspective. It would be hopelessly naive to suppose that any of us can view Hume without any historical distortion, but it is equally naive to read Hume, as he is often read, without historical sensitivity. Furthermore, such insensitivity closes us off from what is uniquely valuable about Hume, for, instead of seeing his writings as the consequence of his unique efforts to confront and answer the philosophical questions posed to him, the historically insensitive read into him their own questions and their own answers. The past studied as an echo of the present is of little interest (and none of that intrinsic), nor can there be much value in the study of those who saw but through a glass, darkly, the truths now so apparent to us. Our intellectual past is important to us because it is different from our intellectual present, and not because it seconds what we presume already to know. I was entirely serious, then, when I said that both the plausibility, and the very meaning of my claim that Hume is a common-sense moralist or a moral realist depends upon considering this claim — and, consequently, Hume — within a particular philosophical context. It will not do to suppose that moral realism 190 is a term with an eternal, unchanging, and Platonic connotation, and then to reject my suggestion outright because Hume was, as I would certainly agree, virtually without sympathy for anything revealing a tincture of Platonism. Philosophical terms as well as philosophical issues are historical, changing entities; it is those who think or act otherwise who smuggle 4 Platonism into the discussion. Doubtless, however, some of the misunderstanding to which I refer is my own responsibility. I can join Hume in saying "I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all 5 mistakes in the readers," and so I shall here offer some clarifications of my view. I. To begin, I wish to bring together in one place evidence of the significant qualifications I put on my claim about Hume's moral realism. Taken together, these remarks show that my position is consistent with the widely held (and generally correct, I would say) view that Hume is in one highly important sense a naturalist, and that I ascribe to him a realism that is neither Platonic, Scholastic, Cartesian, nor Hutchesonian: A. If naturalism is thought to be the view "that the whole of the universe or experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences," then Hume must certainly be called a naturalist because of his efforts to extend the "experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects".... Hume is a naturalist in that he sought to produce coherent philosophical explanations without the slightest recourse to supernatural entities or transcendental principles... an obvious example of this kind of naturalism... is his attempt to explain moral values as derived from human nature or from, that is, human beings as constituted and active in the world (DH 15-16). 191 B. By no stretch of the imagination can Hume be supposed to have borrowed this providential aspect of Hutcheson's thought, not even in morals (DH 54; also see p. 93). C I submit that /Hume/ holds that vice and disapprobation are not identical and that moral qualities are not merely sentiments but, rather, the objective correlates of sentiments. /Footnote:/ No rash conclusions should be drawn from this claim about objective correlates. I do not suggest that virtue and vice are objects in the ordinary sense (physical objects), or that they are transcendently existing qualities of... (shrink)

On a standard reading of David Hume, we know two things about his analogy of morals to secondary qualities: first, it responds to the moral rationalism of Clarke and Wollaston; second, it broadcasts Hume’s realism or antirealism in ethics. I complicate that common narrative with a new intellectual contextualization of the analogy, the surprising outcome of which is that Hume’s analogy is neither realist nor antirealist in spirit, but quietist. My argument has three parts. First, I reconstruct Hume’s argument (...) against rationalist moral ontology in Treatise 3.1.1, revealing his attention to the Intellectualism/Voluntarism debate in rationalism. Second, I present evidence of Hume’s familiarity with the debate between Intellectualist moral realists and Voluntarist moral antirealists, notably Pufendorf. Third, I establish that Hume’s analogy undermines a key assumption structuring that debate, and that the analogy consequently signals his quietist abstention from his rationalist contemporaries’ realism/antirealism debate in ethics. (shrink)

There has been much recent debate on the question of whether Kant is to be best understood as a moral realist or a moral constructivist. In an attempt to resolve this debate I examine whether moral constructivism is a form of moral idealism, briefly contrast realism and idealism, and draw on work in social ontology to look at the different accounts of moral ontology implicit in realist and constructivist accounts. As a result of (...) this investigation I conclude that Kant is a moral constructivist. (shrink)

David Luban identifies a tension between Arendt's conception of ethnic identification in a context of persecution and her conception of humanity. That tension pertains to the reality—or realities—that Arendt addresses: the moral reality of her Bildung that appears throughout her work, and is centered on the “dignity of man,” on the one hand, and the divisive, “political” reality that she was forced to face when “attacked as a Jew,” on the other. By implicitly accepting that in a context of (...) persecution one cannot escape the framing relevance of the “political” —an idea that is also present in her imaginary condemnation speech of Eichmann—Arendt betrays a fundamental theme of her work: “forgiveness” and the inherent possibility of a “new beginning.”. (shrink)

There are prominent resemblances between issues addressed by Simone de Beauvoir in her early essay on moral philosophy, Pyrrhus and Cineas (1944), and issues attracting the attention of contemporary feminist ethicists, especially those concerned with the ethics of care. They include a focus on relationships, interaction, and mutual dependency. Both emphasize concrete ethical challenges rooted in everyday life, such as those affecting parents and children. Both are critical of the level of abstraction and insensitivity to the situation of the (...) moral agent in utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. And both condemn the “moral point of view,” i.e. the assumption that it is possible to speak with a universal voice on behalf of humanity. These resemblances are explored in this article. (shrink)

In this lucid and engaging book focusing on the early Heidegger, James Reid argues that Heidegger sets the foundations for a "phronetic ethics". As Reid later says, "Sein und Zeit could be said to make substantial contributions to 'meta-ethical' reflection on the source of our sense of why, on what basis, we take ourselves to be bound by one thing rather than another". Reid's early Heidegger provides the hermeneutical tools for an ontological meta-ethics that can illuminate "normative questions and questions (...) about the status of normativity as such".Gleaning a meta-ethics from Heidegger depends on arguing that the existential analytic of Dasein proceeds from what Reid calls Heidegger's "ethical... (shrink)

The paper seeks to show that underlying Bentham's concept of utility is a commitment to a criterion or principle of moral status distinguishing morally relevant beings from the morally irrelevant. Further, that the notion of moral status is ultimately inconsistent with Bentham's utility; that it implies something like a Kantian ethic barring the use of morally relevant beings as mere means to some other's satisfaction, an ethic which suitably interpreted may be more useful in defence of some concerns (...) for which Bentham has traditionally been cited, animal rights for example. The paper concludes by noting the history and politics of moral status and argues that the concept involves a fusion of fact and value, the empirical and the evaluative, undermining assumptions of a rigid separation of the two and the consequent essential subjectivity of the latter. (shrink)

Although scientific naturalistic philosophers have been concerned with the role of scientific psychology in illuminating problems in moral psychology, they have paid less attention to the contributions that it might make to issues of moral ontology. In this paper, I illustrate how findings in moral developmental psychology illuminate and advance the discussion of a long-standing issue in moral ontology, that of moral realism. To do this, I examine Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon's discussion (...) of that issue. I contend that their explorations leave the issue unresolved. To break the stalemate, I appeal to empirical psychological findings about moral internalization—the process by which children acquire the capacity to act in terms of moral norms. I contend that these findings illuminate the issue, suggest a way to advance it, and tend to support a moral realist position. (shrink)

My students tend to rank Parfit’s Energy Policy and the Further Future1 among their favourite pieces. It is a marvellously argued, eye-opening paper. One of the most interesting passages comes right at the end, when Parfit suggests that we should act as if we had never realised that the non-identity problem exists: “When we are discussing social policies, should we ignore the point about personal identity? Should we allow ourselves to say that a choice like that of the Risky Policy (...) or of Depletion might be against the interests of people in the further future? This is not true. Should we pretend that it is? […] I would not want people to conclude that we can be less concerned about the more remote effects of our social policies. So I would be tempted to suppress the argument for this conclusion.” (2010 [1983], 119) In the paper, Parfit continuously stresses the implications of our views on personal identity. He differentiates between what he later, in his Reasons and Persons, calls a “narrow” and a “wide” person-affecting view (1984, ch. 18).2 On a narrow person-affecting view, we take seriously each person’s identity and assume that it is determined by its genome which is a product of a certain ovum and a certain sperm cell (112-113). On this view, we may then evaluate an action by considering its impact on each individual that is affected. An action is, thus, better or worse because it is better or worse for someone. Consequently, there may be alternative actions available to perform that seem better or worse, but aren’t really, as they are not better or worse for someone. One example that illustrates this point is the case of a 14 year-old who decides to have a child and, due to her age, gives the boy she conceives a bad start in life (113). In response, one may want to argue that she should have had a child later and that that child would have had a better start in life. This, however, overlooks that the boy that has been born to the young mother could not have been born later: the child she actually had could only come into existence because she decided to become a mother when she was 14. Hence, Parfit argues, we can “not claim that, in having this child, what she did was worse for him” (113, italics in the original). (shrink)

ExcerptI. Introduction The German political philosopher Carl Schmitt belongs to the class of political theorists, who maintain a tradition of separating the political from the moral.1 Drawing on the standard interpretation of Machiavelli2 and following the thinking of Hobbes,3 Schmitt makes two central claims that define his political theorization. The first claim is that the sovereign should possess “the monopoly to decide” what constitutes public order and security; the second claim is the use of the “friend-enemy” metaphor to characterize (...) the political.4 If the two claims are taken together, the logical corollary is that, on the…. (shrink)

The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral (...) reason. Thus, if moral realism might be true, then it is true. (shrink)

The essay undertakes to explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations. The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as love and interpersonality. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the ontology of relations is discussed. Second, various examples are analysed. From this, a conception of relation instantiation emerges, according to which (...) to determine which relation actually obtains, one has to take into account (a) the context, (b) the specific content or meaning of the relation, and (c) some action or decision or mode of existence of the relata. This conception suggests that relation instantiation cannot be explained by a single formula. By the help of this conception, Hume''s thesis of the identity of killing relations between human and nonhuman beings is questioned. Then, the relation of love is analysed. It is shown that love as a moral relation is perfectly explicable in terms of ontology. Moreover, its essence is best captured by the interrelation of the particulars, the relation of love as a universal, and by the relating action of the particulars. Finally, the alleged relation of universal fraternity (interpersonality as such), linking up each human being to all other human beings, is discussed. (shrink)

Critical Notice on Organizations as Wrongdoers By Stephanie Collins Oxford University Press, 2023. -/- Extract: What, if any, role does metaphysics have to play in addressing moral questions? When answering questions about moral responsibility, many theories rely on answers to questions about the nature of agency and agents, the persistence of persons and the existence and nature of free will. In recent work in social ontology, philosophers have argued for views of social categories or identities that take (...) ethical and social–political desiderata into consideration in several ways. Some argue for views of gender identities that depend on epistemic and ethical considerations (Bettcher, 2009). Others develop views of gender categories in ways they take to be metaphysically realist, tracking robust explanatory patterns in the world. For instance, Barnes (2017) argues for this interpretation of Haslanger’s views of racial and gender categories. Others argue that injustice and oppression are reflected in the nature of social categories. For instance, while it ought not to be this way, some gender categories are, for instance, trans-exclusionary (Ásta 2018). Indeed, one might even argue that social categories can involve a distinctively metaphysical form of oppression (Jenkins 2020, 2023). It is clear that many philosophers argue in ways that draw close connections between metaphysical and moral theorizing. ... (shrink)

Assigning the appropriate moral status to different stages of human development is an urgent problem in bioethics. Many philosophers have attempted to assess developmental events using strict ontological principles to determine when a developing entity becomes essentially human. This approach is not consistent with recent findings in reproductive and stem cell biology, including the discovery of the plasticity of early embryonic development and the advent of induced pluripotent stem cells. Substance ontology should therefore not be used to determine (...) the moral status of the embryo. (shrink)

Organizations do moral wrong. States pursue unjust wars, businesses avoid tax, charities misdirect funds. Our social, political, and legal responses require guidance. We need to know what we’re responding to and how we should respond to it. We need a metaphysical and moral theory of wrongful organizations. This book provides a new such theory, paying particular attention to questions that have been underexplored in existing debates. These questions include: where are organizations located as material objects in the natural (...) world? What’s the metaphysical relation between organizations and their members? Can organizations be blameworthy for attitudes and character traits, as well as for actions? What about feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame—can organizations feel these emotions and why does this matter? How and why are members implicated in organizations’ wrongs? How should organizations’ reparative costs be apportioned among members? The book answers these questions. It argues that organizations are material objects with humans as material parts—much like how a pizza is a material object with slices as material parts. This picture helps us make sense of organizations’ blameworthiness, including blame for organization-level actions, attitudes, and character traits. The book argues that organizations can experience moral self-awareness—a crucial component of guilt, remorse, and shame. Members can be implicated in organizations’ actions in numerous ways—and, it is argued, members’ level of implication should determine their share of organizations’ reparative burdens. (shrink)

The paper has two parts. The first considers the debate about whether social entities should be regarded as obiects distinct from their members and concludes that we should let the answer to this question be determined by the theories that social science finds to have the most explanatory power. The second part argues that even if the theory with the most explanatory power regards social entities such as organizations as persons in their own right, we should not accord them citizenship (...) in the moral realm. Rather we should accept moral individualism, the thesis that only individual humans can have rights and duties.The moral status of corporations and other organizations is often thought to depend on their ontological status. In particular, it is thought to depend on whether they can be said to exist as distinct entities, and especially as persons distinct from the individuals who are their members. In this article Iargue that the two questions are actually independent of each other. No matter what the ontological status of organizations, they should not be accorded citizenship in the moral realm in their own right. (shrink)

Following a trajectory of thinking from the philosophy of Spinoza via the work of Nietzsche and through Deleuze’s texts, this article explores the possibility of framing a contemporary pedagogical practice by an ontological order that does not presuppose the superiority of the mind over the body and that does not rely on universal morals but that considers instead, as its ontological point of departure, the actual bodies of children and pedagogues through what has come to be known as affective learning. (...) When considering the potentiality of a pure ontology, as outlined by Spinoza, I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of higher values and universal morals allows for a deeper understanding of the limitations of a traditional image of thought. Furthermore, I argue that Deleuze’s conception of the dogmatic image of thought can provide a helpful framework when connecting the work of the two aforementioned philosophers and when conceptualizing a possible image of thought based on the body as a singularity harboring flows of power, rather than one where the body is considered a necessary obstacle to be overcome in the quest for higher values that are situated always beyond the reach of the experiencing body.This philosophical discussion is then situated within the field of educational philosophy via the concept of affective learning which enables the incorporation of these ideas into a concrete educational setting. (shrink)

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Micro-structure realism” and “Reason realism” . The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink\'s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro- structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR\'s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relation ship (...) between moral facts and their natural- scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped- together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith , which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent\'s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent\'s member ship in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons. (shrink)

Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a “person”; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human person, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being a person. A (...) further question, which will be the primary focus of this paper, concerns what essential features of personhood endow persons, human or otherwise, with their moral status and the inherent rights they concomitantly possess. A survey of the history of philosophical theorizing on what it means to be a person yields a broad consensus upon the key capacities being rational thought, self-consciousness, and autonomous volition. It is not sufficient, however, simply to cite these capacities, but to explain why these particular capacities bear moral import. A more recent concern has developed regarding the possible future existence of so-called “post-persons” who, due to their enhanced cognitive and emotive capacities, may be morally superior to mere persons and thereby possess a higher moral status. This paper will conclude with an analysis of the extent to which this concern is warranted. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the identity of organizations relative to the individuals that compose them. Based on general systems theory, the traditional assumption is that social collectives are more complex, variable, and loosely coupled than individuals. This assumption rests on two premises. The first is a view of the individual as simple, stable, and tightly coupled (i.e., unitary). The second premise (...) is that the relationship between social collectives and their members is characterized by the complete inclusion of individuals in higher order systems.We examine the social science literature that bears on these premises and conclude that they are false. The differences between organizations and individuals in the magnitude of complexity or variability appear to be minimal or nonexistent. An implication of our analysis is that individuals and organizations are coterminous and, therefore, inseparable as moral agents. (shrink)

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Micro-structure realism” and “Reason realism”. The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink\'s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro- structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR\'s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relation ship between (...) moral facts and their natural- scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped- together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith, which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent\'s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent\'s member ship in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed growing concerns about how we should conduct conservation activities in a world of human-altered biophysical conditions. The 'novel ecosystems' perspective has emerged as a way to meet this challenge. Yet its focus on accepting 'new natures' as the 'new normal' has drawn much criticism from those wedded to conventional forms of conservation, such as 'ecological restoration'. This paper: 1) provides a much needed review of this dispute; 2) formulates and deploys an original analytical framework, which draws (...) on Thomas Kuhn's 'theoretical history' of science and Charles Taylor's moral philosophy to extricate the entangled moral and material ontologies of nature which conflate facts with values in the world-building activities of disputants; and 3) identifies and examines the processes underlying these world-building activities. The paper closes by offering an initial suggestion on how to explore options for resolving this highly contentious debate. (shrink)

This long paper (19 pages; about 7,000 words) is a trenchant critique of the first half of David Norton’s 1982 book David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Norton claims that both Hutcheson and Hume were ‘moral realists’, and imputes to them an inflated moral ontology at sharp variance with what they actually wrote. Indeed, Norton’s interpretation is sustainable only when the texts are grossly misrepresented by paraphrases which say the opposite of what the authors actually wrote. (...) The paper concludes: I agree that Hutcheson and Hume were opposed to nihilistic scepticism, but maintain that their conception of morality was essentially a psychological one, free from metaphysical postulates of any supra-sensory or non-natural moral reality. Therefore, to call them moral realists is misleading. In view of the misunderstandings, misrepresentations, ambiguities, and contradictions which pervade Norton’s arguments, his attempt to establish that there were moral realists must be counted unsuccessful. (shrink)

This is the first book that pays systematic attention to ontological issues impinging on this question.