Richard Janko's acclaimed translation of Aristotle's _Poetics_ is accompanied by the most comprehensive commentary available in English that does not presume knowledge of the original Greek. Two other unique features are Janko's translations with notes of both the _Tractatus Coislinianus_, which is argued to be a summary of the lost second book of the Poetics, and fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets, including recently discovered texts about catharsis, which appear in English for the first time.

Joe Sachs has followed up his brilliant translation of Aristotle's Physics with a new translation of Metaphysics. Sachs's translations bring distinguished new light onto Aristotle's works, which are foundational to history of science. Sachs translates Aristotle with an authenticity that was lost when Aristotle was translated into Latin and abstract Latin words came to stand for concepts Aristotle expressed with phrases in everyday Greek language. When the works began being translated into English, those abstract Latin words or their cognates were (...) used, thus suggesting a level of jargon and abstraction, and in some cases misleading interpretation, which was not Aristotle's language or style. These important new translations open up Aristotle's original thought to readers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 145 Luther on Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer. By DENIS R. JANZ. Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fiir Europiiische Geschichte Mainz, Abt. Religionsgeschichte, Bd. 140. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989. Pp. ii + 124. DM 38 {cloth). As Denis Janz, specialist in the late medieval context of Luther's thought (Luther and Late Medieval Thomism, 1983), points out in the "Prospectus," a study of (...) Luther's understanding of Thomas has an inherent appeal, for, " rightly or wrongly, Thomas and Luther are inevitably regarded as the standard-bearers of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism" {p. 1). The recent completion of the necessary critical indices has made the task possible, and the result is a fine and necessary contribution to the work of all scholars interested in the thought of these two pivotal Christian thinkers. The method of Janz is straightforward: assemble the references to Thomas in Luther's works, organize them into appropriate categories, exegete their meanings, and discern important tendencies or perspectives common to these texts. Then "the accuracy of Luther's understanding and the cogency of his critique " can be evaluated from the perspective of twentieth cenrtury historical knowledge {p. 2). Janz recognizes that there are significant hermeneutical difficulties inherent in such a study and that any evaluation " may well imply a notion of history as progress, perhaps even a confidence in the intellectual superiority of modernity over the past " (p. 3). The result bears out the soundness of his approach. Chapter I examines "Luther on the Person of Thomas." Luther, sharing in and contributing to his time's distinctive theological polemic, had no shortage of epithets for Thomas, from " Sophist " to " beggarly paunch " {p. 4). The remarkable thing is the surprising number of complimentary things he has to say. At different times of his career Luther referred to Thomas as " this holy man " or " a man of ' great genius '... woefully misunderstood " {p. 5). A most interesting example is the different uses he makes of a story of Thomas's struggle with despair when near death, when Thomas faced his Anfechtung by holding the Bible and saying "I believe what is in this book" (p. 8). Sometimes Luther cites it as an example of the weakness of implicit faith; but other times he makes no critical comment on Thomas, and the story implies the victory of faith over despair. These different uses show the ambiguity of Luther's attitude toward Thomas as a person, and what in balance seems to be " grudging respect " for an " example of how great persons can at the same time be seriously mistaken " (p. 10). 146 BOOK REVIEWS Chapter U, which comprises the bulk of the hook, carefully examines the substantive issues on which Luther mentions and responds to Thomas: experience, the use of Aristotle, Scripture, penance and indulgences, the Lord's Supper, monasticism, justification, law, baptism, angels, papal authority, purgatory, and the veneration of images. On some of these issues Janz sees only a minor critique of Thomas by Luther and sometimes little real difference between their positions. Both Luther and Thomas give primacy to the literal sense of Scripture, and "both teach that the Church and theology stand under the authority of Scripture" (p. 30). On this question Luther's critique has more to do with the Thomists than Thomas. In regard to penance and indulgences Luther criticizes Thomas's view, though here again there is distortion of Thomas by the Thomists, which Luther correctly suspects (pp. 44-45). Though Luther disagrees with Thomas's understanding of the Lord's Supper, he feels Thomas was entitled to his opinion; what he cannot bear is how Thomas has been raised " to the level of an infallible teacher," with his opinions transformed "into articles of faith" (p. 48). Justification, the heart of Luther's thought, is "a relatively insignificant issue " in his critique of Thomas, as Luther eventually comes to understand better the key place Thomas gave grace (pp. 60, 61). Luther sees Christ as the " abrogation " of the law and criticizes Thomas for not seeing it this way; however, this is a linguistic misunderstanding of Thomas, probably based on Gabriel Bicl's teaching, so that Thomas and Luther are... (shrink)

Why should Aristotle reject his own criteria for a science to admit this puzzling science of being? Or does he really reject them? Perhaps the science of being is not intended to be a universal science of the type rejected elsewhere. The Metaphysics and the Organon are not concerned with exactly the same questions; and verbal differences may not reflect real or important doctrinal conflicts.

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.7 features an argumentative progression from the unwavering actuality of the unmoved mover through its necessity to its goodness, which goodness in turn grounds the manner in which it serves as the ultimate principle of motion, namely, by being an object of love and desire (1072b4-12). One link in this progression is especially brief and startling, namely the second of two inferences in this short sentence: “It is a being of necessity, therefore, and in so far as [it (...) exists] necessarily, [it exists] finely, and it is in this way a principle” (1072b10-11). Aristotle slides smoothly from: x exists necessarily (ex anagkēs) to x exists finely (kalōs), without any intervening step. The seamless speed of this step is bound to give us pause—we naturally read it as enthymematic and start casting about for an intervening premise set. Still more arresting is its apparent move from a descriptive to a normative proposition. From our post-Humean vantage point we may be likely to presume that whatever the missing premise set of this inference turns out to be, somewhere buried in that set will need to be something of the form: if descriptive proposition (DP), then normative proposition (NP). Otherwise, Aristotle’s conclusion will have illicitly inferred a normative proposition from a descriptive premise set, in violation of the Humean edict that one cannot infer an ought from an is. Yet, if we smuggle the norm into our premise set along the way, we have merely relocated our problem. For then we will have asserted, or assumed, that the truth of some descriptive proposition is sufficient for the truth of some normative proposition, namely the consequent of the conditional: if DP, then NP. At any rate, this obtains unless necessity itself is already a normative notion, a questionable assumption, but one we will consider in due course. In either case, though, we need some explication of the route Aristotle follows when he moves, without comment, from necessity to goodness. (shrink)

This article responds to Dimitris Vardoulakis’s claim that Heidegger’s mistaken reading of phronēsis’s relation to the hou heneka, or that-for-the-sake-of-which, in Nicomachean Ethics VI at 1139a32–33, leads to an evacuation of ends from action. I argue that Heidegger is not wrong in his reading of Aristotle on phronēsis’s relation to the end. I offer a reading of the passage on which Vardoulakis focuses, which I believe is consistent with Heidegger’s, to show how Aristotle’s view of phronēsis’s role in action can (...) enable such judgment. I agree with Vardoulakis that on Heidegger’s reading, Aristotle does not view phronēsis as instrumental, but I show that this reading is borne out by the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. I argue that the absence of instrumentality does not mean that phronēsis leaves action without an end; rather, the end of action is in the action itself. I argue in agreement with Heidegger [1997: 29, 34] and contra Vardoulakis that technē as a model of instrumentality does not capture the work of phronēsis in Aristotle (neither is it what is under critique when Heidegger criticizes modern technologizing). I argue in conclusion that Aristotle’s conception of phronēsis and the action to which it leads does allow for judgment: what can be judged is the person or the community as it shows itself in the action. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Although there are a very few occasions on which Aristotle speaks of words, on the one hand, or mental concepts, on the other, as universals, he was no nominalist and no conceptualist. This negative thesis I have argued sufficiently, at least to my own satisfaction, in an earlier paper. He was, rather, a realist, but of a very tenuous sort. As I said in the earlier paper, he viewed universals as real entities but lacking numerical oneness; each is numerically many, (...) and yet each is also one in some sense. The specific identity of numerically distinct particulars creates something like a class, and this is the universal.This interpretation was not, in the earlier paper, defended against those who would attribute to Aristotle a much more robust form of realism, and it is that defense which this paper will undertake to provide. The evidence which can be marshalled for the more robust realism is impressive – more so, I would say, than that which can be brought forth for either the nominalist or the conceptualist interpretations. It rests on numerous passages which either explicitly or implicitly seem to tie together as identical, forms, substances, universals, and intelligible objects. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Aristotle’s discussion of chance in the Physics gives an important contribution to the theory of action put forward in the Nicomachean Ethics, in particular as regards its notion that man is himself the origin or ground of his actions. Whereas the ethical works show a tendency to explain this notion in objective and causal terms, the account of chance as the happening of the unexpected not only points to the essential finitude of all human (...) conduct, but also indicates that the concept of ground in connection with human agency must be understood in subjective terms, or in the direction of sense-giving and responsibility. (shrink)

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder, without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this (...) paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being. (shrink)

This volume, surveying a narrow topic over a long expanse of time, is comprised of selections from a trio of international conferences on the title theme. It is an expensive book, but even its most valuable articles are marred by slovenly editing.Börje Bydén’s contribution begins the survey in Byzantium. By linking Photios’s (apparently) original criticism of Aristotle to Plotinus, Bydén gives an interesting hint of how neo-Platonism came to permeate Christianity. But Photios seems to have been “ignored by posterity” (31). (...) Bydén’s commendable remedy: more and updated critical editions of texts from Greek scholasticism. (The Hadot reference on 25n44, missing in the bibliography, is to Hadot’s 1990 French edition of .. (shrink)

Aristotle states in Metaphysics Z13 that nothing said universally τῶν ϰαϑόλου λεγομένων is substance, rather the substance of each thing is particular to it. The natural interpretation of this statement is that being said universally is a sufficient condition for not being substance. But this claim is very perplexing since it is the key premiss in the following apparently inconsistent set:Form is substance.Form is universal.Nothing universal or said universally is substance, rather the substance of something is particular ἴδιος to it.

Part of the contents: 0Happiness and Theôria in Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics / Eudaimonia and Theôria within the 0Nicomachean Ethics / The Meaning of Bios in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics / Approximation and Acting for an 0Ultimate End / Eudaimonia, Theôria, and the Choiceworthiness of Practical Wisdom / Aristotle on the Choice of Lives: Two Concepts of Self-Sufficiency / Eudaimonia and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics / Theôria and Praxis in Aristotle’s Ethics / The Private Moral Life (...) of Aristotle’s Philosopher: A Defense of a Non-Intellectualist Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics / Theoretical Life, Practical Life, and Happiness in Aristotle / The Best Life according to Aristotle : A Reconsideration / Theos, Theôria, and Therapeia in Aristotle’s Ethical Endings / Contemplation and Service of the God: The Standard for External Goods in Eudemian Ethics / 0Aristotelian Immortality.0. (shrink)

A considerable number of the thirteenth and early fourteenth-century manuscripts of Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's De animalibus display a system of guiding marginal glosses. These glosses are usually added by a later hand with respect to the hand that had written the text. The manuscripts were not only annotated for personal use, but also so as to allow for a better use in compiling commentaries, encyclopaedias and compendia. We can say that the marginalia form the main, if not (...) only, key to our understanding today of the use that readers made of the text. Apart from offering a mere explanation of the contents, we can see that their interest in the text was chiefly related to biblical exegesis and to scientific and medical knowledge. The approach to the text was often allegorical and moralizing in character. Some remarks reflect the reader's own experience and associations in relation to the text. (shrink)

The discussion of "eudaimonia" in the "rhetoric" has a central place in Aristotle's exposition of the material for speeches deliberative, epideictic and forensic varieties of rhetoric. Due to the telos- relatedness of the material for each variety of rhetoric, the treatise on "eudaimonia" (Rhet A5) provides coherence between the varieties by displaying standards in terms of which particular cases at hand are ultimately assessed as good, useful, noble, just or their opposites. A focal and normative meaning of eudaimonia can be (...) identified in A5 which Aristotle expects a prudent orator to maintain even when he is faced with perverted audiences. (shrink)

Much recent work on Aristotle's Categories assumes that there is an ontological theory presented in that work and tries to reconstruct it on the basis of the slender evidence in the book. I claim that this is misguided. Using a distinction made by G.E.L. Owen between theory and the "phaenomena", I argue that the Categories is mainly concerned with setting out the phenomena -- the intuitions that any ontology must explain. This thesis has consequences for the interpretation of Aristotle's ontological (...) writings. I explore some of these. (shrink)

Recent scholarship understands Aristotle to hold that the human intellect is in part corruptible and in part immortal. The main textual support claimed for this understanding is De Anima III.5, where Aristotle, it is said, presents his doctrine of an immortal active intellect and a mortal passive intellect. In this paper I show that Aristotle distinguishes at III.5 not an active and a passive intellect, but an agent and a potential intellect, both immortal. I further show that the mortal passive (...) intellect mentioned at the end of III.5 is an analogous use of the term intellect, and refers to imagination, the act of a corruptible bodily organ, here called intellect only because it supplies the images from which intellect abstracts concepts. (shrink)

Aristotle refers to some animal kinds as μέγιστα γένη, or greatest kinds. The goal of this paper is to make clear the nature and significance of these kinds. I argue that Aristotle thinks of greatest kinds as the most general kinds within a specified domain. I then consider the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of animals’ reproductive parts and modes of reproduction in Generation of Animals is organized around divisions related to the cause of each of the features being explained. I (...) conclude that, while classification is an important goal in Aristotle’s biological treatises, it is of little significance that some of the kinds he identifies are referred to as greatest kinds. The important divisions are, for Aristotle, the divisions that best serve his goal of explaining the various features of animals and these divisions sometimes group together and sometimes cut across the commonly recognized, including the greatest, animal kinds. (shrink)

In particular, Miller argues persuasively for attributing to Aristotle the following theses--theses traditionally rejected by communitarians as liberal innovations antithetical to the Aristotelian point of view.

This is the first complete translation since 1930 of Aristotle's key work on science. It presents Aristotle's thought accurately, while at the same time simplifying and expanding the often crabbed and elliptical style of the original, so that it is very much easier to read. A lucid introduction and extensive notes explain the general structure of each section of the book, and shed light on particular problems.

This difficult and evidently corrupt text of Aristotle has given rise to a variety of differing readings among the commentators. I shall propose a new and conservative emendation of the text, which, I believe, resolves all of the difficulties. But it is helpful first to take stock of those difficulties, in order to see what is required of a solution.

The first major work in the history of philosophy to bear the title "Metaphysics" was the treatise by Aristotle that we have come to know by that name. But Aristotle himself did not use that title or even describe his field of study as 'metaphysics'; the name was evidently coined by the first century C.E. editor who assembled the treatise we know as Aristotle's Metaphysics out of various smaller selections of Aristotle's works. The title 'metaphysics' -- literally, 'after the Physics' (...) -- very likely indicated the place the topics discussed therein were intended to occupy in the philosophical curriculum. They were to be studied after the treatises dealing with nature (ta phusika). In this entry, we discuss the ideas that are developed in Aristotle's treatise. (shrink)