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  1. Sobre o fenômeno da acrasia na filosofia de Aristóteles.Felipe Fernandes Vieira Santos - 2024 - Primordium 7 (14):195–214.
  2. On Becoming Fearful Quickly: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Somatic Model of Socratean Akrasia.Brian Andrew Lightbody - 2023 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 17 (2):134-161.
    The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. -/- Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle (...)
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  3. Neither Virtue Nor Vice: Akratic and Enkratic Values in and beyond the Eudemian Ethics.Jozef Müller - 2022 - In Giulio Di Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle's Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. New York, NY: Issues in Ancient Philosophy. pp. 137-155.
  4. O Método de Investigação da Acrasia no Livro VII da ÉTICA NICOMAQUEIA de Aristóteles.Cristiane Martins da Silva - 2022 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Goiás
  5. The Beauty of Failure: Hamartia in Aristotle's Poetics.Hilde Vinje - 2021 - Classical Quarterly 71 (2):582-600.
    In Poetics 13, Aristotle claims that the protagonist in the most beautiful tragedies comes to ruin through some kind of ‘failure’—in Greek, hamartia. There has been notorious disagreement among scholars about the moral responsibility involved in hamartia. This article defends the old reading of hamartia as a character flaw, but with an important modification: rather than explaining the hero's weakness as general weakness of will (akrasia), it argues that the tragic hero is blinded by temper (thumos) or by a pursuit (...)
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  6. A akrasia antiga e a fraqueza da vontade contemporânea.Matheus Dias Bastos - 2020 - Dissertation, Puc-Rio, Brazil
  7. Akrasia in Epictetus: A Comparison with Aristotle.Michael Tremblay - 2020 - Apeiron 53 (4):397-417.
    This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear that (...)
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  8. Precisão teórica e a constituição do explanandum apropriado em EN VII 3.Fernando Mendonça - 2019 - Dissertatio 49:109-132.
    My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where (...)
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  9. Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action.Elena Giovanna Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):229-256.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 229 - 256 I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuous _akrasia_, weak _akrasia_, stubborn opinionated action and inverse _akrasia_. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily (...)
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  10. Aristotle on the Archai of Practical Thought.Jay R. Elliott - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):448-468.
    Scholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctive archai (“principles” or “starting‐points”) that govern their practical reasoning. The debate has traditionally been dominated by anti‐intellectualists, who hold that for Aristotle all agents acquire their archai solely through a process of habituation in the nonrational soul. Their traditional opponents, the intellectualists, focus their argument on the case of the virtuous person, arguing that in Aristotle’s view virtuous agents acquire their archai through a process of reasoning. I (...)
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  11. Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control.Jozef Müller - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...)
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  12. Aristóteles E a refutação do intelectualismo socrático na explicação da acrasia em en VII 1-3.Fernando Mendonça - 2014 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 19 (2):69-109.
    Nesse artigo, eu procuro mostrar que a leitura tradicional que atribui um procedimento dialético à abordagem aristotélica da acrasia, em Ética Nicomaquéia VII 1-3 provoca um sério problema interpretativo ao tentar compatibilizar a posição socrática acerca da acrasia e os phanomena. Primeiramente, tento mostrar, baseando-me numa análise de Tópicos I 1-2, que o procedimento metodológico, em EN VII 1 1145b2-7, não se caracteriza como dialético. Em segundo lugar, proponho uma leitura em que Aristóteles, passo a passo refuta a tese socrática (...)
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  13. Akrasia : the rest of the story?David Charles - 2011 - In Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle. Oxford University Press.
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  14. ‘Under the influence’ – the physiology and therapeutics of Akrasia in Aristotle's ethics.Sarah Francis - 2011 - Classical Quarterly 61 (1):143-171.
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  15. Sobre a acrasia em Aristóteles: sua possibilidade, a abordagem dialética e a resposta antissocrática ao problema.Fernando Martins Mendonça - 2011 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Uberlândia
    I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In (...)
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  16. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Russell - 2011 - Ancient Philosophy 31 (2):437-441.
  17. Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1150a9-1150b28: Akrasia and self-control, and softness and endurance.Chris Bobonich - 2009 - In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book Vii Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford University Press.
  18. Nicomachean ethics VII. 8-9 (1151b22) : akrasia, enkrateia, and look-alikes.Sarah Broadie - 2009 - In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  19. Nicomachean ethics VII. 3 : varieties of akrasia.David Charles - 2009 - In Carlo Natali (ed.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Akrasia and the emotions.Nafsika Athanassoulis - 2008 - In Nafsika Athanassoulis & Samantha Vice (eds.), The moral life: essays in honour of John Cottingham. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 87.
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  21. The social and political sources of akrasia.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1997 - Ethics 107 (4):644-657.
    Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions.
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  22. A Puzzle about the Possibility of Aristotelian enkrateia.Carol Gould - 1994 - Phronesis 39 (2):174-186.
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  23. Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will. [REVIEW]Stephen D. Hudson - 1988 - International Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):71-72.
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  24. Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will. [REVIEW]Patrick Corrigan - 1985 - Review of Metaphysics 39 (2):349-350.
    Set in an interpretation of Aristotle, Dahl's book is a philosophical investigation into practical knowledge addressing such issues as whether it exists, what is it and what distinguishes it from other knowledge and belief. As its title indicates this book is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part argues that Aristotle teaches that practical reason exists, i.e., that reason co-produces motivation for action, and that practical reason can provide an objective foundation for morality. The second part shows (...)
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  25. Aristotle's forbidden sweets.James Bogen & J. M. E. Moravcsik - 1982 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (2):111-127.
  26. Is Aristotle's Account of Incontinence Inconsistent?Terrance McConnell - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):635 - 651.
    Included among the many topics on which Aristotle writes in the Nicomacheon Ethics is an account of incontinence or akrasia. Many controversies have arisen among interpreters of Aristotle on this issue, and a few of these disputes will be discussed in this paper. In the first part of this paper I shall indicate the usual way of reading Aristotle's account of incontinence, which I shall call the natural interpretation. In the second section I shall raise some apparent difficulties with the (...)
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  27. Aristotle, the Socratic Principle, and the Problem of Akrasia.Robert C. Solomon - 1971 - Modern Schoolman 49 (1):13-21.
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  28. The Practical Syllogism and Incontinence 1.A. Kenny - 1966 - Phronesis 11 (2):163-184.
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  29. Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (review). [REVIEW]Josiah Gould - 1965 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (2):262-264.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Aristotle's Coneeplion of Moral Weakness. By James J. Walsh. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. viii ~- 199. $6.00.) The section of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle discusses at length the notion of akrasia or moral weakness (vii. 1-10) is one which as much as any other has evoked from philosophers a host of varying interpretations. One of the difficulties posed by Aristotle's (...)
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  30. Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness. [REVIEW]Leo R. Ward - 1965 - New Scholasticism 39 (3):397-400.
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  31. Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness. [REVIEW]C. D. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):186-186.
    A painstaking study of the problem of akrasia, from its early thematizations in Socrates and Euripides, who represent the early and late positions of Plato, to Aristotle's labors with it: labors which failed to issue in a satisfactory or even consistent result. Akrasia is treated, of course, as a touchstone for the more embracing questions of reason, practical wisdom, action, etc. Walsh deals minutely with the primary materials, and also investigates current interpretations. It is argued that "the absence of the (...)
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  32. On Aristotle, Nic. Eth._ VII. xiv. 2 _and xii. 2.J. Cook Wilson - 1902 - The Classical Review 16 (01):23-28.
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