What does the growing tide of displaced persons today teach us about the ongoing paradoxes of human rights regimes, which rely on the particular sovereignty of nation-states for their constitution and application but are framed and normatively justified as universal? Working with Arendt’s defense of ‘the right to have rights’ in response to the problem of statelessness which is the practical lynchpin of these historical and theoretical tensions, I specify that and why any person on earth, regardless of their legal (...) status as a national or resident or non-resident alien, can legitimately expect two things from the political community in which they reside: hospitality and membership. (shrink)

Matter and Form explores the relationship between natural science and political philosophy from the classical to contemporary eras, taking an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophic understanding of the structure and process of the natural world and its impact on the history of political philosophy. It illuminates the importance of philosophic reflection on material nature to moral and political theorizing, mediating between the sciences and humanities and making a contribution to ending the isolation between them.

Plato and the Moving Image shows how and why debates in the philosophy of film can be advanced through the study of the role of images in Plato’s dialogues, and vice versa.

As illiberal and authoritarian trends are on the rise--both in fragile and seemingly robust democracies--there is growing concern about the longevity of liberalism and democracy. The purpose of this volume is to draw on the analytical resources of various disciplines and public policy approaches to reflect on the current standing of liberal democracy. Leading social scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds aim to examine the ideological and structural roots of the current crisis of liberal democracies, in the West and beyond, conceptually (...) and empirically. The volume is divided into two main parts: Part I explores tensions between liberalism and democracy in a longer-term, historical perspective to explain immanent vulnerabilities of liberal democracy. Authors examine the conceptual foundations of Western liberal democracy that have shaped its standing in the contemporary world. What lies at the core of illiberal tendencies? Part II explores case studies from the North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, Turkey, India, Japan, and Brazil, raising questions whether democratic crises, manifested in the rise of populist movements in and beyond the Western context, differ in kind or only in degree. How can we explain the current popular appeal of authoritarian governments and illiberal ideas? The Emergence of Illiberalism will be of great interest to teachers and students of politics, sociology, political theory and comparative government. (shrink)

In dialogue with Hannah Arendt’s commitment to politics as the exercise of freedom, this article seeks to identify legitimate as opposed to illegitimate leadership while embracing Arendt’s account of plurality. In The Human Condition and elsewhere, Arendt is critical of the separation of ruling and acting in a way that eschews all instantiated hierarchies, even impermanent ones. In what follows, I will try to show how Arendt’s analysis of power and of politics as freedom can be consistent with a model (...) of legitimate leadership. In this model, human beings pursuing projects fulfill one or more of three roles: rectors; actors; and others. Following Isaac Ariail Reed we can define rectors as persons who not only have a project, but also the wherewithal to induce or constrain actors to subordinate their project to the rector’s project, or even to abdicate their independent projects for the sake of those for which a rector commissions them; while actors are those persons who thus perform and complete the projects rectors have commissioned, and/or act on behalf of or in the name of such projects. The relationship between actors and rectors is thus an agency relationship in the sense of Julia Adams, who makes clear how and why agents find and partially place themselves in these inferior positions in order to advance their own individual gains. Others, finally, are all those who are outside the intersubjectivity of the articulation of a project, and who may be obstacles to it. Legitimate leadership, within this model of agency relations, would occur whenever there are projects guided by rectors who successfully recruit actors for the purpose of completing the project on the basis of a partially mutual understanding both of the project and the roles to be played by both rector and actors in the completion of the project. (shrink)

This book draws out Woolf’s insights into the fundamental structures of existence and experience by showing how the empirical and contingent elements of her dramaturgy are actually in the service of a metaphysical understanding of the human condition.

This article seeks to provide an answer as to why Metaphysics, Lam ends not with the justly famous account of the divine nous with which this book of the treatise is always associated, but with an aporetic account of the living and dying of everything mortal. This surprising moment, I argue, is a manifestation of Aristotle's conviction—quite alien to the mainstream understanding of philosophy as a discipline today—that even the purest moments of theoretical speculation are the work of a human (...) soul always in touch with its materiality and its subsistence in the world. A soul that only is at all when it is at work in living well, which is to say when the soul enacts itself in praxis. This means: the best understanding of the aporetic conclusion to Metaphysics, Lam is the one that asks us to recall that Aristotle's project of first philosophy—however much its most proper subject matter is the unchanging and immaterial—proceeds as part of a human life lived a certain way, and not as part of an academic discipline. (shrink)

HORKY, P. S. (2013). Plato and Pythagoreanism. Oxford University Press.

This is, indeed, another work on the subject of hate speech regulation in the United States. And yet, it is not just another such work. For my goal here is not to settle the jurisprudential arguments regarding the possibility of any specific hate speech regulation, either extant or yet to be conceived, withstanding a Constitutional test. Nor is it my intention to demonstrate, on the basis of a comparative study of existing legislation, that such regulation either is or is not (...) effective in addressing or redressing the social ills of hatred, discrimination, and inequality. Rather, I will achieve greater analytical clarity about just what the harms of hate speech are. I do so in order to reinvigorate the question about regulation with a new view of what exactly the object needing attention is, by demonstrating that though there are real harms here, the state cannot provide a regulatory remedy . Thus, in my conclusion I will assert that the question of what we might do differently in response to hate speech can only be answered —however provisionally—insofar as we first confront how we need to think differently about it. Specifically, I will argue that we need to replace the emphasis on redressing harms once they have occurred with a new emphasis on addressing, and ultimately eliminating, the conditions which make those harms possible in the first place. (shrink)

This is, indeed, another work on the subject of hate speech regulation in the United States. And yet, it is not just another such work. For my goal here is not to settle the jurisprudential arguments regarding the possibility of any specific hate speech regulation, either extant or yet to be conceived, withstanding a Constitutional test. Nor is it my intention to demonstrate, on the basis of a comparative study of existing legislation, that such regulation either is or is not (...) effective in addressing or redressing the social ills of hatred, discrimination, and inequality. Rather, I will achieve greater analytical clarity about just what the harms of hate speech are. I do so in order to reinvigorate the question about regulation with a new view of what exactly the object needing attention is, by demonstrating that though there are real harms here, the state cannot provide a regulatory remedy. Thus, in my conclusion I will assert that the question of what we might do differently in response to hate speech can only be answered —however provisionally—insofar as we first confront how we need to think differently about it. Specifically, I will argue that we need to replace the emphasis on redressing harms once they have occurred with a new emphasis on addressing, and ultimately eliminating, the conditions which make those harms possible in the first place. (shrink)