Evading the IRS.James Bogen & Jim Woodward - 2005 - In Martin R. Jones & Nancy Cartwright (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting the Model: Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences.details
'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the (...) processes by which data is produced and used to detect features of phenomena. Neither of these depends upon, or is greatly illuminated by a consideration of, formal relations among observation and theoretical sentences or propositions. By taking causal structures and error characteristics, you too can evade the IRS. In doing so, you can gain insight into Hempel’s raven paradox, theory loading, and other issues from the standard philosophical literature on confirmation theory. (shrink)
This paper discusses features of an epistemically valuable form of evidence that raise troubles for received and new epistemological treatments of experimental evidence.
Functionalist identity theorists argue that if physical states of the central nervous system have the same function as pain, pains should be identified with those physical states. Many objections have been raised against this position. My aim in this paper is to defend it against opponents who argue that it leads to an absurd result: the ascription of pains to things which cannot reasonably be thought to be capable of suffering, or of having any conscious states. In doing this, I (...) will outline a version of the functionalist position which I think is plausible. It departs in several respects from versions commonly found in the literature. (shrink)
James Bogen - The Possibility of Language: Internal Tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 167-169 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by James Bogen University of Pittsburgh María Cerezo. The Possibility of Language: Internal Tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. CSLI Lecture Notes, 147. Stanford: CSLI, 2005. Pp. xiv + 321. Paper, $30.00. The Possibility of Language is a difficult, painstakingly detailed interpretation and evaluation of central doctrines of (...) the Tractatus. It is not easy reading, but most readers who soldier through it will find their prospects of coming to grips with the Tractatus significantly improved. Cerezo constrains her reading as tightly as she can by what she finds good textual and historical reasons to believe the early Wittgenstein was thinking about. She acknowledges and elaborates on what she takes to be serious internal tensions rather than forcing the Tractatus to make sense where she cannot find any. To avoid anachronism, she scrupulously refrains from trying to resolve difficulties by bringing the Tractatus into line with contemporary views. In keeping with her focus on Wittgenstein's text, she does not attempt to survey the extensive literature on the Tractatus. Instead, she limits herself to brief comments on.. (shrink)
This paper offers a detailed account of arguments in De Caelo I by which Aristotle tried to demonstrate the necessity of the perpetual existence and the perpetual rotation of the cosmos. On our interpretation, Aristotle’s arguments are naturalistic. Instead of being based on rules of logic and language, they depend, we argue, on natural science theories about abilities, e.g., to move and to change, which things have by nature and about the conditions under which these abilities can be exercised. Our (...) interpretation locates the De Caelo arguments in the context of some central doctrines of the Organon, the Metaphysics, the Physics, and other texts. The De Caelo arguments fit a number of views developed in these texts. Aristotle’s treatments of local motion, of natural motion and change, of necessity and possibility, and of abilities and their exercises are examples. But, as we interpret them, the De Caelo arguments raise serious questions about the role of Metaphysics A’s soulful Unmoved Mover in Aristotle’s overall natural-scientific picture. (shrink)
Certain remarks in the Tractatus, taken together with a passage in a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, suggest that at one time Wittgenstein inclined toward a psychologistic theory of language. But textual considerations with regard to the former and a special interpretation of the latter allow us to interpret these statements in a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's later views.
This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ?teleological suspension of the ethical?. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.
This paper offers a detailed account of arguments in De Caelo I by which Aristotle tried to demonstrate the necessity of the perpetual existence and the perpetual rotation of the cosmos. On our interpretation, Aristotle’s arguments are naturalistic. Instead of being based (as many have thought) on rules of logic and language, they depend, we argue, on natural science theories about abilities (δυνάμεις), e.g., to move and to change, which things have by nature and about the conditions under which these (...) abilities can be exercised. Our interpretation locates the De Caelo arguments in the context of some central doctrines of the Organon, the Metaphysics, the Physics, and other texts. The De Caelo arguments fit a number of views developed in these texts. Aristotle’s treatments of local motion, of natural motion and change, of necessity and possibility, and of abilities and their exercises are examples. But, as we interpret them, the De Caelo arguments raise serious questions about the role of (and the need for) Metaphysics A’s soulful Unmoved Mover in Aristotle’s overall natural-scientific picture. (shrink)
This paper offers a detailed account of arguments in De Caelo I by which Aristotle tried to demonstrate the necessity of the perpetual existence and the perpetual rotation of the cosmos. On our interpretation, Aristotle’s arguments are naturalistic. Instead of being based on rules of logic and language, they depend, we argue, on natural science theories about abilities , e.g., to move and to change, which things have by nature and about the conditions under which these abilities can be exercised. (...) Our interpretation locates the De Caelo arguments in the context of some central doctrines of the Organon, the Metaphysics, the Physics, and other texts. The De Caelo arguments fit a number of views developed in these texts. Aristotle’s treatments of local motion, of natural motion and change, of necessity and possibility, and of abilities and their exercises are examples. But, as we interpret them, the De Caelo arguments raise serious questions about the role of Metaphysics A’s soulful Unmoved Mover in Aristotle’s overall natural-scientific picture. (shrink)