Chapter 1 An Essay on the Limits of Human Knowledge “I am you and you are I, and where you are, I also will be, and I am dispersed among all things. Where you choose you will find me, and, finding me, you will find yourself.

With his talk on the limits of natural knowledge in 1872 ("Ignorabimus! We will never know!"), Emil du Bois-Reymond stirred up a controversy (the Ignorabimus-Streit), which spread widely beyond German-speaking countries. It concerned the very possibility to set boundaries to knowledge, the development of the sciences, their attainable results, and concept formation. In this volume, the philosophical value of the Ignorabimus controversy is critically examined. The historical matter and its theoretical implications are assessed with regard to the (...) mutual relationships between philosophy and the sciences in the 19th century and beyond. (shrink)

The knowledge in the context of COVID-19 pandemic must be viewed from the perspective of its purpose: the intention to limit the effects and spread of SARS-CoV-2, respectively to cancel them. In order to increase the level of knowledge we identify some of the possible classifications, based on them allowing a first outline of uncertainty. The purpose of the analysis is to contribute to the clearest possible identification of the known and the unknown, thus creating a more stable (...) cognitive field for effective public health decisions. Given that measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic along with its effects is one of humanity's priorities, it is useful to clear up some of the issues that are likely to have improper meanings. The identification of each situation that includes significant doses of unknown and the public recognition of the uncertainty represents the condition for the possibility of robust public policies. Indicating the place that each current aspect occupies in one of the four cognitive quadrants is an important cognitive work. The position we adopt is characteristic for cognitive skepticism, trying to indicate some of the knowledge`s limits of and the risks of pseudo-knowledge. The article is a theoretical approach, based on some epistemological principles of critical thinking, the starting point being the belief that knowing what you do not know is an essential part of the knowledge. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper analyzes the complex and many-layered interrelation between the realization of the inevitable limits of precision in the experimental domain, the emerging quantum theory, and empirically oriented philosophy in the years 1925–1935. In contrast to the usual historical presentation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as a purely theoretical achievement, this work discloses the experimental roots of Heisenberg's contribution. In addition, this paper argues that the positivistic philosophy of elimination of unobservables was not used as a guiding principle in (...) the emergence of the new quantum theory, but rather mostly as a post facto justification. The case of P. W. Bridgman, analyzed in this paper, demonstrates how inconclusive operationalistic arguments are, when used as a possible heuristic aid for future discoveries. A large part of this paper is devoted to the evolution of Bridgman's views, and his skeptical reassessment of operationalism and of the very notion of scientific truth. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The ethics of reciprocity offered by Simone de Beauvoir is founded upon an irreducible epistemic gap between self and other. This gap is often overlooked by commentators, who have tended to imply that the ethics of reciprocity requires recognition of oneself in the other. I claim that Beauvoir's ethics forecloses such recognition of oneself in the other and reveals that it is at once illusory and dangerous. Recognition in this sense is based upon a false notion of self and (...) constitutes a violation of the alterity of the other. I argue that Beauvoir stages this dangerous form of recognition in her novel She Came to Stay, while her claims about reciprocity in The Second Sex provide an image of a different, more positive recognition capable of respecting alterity. Finally, I claim that the epistemic gap characteristic of reciprocity also holds with respect to one's self-relation. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the essential tenets of the Southwestern Neo-Kantians? take on the philosophy of religion. Specifically, I concentrate on two diverse aspects of Windelband and Rickert?s approaches to religion. In the first place, I look at the way in which they determine religious values. In the second place, I focus on the manner in which they confront religion with the systematic structure of culture. As a result of the analysis of the texts of both authors, we see that (...) it is possible to detect at least three possible roads to elaborate a philosophy of religion. In spite of this plurality of paths, I argue that they exhibit a similar underlying problem, namely, the problematic relationship between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. It is for this reason that the philosophy of religion takes the form of a reflection on the limits of knowledge, and with it, on the limits of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

HOW MUCH CAN A PERSON KNOW? A Leibnizian Perspective on Human Finitude. How much can someone possibly know? What could reasonably be viewed as an upper limit of an individual’s knowledge—supposing that factually informative knowledge rather than performative how-to knowledge or subliminally tacit knowledge is to be at issue?

Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?

The Profound Limitations of Knowledge explores the limitations of knowledge and argues that neither reasoning nor direct or indirect observations can be trusted. We cannot even assign probabilities to claims of what we can know. Furthermore, for any set of data, there are an infinite number of possible interpretations. Evidence suggests that we live in a participatory universe--that is, our observations shape reality.

Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960s. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated historical (...) concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea. (shrink)

This philosophically rich volume examines the limits of human knowledge and considers their implications.

Many books explain what is known about the universe. This book investigates what cannot be known. Rather than exploring the amazing facts that science, mathematics, and reason have revealed to us, this work studies what science, mathematics, and reason tell us cannot be revealed. In The Outer Limits of Reason, Noson Yanofsky considers what cannot be predicted, described, or known, and what will never be understood. He discusses the limitations of computers, physics, logic, and our own thought processes. Yanofsky (...) describes simple tasks that would take computers trillions of centuries to complete and other problems that computers can never solve; perfectly formed English sentences that make no sense; different levels of infinity; the bizarre world of the quantum; the relevance of relativity theory; the causes of chaos theory; math problems that cannot be solved by normal means; and statements that are true but cannot be proven. He explains the limitations of our intuitions about the world -- our ideas about space, time, and motion, and the complex relationship between the knower and the known. Moving from the concrete to the abstract, from problems of everyday language to straightforward philosophical questions to the formalities of physics and mathematics, Yanofsky demonstrates a myriad of unsolvable problems and paradoxes. Exploring the various limitations of our knowledge, he shows that many of these limitations have a similar pattern and that by investigating these patterns, we can better understand the structure and limitations of reason itself. Yanofsky even attempts to look beyond the borders of reason to see what, if anything, is out there. (shrink)

Draws on interviews with many of the worlds leading scientists to discuss the possibility that humankind has reached the limits of scientific knowledge.

This article sets out to show that it is more precise to speak of different liberal traditions than it is to speak of liberalism in general. The argument is pursued by showing how contrary to French liberalism, which has a strong republican element, and in contrast with English and Scottish liberalism, which reserve an important place for political economy, there is also a central European liberalism with a marked philosophical dimension. This particular form of liberalism is analysed by examining the (...) writings of Kant, Simmel and Freud. It is stated at the outset that critiques of liberalism often fail to appreciate the richness and diversity of liberal thinking, and that this depth must be borne in mind in any effective critique. It is explained that there are indeed grounds to critique liberal thought and practice, but that these grounds are obscured by lumping distinct and heterogeneous traditions together as if they all suffered from the same defects. (shrink)

The work of Michel Serres has been of significant value, yet remains under-utilized across the social sciences. In this review article the long-awaited translation of his The Five Senses is explored, with particular interest in its offerings for contemporary theories of the materiality of the human condition. Serres invites the reader into a diverse and rich world of sense, from localized sites of individual bodies to global landscapes of cities and countrysides. Not reducible to individual bodies or language, sense becomes (...) the primary mode of relationality through which experience is produced. Such insights are explored in light of contemporary concerns regarding the constitution of bodies and materiality, which emphasize notions of movement and process. The distinction Serres makes between sense and language is argued to be valuable in terms of theories of virtuality that frame material embodiment as ineffable and beyond language. The article concludes by suggesting that Serres can aid re-attunement to sense, although not in a generalistic fashion, but as part of disciplinary specific engagements. (shrink)

Hume maintained that “since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.” Descartes maintained a very similar doctrine, and Locke and Berkeley held at least part of the doctrine. I shall not try to set out precisely what any of these philosophers thought about self-knowledge; I cite them simply as proponents of the general view which I shall be examining (...) in this paper: namely, that each of us has a special epistemic authority about his own mental life. This view is still widely held, particularly in the form of the thesis that one's sincere avowals of current mental states are incorrigible, i.e., such that, necessarily, no one ever has overriding reason to think them false. (shrink)

“ The doubtful story of successive events.” With this contemptuous phrase1 Bernard Bosanquet brushed aside the claim of history to be considered a study deserving the attention of a thoughtful mind. Unsatisfactory in form, because never rising above uncertainty; unsatisfactory in matter, because always concerned with the transitory, the successive, the merely particular as opposed to the universal; a chronicle of small beer, and an untrustworthy chronicle at that. Yet Bosanquet was well read in history; he had taught it as (...) a young man at Oxford, and his first published work had been a translation of a recent German book on the Athenian constitution; he knew that a vast amount of the world's best genius in the last hundred years had been devoted to historical studies; and when, late in life, he asked himself what it came to, that was all he could say. (shrink)

An introduction for students in the hard and social sciences, this brief book examines the nature and limits of human knowledge. Topics include how humans process information, how they cannot have certain knowledge, the limits to all human systems of definition including science, and the considerations of these limits. -/- .

The limits of ignorance Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9571-z Authors Constantine Sandis, Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OX2 9AT UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

James M. Robins, Richard Scheines, Peter Spirtes, and Larry Wasserman. The Limits of Causal Knowledge.

To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge, we probe the limits of what might be called an experiment. By appeal to examples of scientific practice from astrophysics and analogue gravity, we demonstrate that the reliability of knowledge regarding certain phenomena gained from an experiment is not circumscribed by the manipulability or accessibility of the target phenomena. Rather, the limits of experimental knowledge are set by the extent to which strategies for what we call ‘inductive (...) triangulation’ are available: that is, the validation of the mode of inductive reasoning involved in the source-target inference via appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes of inductive reasoning. When such strategies are able to partially mitigate reasonable doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be well supported by experiment. When such strategies are able to fully mitigate reasonable doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be established by experiment. There are good reasons to expect the next generation of analogue experiments to provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible phenomena such that the relevant theories can be understood as well supported. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The next generation of analogue gravity experiments’. (shrink)

In this essay collection, leading physicists, philosophers, and historians attempt to fill the empty theoretical ground in the foundations of information and address the related question of the limits to our knowledge of the world. Over recent decades, our practical approach to information and its exploitation has radically outpaced our theoretical understanding - to such a degree that reflection on the foundations may seem futile. But it is exactly fields such as quantum information, which are shifting the boundaries (...) of the physically possible, that make a foundational understanding of information increasingly important. One of the recurring themes of the book is the claim by Eddington and Wheeler that information involves interaction and putting agents or observers centre stage. Thus, physical reality, in their view, is shaped by the questions we choose to put to it and is built up from the information residing at its core. This is the root of Wheeler's famous phrase "it from bit." After reading the stimulating essays collected in this volume, readers will be in a good position to decide whether they agree with this view. (shrink)

This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.

Modal agnosticism is the view that we must be agnostic about whether things could have turned out differently. I argue that claims about unrealised possibilities are not justified by our modal intuitions, nor are they justified by any of the means proposed by philosophers. It follows that we do not have merely metaphysical modal knowledge, and that we must adopt modal agnosticism.

How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought behind “separatism” is easy to articulate. Assuming that knowledge of any kind (...) is defeasible, since knowledge-that and knowledge-how are fundamentally different beasts, the best accounts of their defeasibility must reflect the underlying differences between them. I reject a separatist treatment of the defeasibility of knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One can acknowledge certain important differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how without thereby needing two theories of defeasibility. Ultimately, though, I’ll argue that the defeasibility of basic knowledge-how, unlike non-basic knowledge-how, is a much more difficult issue than has been acknowledged. (shrink)

In this article I look at the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions in light of the dynamics of ancient Indian debate. Doing so foregrounds a dimension of the Buddha's interaction with his interlocutors that is central for understanding the problem of what are known as the Undetermined or Unanswered Questions: namely, the Buddha's knowledge and authority vis-à-vis rival teachers.