3 In live performances seated audiences have restricted opportunities for response. Some 4 responses are obvious, such as applause and cheering, but there are also many apparently 5 incidental movements including posture shifts, fixing hair, scratching and adjusting glasses. 6 Do these movements provide clues to people’s level of engagement with a performance? Our 7 basic hypothesis is that audience responses are part of a bi-directional system of audience- 8 performer communication. This communication is part of what distinguishes live from (...) recorded 9 performance and underpins live performers’ moment-to-moment sense of how well a performance 10 is going. Here we investigate the range of visible real-time movements of audiences in four live 11 contemporary dance performances. Video recordings of performers and audiences were analysed 12 using computer vision techniques for extracting face, hand and body movement data. The 13 meaning of audience movements were analysed by comparing clips of the audience at moments 14 of maximum and minimum movement to expert and novice judges. The results show that audience 15 clips with the lowest overall movement are judged as displaying the highest engagement. In 16 addition, we found that while there is no systematic relationship between audience and dancers 17 movement, hands seem to play an especially significant role since they move significantly more 18 compared to the rest of the body. We draw on these findings to argue that collective stillness is 19 an especially salient signal of audience engagement. (shrink)

Treatise on the theory of Advaita Vedanta philosophy.

Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death of women in the United States, yet cardiovascular research is disproportionately conducted using male human subjects and male animal models. This article deploys Katrina Hutchison’s (2019) analysis of gender disparity in clinical trials as a moral aggregation problem to address the problem of underrepresentation of women in cardiovascular research. I identify cost concerns, convenience, pregnancy, and negligence as potential reasons for the underrepresentation of women in CVD research. Finally, I suggest that multilevel (...) strategies will be needed to eliminate sex disparity in CVD research and improve patient care. (shrink)

El presente artículo indaga por la posibilidad del perdón teniendo como telón de fondo el daño extremo, en el cual la víctima ha sido violentada en suintegridad física y psicológica sin razón aparente. Para allanar el problema abordamos la perspectiva de Jankélévitch, donde el perdón no es unívoco ni universal, más bien es un asunto personal. En este sentido, el artículo muestra que el perdón puede proceder de i) un acto de amor, completamente desinteresado, en el que la víctima en (...) un acto de desprendimiento y de humildad dona el perdón sin esperar nada a cambio y ii) del diálogo que se establece entre víctima y verdugo, donde el segundo reconoce la falta y, en consecuencia, establece comunicación con la víctima. No obstante, y dado los límites humanos, el reconocimiento de la falta no implica, necesariamente, el acontecimiento del perdón. (shrink)

Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 120-123.

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough (...) literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated. (shrink)

This essay challenges dominant interpretations of Foucault’s lectures on parrhesia as affirming an ethical, non-political conception of truth-telling. I read the lectures instead as depicting truth-telling as an always political predicament: of having to appear distant from power, while also having to partake in some sense of political power. Read in this way, Foucault’s lectures help us to understand and address the disputed politicality of truth-telling – over who counts as a truth-teller, and what counts as the truth – that (...) his ethical interpreters tend to neglect. Yet the essay also shows that Foucault’s depiction of the predicament of truth-tellers is problematically gendered: focused on the masculine problem of moving in and out of the public sphere, rather than on the experience of the dispossessed, who are excluded from political power altogether. The essay mobilizes an alternative reading of one of Foucault’s key texts – Euripides’ Ion – to draw out an alternative, more democratic model of the predicament of truth-telling: of having to constitute power that can lend significant to truth-telling, while speaking from a position of powerlessness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAtiq Rahimi is a director, photographer and translingual author who has published in Dari and in French since 1999. As an outspoken author, Rahimi did not refrain from narrating l...

In this paper we define the hyper operations ⊗, ∨ and ∧ on a hyper MV -algebra and we obtain some related results. After that by considering the notions ofhyper MV -ideals and weak hyper MV -ideals, we prove some theorems. Then we determine relationships between hyper MV -ideals in a hyper MV -algebra and hyper K -ideals in a hyper K -algebra . Finally we give a characterization of hyper MV -algebras of order 3 or 4 based on the (...) hyper MV -ideals. (shrink)

ObjectiveCaring for patients with Alzheimer’s disease is a stressful situation and an overwhelming task for family caregivers. Therefore, these caregivers need to have their hardiness empowered to provide proper and appropriate care to these older adults. From the introduction of the concept of hardiness, few studies have been conducted to assess the hardiness of caregivers of patients with AD. Presumably, one reason for this knowledge gap is the lack of a proper scale to evaluate hardiness in this group. This study (...) was conducted to develop a reliable and valid Family Caregivers’ Hardiness Scale to measure this concept accurately among Iranian family caregivers sample.MethodsThis study is a cross-sectional study with a sequential-exploratory mixed-method approach. The concept of family caregivers’ hardiness was clarified using deductive content analysis, and item pools were generated. In the psychometric step, the samples were 435 family caregivers with a mean age of 50.26, and the data were gathered via an online form questionnaire. In this step, the items of the FCHS were evaluated using face and content validity. Then, the factor structure was determined and confirmed using exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis followed by convergent and divergent validity, respectively. Finally, scale reliability, including stability, and internal consistency were evaluated.ResultsThe finding revealed that FCHS consists of five factors, namely, “Religious Coping”, “Self-Management”, “Empathic Communication”, “Family Affective Commitment”, and “Purposeful Interaction” that explained 58.72% of the total variance. The results of CFA showed a good model fit. Reliability showed acceptable internal consistency and stability.ConclusionBased on the results of the psychometric evaluation of the FCHS, turned out that the concept of hardiness in Iranian family caregivers is a multidimensional concept that is most focused on individual-cultural values, emotional family relationships, and social relationships. The designed scale also has acceptable validity and reliability features that can be used in future studies to measure this concept in family caregivers. (shrink)

Different people have different perceptions about artificial intelligence (AI). It is extremely important to bring together all the alternative frames of thinking—from the various communities of developers, researchers, business leaders, policymakers, and citizens—to properly start acknowledging AI. This article highlights the ‘fruitful collaboration’ that sociology and AI could develop in both social and technical terms. We discuss how biases and unfairness are among the major challenges to be addressed in such a sociotechnical perspective. First, as intelligent machines reveal their nature (...) of ‘magnifying glasses’ in the automation of existing inequalities, we show how the AI technical community is calling for transparency and explainability, accountability and contestability. Not to be considered as panaceas, they all contribute to ensuring human control in novel practices that include requirement, design and development methodologies for a fairer AI. Second, we elaborate on the mounting attention for technological narratives as technology is recognized as a social practice within a specific institutional context. Not only do narratives reflect organizing visions for society, but they also are a tangible sign of the traditional lines of social, economic, and political inequalities. We conclude with a call for a diverse approach within the AI community and a richer knowledge about narratives as they help in better addressing future technical developments, public debate, and policy. AI practice is interdisciplinary by nature and it will benefit from a socio-technical perspective. (shrink)

This essay argues for reading Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as a work of love that calls for an environmental politics of desire rather than self-preservation narrowly construed. I make this argument by reading Silent Spring in conjunction with the extant love letters of Carson and Dorothy Freeman, where they depict their love as a wondrous multispecies achievement constituted through encounters with birds. I argue that their example reveals that love need be neither worldless nor heteronormative, but may be a world-disclosing (...) practice that leads individuals to live, and desire to live, differently. Reading Silent Spring through the lens of these letters, I argue that it calls us to see the threat insecticides pose not only to “mere life” but also to pleasurable lives of wonder and love. I build on Silent Spring to argue for an alternative politics of survival in the face of climate change: one that foregrounds the connections between inter-human affects and a vibrant multispecies world, between intimate and public feelings, and calls for preservation of a multispecies world through and on behalf of human pleasure. (shrink)

Open Humanities Press, Living Books About Life Series.

There are certain moments, such as the American founding or the Civil Rights Movement, that we revisit again and again as instances of democratic triumph, and there are other moments that haunt us as instances of democratic failure. How should we view moments of democratic failure, when both the law and citizens forsake justice? Do such moments reveal a wholesale failure of democracy or a more contested failing, pointing to what could have been, and still might be? Public Trials reveals (...) the considerable stakes of how we understand democratic failure. Maxwell argues against a tendency in the thinking of Plato, Rousseau and contemporary theorists to view moments of democratic failure as indicative of the failure of democracy, insomuch as such thinking leads to a deference to authority that unintentionally encourages complicity in elite and legal failures to assure justice. In contrast, what Maxwell calls "lost cause narratives" of democratic failure reveal the contingency of democratic failure by showing that things "could have been" otherwise-and, with public action and response, might yet be. A politics of lost causes calls for democratic responsiveness to failure via practices of resistance, theatrical claims-making, and re-narration. Maxwell makes a powerful case for the politics of lost causes by examining public controversies over trials. She focuses on the dilemmas and diagnoses of democratic failure in four instances: Edmund Burke's speeches and writings on the Warren Hastings trial in late 18th century Britain, Emile Zola's writings on the Dreyfus Affair in late 19th century France, Hannah Arendt's writings on the Eichmann trial in 1960's Israel, and Kathryn Bigelow's recent narration of (the lack of) trials of alleged terrorist detainees in Zero Dark Thirty. Maxwell marshals her subtle, historically grounded readings of these texts to show the dangers of despairing of democracy altogether, as well as the necessity of re-narrating instances of democratic failure so as to cultivate public responsiveness to such failures in the future. (shrink)

Ideas II has been the source of several issues in the broader phenomenological literature. Some of these issues focus on the particular aims of that work and its place within the system of transcendental constitutive and genetic Phenomenology. Others are concerned with its significance in the development of Husserl’s thought on the possibility and direction of a phenomenological philosophy of natural science (still under discussion), along with a systematic phenomenological grounding of the human sciences. Furthermore, the manuscript of Ideas II (...) seems to have contributed to the formation of Heidegger’s views on the nature and status of Husserl’s Phenomenology and of Phenomenology in general. Thus, an examination of the actual meaning of the analyses in Ideas II would contribute significantly to the understanding of a variety of important issues in phenomenological philosophy. Husserl’s so-called “transcendental turn” between 1905 and 1907 represents the beginning of the path to Ideas II. From 1907 onwards, Husserl attempted a clear and systematic development of his ideas on the transcendental constitution of intentional beings in their—whatever—actuality. This is a task he undertook in the Ideas I, in which he expounds the general core of the new discoveries that allowed him to go beyond the analyses of the Logical Investigations. Having established transcendental subjectivity as the ultimate ground where “the Mothers” accomplish their constitutive work, Husserl became convinced that he had discovered the source from which all Being (Sein) arises. [...] In Ideas II, inanimate nature is presented as comprising the most basic region and as the fundament for the constitution of all the other ontological regions (or regions of Being or Being-regions). But, in Part I of that work (the English translation reads “Section One”), we find Husserl providing an analysis of the constitution of naturething (Naturding).1 What is Husserl’s conception of nature-things there? How do they relate to inanimate beings in general? How do they relate to the things that are supposed to be given in simple visual perception or in simple sense or sensory experience? Are they the accomplishment of a predicative or of a pre-predicative intentionality? Are they the subject matter of natural science, and in what sense— and, if not, why? The text of the Ideas II generates puzzlement and confusion, much of which is reproduced in the relevant literature. (shrink)

Stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens (SESH) is built in accordance with the modular and hierarchical principle and consists of the same type of self-replicating elements, i.e. is a system of systems. On the top level of the organization of SESH is the superposition of genetic, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic complexes. The components of this triad differ in the mechanism of cycles of generation - replication - transmission - fixing/elimination of adoptively relevant information. This mechanism is implemented either in accordance (...) with the Darwin-Weismann modus, or according to the Lamarck modus, the difference between them is clear from the title. The integral attribute of the system of systems including ESSH is the production of evolutionary risks. The sources of evolutionary risk for stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens are the imbalance of (1) the intra-genomic co-evolution (intragenomic conflicts); (2) the gene-cultural coevolution; (3) the inter-cultural co-evolution; (4) techno-humanitarian balance; (5) intertechnological conflicts (technological traps). At least phenomenologically the components of the evolutionary risk are reversible, but in the aggregate they are in potentio irreversible destructive ones for bio-social, and cultural self-identity of Homo sapiens. When the actual evolution is the subject of a rationalist control and/or manipulation, the magnitude of the 4th and 5th components of the evolutionary risk reaches the level of existential significance. (shrink)

The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings . In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure and (...) pain are recordings for our bodily and spiritual states resulting from our confrontation with beings and situations in the world. Delight and distress are, subsequently, approached as the first full-fledged emotive acts that animate or intentionally interpret pleasure and pain in specific ways. The elementary values of agreeableness and disagreeableness appear correspondingly to the latter in relation to the very pleasure or pain and to what has caused them. In other words, agreeable and disagreeable show how what we confront in the world weighs for us, what value it has for the embodied intentional consciousness, for its state and functioning as well as for its existentio-praxial possibilities in the lifeworld. (shrink)

Husserl and Cassirer stand, according to their own self-understanding, as key 20th century figures in the cultivation of Enlightenment’s principles and views on humanity, culture, and history. In a word, they both understand European culture and history as a story of progress (§ 1). As I see it, central in a culture and its dynamics is its system of values, and a grounded understanding of the issue of progress presupposes an adequate theory of the standing or constitution as well as (...) of the givenness and transvaluation of values. Neither Husserl nor Cassirer, however, actually advanced any such theory. We are still in need of one in order to account for culture’s formation and dynamics in history. Next, I briefly review Husserl’s and Cassirer’s available problematic views on values (§ 2). Then, in § 3, I examine some of the central problems in the traditional approaches to culture and to values. In § 4, I appeal to Köhler’s very interesting Gestalt theoretical approach to values and pinpoint some of its problems. Next, in § 5, I suggest how we could start the research from below, from the level of the organism, which could eventually shed some new light on the problem of value constitution and givenness. Finally, in § 6, I attempt to sketch an explanation for how we can use this new approach to values in order to understand actual cultural formation and its historicity, in a way that goes further than the whiggish philosophy of history. (shrink)

Madness and emotion could be said to share, to a certain extent, their definition as kinds of human response to influences from their environment. The connection between madness and emotion is stressed in modern psychological observations establishing strong links between the causation of madness and human emotionality. Despite the fact that similar insights were absent from Greek medical theorists, or indeed from other contemporary writers, this would come as no surprise to either Sophokles or Euripides. Both tragedians handled their material (...) in such a way as to demonstrate how the strong pressures of familial or social influences can lead to mental disturbance. While it is most probably Sophokles who, for the first time, turns to the influence of internal forces in the process of madness, the lack of subject matter in his surviving plays allows us little scope for further comparison. On the other hand, Euripides seems to have dedicated more of his portrayals to madness. These portrayals offer an almost unique opportunity to examine the introduction, not only in drama but perhaps in the whole of Greek literature, of the emotions as contributing factors in madness. (shrink)

This comprehensive sourcebook of Philo of Alexandria presents topics and themes drawn from commonly studied Philonic texts in seven chapters: theology, cosmology, anthropology, ethics, biblical characters, Jewish Law, and Jewish worship and observances.

This book examines Philo's understanding of the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices using the Greek concept of piety as a central virtue in his ethical discourse. Naveros exceptionally shows how Philo construes his understanding of living ethically within both the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek traditions.

This book deals with foundational issues in Phenomenology as they arise in the smoldering but tense dispute between Husserl and Heidegger, which culminates in the late 1920s. The work focuses on three key issues around which a constellation of other important problems revolves. More specifically, it elucidates the phenomenological method of the reductions, the identity and content of primordial givenness, and the meaning and character of categorial intuition. The text interrogates how Husserl and Heidegger understand these points, and clarifies the (...) precise nature of their disagreements. The book thus sheds light on the meaning of intentionality and of its foundation on pre-objective time, on the sense of the phenomenological a priori, on intentional constitution, on the relatedness between intentionality and world, and on Heidegger’s debt to Husserl’s categorial intuition in formulating the question regarding Being/Nothing. The author revisits these fundamental issues in order to suggest a general intra-phenomenological settlement, and to do justice to the corresponding contributions of these two central figures in phenomenological philosophy. He also indicates a way of reconciling and interweaving some of their views in order to free Phenomenology from its inner divisions and limitations, enabling it to move forward. Phenomenology can re-examine itself, its obligations, and its possibilities, and this can be of benefit to contemporary philosophy, especially with regard to problems concerning consciousness, intentionality, experience, and human existence and praxis within a historical world in crisis. This book is ideally suited to students and scholars of Husserl and Heidegger, to philosophers of mind, consciousness and cognition, and to anyone with a serious interest in Phenomenology. (shrink)

Two seemingly opposing philosophies, Plato’s and Heidegger’s, are brought together by reading the philosophy of politics in the Republic through the existential-analytic lenses of Being and Time and also by using the former in order to explore the philosophico-political potential of the latter. Plato’s thematic of errancy (αμαρτία) is shown to interlock harmoniously with Ηeidegger’s thematic of the fall (Verfall). This provides a single, penetrating interpretation of how philosophy thinks humans are supposed to respond to the predicament of their original (...) condition (painfulness connected with injustice, meaninglessness, etc.). It turns out that in these otherwise antipodean versions of philosophizing, the view emerges, according to which the original difficulty can be fully overcome. The question whether the aforementioned predicament can be actually fully overcome (or rather not) however, would form the basis for a novel phenomenology of the political. (shrink)

Even in the relatively recent literature on the issue of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger, some scholars recognize that despite a large number of very good accounts, the darkness surrounding the matter has not yet been totally lifted. In particular, we still lack a complete account of the exact influence that Husserl’s Phenomenology exerted on Heidegger’s project of a Fundamental Ontology. To use, e.g., Dahlstrom’s wording, until now, the available works on this subject “merely provide points of departure (...) for an explanation of the relation between the two phenomenologists” (Dahlstrom 2001, 142 n. 103; emphasis added). The situation is, of course, somewhat awkward, since Heidegger himself not only admitted his debt to Husserl’s philosophy, but also sometimes tried to guide us through the inner itineraries of this debt. In his Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity (SS 1923), Heidegger admitted, in front of his students, that it was Husserl who gave him his philosophical eyes: “die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt” (GA 63, 5). There are many occasions on which Heidegger thematizes his debt to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Two years later, in his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time (SS 1925), he introduced his students to what he presented as the “three fundamental discoveries” of Husserl’s Phenomenology: intentionality, the doctrine of categorial intuition, and the phenomenological sense of the a priori, thereby publicly acknowledging his admiration for Husserl’s work. Both there and in BT, (1927) as well as in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (SS 1927), Heidegger constantly acknowledges the decisive dependence of his philosophy on Husserl’s thinking. [...] All the available textual evidence, then, makes clear that Heidegger considered the doctrine of categorial intuition, developed in the sixth LI, as the most decisive influence from Husserl on his own thought (with intentionality and the phenomenological a priori following closely). Now, what precisely is the meaning of this influence? How might that Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, namely the question of Being (Seinsfrage)? (shrink)

The evolution of Husserl’s thought did not follow a linear route. Time and again, crucial changes were taking place in its course. The content of fundamental concepts was shifting; successive discoveries of new thematics were happening; incessant expansions of the ever-under-rework teachings to new fields of application were being developed. The evaluation of Husserl’s work in its entirety becomes, thus, an extremely difficult task. The huge bulk of the writings, the multifariousness of their thematics, and the successive reforms and shifts (...) in it make the understanding of even the overall plan wherein the intermediate findings fall very difficult. One thing, though, is certain. In order to overcome all these obstacles to approaching Husserl’s work, we must first deepen our understanding of his method, the phenomenological method of philosophizing. Whatever is said in Husserl’s Phenomenology makes sense and has its value only to the extent that it is a result of ‘the’ phenomenological reduction. (shrink)

In §69.b of BT Heidegger attempts an existential genetic analysis of science, i.e. a phenomenology of the conceptual process of the constitution of the logical view of science (science seen as theory) starting from the Dasein. It attempts to do so by examining the special intentional-existential modification of (human) being-in-the-world, which is called the "mathematical projection of nature"; that is, by examining that special modification of our being, which places us in the state of experience that presents the world to (...) us as taught by, e.g., Galileo and Newton. The idea he puts forward is that modern mathematical physics and the corresponding experience of the real is the result of the mathematical projection of nature. Modern science, Heidegger says, stands out because it is mathematical. But we cannot get the answer to what this mathematicality consists in from mathematics, because mathematics is only a special manifestation of mathematicality. Here is what Heidegger means by "mathematicality" and, accordingly by "mathematical projection of nature." If one were to let two bodies of different weights fall simultaneously from the top of the tower of Pisa, Heidegger notes, both Galileo and an Aristotelian would see that the two bodies would reach the ground with as little time difference as possible, and not at exactly the same moment. Galileo, however, does something decisive: he claims that under conditions that would be impossible to ensure (if we removed absolutely all resistance to the motion of the bodies), the two bodies would reach the ground absolutely simultaneously. This is not something that he or the Aristotelian sees happening empirically. How, then, does Galileo insist so firmly on his position? How exactly does it happen that he has before him such a view of things? Heidegger's answer is that Galileo is mathematically projecting nature. In his Dialogues Galileo says "I conceive with my mind" (mente concipio) a body thrown to move on an infinitely extending horizontal plane, having eliminated from its path every possible obstacle. Finally, I argue that from the detailed interpretation of Heidegger's points of the mathematical and of the notion of mathematical projection of nature, we can arrive at the conclusions I had arrived at in my doctoral dissertation (2000) as regards the meaning and function of thought experiments in physics as seen from a Husserlian phenomenological point of view as intentional acts. In a nutshell, in thought experiments physics constitutes the special metaphysics (to use the Kantian term) of the primordial ontological region it investigates as well as attempts to make natural sense of the mathematical formalism in cases it proves necessary. (shrink)