In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception (...) of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. (shrink)

Mi propósito en este texto es hacer una reflexión de la lectura que Martin Heidegger propone del eterno retorno basándome en la obra que le dedica al autor de dicho pensamiento: Nietzsche. Señalaré los modos de llegar a las interpretaciones cosmológica y antropológica que Heidegger propone, mostrando, a la vez, sus problemas. De esta última interpretación mostraré dos vertientes. Así pues, intentaré depurar el camino entre las diversas interpretaciones del eterno retorno propuestas por Heidegger hasta llegar a una interpretación más (...) clara y coherente. Es decir, intentaré encontrar una respuesta a la pregunta por el fundamento del eterno retorno y a la pregunta por la particular relación que tiene el eterno retorno con el tiempo y la voluntad de poder, relaciones que explicarían de un mejor modo la vinculación del lugar del eterno retorno en la obra de Nietzsche, a partir del pensamiento de Heidegger. (shrink)

Wittgenstein said of Kierkegaard that he was the “single most profound philosopher of the 19th century”; but what accounts for Wittgenstein’s estimation of Kierkegaard’s work? I argue that Kierkegaard, who was a student of ancient philosophy, synthesized Socratic and Aristotelian concepts into a conception of philosophical inquiry that provided the basis for a Socratic-style engagement with what Kierkegaard calls “the present age”. This allows Kierkegaard to engage Socratically with the present age’s assumptions, but with a kind of categorial sophistication that (...) goes beyond traditional Socratic inquiry. This Kierkegaardian model, I argue, provides the template for what Wittgenstein comes to call “philosophical foundations of X”, where X is some non-philosophical enterprise, such as psychology or mathematics. But didn’t Wittgenstein’s later work constitute a fundamental break with the philosophical tradition altogether? As G. H. von Wright famously remarks, “the author of Philosophical Investigations has no ancestors in philosophy”. In fact, I argue that if a reasonable adjustment is made in the understanding of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation, then the Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation can be seen to have more in common with certain Socratic and Aristotelian paradigms in ancient philosophy than we might otherwise assume. At that point, we can appreciate how the work of Søren Kierkegaard represents a significant conceptual and historical transitional link between these two periods. According to Kierkegaard, it is a central Socratic idea that anyone, no matter who they are, always already operates with some philosophical understanding of the things with which they are especially occupied in life. And scientists are no exception to this rule. In fact, scientists can be expected to operate with some formal-causal and ontological-categorial understanding of their subject, as well as an understanding of how the basic domains and topics that preoccupy them fit into the larger scheme of things: however, in light of the division of labor, scientists will not necessarily be aware of the extent to which they are already committed to a distinctively philosophical understanding of things. Making this philosophical understanding explicit and scrutinizing it may in turn have an impact on the ways in which scientists go on to frame their scientific research. I suggest that in light of the above genealogy of Wittgenstein’s concept of “philosophical foundations of X”, Wittgenstein can be regarded as a descendant of this Socratic tradition of philosophy, in which philosophy is occasioned by a reflection on the philosophical foundations of non-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

What is the status of the dichotomy proposed and the nosological validity of the contrasting pathologies described in the target article? How plausibly can dysregulated imprinting explain the array of features described, compared with other genetic models? We believe that considering alternative models is more likely to lead in the long term to the correct classification and explanation of the component behaviours.

A conflict within the community of those investigating business ethics is whether decision makers are motivated by an ethics of justice or an ethics of caring. The proposition put forward in this paper is that ethical orientations are strongly related to cultural backgrounds. Specifically, Hofstede's cultural stereotyping using his masculine-feminine dimension may well match a culture's reliance on justice or caring when decisions are made. A study of college graduates from six countries showed that Hofstede's dimension was remarkably accurate in (...) predicating a justice or caring orientation for decision makers from five of the six countries. (shrink)

The semantic, or model-theoretic, approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice—a claim which has led some to propose a “deflationary” account of models; (ii) it is further contended that the sense of “model” used by the approach differs from that given in model theory. Our aim in the present work is to articulate a possible response to these claims, (...) drawing on recent developments within the semantic approach itself. Thus, the first is answered by utilizing the notion of a “partial structure”, first introduced in this context by da Costa and French in 1990. The second claim is undermined by consideration of van Fraassen's understanding of “model” which corresponds well with that evinced by modem mathematicians. This latter discussion, in particular, has an impact on the continuing debate regarding the relative merits of the semantic and syntactic views and the developments presented here can be taken to provide further support to the former. (shrink)

Drawing on a range of literature, I introduce two new concepts for understanding and exploring distributed cognition: resilience engineering and degeneracy. By re-examining Ed Hutchins’ (1995) ethnographic study of the navigation team I show how a focus on the developmental acquisition of cognitive practices can draw out several crucial insights that have been overlooked. Firstly, that the way in which agents learn and acquire cognitive practices enables a form of resilience engineering: the process by which the system is able to (...) overcome and adapt to errors and the vagaries of nature. Secondly, that the best way to engineer a resilient system is through promoting degeneracy – how differing structures produce the same function – at the level of cognitive practices. These two features show that focusing on cognitive practices and developmental trajectories is important for both greater explanatory leverage; and is also useful in regard to the practicalities of designing real-world cognitive systems. (shrink)

We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structuralrealism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned theview of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualisingobjects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in thecontext of modern physics.

Cartwright and her collaborators have elaborated a provocative view of science which emphasises the independence from theory &unknown;in methods and aims&unknown; of phenomenological model building. This thesis has been supported in a recent paper by an analysis of the London and London model of superconductivity. In the present work we begin with a critique of Cartwright's account of the relationship between theoretical and phenomenological models before elaborating an alternative picture within the framework of the partial structures version of the semantic (...) approach to theories. Drawing on the recent histories of superconductivity by Dahl and Gavroglu, together with the original works by London and London and by F. London separately, and taking due consideration of the heuristic aspects, we argue that the historical details fail to support Cartwright et al.'s claims but that they fit comfortably within the partial structures framework. (shrink)

Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine. The editors bring together some of the most influential (...) contributions of famous philosophers in the field, including John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, as well as more recent extracts from philosophers and scientists such as Ian Hacking, Stephen Jay Gould, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, and John Worrall. The anthology is organised into nine clear sections: science, non science and pseudo-science race, gender and science scientific reasoning scientific explanation laws and causation science and medicine probability and forensic science risk, uncertainty and science policy scientific realism and anti-realism. The articles chosen are clear, interesting, and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they provide an overview of the debate, as well as suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

A crucial question for both philosophy and for science concerns the kind of relationship that obtains between entities—objects, properties, states, processes, kinds and so on—that exist at apparently higher and lower ‘levels’ of reality. According to reductionism, seeming higher-level entities can in fact be fully accounted for by more fundamental, lower-level entities. Conversely, emergentists of various stripes hold that whilst higher-level entities depend in some important sense on lower-level entities, they are nevertheless irreducible to them. This introductory paper outlines the (...) context of the debate between emergentists and reductionists; offers a broad characterisation of ‘strong’ or ontological emergence, and provides summaries of each of the papers to come in this special issue. (shrink)

Recent computer simulations of evolving neural networks have shown that population-level behavioral asymmetries can arise without social interactions. Although these models are quite limited at present, they support the hypothesis that social pressures can be sufficient but are not necessary for population lateralization to occur, and they provide a framework for further theoretical investigation of this issue.

A critical analysis of contemporary strategic management theory and practice suggests that modernist, linear thinking has facilitated the development of an abstracted reality which is misleading to managers and fundamentally flawed. It is argued that formulaic strategic tools such as those propounded by Porter fail to capture the reality of the complex environments that confront firms and falsely suggest that an answer can be derived from a predetermined toolbox. As an alternative to this dominant paradigm, the complexity of markets is (...) presented not as something to be feared and ignored, but rather as a truth to be embraced. As a basis of taking this step, current knowledge on how complex environments work, perspectives on how they can be better understood and how people and organizations can engage within them, is presented. Ultimately it is recognised that both theoretical and practical foundations need significant, further development. (shrink)

As a legal aid union president in New Haven, laboring within shouting distance of a different large research university, I recall how our membership rolled our eyes when Professors Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennesy of Harvard published their study providing evidence, through a randomized control trial, that law clinic housing work made no difference for clients.1 Representing, as I was, “lawyers, secretaries, and paralegals who have dedicated their careers to serving poor clients in crisis,”2 the authors’ conclusion generated first shock, then (...) denial, and then an anxious realization that somebody’s job was to research and disseminate such conclusions. In a 2013 United States where there was one legal aid lawyer for every 8,893 people who qualified,3 where federal Legal Services Corporation funding had dropped 40% over ten years in real dollars,4 and in an America that spends as much on Halloween costumes for its pets as it does legal aid for the poor,5 the inquiry felt like a pile-on. It made no more sense to us than asking if a teacher is “good for students,” a nurse “good for the sick,” or a chef “good for the hungry.”6. (shrink)

The brain displays both the anatomical features of a vast amount of interconnected topological mappings as well as the functional features of a nonlinear, metastable system at the edge of chaos, equipped with a phase space where mental random walks tend towards lower energetic basins. Nevertheless, with the exception of some advanced neuro-anatomic descriptions and present-day connectomic research, very few studies have been addressing the topological path of a brain embedded or embodied in its external and internal environment. Herein, by (...) using new formal tools derived from algebraic topology, we provide an account of the metastable brain, based on the neuro-scientific model of Operational Architectonics of brain-mind functioning. We introduce a “topodynamic” description that shows how the relationships among the countless intertwined spatio-temporal levels of brain functioning can be assessed in terms of projections and mappings that take place on abstract structures, equipped with different dimensions, curvatures and energetic constraints. Such a topodynamical approach, apart from providing a biologically plausible model of brain function that can be operationalized, is also able to tackle the issue of a long-standing dichotomy: it throws indeed a bridge between the subjective, immediate datum of the naïve complex of sensations and mentations and the objective, quantitative, data extracted from experimental neuro-scientific procedures. Importantly, it opens the door to a series of new predictions and future directions of advancement for neuroscientific research. (shrink)

Politics has been defined in different and contradictory ways in the last century or so. If politics is to be a single subject of study then contradictory theories should be capable of being related together. In this article I argue that they can be related in terms of what I call the Aristotelian criterion. The article is in four parts. Firstly, I discuss the problem of defining politics; secondly, I introduce the criterion; thirdly, I consider five modern theories of politics (...) (those of Arendt, Oakeshott, Collingwood, Schmitt and Rancière) in relation to the criterion; and fourthly, I use the criterion to put forward an original and capacious definition of politics.1. (shrink)

The original version of this paper was written during a year spent at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A. and was prepared for presentation at the International Colloquium on Malthus, ‘Congrès International de Démographie Historique: Malthus Hier et Aujourd'hui', Paris, France, 27–29 May. 1980.

We examine, from the partial structures perspective, two forms of applicability of mathematics: at the “bottom” level, the applicability of theoretical structures to the “appearances”, and at the “top” level, the applicability of mathematical to physical theories. We argue that, to accommodate these two forms of applicability, the partial structures approach needs to be extended to include a notion of “partial homomorphism”. As a case study, we present London's analysis of the superfluid behavior of liquid helium in terms of Bose‐Einstein (...) statistics. This involved both the introduction of group theory at the top level, and some modeling at the “phenomenological” level, and thus provides a nice example of the relationships we are interested in. We conclude with a discussion of the “autonomy” of London's model. (shrink)

We still ask the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Every generation seems to offer new and contradictory answers to the question. In the last thirty or so years, the most interesting characterisations of Enlightenment have been by historians. They have told us that there is one Enlightenment, that there are two Enlightenments, that there are many Enlightenments. This has thrown up a second question, ‘How Many Enlightenments?’ In the spirit of collaboration and criticism, I answer both questions by arguing in this (...) article that there are in fact three Enlightenments: Radical, Sceptical and Liberal. These are abstracted from the rival theories of Enlightenment found in the writings of the historians Jonathan Israel, John Robertson and J.G.A. Pocock. Each form of Enlightenment is political; each involves an attitude to history; each takes a view of religion. They are arranged in a sequence of increasing sensitivity to history, as it is this which makes it possible to relate them to each other and indeed propose a composite definition of Enlightenment. The argument should be of interest to anyone concerned with ‘the Enlightenment’ as a historical phenomenon or with ‘Enlightenment’ as a philosophical abstraction. (shrink)

Here is a sketch of a genealogy of political theory for the last century. This is a genealogy in Nietzsche’s sense: therefore, neither unhistorical taxonomy, nor a history of political theory as it is written by historians, but a typology in time. Four types of modern political theory are distinguished. These are called, with some justification, positive, normative, third way and sceptical political theory. Seen from the vantage of the twenty-first century, they form an instructive sequence, emerging as a series (...) of reactions to the canonical political theory that was established in the universities in the late nineteenth century. None of the four should be excluded from our conception of what political theory has been, though most of them, when seen genealogically, reveal their defects more clearly than they do when treated purely theoretically. Since this is a sceptical finding, the genealogy is a polemic against the first three types of modern political theory in favour of the last. (shrink)

If we define tradition too hastily we leave to one side the question of what the relevance of tradition is for us. Here the concept of tradition is opened up by considering the different views of it taken by Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair MacIntyre. We see that each has put tradition into a fully developed picture of what our predicament is in modernity; and that each has differed in their assessment of what our relation to tradition is or (...) should be. Arendt sees tradition as something which no longer conditions action, Oakeshott sees tradition as something which conditions all action, and MacIntyre sees tradition as something which should condition right action. In each case, the view of tradition is clearly one element in an attempt to see how the most important constituent elements of human existence – variously called the human condition, human conduct, or human virtue – should be understood in a modernity which is ours because it has put the traditional concept of tradition into question. (shrink)