In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude
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DOI 10.1080/09608780902761745
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References found in this work BETA

Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):415-419.

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Agency and Self‐Sufficiency in Fichte's Ethics.Michelle Kosch - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):348-380.
The Right and the Wren.Christa Peterson & Jack Samuel - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-103.
An Analogy Between Hegel's Theory of Recognition and Ficino's Theory of Love.Jens Lemanski - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.

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