The Coal Seam Gas extraction industry is developing rapidly within the Surat Basin in southern Queensland, Australia, with licenses already approved for tenements covering more than 24,000 km2. Much of this land is used for a broad range of agricultural purposes and the need for coexistence between the farm and gas industries has been the source of much conflict. Whilst much research has been undertaken into the environmental and economic impacts of CSG, little research has looked into the issues of (...) coexistence between farmers and the CSG industry in the shared space that is a farm business, a home and a resource extraction network. We conducted three workshops with farmers from across a broad region undergoing CSG development to explore farmers’ perceptions of some of the issues arising from large scale land use change. Workshops explored the importance of place identity and landscape aesthetics for farmers, farmers’ acceptance and coping with change, and possible benefits from off-farm income. We found that farmers believed that place identity was not well understood by CSG staff from non-rural backgrounds and that farmers struggled to explain some concerns because of the different way they interpreted their landscape. Furthermore, high staff turnover, and the extensive use of contractors also impacted on communications. These factors were the cause of much frustration and farmers felt that this has led to severe impacts on mental health and wellbeing. Farmers felt that a change in culture within the CSG companies will be required if engagement with farmers is to improve and that efforts to employ local people in these communications was helping this. The workshops also identified a range of issues perceived by farmers arising from increased traffic volumes, impacts to mental health and wellbeing, place identity and loss of water resources for farmers. Finally, it was suggested that scientists and agricultural industry groups will need to work closely with farmers to develop understanding of these emerging issues and to develop solutions that are timely and relevant. (shrink)

Asked about Wittgenstein's contribution to aesthetics, one might think first of all of his discussion of ‘family resemblance’ concepts, in which he argued that the various instances of games, for example, need not have any feature or set of features in common, in virtue of which they are all called games; the concept of a game can function perfectly well without any such set of conditions. This insight was soon applied to the much debated quest for a definition of the (...) word ‘art’, and it was claimed that here too the various instances of art were related by way of family resemblance, so that it was futile to look for a condition or set of conditions, which works of art, and only works of art, had in common. Wittgenstein himself did not extend his argument to the concept of art. Although he was deeply interested in the arts, especially music, he wrote very little on aesthetics, his most sustained treatment of the topic being available for us only in the form of notes taken of a set of his lectures on aesthetics. (shrink)

When, in 1979, A. J. Ayer was asked for an evaluation of his youthful Language, Truth and Logic (LTL), he replied: ‘I suppose the most important of the defects was that nearly all of it was false’. Like many of the claims in the book itself, this verdict is open to question. What was wrong with LTL was not so much that what it said was false, but that it presented philosophical issues in an excessively simple and aggressive way. Yet (...) it was just this quality that put the book and its author on the philosophical map, ensuring for them an important place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. LTL presented a challenge to traditional ways of doing philosophy, the reverberations of which are still evident today. (shrink)

When, in 1979, A. J. Ayer was asked for an evaluation of his youthful Language, Truth and Logic (LTL), he replied: ‘I suppose the most important of the defects was that nearly all of it was false’. Like many of the claims in the book itself, this verdict is open to question. What was wrong with LTL was not so much that what it said was false, but that it presented philosophical issues in an excessively simple and aggressive way. Yet (...) it was just this quality that put the book and its author on the philosophical map, ensuring for them an important place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. LTL presented a challenge to traditional ways of doing philosophy, the reverberations of which are still evident today. (shrink)

This paper examines from a cognitive perspective the rhetorical and epistemic advantages that can be gained from the use of (extended) metaphors in political discourse. We defend the assumption that extended metaphors can be argumentatively exploited, and provide two arguments in support of the claim. First, considering that each instantiation of the metaphorical mapping in the text may function as a confirmation of the overall relevance of the main core mapping, we argue that extended metaphors carry self-validating claims that increase (...) the chances of their content being accepted. Second, we show how the recognition of an extended metaphor’s sophistication and relevance (on behalf of the addressee) can benefit the speaker’s perceived competence (ethos). We then assess whether these two arguments measure against the dual epistemic monitoring postulated in the notion of epistemic vigilance (i.e., assessment of the source of a message and assessment of the message) and conclude that extended metaphors may fulfil the requirements of epistemic vigilance and lead to the stabilisation of a belief. We illustrate our account with an analysis of the extended metaphor of the USA as an empire found in a political pamphlet written by the Swiss politician Oskar Freysinger. (shrink)

»Technologies of mind« can be understood as the different ways in which symbolic media are used to articulate thought. These media are given as facts in a culture, and their internal structure enters into all our acts of articulation – i.e. of our feeling, perceiving, and thinking. In this perspective our entire intellectual life can be regarded as a dynamic interplay between the symbolic repertoire of a culture and the way that individual behavior relates to this repertoire in the effort (...) to it articulation. That is why we only can inquire into »mind« after we have taken note of the culture within which it has formed. (shrink)

When writing about policy, do you think in green or white? If not, I recommend that you do. I suggest that writers and journal editors should explicitly label every policy ethics paper either ‘green’ or ‘white’. A green paper is an unconstrained exploration of a policy question. The controversial ‘After-birth abortion’ paper is an example. Had it been labelled as ‘green’, readers could have understood what Giubilini and Minerva explained later: that it was a discussion of philosophical ideas, and not (...) a policy proposal advocating infanticide. A serious policy proposal should be labelled by writer(s) and editor(s) as ‘white’. Its purpose should be to influence policy. In order to influence policy, I suggest three essential, and two desirable, characteristics of any white paper. Most importantly, a white paper should be set in the context in which the policy is to be made and applied. (shrink)

This article addresses the relationship between understanding and believing from the cognitive perspective of information-processing. I promote, within the scope of the Critical Discourse Analysis agenda, the relevance of an account of belief-fixation sustained by a combination of argumentative and cognitive insights. To this end, I first argue that discursive strategies fulfilling legitimization purposes, such as evidentials, tap into the same cognitive mechanisms as arguments. I then proceed to examine the idea that the most effective arguments are the ones that (...) manage to obscure or make irrelevant counter-evidence and propose, from a cognitive pragmatic perspective, a formulation of rhetorical effectiveness as a constraint on information-selection taking place at the interpretation stage and decisively influencing the evaluation stage responsible for belief-fixation. (shrink)

According to kripke, Wittgenstein denied certain beliefs about meaning and other minds. But who holds these beliefs? we do "not" believe that "all future applications" of a word are "determined"; nor that "i give directions to myself"; nor that something has to "constitute" meaning. Such beliefs are distortions by realist philosophers; it needs no sceptic to deny them. Wittgenstein's "sympathy with the solipsist" is an illusion, Due to misreadings (and mistranslations) of the text. Wittgenstein's position is clear and does not (...) need kripke's revision. (shrink)

I consider and reject two kinds of solution of the problem of feelings about fictional objects: that the relevant beliefs are not really different as between fiction and fact; and that the relevant feelings are not 'really the same'. The problem should be seen in the context of different phases in acquiring the relevant feeling-concepts and I distinguish three such phases. The first is necessarily 'presentational': the child is presented with suitable objects or pictures and responds with appropriate feelings, without (...) distinguishing fact from fiction. This presentational phase remains part of the concept and our responses to fictional objects should be understood accordingly. (shrink)

In modern representative democracies, much healthcare is publicly funded or provided and so the question of what healthcare systems should do is a matter of public policy. Given that public resources are inevitably limited, what should be done and who should benefit from healthcare? It is a dilemma for policymakers and a subject of debate within several disciplines, but rarely across disciplines. In this paper, I draw on thinking from several disciplines and especially philosophy, economics, and systems theory. I conclude (...) that economist and philosopher John Broome’s writing provides the framework for an answer: a healthcare system in a democracy should do as much good as possible, although sometimes we should sacrifice some overall good for the sake of fairness. This leaves open some detailed questions about what in practice we consider to be good and fair, and about when some good should be traded off in order to be fair. The answers to these questions depend on our values, or as explained by systems theory, our weltanschauung. How policy decisions should be made when citizens’ values differ is a subject of extensive academic debate. However, it is a separate question. Representative democracies have mechanisms for resolving such debates. (shrink)

The biblical injunction to love one's neighbour has long been regarded as a central pillar of morality. It is taken to be an ideal which gives direction to our moral aspirations, even though most of us find it difficult to live up to, owing to our selfish natures. But the difficulties I wish to raise are of a logical kind, as distinct from those depending on personal character. They fall under three headings: the first concerns the scope of ‘my neighbour’, (...) the second the injunction to love, and the third the idea of loving oneself. The first will probably be the most familiar. (shrink)

In modern representative democracies, much healthcare is publicly funded or provided and so the question of what healthcare systems should do is a matter of public policy. Given that public resources are inevitably limited, what should be done and who should benefit from healthcare? It is a dilemma for policymakers and a subject of debate within several disciplines, but rarely across disciplines. In this paper, I draw on thinking from several disciplines and especially philosophy, economics, and systems theory. I conclude (...) that economist and philosopher John Broome’s writing provides the framework for an answer: a healthcare system in a democracy should do as much good as possible, although sometimes we should sacrifice some overall good for the sake of fairness. This leaves open some detailed questions about what in practice we consider to be good and fair, and about when some good should be traded off in order to be fair. The answers to these questions depend on our values, or as explained by systems theory, our weltanschauung. How policy decisions should be made when citizens’ values differ is a subject of extensive academic debate. However, it is a separate question. Representative democracies have mechanisms for resolving such debates. (shrink)

Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on the premise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluate problems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that these problems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should not subscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as if non-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons, even if we cannot be certain that they do.

Kant, Schelling, and Hegel research has frequently highlighted differences when considering their three respective concepts of philoso-phy. Especially with regard to natural philosophy, there seems to be little common ground between them. In my paper, however, I want to revise this perspective, picking up on what brings them together. Taking the concept of matter as my primary example, I will argue that neither Kant nor Schelling nor Hegel are interested in conceiving of nature from the viewpoint of empirical observation and (...) as independent of the subject. Rather, their respective philosophical inquiries into nature’s first prin-ciples hinge on critical examinations of reason, providing all three with the conceptual resources to address nature from a metaphysical point of view that is ultimately bound up with rational beings. (shrink)

The question I set myself in ‘Loving my neighbour, loving myself’ was whether the injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself makes sense. I said explicitly that I was concerned with ‘love’ in the modern English sense and not with ancient words whose meaning might differ from that of the modern word. Nevertheless two critics think my argument fails because I do not consider other meanings of ‘love’ that have been or might be invoked in understanding the injunction. According to (...) them, the injunction is not, or was not, meant in the ordinary modern sense of ‘love’, and they quote various authorities to this effect. (shrink)

How can one be both a philosophical ethicist and a democrat? In this article I conclude that it can be difficult to reconcile the two roles. One involves understanding, and reconciling, the conflicting views of citizens, and the other requires the pursuit of truth through reason. Nevertheless, an important function of philosophy and ethics is to inform and improve policy. If done effectively, we could expect better, and more just, laws and policies, thereby benefiting many lives. So applying philosophical thinking (...) to policy is an important job. However, it comes with substantial difficulties, not least in reconciling, or choosing between, competing philosophical theories. Despite the importance of the task, and the apparent obstacles, there is relatively little literature on how to apply ethics to real-world policy-making. Democracies need ethicists who can engage in democratic debate and bridge the gap between philosophy and public policy. I offer some tactics here. (shrink)

The following beliefs can be ascribed to Hume on the basis of his writings: There is no more to our idea of cause and effect than constant conjunction and a resulting habit of mind. There is more to it than that, namely the interaction of bodies. Behind the constant conjunctions, including the interactions of bodies, there are ‘secret’ causes, not knowable by man. The principle of causality is true. Our belief in the principle arises from experience. There is no justification (...) for believing in the principle. It is obvious that there are inconsistencies between these beliefs. is contradicted by and , and appears to contradict . and are consistent, but cannot be asserted consistently together with . There is apparently a contradiction between and , although the question arises whether ‘arising from experience’ is to be regarded as a justification. In the next section I shall offer support for ascribing these beliefs to Hume and in sections III-V I shall try to say why Hume wanted to hold all of them in one way or another and how they fit together in the context of his philosophy. What I shall say will I be broadly in line with Passmore's views about the diversity of Hume's intentions and Kemp Smith's thesis about Hume's primary interest in ethics. (shrink)

This paper investigates the tentative compatibility of two pragmatic approaches, Pragma-Dialectics and Relevance Theory. The development of pragmatics historically led to conceptions of communication that supplied answers formal logic approaches had trouble capturing. Within argumentation studies, PD took this pragmatic turn while at the same time pursuing a normative agenda. This gives evidence of an external approach to language excluding, though not closing the door to cognitive insights. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which PD (...) can operate from an internal cognitive perspective — i.e., with explicit ambitions of dealing with cognitive mechanisms of meaning construction and belief fixation. (shrink)

In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical (...) and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase. (shrink)

In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical (...) and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase. (shrink)

In the spirit of the pragmatic account of quotation and reporting offered by Macagno and Walton (2017), we outline a systematic pragmatic account of rephrasing. For this purpose, we combine two interrelated methods of inquiry into the variety of uses of rephrase as a persuasive device: (i) the annotation of rephrase types to identify locutionary and illocutionary aspects of rephrase, (ii) the crowd–sourced examination of rephrase types to investigate their perlocutionary effects. As it draws on Waltonian insights and on empirical (...) and experimental research on the (mis)use of rephrase, our approach allows us to ground a novel theoretically–informed and data–driven pragmatic account of rephrase. (shrink)

The publication of 'Animal Rights and Souls in the 18th Century' will be welcomed by everyone interested in the development of the modern animal liberation movement, as well as by those who simply want to savour the work of enlightenment thinkers pushing back the boundaries of both science and ethics. At last these long out-of-print texts are again available to be read and enjoyed - and what texts they are! Gems like Bougeant's witty reductio of the Christian view of animals (...) are included together with path-breaking works of ethics such as Primatt's A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals . There are works I have never seen before, including the remarkable Cry of Nature by the Scottish revolutionary Jacobin, John Oswald. In this set, everyone will find something novel, delightful and truly enlightening. - Peter Singer The discussion of animal rights and the moral status of animals, so prevalent in the late twentieth century, has its roots in the mid to late eighteenth century. Some of the themes we consider of recent invention - the legal standing of animals, the ethical status of vegetarians, cruelty towards animals, ultimately resulting in cruelty to humans - are of long standing. But in the eighteenth-century literature they are interconnected with theological issues surrounding animal souls, the birth of the life sciences, the great chain of being and other peculiarly eighteenth-century problems. This collection explores the exciting early discussions of moral theories concerning animals, placing them within their historical and social context. It reveals that issues such as vivisection, animal souls and vegetarianism were very much live philosophical subjects 200 years ago. The six volumes reprinted here includes complete works and edited extracts from such key eighteenth-century thinkers as Oswald, Primatt, Smellie, Monboddo and Jenyns. Many of the materials are extremely rare and never previously reprinted. The collection, edited with a new introduction and bio-bibliography by Aaron V. Garrett provides valuable original source material to supplement contemporary discussions of animal rights. --18th-century material on the theme of animal rights and practical ethics --an important supplement to contemporary animal rights discussions --provides a broader account of early discussions of the 'science of human nature' through animals --widens our understanding of 18th-century ethics through an important area of practical ethics --includes many scarce texts, most of which have never been reprinted before. (shrink)

Oswald Spengler (1880?1936) is a neglected figure in the history of European philosophical thought. This article examines the philosophical anthropology developed in his later work, particularly his Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life (1931). My purpose is twofold: the first is to argue that Spengler's later thought is a response to criticisms of the ?pessimism? of his earlier work, The Decline of the West (1919). Man and Technics overcomes this charge by providing a novel philosophical (...) anthropology which identifies technology as the highest expression of human cognitive and creative capacities. The second is to suggest that in his later period Spengler presents an affirmatory account of modern technology as the final stage of human cultural evolution. I conclude that by providing a philosophical anthropology that reconciles technology with human nature, Man and Technics represents an important development of Spengler's theory of human culture. (shrink)

I provide an account of the political and philosophical thought of Oswald Spengler.

Wolfgang Spohn's theory of ranking functions is an elegant and powerful theory of the structure and dynamics of doxastic states. In two recent papers, Spohn has applied it to the analysis of conditionals, claiming to have presented a unified account of indicative and subjunctive (counterfactual) conditionals. I argue that his analysis fails to account for counterfactuals that refer to indirect causes. The strategy of taking the transitive closure that Spohn employs in the theory of causation is not available for counterfactuals. (...) I have a close look at Spohn's treatment of the famous Oswald-Kennedy case in order to illustrate my points. I sketch an alternative view that seems to avoid the problems. (shrink)

Resumo: A concepção filosófica oswaldiana da antropofagia como visão de mundo evoca a afirmação de si como motor criador, e não a negação do outro, própria da moral escrava, denunciada por Nietzsche. Entretanto, para Oswald de Andrade, o diagnóstico que Nietzsche faz da cultura ocidental não compreende o potencial primitivo recalcado na América. Oswald diz que sua filosofia antropófaga é também uma realização da filosofia nietzschiana. Acredito que ela pode nos oferecer, entre outras coisas, um caminho para a (...) transvaloração de valores indicada pelo filósofo alemão.: The Oswaldian philosophical conception of anthropophagy as “world view” evokes the affirmation of self as creative motor, not as negation of the other, proper to slave morality denounced by Nietzsche. But, for Oswald de Andrade, the occidental culture’s diagnostic made by Nietzsche does not comprehend the primitive potential repressed in America. Oswald says that his anthropophagical philosophy is also an achievement of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I believe that it can offer us, among other things, a path to the revaluation of values indicated by the German philosopher. (shrink)

This paper advances the idea that Oswald de Andrade's Anthropophagy, formulated for the first time in 1928, can be read as a decolonial project avant la lettre. In order to establish this thesis, we will reconstruct the project of the Brazilian thinker through a detailed analysis of the first aphorism of his Manifesto Antropófago (Anthropophagist Manifesto). We will argue that, similarly to what will be later articulated by the decolonial approach, Andrade indicates: (i) that the cultural and economic dimensions (...) of colonialism are entangled ramifications of a larger structure of domination; (ii) that capitalism is an aspect of this larger structure; and (iii) that it is necessary to articulate a third political path irreducible to both capitalism and communism. Anthropophagy would thus function not only as the evident metaphor of cultural appropriation, but also as a diagnosis of the colonial domination and as a therapeutic to face it within a decolonial project. (shrink)

The Vienna Circle was an influential group of philosophers in the early 20th century. Its members were dedicated to do philosophy and to conduct research in accordance with the guidelines of the scientific world-conception. For some of them, Oswald Spengler was a dangerous antagonist due to the success and influence of his metaphysical philosophy of history in Der Untergang des Abendlandes and other works. In this paper, I will explore systematically the Circle’s critical reception of Spengler regarding his methodological (...) approaches, ontological positions, and political philosophy. I will, thereby, also evaluate the criticism brought forth against Spengler. (shrink)

This book is a compact, accessible treatment of the main ideas advanced by the positivists, including Schlick, Carnap, Ayer, and the early Wittgenstein. Oswald Hanfling discusses such ideas as the 'verification principle' ('the meaning of this statement is the method of its verification') and the 'elimination of metaphysics, ' an attempt to show that metaphysical statements, for example about God, are unverifiable and therefore meaningless.

What is philosophy about and what are its methods? _Philosophy and Ordinary Language_ is a defence of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means _ordinary_ language. Some people argue that if philosophy is about ordinary language, then it is necessarily less deep and difficult than it is usually taken to be but Oswald Hanfling shows us that this isn't true. Hanfling, a leading expert in the development of analytic philosophy, covers (...) a wide range of topics, including scepticism and the definition of knowledge, free will, empiricism, folk psychology, ordinary versus artificial logic, and philosophy versus science. Drawing on philosophers such as Austin, Wittgenstein, and Quine, this book explores the nature of ordinary language in philosophy. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz geht der Autor der Frage nach, ob und in wiefern die theologische Annahme, daß das Christusgeschehen paradigmatisch für den Begriff des Handeln Gottes ist, verständlich ist. Der Verfasser analysiert dafür die Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung und versucht die christologischen Konsequenzen der verschiedene Interpretationen für die Konstruktion eines Modells des Handeln Gottes herauszufinden. Er benützt Gedanken geschichtsphilosophischer Art um eine solche Ausdehnung der Vorstellung des Christusgeschehens zu verteidigen, daß auch andere Zeiten als das erste Jahrhundert einzuschließen sind. Damit zeigt (...) der Verfasser, daß Lessings Problem des garstigen Grabens und viele Formen der Leben-Jesu-Forschung theologisch von falschen Fragestellungen ausgehen. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 1 Seiten: 138-154.

ZusammenfassungDieser Aufsatz erörtert einige philosophische Fragen in Bezug auf Bayers Vergegenwärtigung Luthers. Die Einbeziehung der Philosophie bietet der Theologie sowohl Chancen als auch Risiken. Einerseits kann die Philosophie zwischen einem religiösen oder theologischen Vokabular und der gegenwärtigen säkularen Gesellschaft vermitteln; andererseits riskiert die Theologie auf diese Weise eine Beeinflussung durch die innerweltlichen Kategorien der Philosophie. Diese zweite Position scheint die Bayers zu sein, da er die Beziehung von Philosophie und Theologie als Dissonanz interpretiert. Um zu untersuchen, ob und auf welche (...) Weise die Philosophie als Vermittlerin zwischen der Religion und der säkularen Gesellschaft fungieren kann, konzentriere ich mich auf ein gemeinsames Merkmal von Philosophie und Theologie, darauf, dass sie alle Arten überlieferter Weisheit in Frage stellen, um wahre, theologisch oder philosophisch bewährte Weisheit zu bieten.Zunächst analysiere ich Bayers Konzeption der Theologie als persönliche, traditionsgebundene Weisheit. Er entwickelt diesen Gedanken im Kontrast mit Kants kritischer Beurteilung der Weisheit in seiner Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, derzufolge die Wissenschaft die einzige enge Pforte ist, die zur Weisheit führt. Nach Bayer ist der Eintrittspreis viel zu hoch, insofern er ein Reduktion der Theologie auf Wissenschaft erfordert. Im Gegensatz dazu versteht er theologische Weisheit als Metakritik, die in der Mitte zwischen Dogmatismus und Skeptizismus steht.In meinen Bemerkungen zu Bayers Position beginne ich mit der Definition der Weisheit als einer Form von Wissen, die Menschen hilft, die wahre Bestimmung ihres Lebens zu finden. In unserer postmodernen Situation wird jedoch die Plausibilität des Wahrheitsanspruches in Frage gestellt, der in dieser Definition beinhaltet ist. Alle unsere Vokabulare über die Bestimmungen unseres Lebens, ob religiös, theologisch oder philosophisch, werden als radikal kontingent und äquivok wahrgenommen. In der Konsequenz ist Weisheit zur Privatmeinung einer Person oder einer Gruppe Gleichgesinnter geworden. Obwohl ich mit Bayers Kritik der Privatisierung der Weisheit übereinstimme, scheint mir seine Argumentation zugunsten einer theologischen Weisheit, die auf Grund von Gottes persönlicher Anrede über jeden Ideologieverdacht erhaben ist, höchst problematisch zu sein. Obwohl die Religion ein enormes kritisches Potential in Bezug auf die Ideologien unserer Zeit hat, überzeugt das säkulare Zeitgenossen kaum, weil sie die Religion selbst als eine Form der Ideologie betrachten. Deshalb schlage ich mithilfe von Kants Essay Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren? einen anderen Zugang zur notwendigen Kritik der religiösen Weisheit vor, die sich im Unterschied zum Begriff der Wissenschaft am Begriff der Vernunft orientiert. Dies führt zu einer weniger dissonanten Beziehung zwischen Philosophie und Theologie als bei Bayer.SummaryThe focus of this article is to raise some philosophical questions concerning Bayer's aim of making topical the theology of Luther. The involvement of philosophy offers both opportunities and risks for theology. On the one hand, philosophy can mediate between a religious or theological vocabulary and contemporary secular society; on the other, however, theology runs the risk of being affected by the inner-worldly categories of philosophy. The latter position seems to be the one of Bayer since he defines the relation between philosophy and theology as a discordant one. In order to examine if and how philosophy can serve as a mediator between religion and secular society, I concentrate on a common characteristic of theology and philosophy, viz. that they query all kinds of traditional wisdom in order to offer true, theologically or philosophically corroborated wisdom.First, I analyse Bayer's idea of theology as personal, traditional wisdom. He develops it through a confrontation with Kant's critical assessment of wisdom in his Critique of Practical Reason, according to which science is the only narrow entrance gate that leads to wisdom. According to Bayer, the entrance fee is far too high, since is implies an imoverishing reduction of theology to science. Instead, he understands theological wisdom as meta-criticism, standing in the middle between dogmatism and scepticism.In my comment on Bayer's position, I start from the definition of wisdom as a kind of knowledge, helping humans to find the true destiny of their lives. However, in our post-modern times, the plausibility of the truth-claim implied in this definition is being challenged. All our vocabularies about the destinies of our lives, be they religious, theological, or philosophical, are perceived as radically contingent and equivocal. Consequently, wisdom has become a private opinion of a person or a group of like-minded people. Although I agree with Bayer's critique of the privatisation of wisdom, his argument in favour of a theological wisdom which claims to be above any suspicion of being ideological in character because of God's personal address, seems highly problematic to me. Although religion has an enormous critical potential with regard to the ideologies of our times, it does not convince contemporary, secularised people, because they perceive religion itself as a form of ideology. Therefore, I propose, with the help of Kant's, What Does it Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking, another approach of the necessary critique of religious wisdom, which is based on the concept of reason, as distinct from science. This leads to a less discordant view of the relationship between philosophy and theology than Bayer's. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich auf Bayers Interpretation von Luthers Rechtfertigungsverständnis als promissio. In Teil I skizziere ich Bayers zentralen Gedanken, dass dieser Begriff als performativer Sprechakt in Austins Sinne verstanden werden muss, d.h. als ein Akt, der durch seinen Vollzug neue 〉Tatsachen〈 konstituiert und nicht nur schon existierende Tatsachen registriert. Die Worte der Absolution registrieren nicht, dass der Sünder gerechtfertigt ist, sondern vollziehen die Rechtfertigung, wenn sie im richtigen Kontext gesprochen werden.In Teil II beurteile ich die Konsequenzen dieser (...) Interpretation der Rechtfertigung. Einerseits schlage ich vor, dass Bayers Interpretation die Aspekte des Rechtfertigungsverständnisses zum Ausdruck bringt, die für das Luthertum charakteristisch sind und verteidigt werden sollten. Andererseits jedoch kritisiere ich Bayers Behauptung, dass dieses Verständnis der Rechtfertigung als promissio alle Versuche unterminiert, theologische Aussagen zu verifizieren. Ich fasse diese Spannung zwischen der religiösen, pro-lutherischen Perspektive und der philosophischen, Luther-kritischen Perspektive in einem Dialog zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand zusammen.In Teil III stelle ich dar, dass diese Spannung zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand nicht leicht aufzulösen ist, da beide auf ihre Weise wertvoll sind. Trotzdem mache ich in der Konklusion zwei vorsichtige Vorschläge: Der erste besteht darin, dass der Gedanke der 〉Verifikation〈 in einer im weitesten Sinne pragmatischen Form rekonstruiert werden sollte, um aus lutherischer Perspektive akzeptabel zu sein. Der zweite Vorschlag besteht darin, den nicht-relationalen Hintergrund, der vorausgesetzt ist, wenn Rechtfertigung relational interpretiert wird , als ein 〉Vorurteil〈 im Sinne Gadamers zu verstehen, d.h. als in jedem Akt des Verstehens vorausgesetzt und doch jederzeit revidierbar.SummaryIn this contribution, I focus on Bayer's interpretation of Luther's concept of justification as promissio. In part I, I sketch Bayer's central idea that this concept is to be understood as a performative speech-act in Austin's sense, i. e. as an act constituting novel ‘facts’ while being performed rather than registering already existing ones. The words of the absolution do not only register that the sinner is justified but, when being spoken in the proper circumstances, actually do justify him.In part II, I evaluate the consequences of this interpretation of justification. On the one hand, I suggest that Bayer's interpretation captures the aspects of the concept of justification which are characteristic of Lutheranism and should be defended. On the other hand, however, I criticize Bayer's contention that his concept of justification as promissio undermines all attempts to verify theological claims. I summarize the tension between the religious, pro-Lutheran perspective and the philosophical, Luther-critical perspective in a dialogue between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind.In part three, I suggest that there is no easy way out of the tension between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind since both are valuable in their own way. Nevertheless, I offer two cautious suggestions by way of conclusion: The first is that the idea of ‘verification’ should be reconstructed in a pragmatic spirit in order to be acceptable from a Lutheran perspective. The second is that the non-relational background which is presupposed by construing justification in a relational fashion should be construed as a Gadamerian ‘prejudice’, i. e. as being presupposed in every act of understanding, yet, as always being open to revision. (shrink)