This article is about how human freedom is understood in the philosophy of Nicolas Malebranche. According to Malebranche, the most important proponent of occasionalism in the modern period, God is the sole and real cause of the universe and all its functioning. In addition, according to him, people are free and responsible for their own actions. In this case, what it means for man to be free in this vision where God is the only reason for everything needs (...) to be explained. While Malebranche's basic views on occasionalism and human freedom are included in many of his works, these views are especially found in his famous six-volume book titled The Search after Truth and in the book of explanations he wrote for this book, Elucidations of the Search after Truth. In the article, the subject is discussed through Malebranche's basic texts. Firstly, the relationship between the human soul and God has been tried to be explained in order to explain Malebranche's understanding of freedom. At this point Malebranche; unlike the Aristotelian thinkers of the Middle Ages, seems to follow an Augustinian line. In this line, the human soul is towards God and in need of His light. Secondly, what freedom means according to him is examined. In Malebranche, it is seen that freedom is the power of man, who is naturally inclined towards the general good, that is, God, to stop his tendency towards this general good in worldly special goods, or to not consent to this and to move towards the better with attention and research. This view emerges on the basis of Malebranche's view of vision in God and the distinction between soul and body. In other words, since human beings are incomplete and limited in their knowledge, they may sometimes not go towards what they really need to reach and may accept any worldly good as true good for themselves. Or since this good is not the general good and will never satisfy him, he may not consent to it and seek out the general good. Freedom is precisely the power either to stop at the particular good or to pay attention and search beyond it. Then, how this power was reconciled with Malebranche's occasionalism was discussed and three prominent issues were examined. Firstly, Malebranche claimed that man has no causal contribution to the tendency towards general or particular goods, and that this occurs only with the influence of God. Secondly, although it seems that a power is attributed to humans in freedom, it can be said that this power is not a positive action that brings about any change. Third, there is the claim that since God is the only true cause, attention and investigation are not a cause of human knowledge but only an occasional, intermediary cause. With these claims, it has been seen that Malebranche associates freedom with sin because he treats it as a stop, that man cannot make any changes, and therefore he evaluates freedom as only the power to want, not the power to act. As a result, it can be said that it is debatable whether a power that does not cause any action or change, but only the desire to consent or not, can be called freedom. In this regard, Malebranche has moved freedom to a negative or incomplete place. Although this study specifically discusses the nature of freedom and its relationship with God through Malebranche's philosophy, it is aimed to contribute to studies on the nature of freedom. It has been seen that further studies on freedom of action and desire can be carried out, especially in the fields of religion and moral philosophy. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1964, given by Roderick M. Chisholm (1916-1999), an American philosopher.

In The Ethical Primate , Mary Midgley, 'one of the sharpest critical pens in the West' according to the Times Literary Supplement , addresses the fundamental question of human freedom. Scientists and philosophers have found it difficult to understand how each human-being can be a living part of the natural world and still be free. Midgley explores their responses to this seeming paradox and argues that our evolutionary origin explains both why and how human freedom (...) and morality have come about. (shrink)

Christian theists have not normally wished to deny either of the following tenets: T1 God creates human agents such that they are free with respect to certain actions and, therefore, morally responsible for them. T2 God is an omniscient, wholly good being who is omnipotent in the sense that he has control over all existent states of affairs.

Ideas about freedom and related concepts like autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in the moral debate about human enhancement interventions. However, there is not a single understanding of freedom available, and arguments referring to freedom are simultaneously used to argue both for and against enhancement interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and shows how they relate to one another in order (...) to allow for a more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identifying the individual underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human enhancement. (shrink)

In this study, Worsley argues that it is rational to believe in a loving God in the face of evil. Beginning with a critique of Alvin Plantinga, he shows that human freedom is highly complex, and so depends upon complex structures in nature. These are both necessary for freedom but also sufficient for natural evil. He offers close analysis of the evolution of the human brain. The book develops a parallel argument that human evil stems (...) from the evolution of personality. (shrink)

This is a philosophical book about the idea of human freedom in the context of Chinese philosophy on truth, the good, and beauty. The book shows that there is a coherent and sophisticated philosophical discourse on human freedom throughout the history of Chinese Philosophy in aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology. Feng Qi discusses the development of freedom in light of the Marxist theory of practice. In the history of philosophy, the relation between thought and existence, which (...) is fundamental to philosophy, has stimulated many debates. These debates, though they have assumed diverse forms in Chinese and Western philosophy, have eventually concentrated on three inquiries: the natural world (the objective material world); the human mind; and the concepts, categories, and laws that are representative forms of nature in the human mind and in knowledge. In Chinese philosophy, the three inquiries are summarized using three notions: qi (气 breath, spirit), xin (心 heart), dao (道 the Way). What relationship do the three notions have with each other? This book explores the way to human freedom through the divergent paths in Chinese philosophy. This book’s investigation of human activities brings the typical Chinese philosophical discourse from the cosmological realm into the realm of human beings as individuals. In this regard, the three inquiries can be described as being about real life, ideals, and individuals. (shrink)

Mechanistic explanation is the dominant approach to explanation in the life sciences, but it has been challenged as incompatible with a conception of humans as agents whose capacity for self-direction endows them with freedom and dignity. We argue that the mechanical philosophy, properly construed, has sufficient resources to explain how such characteristics can arise in a material world. Biological mechanisms must be regarded as active, not only reactive, and as organized so as to maintain themselves far from thermodynamic equilibrium. (...) Notions from systems biology make key contributions, particularly Gánti’s chemoton, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno’s basic autonomy, and Barandiaran and Moreno’s adaptive autonomous agents. The reconstrual is then extended to mental life by conceiving of cognitive mechanisms as control components in inherently active systems, as illustrated in models offered by Randall Beer and Cees van Leeuwen. (shrink)

Mechanistic explanation is the dominant approach to explanation in the life sciences, but it has been challenged as incompatible with a conception of humans as agents whose capacity for self-direction endows them with freedom and dignity. We argue that the mechanical philosophy, properly construed, has sufficient resources to explain how such characteristics can arise in a material world. Biological mechanisms must be regarded as active, not only reactive, and as organized so as to maintain themselves far from thermodynamic equilibrium. (...) Notions from systems biology make key contributions, particularly Gánti’s chemoton, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno’s basic autonomy, and Barandiaran and Moreno’s adaptive autonomous agents. The reconstrual is then extended to mental life by conceiving of cognitive mechanisms as control components in inherently active systems, as illustrated in models offered by Randall Beer and Cees van Leeuwen. (shrink)

Attempts to describe the essential features of the Western philosophical tradition can often be characterized as ‘boundary work’, that is, the attempt to create, promote, attack, or reinforce specific notions of the ‘philosophical’ in order to demarcate it as a field of intellectual inquiry. During the last century, the dominant tendency has been to delineate the discipline in terms of formal methods, techniques, and concepts and a given set of standard problems and alternative available solutions. One vital feature of the (...) philosophical tradition that has played a certain rather subterranean but nonetheless indispensable role, which I will discuss in this article, is that of repeatedly and stringently calling into question the conditions of its own possibility. The Cartesian tradition shares with the anti-philosophers the insight that this questioning itself is and has always been a problem, perhaps the deepest problem, for philosophy. The idea that one has the right, even the responsibility, to pose questions that are non-standard, not comme il faut, perhaps even taboo, lay at the very heart of notions such as ‘the pursuit of truth’, ‘vita contemplativa’, and ‘philosophy as work on oneself’. On what grounds can one possibly assert such a right? In the Western tradition, it has most often been associated with a form of genuine doubt founded in deep engagement with some subject matter, i.e. the notion that one has a ‘problem’ demanding that one take responsibility for one’s beliefs and thoughts, both morally and logically. It seems to me that the meaning of this most basic attitude is something that each generation must rediscover for itself; indeed, recreate for itself in a new environment and under new conditions. Thus, the blindness of the past, in this self-understanding of philosophy, need not bind or blind us in the future. To the contrary, the European intellectual tradition can be seen as providing a series of perspicuous representations of intermittently faltering and flourishing attempts at asserting the viability of the idea of human freedom as essentially bound up with the pursuit of truth. As such, it is of necessity open to perpetual revision. (shrink)

This paper considers Aquinas's accounts of the end of human action and the structure of human action, examines the debate between intellectualist and voluntarist interpretations of Aquinas, and corrects mistaken accounts of Aquinas's views on freedom, necessitation, and causation.

This is a good time for determinists. One hundred and fifty years of Darwinian thought have undermined belief in the exceptional status of human beings. Biological reductionism is in the ascendant. One of its most recent manifestations—evolutionary psychology, which has been widely influential both within and beyond academe—argues that individual behaviour and even social institutions are expressions of genes, the vast majority of which are common to humans and the higher primates. The implicit, largely unconscious, principles that inform gene-determined (...) human behaviour are rooted in their survival value; and the entity whose survival is served is not the conscious organism but the genome itself. Since the actual reasons for our actions are beyond our ken, they are not truly voluntary. Yet more radical attacks on the notion of human freedom have come from neuroscience: ever more sophisticated and seemingly complete accounts of the human mind in terms of the functioning of our brains, appear to embed even higher level awareness in the material world. (shrink)

A growing body of evidence has linked consumption of trans fatty acids to cardiovascular disease. To promote public health, numerous state and local governments in the United States have banned the use of artificial trans fats in restaurant foods, and additional bans may follow. Although these policies may have a positive impact on human health, they open the door to excessive government control over food, which could restrict dietary choices, interfere with cultural, ethnic, and religious traditions, and exacerbate socioeconomic (...) inequalities. These slippery slope concerns cannot be dismissed as far-fetched, because the social and political pressures are place to induce additional food regulations. To protect human freedom and other values, policies that significantly restrict food choices, such as bans on types of food, should be adopted only when they are supported by substantial scientific evidence, and when policies that impose fewer restrictions on freedom, such as educational campaigns and product labeling, are likely to be ineffective. (shrink)

In the author’s opinion there are three primary conceptions of human freedom - non-coercion, autonomy and indeterminism. He presents his thoughts to define, compare, distinguish and correlate these, not merely with regard to the freedom of the human will, but also and more generally with regard to freedom in human life and thought. The discussion is psychological, ethical and theological. Originally published in 1947.

For both Spinoza and Zhuang-zi, the goal of life is attaining freedom, namely, human freedom. What do they mean by “human freedom”? What are the necessary conditions for humans to attain freedom? Seeking for answers to these questions, I’ve noted that Spinoza and Zhuang-zi suggest remarkably similar answers to these questions. First, both Spinoza and Zhuang-zi understand human freedom as a form of complete independence from externals: self-determination in Spinoza and union with (...) the Dao in Zhuang-zi. Second, both Spinoza and Zhuang-zi assert that human freedom is attainable when one sees things truly or adequately: in Spinoza, when one sees things from the viewpoint of eternity, and in Zhuang-zi, when one sees things from the viewpoint of the Dao. (shrink)

Doppelt argues that the democratic socialist conception of human freedom expressed in some recent works of mine lacks philosophical justification and fails to get to the roots of the socialist ideals of dignity, human worth, and self-respect. Doppelt claims to provide a new approach to the grounding of human freedom which allows him to avoid what he regards as the narrowness of my own conception. Not only does Doppelt fail to show that my own conception (...) of freedom is confined to self-management and cannot embrace the dimensions of social life his own paradigm is claimed to take care of, his article fails to raise or resolve the question of the conflict between the democratic socialist and the Rawlsian components that make up his 'new' paradigm. In this reply I discuss the issues Doppelt himself raises in connection with my own work: (1) how to ground human freedom; (2) whether my conception of freedom in democratic socialism is rationally preferable to the conception embodied in contemporary capitalist society; and (3) whether my idea of freedom does indeed exclude those dimensions of life to which Doppelt refers. (shrink)

This dissertation is the first comprehensive study of human freedom in the philosophy of Pierre Gassendi, a 17th century natural scientist, Catholic priest, and one of the founders of Early Modern philosophy. The key postulate of this dissertation is that the epistemology of probabilism, which represents Gassendi's skeptical stance toward the possibility of certain knowledge, is also the foundation of human freedom: the uncertain and merely probable nature of all our knowledge serves as a guarantee of (...) the multiplicity of options open to us, and thereby ensures freedom. ;The first part of the dissertation investigates the sources on which Gassendi drew to elaborate his notion of freedom. The main sources are Aristotle's ethical theory and discussion of necessity, chance, and choice, as well as the Epicureans' theory of freedom. In conjunction with the latter, I consider the possibility that Gassendi conceives of the human mind---the seat of freedom---as corporeal, and thereby capable of generating autonomous developments on the basis of the natural motions of its atoms. ;The second part is devoted to studying Gassendi's epistemology of probabilism as the foundation of freedom. I look at the process of judgment that underlies choice, and consider the various manifestations of the freedom of indifference in the process of acquiring knowledge or preparing for a practical decision. I also look at the roles of the will and the intellect throughout these activities. ;The third part looks at theological issues in Gassendi's philosophy that relate to human freedom: divine concurrence with created beings, divine providence, and the limitations that faith imposes on the scope of our inquiry. ;The fourth and final part presents a study of Gassendi's ethics from the perspective of freedom. I investigate the role of temperament, passions, and opinions in human behaviour, and study the role of freedom in shaping these factors. I also consider the concept of pleasure as the central motive of human actions, and its various manifestations in Gassendi's ethics. (shrink)

This is a good time for determinists. One hundred and fifty years of Darwinian thought have undermined belief in the exceptional status of human beings. Biological reductionism is in the ascendant. One of its most recent manifestations—evolutionary psychology, which has been widely influential both within and beyond academe—argues that individual behaviour and even social institutions are expressions of genes, the vast majority of which are common to humans and the higher primates. The implicit, largely unconscious, principles that inform gene-determined (...) human behaviour are rooted in their survival value; and the entity whose survival is served is not the conscious organism but the genome itself. Since the actual reasons for our actions are beyond our ken, they are not truly voluntary. Yet more radical attacks on the notion of human freedom have come from neuroscience: ever more sophisticated and seemingly complete accounts of the human mind in terms of the functioning of our brains, appear to embed even higher level awareness in the material world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 136-137 [Access article in PDF] John Watkins. Human Freedom after Darwin: A Critical Rationalist View. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1999. Pp. xi + 348. Cloth, $49.95. Paper, $24.95. John Watkins examines man's place in nature since Darwin. As a critical rationalist, using the methods of science, Watkins hopes to construct a world-view which challenges competing hypotheses and supports his (...) own. He recognizes that his view is, also, a candidate for critical rejection. All scientific views are, in principle, fallible. He divides his book into two parts: Naturalism and Freedom. [End Page 137]In evolutionary development, he accepts, as critically established, the sequence: matter before life, life before mind, and, no mind without a brain. Thus, naturalism is preferred beforesupernaturalism or divine intervention. These guides may support a continuous, steady evolutionaryprocess or discontinuity, mutations, and various stages of change. Darwin acceptedthe former and held physical changes were unaffected by consciousness. All change is, in principle,present from the beginning and unfolds over time. Darwin's view, then, is deterministic.Watkins challenges this position and argues for consciousness affecting physical change in new and unpredictable ways. It is herein that the possibility of animal and human freedom lies. Watkins gives examples of the actions of the hunter and hunted among animals, and of strategies developed by humans during crises, to support the view that there are novel and unpredictable actions by conscious beings. These actions can hardly be called predetermined in the nature of things. There is a huge difference between a general genetic structure for kinds of behavior and specific actions during crises (not that these are the only instances of freedom). At any rate, there is a reciprocal action between an individual and its environment and not merely a unilinear one.In Part II, Freedom, Watkins examines some classical, philosophical views of human freedom. He gives brief, but penetrating, analyses of Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza. Either they account for human action in strictly physical terms that are causally deterministic or they turn to non-empirical sources that are not verifiable. Since the latter make no difference in our account of behavior, they are entities multiplied beyond necessity. Those who give a completely deterministic view—Hobbes, Hume, and Schopenhauer—offer no continuum between cause and chance. Chance turns out to depend upon our ignorance of causes; further examination would show it causally determined.Watkins seems most sympathetic to Spinoza's treatment. In his hard-headed naturalism, Spinoza rejects any non-natural or supernatural accounts of human behavior. He is a strict determinist where man's confrontation with nature is concerned. Human emotions are passive and react to our environment; they do not affect it. Human reason makes no difference, but in its capacity to contemplate eternal truths it offers a way out. Instead of reacting to nature, man may transcend it. This transcendence is the key to Spinoza's view of the intellectual love of God, and human freedom. Watkins criticizes this flight from man's place in nature and the limited use of reason. In this vein, Spinoza seems to abandon the confrontation of nature for a flight to eternal truths. For Watkins, however, reasons must be used in confronting nature. As we saw, he claims that reason may have an effect upon the environment that is novel and unpredictable. Human agency is a part of the evolutionary story. Human agency is not an either/or proposition. There are degrees of effectiveness in human response to nature.In his analysis of human freedom, Watkins turns to the works of Newton, Faraday, Einstein, and others. In studying the problems posed by the consideration of natural phenomena during their time, they showed intellectual perspicacity of the highest order. Faraday's unified field theory brought electrical and magnetic phenomena, previously thought to be disparate, together. Newton's laws of motion brought celestial and terrestrial mechanics under one theory. Einstein changed the way in which space, time, mass, energy, and light were conceived. In a real sense, they were... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 136-137 [Access article in PDF] John Watkins. Human Freedom after Darwin: A Critical Rationalist View. Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1999. Pp. xi + 348. Cloth, $49.95. Paper, $24.95. John Watkins examines man's place in nature since Darwin. As a critical rationalist, using the methods of science, Watkins hopes to construct a world-view which challenges competing hypotheses and supports his (...) own. He recognizes that his view is, also, a candidate for critical rejection. All scientific views are, in principle, fallible. He divides his book into two parts: Naturalism and Freedom. [End Page 137]In evolutionary development, he accepts, as critically established, the sequence: matter before life, life before mind, and, no mind without a brain. Thus, naturalism is preferred beforesupernaturalism or divine intervention. These guides may support a continuous, steady evolutionaryprocess or discontinuity, mutations, and various stages of change. Darwin acceptedthe former and held physical changes were unaffected by consciousness. All change is, in principle,present from the beginning and unfolds over time. Darwin's view, then, is deterministic.Watkins challenges this position and argues for consciousness affecting physical change in new and unpredictable ways. It is herein that the possibility of animal and human freedom lies. Watkins gives examples of the actions of the hunter and hunted among animals, and of strategies developed by humans during crises, to support the view that there are novel and unpredictable actions by conscious beings. These actions can hardly be called predetermined in the nature of things. There is a huge difference between a general genetic structure for kinds of behavior and specific actions during crises (not that these are the only instances of freedom). At any rate, there is a reciprocal action between an individual and its environment and not merely a unilinear one.In Part II, Freedom, Watkins examines some classical, philosophical views of human freedom. He gives brief, but penetrating, analyses of Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza. Either they account for human action in strictly physical terms that are causally deterministic or they turn to non-empirical sources that are not verifiable. Since the latter make no difference in our account of behavior, they are entities multiplied beyond necessity. Those who give a completely deterministic view—Hobbes, Hume, and Schopenhauer—offer no continuum between cause and chance. Chance turns out to depend upon our ignorance of causes; further examination would show it causally determined.Watkins seems most sympathetic to Spinoza's treatment. In his hard-headed naturalism, Spinoza rejects any non-natural or supernatural accounts of human behavior. He is a strict determinist where man's confrontation with nature is concerned. Human emotions are passive and react to our environment; they do not affect it. Human reason makes no difference, but in its capacity to contemplate eternal truths it offers a way out. Instead of reacting to nature, man may transcend it. This transcendence is the key to Spinoza's view of the intellectual love of God, and human freedom. Watkins criticizes this flight from man's place in nature and the limited use of reason. In this vein, Spinoza seems to abandon the confrontation of nature for a flight to eternal truths. For Watkins, however, reasons must be used in confronting nature. As we saw, he claims that reason may have an effect upon the environment that is novel and unpredictable. Human agency is a part of the evolutionary story. Human agency is not an either/or proposition. There are degrees of effectiveness in human response to nature.In his analysis of human freedom, Watkins turns to the works of Newton, Faraday, Einstein, and others. In studying the problems posed by the consideration of natural phenomena during their time, they showed intellectual perspicacity of the highest order. Faraday's unified field theory brought electrical and magnetic phenomena, previously thought to be disparate, together. Newton's laws of motion brought celestial and terrestrial mechanics under one theory. Einstein changed the way in which space, time, mass, energy, and light were conceived. In a real sense, they were... (shrink)

After centuries of reflection, the issue of human freedom remains vital largely because of its connection to moral responsibility. When I ask—What is human freedom?—I mean to be asking what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? Questions about moral responsibility are intimately connected to questions about social policy and justice; so, the issue of moral responsibility—of desert, of whether or not anyone is ever really praiseworthy or blameworthy—has practical as well as theoretical significance.

The Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics is an enviable form of energetic subsidy which implements an American concern for intellectual integrity much more realistically than the lipservice which older and more complacent nations commonly profess. It believes that Christian culture should be brought to bear in detail upon the actual problems of politics and social order and it devotes an annual series of public lectures to this high-minded aim. The published series is inaugurated in this exploratory essay (...) into the possible nature of Christian philosophy itself by a distinguished Harvard professor, the text being developed from his Walter Freeman Whitman Lectures and Lilly Foundation Lectures of 1958. Holding that our anxious century has lost confidence in the self-sufficiency of human reason to establish an evident and closed order in reality, he believes that men are now ready to contemplate the reality of a chastened reason open to the influence of religious ideals. And he claims that the very reception of the term, ‘Christian philosophy’ only recently into common usage is ‘the expression of a noteworthy gap in our intellectual history’. (shrink)

The ancient problem of fatalism, more particularly theological fatalism, has resurfaced with surprising vigour in the second half of the twentieth century. Two questions predominate in the debate: (1) Is divine foreknowledge compatible with human freedom and (2) How can God foreknow future free acts? Having surveyed the historical background of this debate in "The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge" and "Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez" (Brill: 1988), William Lane Craig now attempts to address these issues critically. His (...) wide-ranging discussion brings together a thought- provoking array of related topics such as logical fatalism, multivalent logic, backward causation, precognition, time travel, counterfactual logic, temporal necessity, Newcomb's Problem, middle knowledge, and relativity theory. The present work serves both as a useful survey of the extensive literature on theological fatalism and related fields and as a stimulating assessment of the possibility of divine foreknowledge of future free acts. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control (...) is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism. (shrink)

If God is omniscient and exhaustive knowledge of the future is possible, then God knows (and in fact knew a long time ago) what we will do in the future. But is this compatible with our future actions being free? I address this question by responding to an argument that claims that these things are incompatible. At the heart of this incompatibility argument is the idea that God’s past beliefs about our future actions are “accidentally necessary”—can’t be changed—and that this (...) necessity transfers to our actions. I consider four main responses to the argument: Brian Davies’ claim that God’s past beliefs about our future actions are properly characterised as beliefs about what we will freely do; Alvin Plantinga’s view—stemming from the work of William of Ockham—that God’s past beliefs about our future actions aren’t wholly about the past and so aren’t accidentally necessary; Trenton Merricks’ idea that our having a choice about God’s past beliefs doesn’t require us to be able to change the past; and Alfred Freddoso’s claim that the accidental necessity of God’s beliefs doesn’t transfer to our actions. My response, like that of Merricks, focuses on the idea that God’s past beliefs are dependent on, and to be explained in terms of, our future actions; rather than vice versa. I support this view by appealing to the idea that God’s foreknowledge is simple (an idea I defend against several William Hasker—inspired objections). I argue that neither God’s beliefs, nor their accidental necessity, should be thought of as a threat to our freedom; and that in any event, the accidental necessity of God’s beliefs isn’t something that can coherently be thought to transfer to our actions. I conclude that God’s past beliefs about our future actions are perfectly compatible with our freedom. (shrink)

In that it holds God to be the only true efficient cause, Malebranche’s occasionalism would seem to deny human freedom and to make God responsible for our sins. I argue that Malebranche’s occasionalism must be considered within its Cartesian framework; once one understands what it is to be an occasional cause in this context, Malebranche can be seen as saving a place for human freedom, and he can consistently hold that we are morally responsible for our (...) actions. (shrink)

The Essence of Human Freedom is a fundamental text for understanding Heidegger's view of Greek philosophy and its relationship to modern philosophy.

Schelling’s 1809 Freiheitsschrift, perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is in sum that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which faces Kant’s theory of (...) class='Hi'>freedom and transcendental idealism, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil. I argue that Schelling’s thesis concerning evil also provides a key to the new and highly original metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved. (shrink)

Advances in biology, genetic research and operant behavior modification have thrown into question the status of human freedom of self-determination, i.e., the ability to conceive and understand rules and the ability to act in accordance with or in opposition to them. An argument based on biological and psychological research is sometimes claimed to show that all human behavior is determined by genetic make-up and environment and that freedom of self-determination is an illusion. An analysis of (...) class='Hi'>human action and of the scientific enterprise, however, shows such determinism to be inconsistent and hence untenable. (shrink)

This book consists of selections that cover almost thirty years of writing, from Nausea to the essay, Search for a Method which summarizes the Critique of Dialectical Reason The selections succeed in giving us a substantial account of Sartre’s explanation of the nature and conditions of human freedom, and in reflecting also his thinking on contemporary issues which affect human rights. They are arranged chronologically and suggest an actual development of thought. In Nausea Sartre uses Roquentin’s struggle (...) to dramatize his discovery of ‘the key to existence, the key to my Nausea, to my own life’; through the void of his own conceptual existence he glimpses the fact and possibilities of his own freedom. In The Psychology of Imagination ’Sartre examines the function of consciousness in creating a world of unrealities, probes the nature of the psychic life and the mind’s complex ties with the outer world, defines the intentional structure of the image and the uniqueness of man’s freedom to create, and concludes that “the imagination is the necessary condition for the freedom of empirical man in the midst of the world”’. The full exposition of Sartre’s philosophy of freedom is given in Being and Nothingness. But for Sartre, a writer must use his own freedom to promote the freedom of all men. There are selections from his writings on freedom from persecution, freedom to write, freedom to do evil, freedom from exploitation. Finally, in Search for a Method there is an excerpt on his positive social theory and his hope that Marxism will take on ‘the human dimension’. (shrink)

, LI, . D., F. B. A. Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen LONDON QEO IGE ALLEN AND IJNWIN LTD PREFACE JOHN LAIRD did not live to ...