This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made (...) with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science. (shrink)

Wicked problems are tricky to solve because of their many interconnected components and a lack of any single optimal solution. At the science–policy interface, all problems can look wicked: research exposes the complexity that is relevant to designing, executing and implementing policy fit for ambitious human needs. Expertise in philosophical research can help to navigate that complexity.

This paper investigates the value of trust and the proper attitude lay people ought to have towards scientific experts. Trust in expertise is usually considered to be valuable, while distrust is often analyzed in cases where it is harmful. I will draw on accounts from political philosophy and argue that it is not only public trust that is valuable when it comes to scientific expertise – but also public vigilance. Expertise may be distorted in different ways, which cannot be remedied (...) by internal control mechanisms alone. This reveals the importance of some forms of democratic oversight. The proper attitude is vigilant trust in expertise. However, vigilant trust seems to be a contradictory notion: How can one be trusting and watchful at the same time? I will show that it is not, and that trust and vigilance can be compatible to a certain extent. I will do so by distinguishing between different levels of both trust and vigilance. Interestingly, this argument requires acknowledging the value of some forms of distrust in scientific expertise, even if that distrust targets trustworthy experts. (shrink)