My goal in this chapter is to consider the connection between an agent’s moral character and those actions that she is capable of freely performing. Most of these connections hold for all moral agents, but my particular focus will be on the specific case of divine agency. That is, I’m primarily interested in the connection between God’s moral character and His exercise of His free agency. As I will argue, even if an agent’s character determines her choices or actions, that (...) doesn’t threaten the agent’s freedom so long as her character is formed in the right way.1 (Or, perhaps more accurately, so long as it’s not formed in the wrong way. And I do not see how God’s character could be formed in such a way that would undermine the exercise of His agency.) I proceed as follows. First, I explore the relationship between what an agent freely chooses to do and her moral character in general. I then address the relationship between God’s character, His reasons, and His freedom, on the assumptions of Perfect Being Theology.2 In the third section, I turn to the compatibility question, and show how an incompatibilist could agree with everything I say in the first two sections. That is, I argue that the considerations to which I appeal regarding divine freedom do not force the Perfect Being theologian to endorse compatibilism (though they also don’t prove incompatibilism). (shrink)

Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the (...) idea of free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

The article deals with the peculiarities of the formation of the concept of freedom of human in the philosophy of history of Russian thinker at the beginning of the nineteenth century P. Chaadayev. Formation of spirituality and general worldview-philosophical principles in Russian philosophy at the beginning of the nineteenth century had their own peculiarities and differences from Western philosophy. Rationalism and individualism, as specific characteristics of Western philosophy did not satisfy the representatives of philosophical thought in Russia.The dominant principles (...) in philosophical culture are community, catholicity, versatility, reflecting the distinctive character of socio-political development. Representatives of Russian philosophy assumed that the next stage in the historical development of mankind should not be social separation, but reunification in a qualitatively new social unity. P. Chaadaev was the first in early nineteenth century, who conducted a complex philosophical analysis of the specifics of worldview and historical development of the people, forming the general foundations of the philosophy of history. Problems of historical development, morality, and religion determine the cognitive process and the synthetic interdependence of freedom of the will man’s will and necessity. Freedom of will is determined by cognitive abilities and spiritual and practical activities that bring it closer to «higher law», the syncretism of God’s wisdom. (shrink)

This article is devoted to consideration of the main principles of the concept elaborated by the famous English scientist and Christian theologian J. Polkinghorne and directed to formation more accurate idea of Creator and creation. The basic ideas of this concept: the necessity to theology a rational approach to comprehension not only of nature and peculiarities of the universe but also of its Creator; an importance of co-ordination of the modern Christian doctrine of creation with the scientific picture of the (...) world; the great significance of natural theology for solving propounded tasks; our universe is a complex, developing by interaction of chance and law, but at the same time well-ordered and interrelated structure; human being is a part of this structure; the act of creation is a continuing process; God express Himself through His creation; Creator is simultaneously immanent and transcendent to His creation; Creator’s actions are dependent only on His free will; Creator is not impersonal, but rational, loving and suffering; Creator presented universe with an ability to self-development and human being with free will; realization of this self-development is accompanied by unpredictable consequences which are unknown not only for man, but for Creator also; God only of His own free will realized a self-limitation of His omnipotence because He loves human beings; one of our main tasks is to learn how to use our superior value - our freedom. (shrink)

An introduction, designed for the lay reader, developing four central issues with as little technical language as possible.—S. A. E.

This book connects the philosophy of Henri Bergson to contemporary debates in metaphysics and analytic philosophy of religion. More specifically, the book demonstrates how Bergson’s philosophy of time can respond to the problem of foreknowledge and free will. The question of how humans can be free if God knows everything has been a perennial issue of debate in analytic philosophy of religion. The solution to this problem relies heavily on what one thinks about time. The problem of time is central (...) to Bergson’s philosophical system. In this book, the author offers a systematic application of Bergson’s thought to the freedom and foreknowledge problem. The first chapter presents a discussion of Bergson’s central concept of la durée (duration). The subsequent two chapters link la durée to the relation of time and space. Here the author provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time and develops a novel theory of time connected to Bergson’s analysis of temporal experience. The last three chapters explore the relation between free will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. The author reconstructs Bergson’s theory of freedom and shows how it undermines the underlying dogmas of contemporary free-will theories. The author then argues that Bergson’s philosophy can be used to resolve the free will and foreknowledge problem in philosophy of religion. The monograph concludes by opening avenues for new research into Bergson and analytic philosophy of religion, such as the philosophy of religious language, the relation between God and modality, religious experience, and religious pluralism. (shrink)

The problem of freedom is researched in various ways by the religions of the world, by the scientific theories and by the mythological consciousness of people. The article pays great attention to the myth and its influence on the realm of freedom and on our interpretation of reality. The author understands a myth as a certain free fiction of a man in order to interpret reality in his own way and sometimes to create his own artistic image of (...) the world. Often the myth stimulates the ability of the imagination and thus it participates in the creation and existence of personality. It is argued that the traces of the myth can be found in most ways of orientation in the material and ideal worlds as well as in the systems of human interests and relationships, in the original human desire of freedom. The problem of freedom is central to all human history. Freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, political freedoms - one can name a large number of different freedoms, but the freedom of creativity should be considered as principal freedom. It should be noted also the freedom of thought, which can lead a cognizing person beyond the worlds of substances and energies, to the place where the Eternal Creator should abide. As the world religions believe, we inherit the capacity for creativity and self-knowledge from God. The very same creative freedom exists historically. Freedom of thought is accompanied by spontaneity and mystery. Spontaneity of consciousness and freedom of creativity create a system of meanings that determine the course of human history, while history is perceived by an observer as a completely unique, cognizable phenomenon. (shrink)

ARISTOTLE’S chapter-long digression in the Peri Hermenias to remark a restriction of the law of the excluded middle has touched off reams of commentary, logical, metaphysical and theological. For the theologian, God’s omniscience and human freedom were each at stake; for the metaphysician, the status of time; and logicians professed to find here an application for their remote exercises in trivalent logics. But whatever be the concern of the commentator, a glance at any one of them is likely to (...) discourage a student from pursuing a question which seems destined only to further entangle itself. (shrink)

Building on recent research exposing Hegel’s debt to esoteric Christianity (both Gnostic and Hermetic traditions), the aim of this paper is to show how Hegel and Schelling resolve an ambiguity in Boehme’s theology of evil in opposing ways. Jacob Boehme’s notion of the individuation of God through the overcoming ofopposition is the central paradigm for both Hegel’s and Schelling’s understanding of the role of evil in the life of God. Boehme remains ambiguous on the question of the modality of evil: (...) Is it necessary to God’s self-unfolding, or is it rather an anarchic act that God permits in the interest of preserving the autonomy of finite freedom? If the former, Boehme becomes much more closely aligned to Gnosticism by identifying finitude with evil. This identification is shown to be exactly Hegel’s solution to the ambiguity, one Hegel opts for in the interest of maintaining the absolute rationality of the system. Hermeticism opposes Gnosticism on this point: for the Hermeticist, finitude / material being / nature is not evil but ‘of God,’ the means of his individuation. This conflict in interpretations of Boehmeilluminates an often overlooked but essential difference between Gnosticism and Hermeticism. Schelling remains faithful to the Hermetic tradition by sacrificing system for the sake of preserving the contingency of evil, and disidentifying finitude and evil. (shrink)

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

Based on papers read to the Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français by a group of Catholic authors, including Gustave Thibon and Daniel-Rapa. Freedom is not mere independence: it is the choice of bonds to those we love. Since the Christian is related to his God in love, Christianity is the source and basis of genuine freedom. The authors attempt to substantiate this thesis in essays on Hinduism, Islam, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Freedom in the Greek World. The (...) concluding essays examine the requirements for the preservation of freedom in our day.--R. G. S. (shrink)

Resumen Para Eckhart la transformación del ser humano opera a partir de un progresivo reconocimiento que cada uno hace de su propia condición creatural a la luz de la vida intratrinitaria de Dios. El ser humano necesita liberarse de su constante inseguridad y dependencia de las cosas y de las convenciones sociales. Solo así puede iniciar ese camino de transformación que le permite ir de su condición terrenal, truncada por posesiones, miedos y limitaciones hacia una existencia en Dios plena en (...) el espíritu, en la gratuidad y en la libertad. Este camino conduce a la unión con Dios, pero ésta solo se alcanza a través del desasimiento de las cosas y del ego.For Eckhart the transformation of the human being operates from a progressive recognition that each one makes of his own creature condition in the light of God's intratrinitarian life. Human beings need to be freed from their constant insecurity and dependence on things and social conventions. Only in this way can he initiate that path of transformation which allows him to go from his earthly condition, truncated by possessions, fears and limitations to an existence in God full of the spirit, gratuitousness and freedom. This way leads to union with God, but this is only achieved through the disengagement of things and ego. (shrink)

What we must do is step back and take a grand view of the perspectives in order to understand it on a more particular level. If we can picture all of God’s attributes on a bar graph scale, all of God’s attributes would max out at 100% each. These attributes are always operating at 100%; at no time does any attribute diminish or decrease below 100%. However, there are times when one of His attributes shows forth more than another does, (...) but they are all operating at a maximum level. (shrink)

Preface--I. The definition of pragmatism and humanism--II. From Plato to Protagoras.--III. The relations of logic and psychology.--IV. Truth and Mr. Bradley.--V. The ambiguity of truth.--VI. The nature of truth.--VII. The making of truth.--VIII. Absolute truth and absolute reality.--XI. Empiricism and the absolute.--X. Is absolute idealism solipsistic? XI. Absolutism and the dissociation of personality.--XII. Absolutism and religion.--XIII. The papyri of Philonous, I-II.--XIV. I. Protogoras the humanist.--XV. II A dialogue concerning gods and priests.--XVI. Faith, reason, and religion.--XVII. The progress of psychical research.--XVIII. (...) Freedom.--XIX. The making of reality.--XX. Dreams and idealism.-- Index. (shrink)

Rejecting an eternal, unchanging soul or essence, Jean Paul Sartre praises the beauty of the human experience and definitively declares his preference for a temporary life of change and transformation over an eternity of certainty. In The Good Place, Michael is an immortal demon called an architect, who takes on the ambitious task of designing a neighborhood that will prompt condemned humans Eleanor, Chidi, Tahani, and Jason to unknowingly torture each other. Sartre's existentialism is characterized by his rejection of a (...) pre‐given human essence as well as his focus on the power of individual freedom. In Sartre's view, there is no divine creator, no final judge, and no supernatural moral fabric holding everything together. Throughout the course of four seasons of The Good Place, Michael decides that the project of an eternal certainty is less preferable than a possibly limited lifetime of risk, change, and transformation. (shrink)

Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom (...) supports a different interpretation of the way God acts according to right reason. (shrink)

The paper defends a compatibilist solution to the problem of the relationship between divine and human freedom. It is argued that the asymmetry of ability constituted by our ability to foreknowledge influence the future and our inability to control the past results from the asymmetry of openness between fixed past and open future interpreted in terms of the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. Therefore, if the asymmetry of openness is not true of some types of facts, then we may be (...) able to control them even if they are facts about the past. It turns out that widely shared accounts of the nature and source of God’s foreknowledge entail that the asymmetry of openness does not apply to God’s past beliefs about future contingencies. Thus, it is unjustified to claim that we are unable to now do anything such that, if we were to do it, God’s past beliefs would have been different. (shrink)

Based on papers read to the Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français by a group of Catholic authors, including Gustave Thibon and Daniel-Rapa. Freedom is not mere independence: it is the choice of bonds to those we love. Since the Christian is related to his God in love, Christianity is the source and basis of genuine freedom. The authors attempt to substantiate this thesis in essays on Hinduism, Islam, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and Freedom in the Greek World. The (...) concluding essays examine the requirements for the preservation of freedom in our day.--R. G. S. (shrink)

The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of God’s freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason (...) to do so. (shrink)

Kant’s concept of the highest good proportionately unites virtue and happiness—the supreme goods of, respectively, the systems of freedom and of nature. A middle path between theological and secular interpretations of Kant’s highest good is possible if we disentangle two distinct roles played by God: a causal role in promoting the real unity of the highest good, i.e., its actualization; and a conceptual role in modeling its conceptual unity. The highest good is theological in the first case, but neutral—neither (...) directly theological nor secular—in the second. Reconstructing how Kant envisioned the conceptual unity of the highest good requires taking seriously his repeated reference to God as the highest original good, and to the best world as the highest derived good. If, as Kant thought, a moral God forms a triadic unity comprised of holiness, goodness, and divine justice, perhaps he assumed that the conceptual unity of the derived good is likewise triadic, comprised of virtue, happiness, and a form of justice that is not directly divine but “systemic,” designating the unity of the systems of nature and of freedom. Divine justice, in contrast, constitutes the real unity of the highest good. (shrink)

Spinoza has been variously represented as a pantheist, a sceptic or an atheist. But whatever about his pantheism, he would have been shocked at being called an atheist. For Spinoza, the pursuit of philosophy was never a mere academic exercise, but rather a search for a way to true happiness, for “the road to inner freedom”, the experience of the amor dei intellectualis. All his writings are characterised by this ethical aim, and to his greatest philosophical work he gave (...) the simple title Ethica. The Ethica has long since become a classic in philosophy and it is Dr. Runes’ very laudable intention in the present edition to bring it down to the level of the greatest number of people. Dr. Runes is a lifelong student of Spinoza and makes no secret of his enthusiasm for his favourite author. In the present work he gives us a selection of extracts from the Ethica which bears no trace of the complicated and almost forbidding lay-out of the original. But, in the attempt to popularise the Ethica, the editor has omitted most of the reasoning which gave the original its philosophical appearance. Not only must the reader be satisfied with extracts, but Spinoza’s order of treatises is changed and we are given parts 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, in that order. This means that, whereas Spinoza began with the treatise on God, the one substance, from which he deduced his whole system, Dr. Runes introduces the divinity only towards the end. Curiosity may lead the thoughtful student to read the original, where he cannot fail to be struck by the logical inconsistency of Spinoza’s philosophy. But if he bears in mind the sad circumstances of the philosopher’s personal life, he will not be too severe in his criticism of the persecuted Jew. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:James S. Mullican DETERMINISM, FATALISM, AND FREE WILL IN HAWTHORNE A recurrent theme in Nathaniel Hawthorne's writing is the relationship between fatalism and free will. His tales, romances, and notebooks contain explicit and implied references to man's freedom of choice and his consequent responsibility for his acts, as well as to "fatalities" that impel men to various courses of action. Much of the ambiguity in Hawthorne's fiction rests (...) on this conflict between the notions of human freedom and responsibility on one hand and fatalism on the other. Although there is no question that this theme was important for Hawthorne, there is much disagreement concerning what Hawthorne himself believed. Critics have taken virtually every position on the spectrum between the poles of complete freedom and complete fatalism. That this disagreement exists should not be surprising. Hawthorne was an artist, not a philosopher or theologian; an important element of his technique, perhaps essential to his vision of life, was his ambiguity. His dual vision of the world, of matter and spirit, of evil and good, and his emphasis now of one, now of the other, engender disagreement concerning his view of life. His alternate fascination with and apparent rejection of Puritanism have led some to believe he was a predestinarían, others to hold that he was a "libertarian," and at least one critic to write that Hawthorne believed in a "modified predestination." Turner argued that Hawthorne's attitude toward reform led him to fatalistic thinking. Since reform movements touched only the surface manifestations of vice, such movements were useless, in Hawthorne's view. The logical conclusion of such a position, reasoned Turner, was fatalism. "Hence reform which would stir only the superficial outcroppings and would leave untouched the real causes underneath would be futile at best. And since the true sources of evil, so Hawthorne thought, lie largely beyond the reach of human efforts, fatalism was the certain end of his thinking." Turner saw evidence for fatalism 91 92Philosophy and Literature in Hawthorne's fiction also: "... there is a clear suggestion that the decisions [by Hester, Dimmesdale, Rappaccini, Ethan Brand, and Hollingsworth] have been inevitable, that the agent responsible is fate rather than Hawthorne's character." This critic concluded that Hawthorne was convinced that "the universe, including man and man's soul, is governed by inexorable law." Some critics have linked Hawthorne's beliefs regarding free will and fatalism to his attitude toward Calvinism. Schneider wrote, "... Hawthorne translated into empirical truths the essential doctrines of Calvinism.... From the popular doctrine of reform, he returned to the Puritan doctrine of divine sovereignty." Schneider suggested that Hawthorne purified the doctrines of the Puritans and returned them to their original purpose, salvation of the soul. "He recovered what Puritans professed but seldom practiced—the spirit of piety, humility, and tragedy in the face of the inscrutable ways of God." Cowley wrote that Hawthorne "believed in predestination, as the Calvinists did." Mills was of the opinion that Hawthorne was the most sympathetic to the Puritans of the writers of his day, but that Calvinist dogma was moderated and softened in Hawthorne: "He did not accept completely the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, nor did he emphasize the supreme sovereignty of God which was the driving force of Calvinism." Other critics have granted some measure of freedom to Hawthorne's characters. Arvin wrote, "... freedom of choice exists, but on so narrow a basis that, once exercised in the wrong direction, it is forever resigned." Fairbanks held that Hawthorne reserved to man the initial moral choice which set up the chain of necessity, and from that notion Fairbanks drew the conclusion that, "Though often called a fatalist, Hawthorne believed in free will." Schwartz, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, argued from Hawthorne's life and from his writings that he rejected fatalism in favor of free will. Wagenknecht noted that Hawthorne refused "to accept foreordination and total depravity." Still other critics have emphasized a paradoxical element in Hawthorne 's writing, his acceptance of both horns of the dilemma. Waggoner wrote: "He saw man as immersed in a mystery in which responsibility is at odds with fate. His own natural tendency was to emphasize causation at the... (shrink)

A scholarly and systematic treatment of the moral sphere, using the Bergsonian notion of obligation derived from status as a point of departure. It moves, through a treatment of such concepts as the Good, moral freedom, and retribution and immortality, to the conclusion that, though an individual man can be good without believing that God exists, there is no possibility of good if God does not in fact exist. The author's basic context is the Judaic tradition; however he pays (...) more than adequate attention to both classical and modern thinkers outside this tradition. --D. S. (shrink)

In a recent article in Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is incompatible with his version of the ontological argument because the former requires that God be free in a sense that precludes a requirement of the latter---that God be morally perfect in all possible worlds. God’s perfection, according to Morriston, includes moral goodness, which requires that God be free in the sense that entails that in some possible worlds God performs wrong actions. I argue (...) that Morriston’sintention is based upon a faulty conception of both God’s perfection and His freedom. God’s perfection does not entail that He has moral obligations which in some possible worlds He fails to discharge, and His freely performing an action does not entail that there are possible worlds in which He does not perform it. (shrink)

This article offers broad lessons for ways to rethink the tangled relation among religion, modernity, and the secular. After characterizing what I mean by theories of secularization and how these theories have dominated our accounts of British romanticism, I consider two poems – one by Coleridge, the other by Wordsworth – that disrupt the view that British Romanticism replaces God with nature and discipline with unencumbered freedom. I conclude by suggesting that when we disclose the language and ways of (...) religion and practice in British Romanticism, we make more apparent its political and environmental dimensions. (shrink)

Im folgenden komme ich zu dem Ergebnis, daß Gott nicht wählt, welche Welt er wählen solle, er wählt vielmehr eine besondere Definition von Vollkommenheit. Diese gilt dann als Kriterium für die Wahl der Welt. Meine Argumente für dieses Ergebnis zeigen, daß jeder wohldefinierte Seinsbereich eine eigene Definition von Vollkommenheit benötigt und all diese Definitionen logisch konsistent sein müssen. Beispiele für Definitionen werden angeführt. In diesem Zusammenhang weise ich nach, inwiefern Candides moralische Einwürfe Leibniz' mathematischphysizistischen Gott nicht treffen.

This chapter contains section titled: Maximal Power and the Uniqueness of God What an Omnipotent Agent Can Do The Analysis of Omnipotence Divine Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and Freedom.

This is an exploration of the political thought of the American transcendentalists focusing on Emerson, Thoreau, and Fuller. They were writing at a time when the American state was thought of as sacred, the two cities of Augustine, the City of God and the City of Man, combined as one. Indeed the Augustinian metaphor was a powerful one, frequently invoked in this period. American republican democracy in the City of Man enabled citizens through their participation in the state to achieve (...) something close to the spiritual status of the City of God. The transcendentalists, with their emphasis on the importance of individual freedom, did not accept this analysis, according to Daniel Malachuk. They looked at American democracy and saw much that did not support individual pursuit of goodness nor a society that approached the status of the City of God. For example, the continued existence of slavery hardly fit with a godly place. Malachuk argues that the separation between the City of God and the City of Man remains important to transcendentalists who thought that individuals needed to be given space by the state to pursue their individual development. (shrink)

We ask God to involve himself providentially in our lives, yet we cherish our freedom to choose and act. Employing both theological reflection and philosophical analysis, the author explores how to resolve the interesting and provocative puzzles arising from these seemingly conflicting desires. He inquires what sovereignty means and how sovereigns balance their power and prerogatives with the free responses of their subjects. Since we are physically embodied in a physical world, we also need to ask how this is (...) compatible with our being free agents. Providence raises questions about God's fundamental attributes. The author considers what it means to affirm God's goodness as logically contingent, how being almighty interfaces with God's self-limitation, and the persistent problems that arise from claiming that God foreknows the future. Discussion of these divine properties spills over into the related issues of why God allows, or even causes, pain and suffering; why, if God is all-knowing, we need to petition God repeatedly and encounter so many unanswered prayers; and how miracles, as ways God acts in the world, are possible and knowable. Throughout, the author looks at Scripture and attends to how providence deepens our understanding of God and enriches our lives. (shrink)

This paper deals with atheism, Sartre's notion of absolute freedom and Jean-Paul Sartre's claim of the irreconcilability of human freedom with God’s existence. For Sartre, man to be truly human must continuously create his own essence and continuously assert himself. Man can achieve this because he is absolutely free; the affirmation of God would undermine the exigencies of man's freedom and creativity. The question on the impossibility of the coexistence between the affirmation of God's existence and (...) the recognition of human freedom raises certain points against Sartre's notion of God and human freedom. The paper urges the believer to fully understand his beliefs and be also critical of his faith. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction General Philosophical Background Substance Substances: Mental and Material Kingdom of Nature: Physics and Laws of Motion Union of Mind and Body: Pre‐established Harmony Kingdom of Nature and of Grace: Grades of Life Human Freedom in the Kingdom of Grace Sufficient Reason and Indiscernibility: Space and Time The Existence of God.

abstract: This essay explores the parallels in the life and teaching of the Korean Zen master Pojo Chinul (1158–1210) and the Franciscan saint and theologian Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (ca. 1217–1274). Living during the same thirteenth century but on opposite sides of the world, both men committed their lives to reforming the religious life and to attaining the experience of awakening in their respective traditions. To this end, both encouraged the study of their foundational texts, together with the earnest practice of (...) meditation and contemplation. Both commented on the issues of a kataphatic and apophatic approach to ultimate reality, finding in the latter a fuller description (by non-description!) of the goal of the spiritual life. Controlling thoughts and developing intuitive wisdom were practices that united the two men, aiming to establish a constant awareness of the numinous moment by moment. In this way, they rejoiced in the freedom from fear bestowed by awakening to a clear vision of things as they really are in the unity of the infinite yet intimate being that undergirds all things. Ultimately, they seem to part company in the practice of devotion, with Bonaventure pointing to the love of the crucified Jesus, and yet even here, the remembrance of the name of the Buddha or the Christ was valued by both as an authentic path to the journey's goal. (shrink)

Nieprzezwyciężona wola Boga i tajemnica wolności stworzonych bytów. Komentarz do książki Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek Dariusza Łukasiewicza Artykuł jest komentarzem do książki Dariusza Łukasiewicza Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Zasadniczą jego tezą jest to, że nie istnieje wolność ludzka jako nie-kauzalny generator wolnych aktów. Prawdziwej wolności doświadczymy tylko w życiu wiecznym, a stanie się ona dla nas czymś realnym dopiero wtedy, gdy zostanie nam ujawniona nasza indywidualna istota. Życie wieczne polegać będzie, między innymi, na ujrzeniu, w jaki sposób wszystkie nasze działania (...) wypływają z naszej indywidualnej istoty. (shrink)

This book argues that Kierkegaard, influenced by Kant's critique of metaphysics, did not attempt to integrate human and divine agencies in any speculative theory. Instead, Kierkegaard deploys them to encourage different passions and dispositions that can be integrated in a coherent human life.

Rationalist models of divine agency typically ascribe perfect freedom to God, where this is understood as a freedom from external causal influences and non-rational influences, including desires or preferences not derived from reason alone. Paul Draper has recently developed a rationalist model of God’s agency on which God faces “hard choices” between options differing in moral and non-moral value. He argues that this model is preferable to rival rationalist models because it is compatible with God’s having significant (...) class='Hi'>freedom and being maximally worthy of praise and gratitude. I argue that on an alternative model of divine agency, which rejects perfect freedom and holds that God makes hard choices on the basis of brute preferences, God would be more worthy of praise and gratitude. However, a probabilistic problem for theism which Draper identifies for his model also applies to the brute preference model. (shrink)

The essay aims to focus on reception and interpretation of Dostoevsky in the thought of Luigi Pareyson and his heirs, who have developed a deep and original theoretical reading of Dostoevsky's work, able to bring out not only its ethical stance, but most of the essential aspects of his thought, and to investigate its current relevance. The reflection of Pareyson – who promoted the introduction of Dostoevsky's thought into the academic circles of Turin, being convinced that philosophy cannot avoid confronting (...) the issues it explores – consists of three main moments: the experience of good and evil, the experience of freedom and the experience of God. Starting from consideration of Dostoevsky's characters as ideas, Pareyson proposes a new and coherent philosophical interpretation of his work, which can undoubtedly be compared to those of Ivanov, Berdjaev, Evdomikov, Šestov. His observations around the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor and the "refutation of Ivan" – which, according to him, constitute the most significant and theoretically prolific moments of Dostoevsky's production – seem unaffected by the flow of time and could still represent a valuable and indispensable contribution to the understanding not only of the great Russian author, but of human nature itself. (shrink)

According to Alvin Plantinga and his followers, there is a complete set of truths about what any possible person would freely do in anypossible situation. Richard Gale offers two arguments for saying that this doctrine entails that God exercises “freedom-canceling” control over his creatures. Gale’s first argument claims that Plantinga’s God controls our behavior by determining our psychological makeup. The second claims that God causes (in the “forensic” sense) all of our behavior. The present paper critically examines and rejects (...) both of these arguments. The second of Gale’s arguments blurs the distinction between causal laws and the conditionals of freedom, whereas the first fails to appreciate the force of the libertarian claim that our psychological makeup may “incline” us in a certain direction without determining our behavior. It also fails to acknowledge the way in which a libertarian like Plantinga might think we contribute to shaping our own characters. (shrink)

It is important to specify terms – the truth is conformity of a word to a thing or an event, whereas a lie is making the truth unavailable to someone who has the right to it. John Paul II promoted the essential truth that a man is God’s creation; God knows what is good for his creation; human person is God’s image, then should act in such a manner that the image is clear. Faith has moral dimension-it is moral dimension. (...) It is the source of practical involvement which remains in harmony with faith. The principles of one’s conduct are God’s commandments, whereas individualistic ethics, practised in the spirit of illusory freedom, prevents us from discovering the only certain truth-God. Contemporary crisis of society is that faith is rejected and as a result there is breaking off the essential and constitutive bond between the truth and freedom. In economy we can see that the truth in one’s conduct cannot withstand the style of the present geared towards profit. It is proper that the Church supports profit but the profit cannot be the only regulator of a company’s life. There are still human and moral factors. Economic growth should respect human values. Freedom in the economic and social area cannot be torn out from the truth about a human being. The meeting of the Church and the workers’ movement in 1980 showed that it is possible to demand ethics in economy in the name of the truth of a human being-then the civilisation of love is created with its main principles: a person before a thing, more important to be than to have, ethics before technology, mercy before justice, defeat evil with good. Problems existing in this area cannot be disregarded. The matter is important and urging – otherwise, as Pope Leo XIII said in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, delaying would make evil incurable. (shrink)

Moral transformation is the process by which a person grows in holiness. The grace of the Holy Spirit enables this growth. This article explores how the notion of ‘prudence of the Spirit’ in Aquinas’s commentary on Romans can help to further elaborate the concept of moral transformation. It does so by first presenting this transformation as a human process. Second, the article presents an in-depth interpretation of Aquinas’s commentary on Romans 8:14: ‘those who are led by the Spirit of God (...) are children of God’. Here, special attention will be given to the proper character of the prudence the Holy Spirit forms in believers. The concluding discussion draws lessons from our reading of the commentary and related texts. This reinforces the conviction that grace enables freedom and will help us to find proper metaphors for speaking of the transformative work of the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

This book is a Festschrift offered by twelve Catholic theologians and philosophers to the great Jewish theologian David Novak. Each of the twelve essays is followed by a response by David Novak, and it thereby represents a significant addition to his oeuvre. The book includes an introduction by Matthew Levering surveying Novak's many contributions to Jewish-Christian dialogue, as well as a transcribed conversation between Robert George and David Novak that encapsulates Novak's sense of the present situation for Jews and Christians. (...) Among the topics treated by the authors are religious engagement in a pluralist and secular culture, the question of whether Jews and Christians worship the same God, the morality of suicide, the role of divine commandments in Catholic moral theology, the question of whether classical versions of natural-law doctrine are susceptible to the critiques proffered by Novak, the pedagogical impact of Dabru Emet, religious freedom, the recent debate about Pope Pius IX and Edgardo Mortara, the nature of justice, the relationship of reason and revelation, the sanctity of human life and the death penalty, and supersessionism. (shrink)