Excerpt: 1. Introduction This chapter provides insight into the diverse ethical debates on genetics and epigenetics. Much controversy surrounds debates about intervening into the germline genome of human embryos, with catchwords such as genome editing, designer baby, and CRISPR/Cas. The idea that it is possible to design a child according to one’s personal preferences is, however, a quite distorted view of what is actually possible with new gene technologies and gene therapies. These are much more limited than the editing (...) and design metaphors suggest. Such metaphors are therefore highly problematic phrases in the context of new gene technologies, for two reasons. On one hand, to design a child of choice by modifying the genome would require modifying any gene of choice, which is more than can be done with current gene technologies, such as CRISPR/Cas. On the other hand, a modification of genes would need to be enough to create any characteristic of choice in the future child. The latter presupposes the assumption of genetic determinism. Moreover, the CRISPR/Cas technology can not only be used in a potentially therapeutic manner at the germline level. In addition, there is the (more likely) scenario of a future clinical therapeutic use of these new gene technologies for modifying the DNA sequence of other cells of the body (somatic genome editing). There is also the option of modifying the epigenome, that is, the spatial configuration of DNA (epigenome editing) (see table 1). Like genetics and genome editing, epigenetics has been at the center of recent popular scientific and ethical discourse as well as scientific debates. The concept of epigenetics has given rise to very different notions of inheritability and responsibility for health, which, however, are oftentimes based on scientifically controversial basic assumptions. That there continues to be covert genetic determinism in the form of epigenetic determinism (see table 2) in debates about epigenetics has been pointed out in ethical analyses of epigenetics. Neither genetic determinism nor epigenetic determinism has been confirmed scientifically. It is therefore important to recognize the concepts that are discussed (and sometimes harshly criticized) in debates about genome editing and epigenetics—for example, concepts about the causal role of DNA for our own life course. This importance is based on the fact that if we understand such controversial concepts, we will be able to remain critical when evaluating scientific knowledge and ethical arguments about genome editing and epigenetics. This chapter, therefore, explains some of these concepts. For an ethical analysis of epigenetics as well as of genome editing, it is necessary to understand and critically reflect upon the underlying concepts of genetic determinism and other, related -isms. The following section offers a detailed introduction to these -isms (section 2; see also table 2). Section 3 provides an ethical analysis of genome editing and epigenetics based on the explanations in section 2. Section 3 focuses on inheritability and responsibility, justice, safety, the problem of consent, and the effects of genome editing and epigenetics on embryos and future generations. This section does not discuss in detail further points that can be found in ethical debates about epigenetics as well as in ethical debates about genome editing. These points include (among others): • fear that the findings of epigenetics and that the methods of genome editing are misused—this also with respect to eugenics and enhancement; • naturalness—an issue we mention in passing a few times in the following analysis; • a possible connection between the genome/epigenome and the concept of human dignity, and the derived danger of instrumentalization and infringement of autonomy when intervening in the genome or epigenome. Since current discourse about ethical issues associated with genome editing focuses mainly on germline interventions, which are, for instance, interventions into a human embryo’s genome, we mainly focus on germline interventions when comparing the debates on genome editing and on epigenetics in section 3. (shrink)

When hard determinists reject the claim that people deserve particular kinds of treatment because of how they have acted, they are left with a problem about remorse. Remorse is often represented as a way we impose retribution on ourselves when we understand that we have acted badly. (This view of remorse appears in the work of Freud, and I think it fits our everyday, pretheoretical understanding of one kind of remorse.) Retribution of any kind cannot be appropriate if we do (...) not deserve bad treatment because of how we have acted. But remorse seems to be essentially bound up with understanding that we have acted badly. If this is right, it is important for hard determinists to find a non-retributive account of remorse, so that they can accommodate remorse within their theories. My goal in this paper is to provide such an account. I describe a kind of remorse which I think is a common human experience, a kind which is based on suffering in sympathy with the person one has wronged. It is similar to suffering in sympathy with one's friends when they suffer. We suffer in sympathy with friends not because we think we deserve to, but because we care about them, and their suffering gives us pain. In the wake of a wrongful act, a "virtuous wrongdoer" comes to care about the person wronged, and suffers in sympathy with him. This kind of remorse can be accommodated by hard determinists. (shrink)

Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they must accept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”‐based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to (...) do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”‐based moral reasons do. (shrink)

In The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5) Paul Linjamaa offers the first full length thematical monograph on the longest Valentinian text extant today. By investigating the ethics of The Tripartite Tractate, this study offers in-depth exploration of the text's ontology, epistemology, theory of will, and passions, as well as the anthropology and social setting of the text. Valentinians have often been associated with determinism, which has been presented as "Gnostic" and then not taken seriously, or disregarded (...) as an invention of ancient intra-Christian polemics. Linjamaa challenges this conception and presents insights into how early Christian determinism actually worked, and how it effectively sustained viable and functioning ethics. (shrink)

In this module, I first explore the dialectic that leads to Kant’s substantive moral theory. In the second section, I explicate the roots of Kant’s ethical theory in terms of his attempt to resolve the antinomy of freedom and determinism. Kant’s solution is a Normative Compatibilism that resolves the inconsistency via morality, in general, and self-governance in particular. As noted in our lesson on Yoga, this is a strategy that Yoga endorses, and hence, predates the Kantian approach by (...) over a millennia and a half. Yet, Kant’s approach to Normative Compatibilism is unique to him, and perhaps, more influential. In the third section, I review Kant’s dialectic by which he concludes that The Categorical Imperative is the means by which rational agents resolve this tension by freely determining themselves. In the fourth section, I consider some preliminary objections to Kant’s theory. In the fifth section, I draw some conclusions. (shrink)

New media have changed the parameters of public relations, multiplying audiences and altering the nature of relationships. Practitioners’ ethics approaches have been slower to adapt, frequently proving inadequate to the changes. McLuhan’s theory of technological determinism predicts this lag in conceptualizing and adapting to technological evolution; with awareness of the problem, however, practitioners have an opportunity to consciously shift to using the potential of new media proactively for ethical guidance, rather than continuing to allow ethics processes to lag (...) behind technological capacity. -/- In 1967 Marshall McLuhan wrote, “When faced with a totally new situation, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavor of the most recent past” (74). His words referred to the gap he observed between the potentially innovative functionality of new media, and the predominately traditionalist approaches to their use. While McLuhan’s comments are now more than 40 years old, and a host of newer technologies has evolved from those he described, his point remains strikingly germane: This chapter demonstrates that there is still a chasm between the potential and the utilization of new media, and explores the implications of that chasm for the specific context of new media and ethics in the field of public relations. (shrink)

Did Aristotle believe that upbringing determines character, and character, in turn, determines action? Some scholars answer this question in the affirmative and thus read Aristotle as a determinist with little use for the idea that people are morally responsible for what they do. The present paper counters this interpretation by showing that a deterministic reading of Aristotle’s theory of action and character is indefensible in the face of the text. The author points to three main facts: (1)a passage in the (...) Nicomachean Ethics shows conclusively that Aristotle did not regard upbringing as determining moral character; (2) the doctrine of character expounded in Nicomachean Ethics III does not entail that people can only act in conformity with their moral dispositions, and (3) Aristotle viewed alternatepossibilities as genuinely open to moral agents, not as available to them only in principle (i.e., if they had received a different upbringing or had had different beliefs and desires). (shrink)

Did Aristotle believe that upbringing determines character, and character, in turn, determines action? Some scholars answer this question in the affirmative and thus read Aristotle as a determinist with little use for the idea that people are morally responsible for what they do. The present paper counters this interpretation by showing that a deterministic reading of Aristotle’s theory of action and character is indefensible in the face of the text. The author points to three main facts: (1)a passage in the (...) Nicomachean Ethics shows conclusively that Aristotle did not regard upbringing as determining moral character; (2) the doctrine of character expounded in Nicomachean Ethics III does not entail that people can only act in conformity with their moral dispositions, and (3) Aristotle viewed alternatepossibilities as genuinely open to moral agents, not as available to them only in principle (i.e., if they had received a different upbringing or had had different beliefs and desires). (shrink)

As in Marx's and Lenin's time, bourgeois critics of Marxism are accusing Marxists of denying ethics in principle. Some of them say that Marxist economic theory entirely rules out any element of free choice of actions and ethical judgment. Others say that Marx's economic analysis includes a moral indictment of capitalism as an unjust society, but that this means no more than that the ethical element in Marxism is entirely pushed aside by economic analysis and plays no independent (...) role. In the opinion of these critics, Marxism merely reduces such questions as what man should do, and what the ethical norms of his life are, to acceptance of the justice and moral rightness of whatever emerges in history as economic necessity. In other words, Marxism allegedly "makes a virtue of necessity" where ethics is concerned, and demands of human beings nothing more than adaptation to what is or to what will be. In either case, according to that interpretation of Marxism, people must accept without qualification that which corresponds to historical necessity. Free choice, reason, and human conscience can play no role. (shrink)

The Yoga Sūtra (YS) is perhaps the most popular book of Indian philosophy today the world over. It is widely regarded by practitioners of Yoga as a conceptual manual for yoga and there are several competing translations of the work on the market. Yet, the Yoga Sūtra is also widely regarded as a difficult text to read. It is written in a dense, aphoristic, sūtra format. In the introductory section, I tackle the question of methodology in reading the Yoga Sūtra. (...) In the second explication section, I move to the crux: Yoga and Sāṅkhya—two schools that are often conflated with each other—present two very differing accounts of Freedom and Determinism. In the third section, I review the considerations that Yoga presents for its Normative Compatibilism. Yoga is depicted by the Yoga Sūtra as a process that we explore and finalize in public space. The goal of extricating ourselves from nature so as to deliver us into a personal world is the aim that underlies the project of liberating ourselves from external coercion in public. Ethics, or Dharma, is the normative light that makes us unique and makes us individual persons, as opposed to functions of nature or our environment. Isolation, autonomy, kaivalya, is our freedom as individuals in a social world free from external influence and coercion. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur le déterminisme compatibiliste de Kazimierz Twardowski. Dans un premier temps, j’explique ce qu’est le déterminisme selon Twardowski et pourquoi il s’agit d’après lui d’une position plus probable que l’indéterminisme. Dans un deuxième temps, je présente son analyse du concept d’imputation [poczytywanie] – très proche de ce qu’on appelle en philosophie pénale la character theory of excuses – qui lui permet de concilier déterminisme et imputation. Cette analyse pose qu’un acte ne peut être imputé (à faute ou (...) à mérite) que s’il émane du caractère de l’agent. Dans un troisième temps, j’expose son analyse du concept de responsabilité. Dans un dernier temps, je montre que Twardowski penche vers l’incompatibilisme lorsqu’il est question du remords ou du sentiment de responsabilité, mais qu’il ne pense pas que cela doive nous conduire au scepticisme éthique. Cet article comporte en annexe une traduction d’une publication synthétique de Twardowski sur ce sujet. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the classic dispute between `compatibilists' and `incompatibilists' about determinism and moral responsibility. Martha Klein argues that the traditional account of the dispute, turning as it does on the notion of the agent's `ability to have acted otherwise',misrepresents the real disagreement, which arises from the compatibilists' conviction that it is sufficient for blameworthiness that an agent's wrongdoing was the result of a morally reprehensible frame of mind, and the incompatibilists' insistence that wrongdoers cannot be (...) morally responsible fortheir actions if they are not responsible for their motivating desires and beliefs. The incompatibilist position seems compelling when, for instance, we consider wrongdoers whose desires and attitudes can be traced to early emotional deprivation. The author argues that our response to these andother `problem cases' commits us to an incompatibilist condition for blameworthiness which is actually unfulfillable. In her view, however, some reflections on emotional deprivation should also encourage acceptance of a compatibilist condition which will satisfy our desire to be just more fully thanthe usual proposals emanating from either side of the debate. (shrink)

This book examines the way in which new discoveries about genetic and neuroscience are influencing our understanding of human behaviour. As scientists unravel more about the ways in which genes and the environment work together to shape the development of our brains, their studies have importance beyond the narrow confines of the laboratory. This emerging knowledge has implications for our notions of morality and criminal responsibility. The extent to which "biological determinism" can be used as an explanation for our (...) behaviour is of interest to philosophers reflecting on the free will versus determinism debate. It also has repercussions for the criminal justice system; in courtrooms around the world, defence lawyers are beginning to appeal to genetic and brain imaging data as grounds for finding their clients not guilty. Can a defendant's genes or the structure of his brain be used as an excuse for his behaviour? Is criminality "hardwired"? Is it legitimate to claim "I couldn't help it, my genes made me do it"? This book appeals to anyone interested in the link between behaviour and genetics, the science and philosophy of moral responsibility and/or criminal law. (shrink)

The brain disease model of addiction is widely endorsed by agencies concerned with treating behavioral disorders and combatting the stigma often associated with addiction. However, both its accuracy and its effectiveness in reducing stigma have been challenged. A proposed alternative, the “choice” model, recognizes the residual rational behavior control capacities of addicted individuals and their ability to make choices, some of which may cause harm. Since harmful choices are ordinarily perceived as blameworthy, the choice model may inadvertently help justify stigma. (...) This paper seeks to fully naturalize the choice model by highlighting the determinants of voluntary action and thus increase its potential for destigmatizing addiction. In light of a deterministic understanding of behavior, it is unreasonable to suppose that addicted individuals could have made different choices in becoming addicted and in subsequent situations. To the extent that stigma is motivated by the supposition that addicted individuals could have chosen otherwise in actual situations, a deterministic understanding of addictive behavior promises to mitigate blame and stigma. (shrink)

Socially Assistive Robots are increasingly conceived as applicable tools to be used in aged care. However, the use carries many negative and positive connotations. Negative connotations come forth out of romanticized views of care practices, disregarding their already established technological nature. Positive connotations are formulated out of techno-deterministic views on SAR use, presenting it as an inevitable and necessary next step in technological development to guarantee aged care. Ethical guidance of SAR use inspired by negative connotations tends to be (...) over-restrictive whereas positive connotations tend to provide over-permissive guidance. To avoid these extremes, we report on the development and content of 21 ethical orientations regarding SAR use in aged care. These orientations resulted from a multi-phased project, which consisted of empirical-ethical research focusing on older adults’ intuitions regarding SAR use and philosophical-ethical research focusing on philosophical-ethical argumentations regarding SAR use. This project led to the Socio-historical contextualization of the ethics of SAR use, in which the ethical impact of SAR use is localized on three interrelated analysis levels: societal, organizational, and individual-relational. The 21 novel orientations regarding SAR use are structured according to these levels and further categorized into foundational and applied orientations. The first category leads to critical reflection on SAR use while the latter category inspires decision-making processes regarding this use. While going beyond the care-romantic and techno-deterministic gaze of SAR use in aged care, the described orientations balance themselves between their over-restrictiveness and over-permissiveness. (shrink)

Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. In the previous module, I review the ethics of the End of the Vedas and (...) explicate the Moral Irrealism of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, which is articulated as a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra. In this module, I compare Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) and Madhva's (Dvaita Vedānta) account of the Vedānta Sūtra. Both are moral realists. They differ on the room for freedom given the necessity of moral considerations. One value of the Vedānta approach to ethics is that it provides a non-speciesist framework to think about ethics. It allows us to understand ourselves (ātmā) and our interest in Development (Brahman) as conceptually distinct, though identical in some manner. The Advaita view is that this identity is strict. The Dvaita approach is that Development realises the results of choices of individuals, but only some, owing to their good character, are capable of taking advantage of this for their betterment. The Viśiṣṭādvaita approach of Rāmānuja suggests in contrast that each self is a microcosm of reality. Reality is Development – the genus of individual selves. Each self has Development as an essential trait, but owing to past choices (karma), this is poorly understood. Things change when the individual self understands Brahman to be its true self, for then an individual can re-direct their efforts from procuring results to self-governance by treating the personal essence of the Development (the Lord) as the explanation for improvement. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn 2001, Julian Savulescu wrote an article entitled ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children’, in which he argued for the genetic selection of intelligence in children. That article contributes to a debate on whether genetic research on intelligence should be undertaken at all and, if so, should intelligence selection be available to potential parents. As such, the question of intelligence selection relates to wider issues concerning the genetic determination of behavioural traits, i.e. alcoholism. This article is designed (...) as an engagement in the intelligence selection debate using an analysis of Savulescu's arguments to raise a series of problematic issues in relation to the ethics of parental selection of intelligence. These problematic issues relate to wider assumptions that are made in order to put forward intelligence selection as a viable ethical option. Such assumptions are more generic in character, but still relate to Savulescu's article, concerning issues of genetic determinism, private allocation and inequality, and, finally, individual versus aggregate justice. The conclusion focuses on what the implications are for the question of agency, especially if intelligence selection is allowed. (shrink)

The proper limit to paternalist regulation of citizens' private lives is a recurring theme in political theory and ethics. In the present study, we examine the role of beliefs about free will and determinism in attitudes toward libertarian versus paternalist policies. Throughout five studies we find that a scientific deterministic worldview reduces opposition toward paternalist policies, independent of the putative influence of political ideology. We suggest that exposure to scientific explanations for patterns in human behavior challenges the notion of (...) personal autonomy and, in turn, undermines libertarian arguments against state paternalism appealing to autonomy and personal choice. (shrink)

A set of axioms implicitly defining the standard, though not instant-based but interval-based, time topology is used as a basis to build a temporal modal logic of events. The whole apparatus contains neither past, present, and future operators nor indexicals, but only B-series relations and modal operators interpreted in the standard way. Determinism and indeterminism are then introduced into the logic of events via corresponding axioms. It is shown that, if determinism and indeterminism are understood in accordance with (...) their core meaning, the way in which they are formally introduced here represents the only right way to do this, given that we restrict ourselves to one real world and make no use of the many real worlds assumption. But then the result is that the very truth conditions for sentences about indeterministic events imply the existence of tensed truths, in spite of the fact that these conditions are formulated (in the indeterministic axiom) in terms of tenseless language. The tenseless theory of time implies determinism, while indeterminism requires the flow of time assumption. (shrink)

It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second (...) one does not. It is argued that reasons require alternative possibilities, because reasons are action-guiding. A supposed reason to do the impossible, or to do what was inevitable anyway, could not fill this function. I discuss different interpretations of the claim that reasons are action-guiding, and show that according to one interpretation it is sufficient that the agent believes that she has several alternative options. According to other interpretations, the agent must really have alternative options, but only in a compatibilist sense. I suggest that an interpretation of action-guidance according to which reasons can only guide actions when we have several options open to us in an incompatibilist sense cannot be found. We should therefore assume that reasons and obligations are compatible with determinism. (shrink)

Determinist thought with its sui generis view on life, nature and being as a whole is a point of view that could be observed in many different cultures and beliefs. It was thanks to Greek thought that it ceased to be a cultural element and transformed into a systematic cosmology. Schools such as Leucippos, then Democritos and Stoa attempted to integrate the determinist philosophy into ontology and cosmology. In the course of time, physics and metaphysics-based determinism approaches were introduced, (...) and a wide spectrum has emerged from genetics to behaviorism, from culture to psychology, from atomism to divinity. Determinism, whether physical or metaphysical origin, ignores freedom of will and deny agency competence over human behavior. Due to this feature, it is opposed by ethical theories, legal philosophies and religions. When the arguments for determinism are possible to disprove logically and philosophically, this is not so easy when the claims base themselves on scientific base. As the logical consequence of this novel fact, it is important to question the epistemological value of scientific knowledge and critically analyze the data of experiments and clinical studies in terms of methodology when answering any hypothesis such as neuro-biological, neuro-psychological, or neuro-theological argumentations. On the other hand, it is necessary to reach alternative experiments on the same subject or to show that it is possible to interpret them in different ways, as in the example of the Libet experiment. The neurobiological determinism based on biological reductionism, emerged as the result of ignoring the ontological difference of the mind, equating the mind with the brain, or defining mentality as an epiphenomenon of the brain. The main divergence stems from the acceptance of materialist philosophy. Paradigms that reduce existence only to matter do not take the metaphysical possibilities into account. In this case, although the problems called qualia or subjective experience stand there unresolved, the claim is preserved. Although many new developments such as the discovery of the entropy law, the big bang theory, and quantum physics have shaken the materialist philosophy, modern science resists an epistemological revision. However, with the current epistemology, it does not seem possible to grasp both the universe and the being as a whole. This is the most important reason why every attempt to understand the nature and spiritual side of human beings fails despite numerous experiments on the brain. However, the human brain is an organ that seems sophisticated and its secrets cannot be easily solved. Since there is not enough information about the brain, there is not enough evidence to claim that the brain, and therefore the mind, are part of the deterministic universe. Increasing brain researches since the last quarter of the twentieth century has revealed that genes, neurons and particularly brain chemistry claim much greater role than expected in human behavior. These results have been instrumentalized by some researchers for a radical claim that free will is an illusion, while by others it has led to the acceptance of will as less important over actions than was thought. Both ideas adopted a model of biological determinism in which freedom of will was ignored. Hypotheses based on controversial interpretations of various experiments raised concerns about religious, moral, and legal responsibility. Although man cannot be thought of as a non-free being from the point of view of common sense, the smog screen over the truth would not be lifted unless the scientific data in question had a correct interpretation. At first glance, it seems unreasonable to discuss universal determinism in the quantum universe. Nevertheless, the claim that strong causality prevails in the material world, including consciousness, remains in place. Therefore, firstly criticizing determinism and then examining biological determinism will help to fix the conceptual framework. This article aims to explain why genetics and neurobiology, while acknowledging their importance in the realization of behavior, can’t completely abolish moral agency. Some hypotheses attribute consciousness and free will to the physico-shimic structure of the brain, the random activity of neurons, or the ability to automatically transform inputs into outputs with the advantage of genetic information. This is the most sensitive and important point of being human; it attacks free will. Paradoxically, while global civilization of our time promises infinite freedom to human beings the science of the same age tries to prove that it is not free. (shrink)

The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability , that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such (...) predictions, does not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability —we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour. (shrink)

After a brief but necessary characterization of the notion of determinism, I discuss and critically evaluate four views on the relationship between determinism and free will by taking into account both (i) what matters most to us in terms of a free will worth-wanting and (ii) which capacities can be legitimately attributed to human beings without contradicting what we currently know from natural sciences. The main point of the paper is to argue that the libertarian faces a dilemma: (...) on the one hand, the possibility of ?doing otherwise? ? a necessary condition of a free will according to the libertarian ? requires indeterminism or chance, but any kind of indeterminism has the undesirable consequence of separating our actions from our character and our past. On the other hand, if our character has to be fully expressed by our actions, determinism becomes necessary and we seem to be metaphysically unfree. I conclude by showing that the dispute between compatibilists and libertarians possesses an important but hitherto very neglected pragmatic component as well, dependent on two different ethical attitudes toward a meaningful life. (shrink)

One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and historical periods, giving (...) the notion that there are two types of ethical point of view that have assumed shapes during history. These points of view are mutually exclusive on the one hand, and on the other, they both stand as axiomatic standpoints of morality throughout history. The dialectical relationship between the two formulates the moral discourse throughout history. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:The present article reassesses Aristotle's views on the relationship between ethical character and the natural environment. The standard reading, to the effect that Aristotle endorsed environmental determinism, is rejected. The discussion invites a more careful examination of Aristotelian texts commonly adduced to support the orthodox reading, while also providing a clear account of what environmental determinism is. I argue that the textual evidence presented by defenders of the standard reading does not match that account. All in all, (...) I conclude, we are not authorized to invoke Aristotle's views on the relationship between natural environment and human beings in order to discredit his ethical and political project. (shrink)

In this book, Ted Peters explores the fallacies of the "gene myth" and presents a resounding array of arguments against this kind of all-encompassing genetic determinism. On the scientific side, he correctly points out that genetic influences on behavior are in most instances relatively modest. Does anyone deny that identical twins are still able to practice individual free will? After dispatching some of the sweepingly deterministic conclusions of the "science" of evolutionary psychology with a particularly effective set of rebuttals, (...) Peters arrives at the conclusion that the nature of humanness is an interaction of three things- not one, not two, but three: genetics, environment, and free will. Neglecting any one of these three leads down a path of fuzzy thinking and dangerous consequences. (shrink)

The paper deals with the use of predictive genetic tests in medical research. I limit my discussion to those advances in genetics which try to overcome the limits represented by our genetic make-up, in particular by gene mutations that lead, or could lead, to the development of genetic diseases. Besides the ethical issues concerning the topic of the current discussion, the reader will also find an evaluation of the legal provisions elaborated at the different levels of the legal order. (...) The aim of this evaluation is to find out which model of Law is being adopted in bioethical issues like the one discussed in this paper. The paper underlines and argues how Law can contribute to value and to spread an ethics of responsibility. Tekst se bavi primenom prediktivnih analiza u medicinskim istrazivanjima. Diskusija se odnosi samo na one vidove genetike kojima se pokusavaju prevazici ogranicenja sadrzana u nasem genetskom sklopu, pre svega ogranicenja koja su izazvana mutacijama gena koja izazivaju ili mogu izazvati pojavu genetskih oboljenja. Pored etickih pitanja vezanih za temu ove diskusije, tekst razmatra i pravna resenja s razlicitih nivoa pravog poretka. Cilj procene pravnih resenja je da utvrdi koji je pravni model usvojen u slucaju bioetickih pitanja kojima se bavi ovaj tekst. U tekstu se naglasava da zakon moze doprineti afirmisanju i sirenju etike odgovornosti. (shrink)

A critical review of Charles Goodman's view about Buddhism and free will to the effect that Buddhism is hard determinist, basically because he thinks Buddhist causation is definitively deterministic, and he thinks determinism is definitively incompatible with free will, but especially because he thinks Buddhism is equally definitively clear on the non-existence of a self, from which he concludes there cannot be an autonomous self.

In this book the most important aristotelian passages concerning the question of determinism are thoroughly reexamined: chapter 9 of de interpretatione, chapter 3 of Metaphysics's book VI, several chapters from the Ethics, as well as some texts from the aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. This is the author's main contention: "In Aristotle's view the world of social relations and of human behaviours really is always highly undetermined; but this is mainly due to the unpredictable intersections of the different causal (...) series issuing from each agent involved, while in each of these series at least one element tends to remain constant (indeed, it is the most stable element in every situation): the personal character of the human agent and the kind of response this character offers to the new situations that constantly arise.". (shrink)

There has been a long-standing debate about the relationship of predictability and determinism. Some have maintained that determinism implies predictability while others have maintained that predictability implies determinism. Many have maintained that there are no implication relations between determinism and predictability. This summary is, of course, somewhat oversimplified and quick at least in the sense that there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in the philosophical literature. In this essay I will focus (...) on what I take to be the Laplacean vision for determinism and predictability. While many forms of predictability are inconsistent with this vision, I argue that a suitably restricted notion of predictability, consistent with the practice of physicists, is implied by the Laplacean notion of determinism. It is argued that limitations on predictability are of an in principle nature in the Appendix. (shrink)

Commentators are divided between those who welcome and creatively extend the agenda of Lifelines and those who defend what it criticises. My response covers style; history, politics, and ethics; concepts of freedom, active organisms, and determinism; the uses of metaphor; reductionism and levels of analysis; Darwin and Darwinists; heritability and intelligence; human universals and biological determinism.

This paper engages with one debate in the emerging field of neuroethics. It is sometimes claimed on the strength of neuroscientific research that our actions are causally determined and therefore not truly free, or more modestly that brain structures or processes constrain some choices and actions, raising questions about our moral responsibility for them. I argue that a Reformed account of providence, sin and grace offers an account of causation able to resist hard determinism, reframes concepts of freedom and (...) responsibility, and provides a theological perspective for evaluating medical interventions in brain activity. Thus the paper not only contributes to a neuroethical debate, but also illustrates the capacity of Reformed ethics to respond creatively to novel problems. (shrink)

This article builds upon previous discussion of social and technical determinisms as implicit positions in the biofuel debate. To ensure these debates are balanced, it has been suggested that they should be designed to contain a variety of deterministic positions. Whilst it is agreed that determinism does not feature strongly in contemporary academic literatures, it is found that they have generally been superseded by an absence of any substantive conceptualisation of how the social shaping of technology may be related (...) to, or occur alongside, an objective or autonomous reality. The problem of determinism emerges at an ontological level and must be resolved in situ. A critical realist approach to technology is presented which may provide a more appropriate framework for debate. In dialogue with previous discussion, the distribution of responsibility is revisited with reference to the role of scientists and engineers. (shrink)