Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and (...) equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic. (shrink)

This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical (...) reason, including contractarianism, are discussed. In normative ethics, the chapter focuses on the distinction, among theories of right action, between consequentialism and non-consequentialism, as well as the distinction between theories of right action and other kinds of normative theory, such as rights theory, virtue theory, and the ethics of care. There is an overview of the debate between consequentialism and deontology regarding moral constraints, as well as a discussion of indirect consequentialist responses to deontological objections. (shrink)

In the previous module we examined the dialectic that Krishna initiates in the Bhagavad Gītā. Arjuna’s despondency and worry about the war he must fight is captured in his own words by teleological concerns – consequentialism and virtue theoretic considerations. In the face of a challenge, a teleological approach results in the paradox of teleology---namely, the more we are motivated by exceptional and unusual ends, the less likely we are to pursue our ends given a low expected utility. Krishna's solution (...) is to switch to a procedural ethics. To this extent, Krishna identifies three ethical theories. Two were discussed extensively in the earlier chapter on the Gītā. The first is basic deontology, called karma yoga. This states that we should choose to do our duty without appealing to the outcome as a justification. The duties in question are definable by good outcomes, but the outcomes do not constitute the reason for embracing duty. The second, spoken about at length, is bhakti yoga. According to this, the right thing to do is to worship the ideal by our actions. This practice results in us improving our skill and practice such that we come to liberate ourselves from fault and instantiate the ideal itself. The third is the Gītā’s metaethical theory—conceptual account of the right and the good. This is called “jñāna yoga.” This module focuses on the metaethical dimensions of the Gītā. (shrink)

In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of (...) little help here. Finally, it seems to me that Slote's metaethical account will turn out to be much less externalist than he suspects. (shrink)

The interpretation of experimental data in neuroscientific research concerning moral decisions is controversial. One of the leading experimenters in the field, Joshua Greene, holds that the data show that deontological theories of morality are the expression of a confabulation which tries to give a rational justification for emotional responses. His arguments are criticized on the basis of a different interpretation of deontology. On the other hand, Marc Hauser, John Mikhail and others have proposed a research project in moral psychology (...) called Universal Moral Grammar. This perspective is more promising as far as the normative dimension of moral judgment is concerned. Yet, it is suggested that rather than looking for the universal moral principles we should look for the formal principles of morality, in a more thoroughly Kantian perspective. (shrink)

This chapter deals with Kierkegaard's contributions to ethics by focusing on his relation to virtue ethics and deontology, his views of moral agency, and the source of moral obligations. It argues that Kierkegaard presents a critique of Kantian autonomy that favors moral realism and theological voluntarism, and that he gives an account of human agency and selfhood in which morality is inescapable.

This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative ethics and metaethics. Recent empirical findings in moral psychology, such as the impact of emotions, intuitions, and situational factors on moral judgments, have sparked a debate about whether ordinary moral judgments are systematically error-prone. Some philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, argue that these findings challenge the reliability of moral intuitions and support more "reasoned", consequentialist approaches over deontological ones. The first part of (...) the dissertation reviews these provocative findings and the philosophical reactions to them, which often invoke the notion of 'moral relevance' - the idea that some factors shaping moral judgments are morally irrelevant. The second part develops a psychological account of moral relevance, drawing on theories of the moral domain, the role of emotions, and models of moral cognition. This account reveals the complex interplay of intuitive and reasoned processes in generating impressions of moral relevance. The final part reevaluates the philosophical discussions in light of this psychological understanding. It contends that the evolutionary background of moral intuitions does not necessarily render them inadequate, and that both deontological and consequentialist judgments likely depend on evolved intuitions to a significant degree. Furthermore, the tendency to dismiss certain influences on moral judgment as irrelevant can itself be explained psychologically. Considering the psychological account presented, mind-independent accounts of morality become less plausible. The dissertation concludes that while empirical moral psychology reveals important constraints on normative theorizing, it does not decisively favor consequentialism over deontology. To assess the significance of empirical-scientific findings for ethics, a nuanced understanding of the origins of moral judgments is nevertheless indispensable. (shrink)

Is a Health Care Ethics possible? Against sceptical and relativist doubts Kantian deontology may advance a challenging alternative affirming the possibility of such an ethics on the condition that deontology be adopted as a total programme or complete vision. Kantian deontology is enlisted to move us from an ethics of two-person informal care to one of institutions. It justifies this affirmative answer by occupying a commanding meta-ethical stand. Such a total programme comprises, on the one hand, a dual-aspect strategy incorporating (...) the macro- (institutional) and micro- (person-to-person) levels while, on the other, it integrates consistently within moral epistemology a meta-ethics with lower-ground moral theories. The article describes the issues to be dealt with and the problems which have to be solved on the way to a unifying theory of that kind (Sections I-III) and indicates elements of Kantian moral philosophy which may serve as building blocks (Section IV). Among these are not only Kant’s ideas concerning the moral acting of persons and his ideas concerning civil society and state but also his ideas concerning morality, schematism and religion. (shrink)

The moral principle that Ought Implies Can (“OIC”) is often assumed without argument in normative discourse. Is this assumption defensible? Some would argue that it is not, as there are many purported counterexamples against it in the literature. However, OIC is not so much a single principle as rather a family of them. In this paper, I will argue that, while not every OIC-type principle is defensible, at least one of them may be. I defend the cognate moral principle that (...) Ought Implies Can or Could Have (“OICCH”). I first show that it is able to circumvent the traditional counterexamples to OIC. And then I show that OICCH is even more plausible than some of the best alternative OIC-type principles to date. The upshot of this paper is that those who find OIC compelling should consider accepting OICCH instead. (shrink)

The Bhagavad Gītā occurs at the start of the sixth book of the Mahābhārata—one of South Asia’s two main epics, formulated at the start of the Common Era (C.E.). It is a dialog on moral philosophy. The lead characters are the warrior Arjuna and his royal cousin, Kṛṣṇa, who offered to be his charioteer and who is also an avatar of the god Viṣṇu. The dialog amounts to a lecture by Kṛṣṇa delivered on their chariot, in response to the fratricidal (...) war that Arjuna is facing. The symbolism employed in the dialog—a lecture delivered on a chariot—ties the Gītā to developments in moral theory in the Upaniṣads. The work begins with Arjuna articulating three objections to fighting an impending battle by way of two teleological theories of ethics, namely Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism, but also Deontology. In response, Kṛṣṇa motivates Arjuna to engage in battle by arguments from procedural ethical theories—specifically his own form of Deontology, which he calls karma yoga, and a radically procedural theory unique to the Indian tradition, Yoga, which he calls bhakti yoga. This is supported by a theoretical and metaethical framework called jñāna yoga. While originally part of a work of literature, the Bhagavad Gītā was influential among medieval Vedānta philosophers. Since the formation of a Hindu identity under British colonialism, the Bhagavad Gītā has increasingly been seen as a separate, stand-alone religious book, which some Hindus treat as their analog to the Christian Bible for ritual, oath-swearing, and religious purposes. The focus of this article is historical and pre-colonial. (shrink)

I wish to defend the claim that given the content and structure of any moral theory we are likely to find palatable, there is no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or deontological elements. Indeed, once we examine the actual structure of any such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way arbitrarily. Hence if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by adherents of the consequentialist-deontological distinction, we are (...) quickly led to the conclusion that this distinction contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral theory. I will try to show that there are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms endemic to the consequentialist-deontological distinction have no unique references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, scrutiny of actual and viable moral theories reveals a much finer-grained structure than the consequentialist-deontological taxonomy can capture. And it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, that determines practical moral decision making. We would thus do better to develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, states and events (mental, social, or physical). So in the end, the consequentialist-deontological distinction is irrelevant at the normative level of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is convincing, upon reflection, to any practicing moral philosopher. (shrink)

Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm's generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt (...) to bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann's criticisms. Furthermore, the term “Kantian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either “Kantian rationalism” or “Kantian deontology” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into. (shrink)

Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions (...) it is supposed to yield can be maintained. More specifically, I argue that the evidence from neuroimaging relies on a problematic reverse inference, that the behavioral data are flawed, and that the findings from focal brain damage do not support the model. From a normative point of view, Greene fails to show that we ought to discount the intuitions that give rise to deontological judgments because they respond to morally irrelevant factors: firstly, I show that they do not pick up on the factors Greene deems to be morally irrelevant in the first place, and secondly, I argue that there generally is reason to trust our deontological intuitions. (shrink)

What really makes the concepts of obligation or permission so important for practical philosophy? What if we could find a better concept, one that, despite the simplicity, could show itself as intuitive and rich as possible? Could justifications be used in common language and practice as a sign of ethical judgment and as a strong motive for action? In most scenarios, for example, it really doesn’t matter if a given action is obliged, permitted or forbidden, one may perform the action (...) as long as a justification for doing it is present. In this sense, the notion of justification seems to be more basic and powerful than other concepts used in the philosophical discourse. The existence of formal systems based on the epistemological side of justification, created by Artemov, led us primarily to think that justification could make the formal discourse much more accurate for ethics than the ones using deontological concepts. In the semantical and syntactical aspects, almost all of Artemov’s systems directly proved to be fruitful for ethical purposes. We also developed combinations between the standard deontic logic and logics of justification, resulting in what whe called the Logics of Normative Justification. These systems were able to change the object of the justification formulas and shed some light in ethics as a whole, normative and metaethics. Metaethics were a forgotten subject in formal ethics. We were also able to deal with some known problems in deontic logic, like the famous Ross’s paradox and the expressiveness of prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. (shrink)

This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving “up close and personal” harm back to (...) our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene’s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism. (shrink)

From the beginning of the 1990s, a considerable interest in business ethics has been observed in Poland. It seems that the heritage of Polish researchers concerned with this academic discipline is already rich enough, and at the same time so diverse that it is worth making an attempt to systematize it, deepening and naming appropriate principle methods of grasping business ethics in Poland. The carried-out analyses allowed determining the following leading methods in the formal aspect: first, the metaethics of (...) business ethics; second, business ethics grasped in the framework of various modifications of normative ethics (most often, deontology, utilitarianism, ethics of virtue and ethics of responsibility; on the other hand, it has been noticed that there is a complete lack of clear references to personalistic ethics); third, business ethics performed as etiology (descriptive ethics) in economic life. (shrink)

Derek Parfit was one of the world’s leading philosophers. His _On What Matters_ was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. _Reading Parfit: On What Matters _is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit’s monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit’s book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit’s discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and (...) Kantian deontology; and his metaethical ideas and arguments. Reading Parfit will be central reading for students of ethics and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of one of the most important works of philosophy published in the last fifty years. (shrink)

E. F. Carritt (1876-1964) was educated at and taught in Oxford University. He made substantial contributions both to aesthetics and to moral philosophy. The focus of this entry is his work in moral philosophy. His most notable works in this field are The Theory of Morals (1928) and Ethical and Political Thinking (1947). Carritt developed views in metaethics and in normative ethics. In meta-ethics he defends a cognitivist, non-naturalist moral realism and was among the first to respond to A. (...) J. Ayer’s emotivist challenge to this view. In normative ethics he advocates a deontological view in which there is a plurality of obligations and of non-instrumental goods. In the context of defending this view he raised some penetrating and novel criticisms of ideal utilitarianism. He held that it is not acceptable to revise our reflective common-sense moral attitudes in the face of philosophical moral theories, and that moral philosophy is only indirectly practical. (shrink)

Ethical rationalism has recently dominated the philosophical landscape, but sentimentalist forms of normative ethics (such as the ethics of caring) and of metaethics (such as Blackburn's projectivism and various ideal–observer and response–dependent views) have also been prominent. But none of this has been systematic in the manner of Hume and Hutcheson. Hume based both ethics and metaethics in his notion of sympathy, but the project sketched here focuses rather on the (related) notion of empathy. I argue that empathy (...) is essential to the development of morally required caring about others and also to deontological limits or restrictions on self–concern and other–concern. But empathy also plays a grounding role in moral judgement. Moral approval and disapproval can be non–circularly understood as empathic reflections of the concern or lack of concern that agents show towards other people; and moral utterances can plausibly be seen not as projections, expressions, or descriptions of sentiment but as “objective” and “non–relative” judgements whose reference and content are fixed by sentiments of approval and disapproval. (shrink)

In this lesson we review the philosophical foundations of ethics as a sub-field of philosophy. Ethics, moral or dharma philosophy is the confluence of dissenting theories and what they have in common as they disagree is the basic concept of ETHICS/DHARMA: THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD. Every theory of ethics or dharma is an account of this concept from some perspective. This allows us to identify three varieties of moral philosophical investigation: applied ethics, normative ethics and metaethics. It also (...) involves discerning four basic, normative theoretical options: Virtue Ethics (the good leads to the right), Consequentialism (the good justifies the right), Deontology (the right justifies the good), and a fourth theory peculiar to the Indian tradition: Bhakti/Yoga (the right leads to the good). Examples of all four ethical theories are found in the Indian tradition. (shrink)

Joseph Mendola defends an original ethical theory in the consequentialist tradition, which also incorporates contractarian and deontological elements. He argues that this theory is required by physical reality and the correct metaethics, and focuses in particular on the moral significance of group acts, and indeterminacies of morally relevant fact.

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. The analysis is neutral regarding competing substantive theories of obligation, whether consequentialist or deontological in character. What it seeks to do is generate solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Amongst these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, prima facie obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its (...) normative neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed. This study is a major contribution to metaethics that will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with normative ethical theory. (shrink)

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be (...) ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain.Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular moral theory, Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction. (shrink)

Numerous ethical theories have been proposed as a foundation of business ethics, and this often brings about appreciable perplexity. This article seeks to identify specific problems for a sound foundation of this discipline. A first problem is this multiplicity of ethical theories, each with its own metaethics, often accepted without a serious discussion of their philosophical grounds. A second problem is the fragmentation of theories; some centred on duties or obligations, others on consequences, virtues, or moral sentiments. In addition, (...) some theories focus on universal principles, while others take the singularity of each situation as their focal point. A third problem is that not every ethical theory covers the personal, organizational and societal dimensions of business ethics, and this introduces reductionism. These problems cannot be satisfactorily addressed through ‘ethical pluralism’, in which all theories are accepted, without falling into ethical relativism. ‘Ethical pragmatism’, which welcomes any ethical theory only on the basis of their practically, is also questioned. Furthermore, there is the problem of integrating ethics into business theory, which is often extrinsic to the economic function. After analysing these problems, the article concludes by exploring some proposals that might serve to build a sound and complete ethical theory which includes human goods (objective values), principles (or norms) and virtues. The necessity of reconsidering the human action for a closer integration of ethics into business theory is also suggested. (shrink)

Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an incoherent power to release oneself from obligations. I argue that self-release is possible, both as a matter of deontic logic and of metaethics.

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality and (...) Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

As its title suggests, Robert Audi’s The Good in the Right1 defends an intuitionist moral view like W.D. Ross’s in The Right and the Good. Ross was an intuitionist, first, in metaethics, where he held that there are self-evident moral truths that can be known by intuition. But he was also an intuitionist in the different sense used in normative ethics, since he held that there are irreducibly many such truths. Some concern the intrinsic goods, which are in turn (...) plural, so there are prima facie duties to promote pleasure, knowledge, virtue, and just distributions. But others are deontological, requiring one apart from any consequences to keep promises, not lie, make reparations, express gratitude, and not injure others. Audi embraces both these intuitionist views, but in each case with an important addition. Ross sometimes said that if a proposition does not need proof, it is incapable of proof, or cannot be justified inferentially. Audi argues persuasively that this is not so. A proposition that is selfevident, in the sense that understanding it justifies one in believing it, can also be derivable from other self-evident propositions in a way that increases its justification. And he exploits this possibility in his normative ethics. Whereas Ross held that his prima facie duties are underivative, Audi suggests that, while self-evident, they can also be grounded in a more abstract principle. More specifically, he argues in Chapter 4 of his book that they can be grounded in Kant’s categorical imperative, which he applies primarily in its second, or formula of humanity, version. The result is to transform what Audi calls Rossian intuitionism into Kantian 1 intuitionism, where specific duties about promoting pleasure and keeping promises derive from a more fundamental requirement to respect rational personhood. I will not challenge Audi’s version of metaethical intuitionism, which I think is the most subtle and persuasive yet given. Nor will I question his normative starting-point in Ross’s theory of prima facie duties, which I find unimpeachable.. (shrink)

Normative ethics: Eudaemonism and Consequentialism -- Normative ethics: Contractualism, Deontology, Feminism, and Egoism -- Metaethics -- Applied ethics.

_Ethical Theory: An Anthology_ is an authoritative collection of key essays by top scholars in the field, addressing core issues including consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, as well as traditionally underrepresented topics such as moral knowledge and moral responsibility. Brings together seventy-six classic and contemporary pieces by renowned philosophers, from classic writing by Hume and Kant to contemporary writing by Derek Parfit, Susan Wolf, and Judith Jarvis Thomson Guides students through key areas in the field, among them consequentialism, deontology, contractarianism, (...) and virtue ethics Includes coverage of metaethics, normative ethics, and practical ethics Reaches beyond traditional texts by also including important, but usually underrepresented, topics such as moral knowledge, moral standing, moral responsibility, and ethical particularism Raises questions about the status and rational authority of morality. (shrink)

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he (...) adds that utilitarian beliefs about wellbeing—e.g. the belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad—were probably shaped by evolution. Logically, de Lazari-Radek and Singer should therefore reject these beliefs along with the deontological beliefs that evolved. The present paper is a defense of their argument. After considering a number of unsuccessful replies to Kahane’s objection, I put forward a more promising solution: de Lazari-Radek and Singer should combine their objectivist view in metaethics with a subjectivist account of well-being, such as the desire theory. Such a hybrid account would tackle Kahane’s challenge because subjective accounts of value are immune from evolutionary debunking arguments. And it would be compatible with utilitarianism, which doesn’t fit very well with metaethical subjectivism. Before concluding, I deal with two concerns that this solution might raise: I argue that the desire theory is actually subjective enough to escape Kahane’s objection, and I deny that retreating to the combination of ethical objectivism and prudential subjectivism is ad hoc. (shrink)

Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian approach, (...) Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration by Jay L. GarfieldYilun Zhai (bio)Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration. By Jay L. Garfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 248. Paperback $24.95, ISBN 978-0-19-090764-8.Jay L. Garfield's Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration offers a comprehensive presentation of Buddhist ethics as well as one of the most ingenious metaethical developments in the field. With Western philosophers as its potential readers, the (...) tone and the choice of examples of this book contain a typical philosophical flavor. Most interestingly, it is not only an objective interpretation of the existing Buddhist ethical theories, but also an innovative work that expands the current theoretical boundary. Buddhist Ethics is divided into three parts: in the first part ("Structure") Garfield argues that Buddhist ethics is best characterized by "moral phenomenology," a metaethical theory that emphasizes how we experience over what we do. The second part ("Doctrine") elaborates on how both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna paths are ethical in nature and compatible with a phenomenological interpretation. The third part ("Contemporary Issues") introduces Engaged Buddhism, and claims that Buddhist ethics can function naturalistically without supernatural concepts such as rebirth and the six realms of transmigration.The first part of Buddhist Ethics maps a structural framework of moral phenomenology. Over the past decades, philosophers have endeavored to place Buddhist ethics under the existing Western metaethical categories, for Buddhist ethical thought bears a striking resemblance to all of the major traditions of Western ethics--consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology. But Garfield rejects any simple generalization and proposes a particularist reading of Buddhist ethics, which he calls "moral phenomenology." For Garfield, Buddhist ethics cannot be captured by any universal, overarching moral principle; not because Buddhists neglected ethics or failed to create metaethical theory, he argues, but that no universal moral principle is sufficiently sophisticated as a guidance for real life (p. 23). The complexity of dependent origination and the unique goal-oriented paths make the Buddhist definitions of action, agent, free will, pleasure, and pain utterly distinct from their Western counterparts. In particular, while Western philosophers often rely on our natural perceptual capacities and the conceptual mind as sources of information (such as the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas"), according to Garfield, Buddhist ethicists regard ordinary perception as [End Page 1] fundamentally flawed and the source of all suffering. Thus, they "aim to correct a 'natural' way of experiencing ourselves," characterized by moral phenomenology (p. 22).Although moral phenomenology is the nucleus of Garfield's entire project, a comprehensive, formal definition of the term is lacking throughout the book. To help the reader understand this sophisticated term and its ethical stance, I will briefly summarize it here. Buddhist moral phenomenology centers on the transformation of our mental experiences, which Garfield calls an "input ethics," in contrast to the Western "output ethics" that emphasize explicit rules, external actions and their consequences, and cultivation of virtues (p. 29). The process of ethical cultivation--completed through prescriptive paths--replaces our natural egocentric experiences with a liberated perspective stemming from the interdependence of all things. Such a perceptual transformation in turn replaces one's instinctive reactions with a spontaneous and responsive mode of comportment toward the world (p. 27). The final goal of moral phenomenology is the elimination of suffering for all sentient beings, with the buddhas and bodhisattvas as exemplary models of its perfection. In this sense, it is a combination of an ethical path and a soteriological path.To the best of my knowledge, Garfield is the first person to explicitly identify a moral phenomenological reading of Buddhist ethics: His 2010 article "What Is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva" and 2015 book Engaging Buddhism include pioneering research on this theory. The current book (Buddhist Ethics) further develops the theory, offering a more mature metaethical structure and in-depth explorations of canonical texts from the Indo-Tibetan traditions. By endorsing a moderate form of ethical particularism, Buddhist phenomenology refrains from committing to a single Western metaethical category, and gains notable advantage in synthesizing a myriad of Buddhist moral discourses into a united whole. This theory is undoubtedly Garfield's paramount contribution in the... (shrink)

Derek Parfit was one of the world’s leading philosophers. His _On What Matters_ was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. _Reading Parfit: On What Matters _is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit’s monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit’s book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit’s discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and (...) Kantian deontology; and his metaethical ideas and arguments. Reading Parfit will be central reading for students of ethics and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of one of the most important works of philosophy published in the last fifty years. (shrink)

Moral sentimentalism can be understood as a metaethical theory, a normative theory, or some combination of the two. Metaethical sentimentalism emphasizes the role of affect in the proper psychology of moral judgment, while normative sentimentalism emphasizes the centrality of warm emotions to the phenomena of which these judgments properly approve. Neither form of sentimentalism necessarily implies a commitment to virtue ethics, but both have an elective affinity with it. The classical metaethical sentimentalists of the Scottish Enlightenment—such as David Hume and (...) Adam Smith—were all, to a greater or lesser extent, also virtue theorists. The connection is even stronger in the case of Enlightenment philosophers who were also normative sentimentalists , as with Frances Hutcheson. For Hutcheson, virtue simply is a habit of acting from the warm motive of universal benevolence. Today, neo-sentimentalist metaethicists such as Allan Gibbard, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson generally remain agnostic on the question of whether virtue ethics is superior to its deontological and consequentialist competitors. Michael Slote, however, has developed a comprehensive theory of sentimentalist care ethics in an unambiguously virtue-centered form. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to explore the forcefulness of the adoption challenge to procreative parenting. After framing the challenge, I consider two of the most developed attempts to respond to it, due to Luara Ferracioli and Elizabeth Brake. I argue that neither strategy is a promising way to vindicate the permissibility of procreative parenting. I then present several reasons to value procreative parenting that are underappreciated in the recent literature. Though these considerations deserve more philosophical attention, I’m (...) agnostic about whether they are strong enough to overcome the adoption challenge. I explain why this agnosticism is reasonable, and the debate about permissibility arguably intractable, in the context of prevailing deontological assumptions structuring discussions of procreation. I conclude by arguing that an independently interesting metaethical thesis, which I call deontic fictionalism, may give us some perspective on this debate and others like it. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1921 masterpiece, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, defends no theory of normative ethics, no ethical system on a par with, say, utilitarianism and deontology. Nor does it offer any metaethical theory comparable to emotivism, cognitivism, or moral realism, though in a sense we may consider its ethical remarks “metaethical”. They elucidate what ethics is or means, that is, how ethics structures the ways we relate to the world. Even in the absence of any explicit “ethics of the Tractatus”, understanding Wittgenstein’s conception (...) of the relation between language and reality, as well as the underlying account of subjectivity and the self, is crucial for appreciating what it means to adopt an ethical stance. (shrink)

Environmental ethics is the discipline in philosophy that studies themoral relationship of human beings to, and also the value and moralstatus of, the environment and its non-human contents. This entrycovers: the challenge of environmental ethics to theanthropocentrism embedded in traditionalwestern ethical thinking; the development of the discipline fromthe 1960s and 1970s; the connection of deep ecology, feministenvironmental ethics, animism and social ecology to politics; theattempt to apply traditional ethical theories, includingconsequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, to supportcontemporary environmental concerns; the broader (...) concerns of somethinkers with wilderness, the built environment and the politics ofpoverty; and the ethics of sustainability and climate change. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es exponer un paso argumental para una justificación kantiana de la aplicación jurídico-política del principio de la humanidad que sea plenamente compatible con la tesis de la diferencia deontológica entre ética y derecho. Dicho paso se ubica en el nivel metaético de justificación de los principios de justicia en el marco del contrato originario. Específicamente, mi tesis interpretativa consiste en que este nivel se inicia con una teoría de la acción por la cual la descripción (...) de los rasgos de los agentes o personas que participan de él resulta compatible con el 'hecho del pluralismo'.The aim of this paper is to develop a step within the justificatory argumentation that bases the juridical-political application of the principle of humanity in a way that makes it fully compatible with the thesis of the deontological distinction between ethics and law. This step belongs to the metaethical level that serves to justify Kant's principles of justice within the original contract. Specifically, my interpretative thesis holds that this level begins with a theory of action by which the description of the agents or persons that participate in the contract is fully compatible with the fact of pluralism. (shrink)

Most moral philosophers who have recently expressed sympathy with feminist or ‘care-based’ perspectives on ethical theory have thought that such perspectives can make valuable contributions to more comprehensive ethical theories. Few have thought that an ethics of care can offer a complete normative theory. However, Michael Slote is one of the ambitious few. In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, he seeks to show that a care-based perspective can do a lot of service in first-order moral and (...) political theory as well as in metaethics. Here is a quick overview of the book's content: In Chapter 1, Slote explicates the notion of empathy that is central in his ethics of care, which he locates within the sentimentalist paradigm, stemming from philosophers such as Hume and Hutcheson. Slote's account of empathy and moral development draws substantially on work by the psychologist Martin Hoffman. Chapter 2 discusses care ethics and our obligation to help others, including both the near and the distant needy. Chapter 3 aims to show how the notion of empathy can further the case for deontology in ethics. Chapters 4 through 6 discuss the relation of care ethics to pivotal issues in political philosophy, such as autonomy, liberalism, social justice and rights. Slote maintains that autonomy …. (shrink)

Reissue of Becker's 1973 monograph, which argues the following: Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of _On Justifying Moral Judgments_ insists, on the contrary, that rigorous (...) justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the ‘is-ought’ issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument. (shrink)

This article is a textual analysis of messages and themes in "Calvin and Hobbes," a comic strip nationally syndicated from 1985 to 1995. The article examines the content found in "Calvin and Hobbes" to determine underlying messages concerning ethics and values. Specifically, the messages are analyzed to determine under which category of metaethics-deontological, teleological, and virtue-they fall.

INTRODUCTION: Philosophy is the unique science which considers all other sciences in systematically unity (Kant). The classical anthropology (Platon, Aristoteles, Descartes, Hume, Kant, etc.) considers the human and his "spheres" (biological, psychological, logical, philosophical, theological) and his interdependence with nature and society. A philosophical theology investigates spiritual phenomena, described by religions and parapsychology in context of ethics, epistemology (incl. metaphysics), aesthetics. A theological anthropology should consider these phenomena multidimensional in context of a holisticscience, i.e. physico- (Kant), bio- (Lüke), psycho-, logico-, (...) philosophical theology, etc. [Lit.: Neu, Michailov: Integralanthropology. In: Proc. 21st World Congr. Philos. Istanbul. Press FISP 280‐281, 2003; Theol. Anthrop. In: Book: New Pathways for Eur. Bioethics. Ed.: Eur. Ass. Med. Ethics, Leuven, p. 53/60, 2006; Med. Ethics, 21st Ann. Conf. EACME (Ed.) Zürich, p. 53, 2007]. CONCEPTION: Regrettably philosophical theology is reduced to nearly philosophical and theological ethics: Both ethics in the future should realize a common scientific integrated ethics based on philosophy, theology, and psychology incl. of great cultures - Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianism-Mosaism, Confucianism, and Mohammedanism. The present moral philosophy is very pluralistic: Many views concerningnormative and metaethics (deontology, axiology), also relativism, absolutism (incl. utilitarism), noncognitivism are present. A similar situation exists in moral theology: Not only in context of philosophy (consequentialism, justice, protectionism), but more - of theology are existent contradictionary differences concerning ethics in the great religions (related to God, Spirit/Soul, reincarnation, etc.). A future philosophical theology needs a renewal of its scientific theoretical andexperimental fundamentals (controlled observations: criterion for intersubjectivity) concerning theological anthropology incl. not only occidental epistemology (metaphysics, scientific theory, etc.), but also oriental - esp. Brahmanistic and Buddhist (self realization by Yoga, Tibetan, Zen Buddhism) and scientific evaluation of spiritual phenomena by biophysics, physiology, psychology and formal (Aristoteles, Gautama), real, transcendental (Kant), metaphysical (Hegel) normal logic. Areconsideration of application of philosophy of arts, esp. aesthetics in philosophical theology is also necessary (incl. inspirations in music/Bach, Beethoven, Händel, painting/Leonardo da Vinci, sculpture/Michelangelo). CONCLUSION: Scientific and political support for a renovation of theological anthropology and philosophical theology could help essentially for a realization of UNO-Agenda 21 for better total (incl. spiritual) health and peaceful world. (shrink)

Most moral philosophers who have recently expressed sympathy with feminist or ‘care-based’ perspectives on ethical theory have thought that such perspectives can make valuable contributions to more comprehensive ethical theories. Few have thought that an ethics of care can offer a complete normative theory. However, Michael Slote is one of the ambitious few. In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, he seeks to show that a care-based perspective can do a lot of service in first-order moral and (...) political theory as well as in metaethics. Here is a quick overview of the book's content: In Chapter 1, Slote explicates the notion of empathy that is central in his ethics of care, which he locates within the sentimentalist paradigm, stemming from philosophers such as Hume and Hutcheson. Slote's account of empathy and moral development draws substantially on work by the psychologist Martin Hoffman. Chapter 2 discusses care ethics and our obligation to help others, including both the near and the distant needy. Chapter 3 aims to show how the notion of empathy can further the case for deontology in ethics. Chapters 4 through 6 discuss the relation of care ethics to pivotal issues in political philosophy, such as autonomy, liberalism, social justice and rights. Slote maintains that autonomy …. (shrink)

Moral theories often take the guidance of individual conduct as their central task, and seek to provide grounds for confidence in deliberation. Yet they are inevitably also drawn into justifying our reactions to and interventions in one another's actions. This dissertation takes critical encounters to mark a central aspect of moral life. Yet standard deontological and consequentialist theories fall short of providing conceptual tools adequate for reflection on this aspect, and virtue theory is surprisingly undeveloped here. I develop a (...) naturalistic account of the capacities and virtues of critical engagement, and suggest some consequences in ethics and metaethics. ;Critical processes are often inarticulate, being experientially and historically prior to moral theory. For example, certain "thick" judgments , conceive a provocation immediately in terms of specific evaluative response-strategies whose fittingness is implicitly honored, but left opaque. Processes of critical response also function inarticulately on a much larger scale, sparking long-term projects, convictions, and identities of solidarity and resistance. A proper-function account of critical agency illuminates our intuitive attachments to critical response patterns, while suggesting some senses in which they can fail. ;Meanwhile, articulated moral judgments have a problematic role in critical engagement. They can be understood as signs with descriptive content, but such content cannot be interpreted without attention to how the thought or claim is historically poised to be put to use or "taken up" in subsequent attitudes and activity. I highlight the fragility of the historical, social, and psychological contexts in which moral verdicts engage effectively with their audiences. ;I argue against identifying the critical moral domain by way of its connection to any fixed set of reactive attitudes, such as resentment and guilt . Moral complexity and critical virtue emerge as critical agency acquires certain new formal dimensions. Subtleties of critical virtue include a capacity for engaged ambivalence, interest in the genealogy of our attitudes and norms, and an ability to apprehend and reconstruct strands of critical moral agency where we might otherwise have been tempted to diagnose brute moral error. (shrink)

Emotivism has enjoined a revival of sorts over the past few decades, primarily driven by a Darwinian interpretation of the Humean metaethic. Evolutionary ethics, the metaethical view that at the heart of our moral sense lies a set of moral sentiments whose existence 'pre-dates' in evolutionary terms our species' ability to engage in more explicit, cognitive moral deliberations and discourse, whether in the discovery of deontological rules or in the crafting of social contracts, figures prominently in Robert Solomon's work (...) in justice theory and J. Baird Callicott's work in environmental ethics, to name just two efforts to revive emotivism. Though the idea that our moral sense is grounded in our evolved biology lies at the heart of the new ethical emotivism, there has been a curious lack of a truly evolutionary account of the origin of that biological predisposition in the work of Solomon, Callicott, and others involved in the revival. In particular, what is missing is an account of how we evolved our moral sense as an adaptation to the ecology in which our very early ancestors existed. The typical explanation is to treat it as selected for by the pressure to cooperate that bore upon our early ancestors; for example, the advantage that cooperative effort confers in bringing down big game or warding off competing groups. But this type of explanation, I hope to show, rather than providing an account of how our moral sense came to be, actually must presuppose the existence of a rudimentary moral sense. If so, then the origin of our moral sense must be accounted for as an adaptation to our pre-social, ecological environment. As a model for what such an explanation might look like I will use Jared Diamond's recent work in biogeography, Guns, Germs and Steel. (shrink)

The central question which I address is whether appeal to a hypothetical contract between moral persons is acceptable as a method for justifying basic ethical principles. ;My first two substantive chapters concern general issues in metaethics, particularly the shortcomings of both standard naturalist and noncognitivist theories of evaluative language; some conditions of acceptability for methods of moral justification are proposed and supported as well. Firth's and Hare's methods fail to satisfy these criteria, while Brandt's present approach and Rawls' method (...) of reflective equilibrium largely succeed. Rawls, quite correctly, intends his contract argument to apply only within the framework of this more basic method. ;Major aspects of Rawls' contract theory are examined at length in Chapter IV. My central concern is with the reasons Rawls gives for regarding his interpretation of the initial contract situation as the "rationally preferred" one. The concepts of impartiality, neutrality, and fairness are discussed at the outset. I then proceed to explain and criticize Rawls' reasons for imposing a "thick veil of ignorance" on the contractors. The argument that natural assets and social contingencies are "morally arbitrary" and hence should not influence the choice of principles of justice is found to be open to serious objection and to rest upon a specific type of egalitarian moral commitment. Rawls' "Kantian" argument is shown to lack sufficient support and to involve an unwarranted exclusion of certain deontological, perfectionist, and other teleological theories from serious consideration. ;Grice's contract theory, which omits the "veil," is examined in Chapter V, together with his account of prudential reasoning and his argument for a necessary connection between moral obligation and rationality. His type of contract approach is demonstrated to be unworkable due to vague description of the initial situation. Moreover, it has unacceptable implications and cannot serve as an appropriate basis for moral justification in any case. ;I conclude that the ideal contract method is at best a very conditional procedure of moral justification, far more suitable for some types of moral conceptions than for others. It seems unlikely, furthermore, that achievement of wide reflective equilibrium or "full rationality" in Brandt's sense would result in a consensus favoring any one description of the initial contract situation. (shrink)

Representing moral choice as a function of rational choice is carried out by formalizing moral evaluation into a functional mechanism called "Moral Choice Function" whose domain is information on a state of affairs and range is a moral judgment, and upon which formal and substantive requirements are imposed. The notions such as impartiality, universalizability, proportionality, and informational invariance are employed for the issue of how to solve conflict of values faced by an individual as well as collective moral agent. By (...) utilizing the structural affinity with post-Arrovian social choice theory, it is shown that inter-attribute commensurability is indispensable for any serious moral agent who wants to solve conflict of values through pluralistic maximizing. It is also shown that once the morally relevant attributes are identified, formal requirements are powerful enough to qualify the function to behave in a certain way such that the formulas for pluralistic maximizing vary with the modes of inter-attribute commensurability. It is also shown how it is still possible to manage conflict of values rationally without value commensurability by interpreting John Rawls's theory of justice as neo-Kantian in dealing with conflicting desiderata from Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. The metaethical tenets for the project are also argued for such that it is neutral about the ontological status of morality; but it is anti-Humean with its supervenience thesis, anti-Moorean with its reducibility thesis, and anti-naturalist with its syntheticity thesis. It is also argued that behind the project there lies a fundamental metaphysical conception of an entity as a bundle of properties conjoined with epistemic foundationalism, which is evidenced not only in moral evaluation but also in other kinds of cognitive activity. (shrink)

The critical target of my paper is the normativist stance of Kantian meta ethics. After a very short introduction, I develop a characterization of contemporary mainstream Kantism as a conjunction of a normativist claim, a rationalist claim and a proceduralist claim. In the subsequent section I make the case against the normativist claim by drawing a counterexample, and defend the relevance of such counterexample as a reason that defeats the appeal of the Kantian approach to meta ethics. I finally conclude (...) by highlighting the main reasons why the challenge my counterexample rises are not answerable within a Kantian framework. (shrink)