Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism

Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153 (2003)
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Abstract

In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of little help here. Finally, it seems to me that Slote's metaethical account will turn out to be much less externalist than he suspects

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Author Profiles

Michael S. Brady
University of Glasgow
Michael Brady
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Agent-based Theories of Right Action.Damian Cox - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):505-515.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morals from motives.Michael Slote - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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