This memorandum was prepared by Daniel Steiner, General Counsel to Harvard University on behalf of the President's Office and distributed to the faculty in October, 1980. It reviews recent Harvard policy with regard to patents and technology transfer. Spurred by recombinant DNA research, at Harvard and elsewhere, benefits and pitfalls of the University's participation as a minor shareholder in a company engaged in research and development are identified. The author notes that “The memorandum has benefited from numerous discussions (...) with members of the faculty and administration and in particular from the comments of President Bok and Dean Rosovsky.”. (shrink)

Individual and institutional conflict of interests in biomedical research have becomes matters of increasing concern in recent years. In the United States, the growth in relationships — sponsored research agreements, consultancies, memberships on boards, licensing agreements, and equity ownership — between for-profit corporations and research universities and their scientists has made the problem of conflicts, particularly financial conflicts, more acute. Conflicts can interfere with or compromise important principles and obligations of researchers and their institutions, e.g., adherence to accepted research norms, (...) duty of care to patients, and open exchange of information. Disclosure is a key component of a successful conflict policy. Commitments which conflict with a faculty member's primary obligations to teaching, research, administrative responsibilities, or patient care also need attention. Institutional conflict of interests present different problems, some of which are discussed in an analysis of an actual problem posed by two proposed clinical trials. (shrink)

A partir de las reflexiones que Durkheim lleva a cabo en La División del Trabajo Social, podemos entender que un intento por desarrollar un concepto de sociedad es una tarea abordable a partir de la indagación sobre sus formas de integración. Siguiendo sus planteamientos, referirse sociológicame..

Les défis permanents, mais très actuels, liés aux questions éducatives nécessitent d'enrichir les ressources à disposition des enseignants, des formateurs, des éducateurs... Cet ouvrage propose de re-découvrir des réflexions et des propositions d'auteurs soucieux de renforcer la relation entre l'apprenant et le savoir, entre apprenants, entre apprenants et adultes-référents favorisant l'émergence d'un homme rigoureux intellectuellement et pleinement équilibré. Ce travail s'appuie sur des contributions diversifiées permettant de disposer de nouvelles clés pour exercer au quotidien un métier sans cesse en questionnement. (...) On appréciera ce travail de synthèse mettant à la portée de chacun les enseignements de Jung, Krishnamurti, La Garanderie, Rogers, Steiner, mais également les apports du yoga, d'une éducation à la joie, à la recherche du sens... (shrink)

Dans son « Découverte d'un nouveau principe de mécanique » (1750) Euler a donné, pour la première fois, une preuve du théorème qu'on appelle aujourd'hui le Théorème d'Euler. Dans cet article je vais me concentrer sur la preuve originale d'Euler, et je vais montrer comment la pratique mathématique d Euler peut éclairer le débat philosophique sur la notion de preuves explicatives en mathématiques. En particulier, je montrerai comment l'un des modèles d'explication mathématique les plus connus, celui proposé par Mark (...) class='Hi'>Steiner dans son article « Mathematical explanation » (1978), n'est pas en mesure de rendre compte du caractère explicatif de la preuve donnée par Euler. Cela contredit l'intuition originale du mathématicien Euler, qui attribuait à sa preuve un caractère explicatif spécifique. (shrink)

Dans son « Découverte d'un nouveau principe de mécanique » (1750) Euler a donné, pour la première fois, une preuve du théorème qu'on appelle aujourd'hui le Théorème d'Euler. Dans cet article je vais me concentrer sur la preuve originale d'Euler, et je vais montrer comment la pratique mathématique d Euler peut éclairer le débat philosophique sur la notion de preuves explicatives en mathématiques. En particulier, je montrerai comment l'un des modèles d'explication mathématique les plus connus, celui proposé par Mark (...) class='Hi'>Steiner dans son article « Mathematical explanation » (1978), n'est pas en mesure de rendre compte du caractère explicatif de la preuve donnée par Euler. Cela contredit l'intuition originale du mathématicien Euler, qui attribuait à sa preuve un caractère explicatif spécifique. (shrink)

El artículo indaga la legitimidad libertaria de las fronteras estatales para excluir inmigrantes. Se sostiene que en estas teorías la legitimidad de las fronteras se construye mediante la legitimidad de la propiedad. El artículo analiza las teorías libertarias de Nozick y Steiner y argumenta contra la idea de que el derecho de propiedad libertario permite excluir en las fronteras y sostiene que las condiciones de legitimidad de la propiedad implican una potestad estatal reducida para controlar fronteras. Si bien en (...) un mundo ideal las comunidades dispondrían del poder total para controlarlas, en nuestro mundo imperfecto los estados carecen de esa potestad. (shrink)

Daniel Marcelle, Aron Gurwitsch, The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch, Volume I: Constitutive Phenomenology in Historical Perspective, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009; Volume II: Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010; Volume III: The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010; Claudia Șerban, Jean-Luc Marion, Certitudes negatives, Paris: Grasset, 2010; Christian Rössner, Hans-Dieter Gondek, László Tengelyi, Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011; Daniel Dwyer, Hans-Helmuth Gander, Husserl-Lexikon, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010; Délia Popa, Jean-François Lavigne, (...) Acceder au transcendantal? Reduction et idealisme transcendantal dans les Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure et une philosophie phénoménologique de Husserl, Paris: Vrin, 2009; Mădălina Diaconu, Lambert Wiesing, Das Mich der Wahrnehmung. Eine Autopsie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009; Mădălina Diaconu, Sam B. Girgus, Levinas and the Cinema of Redemption. Time, Ethics, and the Feminine, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010; Rolf Kühn, Frédéric Seyler, ≪ Barbarie ou culture ≫ : L’ethique de l’affectivitedans la phenomenologie de Michel Henry, Paris: Kimé, 2010; Stephan Steiner, Mette Lebech, On the Problem of Human Dignity. A Hermeneutical and henomenological Investigation, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009. (shrink)

This book addresses the perennial question: What is justice?

Rudolf Steiner developed a comprehensive view of social life which he viewed as being made up of three inter-dependent realms: spiritual-cultural, political and economic. Out of this grew his philosophy known as 'associative economics', which in contrast to our global financial systems, is collaborative and serves the real needs of consumers.This book, a companion to Gary Lamb's Associative Economics, is a comprehensive collection of Rudolf Steiner's statements on economics, compiled from all of his works currently available in English. (...) It will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in alternative approaches to our current financial crises. (shrink)

In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.

"Die Gedanken, die ich in diesem Buche mitteile, sollen die Grundstimmung festhalten, die ich in der Weltanschauung Goethes beobachtet habe. Im Lauf vieler Jahre habe ich immer wieder und wieder das Bild dieser Weltanschauung betrachtet. Besonderen Reiz hatte es fur mich, nach den Offenbarungen zu sehen, welche die Natur uber ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze den feinen Sinnes- und Geistesorganen Goethes gemacht hat. Ich lernte begreifen, warum Goethe diese Offenbarungen als so hohes Gluck empfand, dass er sie zuweilen hoher schatzte (...) als seine Dichtungsgabe. Die Eindrucke, welche Goethe von den Erscheinungen der Natur empfangen hat, muss man kennen, wenn man den vollen Gehalt seiner Dichtungen verstehen will. Die Geheimnisse, die er dem Wesen und Werden der Schopfung abgelauscht hat, leben in seinen kunstlerischen Erzeugnissen und werden nur demjenigen offenbar, der hinhorcht auf die Mitteilungen, die der Dichter uber die Natur macht. Niemand kann in die Tiefen der Goetheschen Kunst hinuntertauchen, dem Goethes Naturbeobachtungen unbekannt sind." [...] Rudolf Steiner war ein osterreichischer Esoteriker und Philosoph. Auf Grundlage seiner Lehre entstand unter anderem die Waldorfpadagogik. Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder zugangig gemacht. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein unveranderter Nachdruck der historischen Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1897.". (shrink)

How do we evaluate the power and utility of language when it has been made to articulate falsehoods in certain totalitarian regimes or has been charged with vulgarity and imprecision in a mass-consumer democracy? How will language react to the increasingly urgent claims of more exact speech such as mathematics and symbolic notation? These are some of the questions Steiner addresses in this elegantly written book, first published in 1967 to international acclaim.

This collection of essays explores the metaphysical thesis that the living world is not made up of substantial particles or things, as has often been assumed, but is rather constituted by processes. The biological domain is organised as an interdependent hierarchy of processes, which are stabilised and actively maintained at different timescales. Even entities that intuitively appear to be paradigms of things, such as organisms, are actually better understood as processes. Unlike previous attempts to articulate processual views of biology, which (...) have tended to use Alfred North Whitehead’s panpsychist metaphysics as a foundation, this book takes a naturalistic approach to metaphysics. It submits that the main motivations for replacing an ontology of substances with one of processes are to be found in the empirical findings of science. Biology provides compelling reasons for thinking that the living realm is fundamentally dynamic, and that the existence of things is always conditional on the existence of processes. The phenomenon of life cries out for theories that prioritise processes over things, and it suggests that the central explanandum of biology is not change but rather stability, or more precisely, stability attained through constant change. This edited volume brings together philosophers of science and metaphysicians interested in exploring the consequences of a processual philosophy of biology. The contributors draw on an extremely wide range of biological case studies, and employ a process perspective to cast new light on a number of traditional philosophical problems, such as identity, persistence, and individuality. (shrink)

Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a wideningresponsibility gap, which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral (...) agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions ofagencyor to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion ofartificial moral responsibility. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

This book strongly challenges the Western philosophical tradition's assertion that humans are superior to nonhuman animals. It provides a full and direct moral status of nonhuman animals. The book provides basis for a radical critique of the entire trajectory of animal studies over the past fifteen years. The key idea explored is of 'felt kinship' a sense of shared fate with and obligations to all sentient life. It will help to inspire some deep rethinking on the part of leading exponents (...) of animal studies. The book's strong outlook is expressed through an appeal for radical humility on the side of humans rather than a constant reference to the 'human-animal divide'. Historical figures examined in depth include Aristotle; Seneca, and Kant; contemporary figures examined include Christine Korsgaard and Martha Nussbaum. This book presents an account in which the tradition has proceeded based on impartial motivations at all, but instead has made a set of pointedly self-serving assumptions about the proper criteria for assessing moral worth. Readers of this book will gain exposure to a wide variety of thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition, historical as well as contemporary. This book is suitable for professionals working in nonhuman animal studies, students, advanced undergraduates, and practitioners working in the fields of philosophy, environmental studies, law, literature, anthropology, and related fields. (shrink)

After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more”—or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call “(Positive) (...) Responsiveness,” Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” assumes that “equal” lives are fungible, and Hsieh et al. have it that spreading goods broadly best approximates equality. In each case, the crucial premise is not equality itself but a further idea that Taurek, I argue, can safely reject. I conclude with a conjecture: there is no theory-neutral argument that settles the question of whether the numbers count. (shrink)

This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which ...

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

I defend the cosmopolitan instrumentalist theory of secession, according to which a group has a right to secede only if this would promote cosmopolitan justice. I argue that the theory is preferable to other theories of secession because it is an entailment of cosmopolitanism, which is independently attractive, and because, unlike other theories of secession, it allows us to give the answers we want to give in cases like secession of the rich or secession that would make things worse for (...) minorities. I defend the view against the objections that it allows for colonialism and annexation, that it is not a distinct theory, and that it is impractical. (shrink)

This chapter draws on insights from non-equilibrium thermodynamics to demonstrate the ontological inadequacy of the machine conception of the organism. The thermodynamic character of living systems underlies the importance of metabolism and calls for the adoption of a processual view, exemplified by the Heraclitean metaphor of the stream of life. This alternative conception is explored in its various historical formulations and the extent to which it captures the nature of living systems is examined. Following this, the chapter considers the metaphysical (...) implications of reconceptualizing the organism from complex machine to flowing stream. What do we learn when we reject the mechanical and embrace the processual? Three key lessons for biological ontology are identified. The first is that activity is a necessary condition for existence. The second is that persistence is grounded in the continuous self-maintenance of form. And the third is that order does not entail design. (shrink)

This is a book about the education America owes to its children, why its education system is in poor condition, and what might be done to give that system both energy and quality.

1. Teilband. Vorwort, Einleitung, Text Band I, Abkürzungen und Stellenkommentar -- 2. Teilband. Text Band II, Stellenkommentar, Literaturverzeichnis und Namenregister.

This chapter introduces readers to the view that praise is a form of address, or is communicative in the sense of seeking uptake from its target. The proposal that praise is communicative will seem counterintuitive if we take blame to be our paradigm of what it is for a responsibility-response to be communicative. This is because blame is communicative in a manner that intuitively presupposes some normative failure; it involves calling its target to account (or answer) for some wrongdoing. But, (...) the ‘rightdoer’ already properly regarded the relevant reasons in acting praiseworthily. So, there is nothing for which the praiseworthy agent must similarly account or answer for. How then could praise be communicative in sense of seeking uptake from its target? This chapter develops the view that praise is communicative in that it invites the praiseworthy agent to accept credit by co-valuing their action in the evaluative terms supplied by the praiser. This proposal is defended against three objections, namely that it is descriptively inadequate regarding our actual practices, that it is morally mistaken about when we owe others a response, and that it implies redundant communication. (shrink)

This paper argues that praise is governed by a norm of standing, namely the evaluative commitment condition. Even when the target of praise is praiseworthy and known to be so by the praiser, praise can be inappropriate owing to the praiser’s lacking the relevant evaluative commitment. I propose that uncommitted praisers lack the standing to praise in that, owing to their lack of commitment to the relevant value, they have not earned the right to host the co-valuing that is the (...) communicative aim of praise. (shrink)

In this volume of newly commissioned essays, leading moral philosophers offer a comprehensive overview of virtue ethics.

English summary: Rudolf Steiners book Theosophy (1904) is regarded as the definitive account of the anthroposophical understanding of man (Menschenkunde). It documents how deeply Steiner delved into the theosophical world view of Annie Besant and Charles Leadbeater around the turn of the century, seeking to harmonize them with the idealistic and developmental concepts of his own Philosophy of Freedom of 1894. The edition at hand reveals the rich textual development of this foundational work in Anthroposophy through several major reworkings (...) and critically contextualizes its concepts. Also included is a fragment of 1910 titled Anthroposophie which outlines Steiner's theory of the senses (Sinneslehre). German description: Die Theosophie (1904) stellt Rudolf Steiners klassische Darstellung der anthroposophischen Menschenkunde dar. Sie dokumentiert Steiners intensives Eintauchen in die theosophische Gedankenwelt Annie Besants und Charles Leadbeaters um die Jahrhundertwende und seinen Versuch einer Harmonisierung derselben mit seiner eigenen, stark vom deutschen Idealismus sowie von der Entwicklungslehre Ernst Haeckels gepragten Philosophie der Freiheit von 1894. Der vorliegende Band, der die wechselvolle Textgeschichte dieses Grundwerks der Anthroposophie dokumentiert und kritisch begleitet, wird erganzt durch die Fragment gebliebene Skizze einer anthroposophischen Sinneslehre (Anthroposophie) aus dem Jahre 1910. (shrink)

This article focuses on the main methods used in analytic metaphysics. It first considers five important sources of constraints on metaphysical theorizing: linguistic and conceptual analysis, consulting intuitions, employing the findings of science, respecting folk opinion, and applying theoretical virtues in metaphysical theory choice such as preferring simpler theories, or preferring more explanatory theories. It then examines the role of formal methods in metaphysics as well as the role of metaphysical communities, traditions, and the place of the history of metaphysics (...) in contemporary work. It also discusses the issue of whether metaphysics should be seen as an enterprise that will yield knowledge of metaphysical matters or whether it should have more modest epistemic goals. Finally, it explores the question of how much of metaphysics is a priori. (shrink)

This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.

English summary: Stephan Steiner presents a historical-biographical study of Leo Strauss, in which he brings the contexts and genesis of Strauss' political philosophy to light. In order to do this, it is crucial to look at the transformation of Strauss' philosophical position in the USA while also placing it in perspective against the background of the conditions during the Weimar Republic. Taking Strauss' position on the sociology of knowledge, on historicism and on dialectical theology into account, Steiner shows (...) how Strauss brought a specifically German criticism of modernism to America, which he developed during his first years in New York. In order to explore this in more detail, Strauss's understanding of revelation, his criticism of historicism and the philosophical-historical preconditions of his image of Antiquity have been reconstructed. Instead of presenting one-dimensional philosophical narratives and autobiographical self-staging, this makes accessible the history of experience in Strauss' thinking. German description: Stephan Steiner prasentiert eine historisch-biographische Studie zu Leo Strauss, in der er die Kontexte und Genese seiner Politischen Philosophie sichtbar macht. Neben der Verortung in den Konstellationen der Weimarer Republik ist dafur der Blick auf die Transformation von Strauss' philosophischer Position in den USA entscheidend. An dessen Verhaltnis zu Wissenssoziologie, Historismus und dialektischer Theologie zeigt Steiner, wie Strauss eine spezifisch deutsche Kritik der Moderne nach Amerika brachte, die er wahrend der ersten Jahre in New York ausarbeitete. Um dies im Detail zu verfolgen, werden Strauss' Offenbarungsverstandnis, seine Historismuskritik sowie die philosophiehistorischen Voraussetzungen seines Antikebildes rekonstruiert. Anstelle philosophischer Einheitserzahlungen und autobiographischer Selbstinszenierungen wird darin die Erfahrungsgeschichte von Strauss' Denken lesbar gemacht. (shrink)

Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s appeal to the notion of use pulls (...) in two directions. In several places, Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG 68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say, ‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general principle governing its use, rulism. (shrink)

Majority rule is often regarded as an important democratic principle. But modern democracies divide voters into districts. So if the majority should rule, which majority should rule? Should it be the popular majority, or an electoral majority (i.e., either the majority of voters in the majority of districts, or the majority of voters in districts that contain the majority of the population)? I argue that majority rule requires rule by the popular majority. This view is not novel and may seem (...) obvious. But it is rarely defended, and often rejected. I defend it by arguing that this view about which majority should rule is best supported by the arguments for why the majority should rule, and best avoids the arbitrary and perverse verdicts of rule by electoral majorities. I close by considering the significant practical implications of the view. The Electoral College is often criticized on the basis that the winner of the popular vote doesn’t always win the election. But all district-based democracies have this feature, so all district-based democracies must be reformed if they are to satisfy the principle of majority rule. (shrink)