At present, Third World countries owe over one trillion dollars to the developed Western nations; much of the debt is held by the leading international commercial banks. The debt of six Latin American countries alone — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela — is over $330 billion, of which $240 billion is owed to commercial banks. Let us immediately narrow our focus to loans made by the major international commercial banks to Third World governments. We shall not be concerned (...) with government-to-government loans, or private-party-to-private-party loans, or with debt owed to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. The bank-to-government loans — the so-called “sovereign loans” — are the most economically troublesome and morally interesting. The largest lenders, at least with respect to the Latin American countries, are the American banks Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Manufacturers Hanover, and Chemical Bank. About fifteen Third World countries have serious debt problems, including the largest: Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. (shrink)

The ‘global justice gap’ refers to the state of affairs in which the just entitlements of the global poor do not correlate with the justly enforceable duties of the global rich. The possibility of a global justice gap is controversial, because it is widely thought that claims of justice cannot exist unless they are matched up with corresponding duties. In this essay, I refute this sceptical view by showing that the global justice gap is indeed a theoretical possibility. My strategy (...) is to argue for a particular way of understanding the concept of distributive justice which I call the ‘dual-component model of justice’. On this view, distributive justice is a single value with two distinct components: (1) a fairness component, which specifies the situation that people would be in if they lived under conditions of what I call ‘basic distributive fairness’, and (2) a legitimacy component, specifying the rights that people have according to what I call the ‘principles of justified coercion’, which limit the ways in which they may permissibly be coerced. The global justice gap arises when the two components of justice are not in alignment. This happens when, although it is within the collective capacity of the members of the developed world to bring the global distribution much closer to the ideal of basic distributive fairness, there are considerations that make it unjust to coerce them into exercising this capacity. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;I deal with two themes: the idea that an account of thought should be given by giving an account of the ascription of thoughts by a radical interpreter--which I call interpretationism; and the idea that psychological concepts like action and perception are essentially causal. It has often been thought that these two themes conflict; or at least, that if they can co-exist, then they must be kept separate, and (...) associated with different perspectives on behaviour. But is that right? I discuss the character of interpretationism and the nature of causal theories, and examine the extent to which the two themes are compatible. ;Chapter I explains and argues for an interpretationist approach, distinguishing between different interpretationist views, and defending interpretationism against various common objections. ;Chapter II examines the links between interpretationism and the anomalousness of the mental. I discuss a number of different arguments and distinguish a range of theses about anomalousness and indeterminacy which they may support. ;Chapter III discusses the motivation for causal theories. I explain why it matters that we should give causal theories within an interpretationist perspective rather than treating the two themes as insights of different perspectives; and I examine the difficulties of doing so. ;Chapter IV considers the causal theory of vision. I argue against the view that the interpretationist's conception of experience undermines the causal theory. ;Chapter V considers the case of action. I develop a substantive causal theory of action which responds to the following argument: that if we accept the interpretationist's claim that the mental is anomalous, then we must concede that mental properties cannot be causally relevant. ;From the particular cases, and on general grounds, I conclude that it is possible to adopt an interpretationist perspective which simultaneously sees the mental in causal terms; and that such a perspective is essential for an adequate understanding of the mind. (shrink)

It is frequently argued that wrongdoers forfeit, through their wrongdoing, their previously held claim rights against being punished. But this is a mistake. Wrongdoers do not forfeit their claim rights against being punished when they violate rights. They forfeit their _immunity_ to having their claim rights against being punished removed. The reason for this, I argue, is that when they violate rights, wrongdoers culpably disregard the authority of right-holders to negotiate the conditions under which it is permissible to interact (...) with them. The effect of this, far from undermining the authority of right-holders, is to transfer authority to right-holders to unilaterally impose the ‘conditions of interaction’ on wrongdoers _after_ the violation. The conditions can be imposed for a diverse range of reasons and can take a variety of forms, including punishment. In this essay I explain and defend this new ‘unilateral authority theory’ of punishment. (shrink)

Statists claim that robust egalitarian distributive norms only apply between the citizens of a common state. Attempts to defend this claim on nationalist grounds often appeal to the 'associative duties' that citizens owe one another in virtue of their shared national identity. In this paper I argue that the appeal to co-national associative duties in order to defend the statist thesis is unsuccessful. I first develop a credible theory of associative duties. I then argue that although the associative theory can (...) explain why the members of a national community should abide by egalitarian norms, it cannot show that people have a duty to become or to continue as a member of a national community in the first place. The possibility that citizens might exercise their right to reject their national membership undermines the state's ability justifiably to coerce compliance with egalitarian distributive norms and, ultimately, the statist claim itself. (shrink)

Statists claim that robust egalitarian distributive norms only apply between the citizens of a common state. Attempts to defend this claim on nationalist grounds often appeal to the 'associative duties' that citizens owe one another in virtue of their shared national identity. In this paper I argue that the appeal to co-national associative duties in order to defend the statist thesis is unsuccessful. I first develop a credible theory of associative duties. I then argue that although the associative theory can (...) explain why the members of a national community should abide by egalitarian norms, it cannot show that people have a duty to become or to continue as a member of a national community in the first place. The possibility that citizens might exercise their right to reject their national membership undermines the state's ability justifiably to coerce compliance with egalitarian distributive norms and, ultimately, the statist claim itself. (shrink)

As the expansion of the Internet and the digital formatting of all kinds of creative works move us further into the information age, intellectual property issues have become paramount. Computer programs costing thousands of research dollars are now copied in an instant. People who would recoil at the thought of stealing cars, computers, or VCRs regularly steal software or copy their favorite music from a friend's CD. Since the Web has no national boundaries, these issues are international concerns. The contributors-philosophers, (...) legal theorists, and business scholars, among others-address questions such as: Can abstract ideas be owned? How does the violation of intellectual property rights compare to the violation of physical property rights? Can computer software and other digital information be protected? And how should legal systems accommodate the ownership of intellectual property in an information age? Intellectual Property is a lively examination of these and other issues, and an invaluable resource for librarians, lawyers, businesspeople, and scholars. (shrink)

Research involving recently deceased humans that are physiologically maintained following declaration of death by neurologic criteria—or ‘research involving the recently deceased’—can fill a translational research gap while reducing harm to animals and living human subjects. It also creates new challenges for honouring the donor’s legacy, respecting the rights of donor loved ones, resource allocation and public health. As this research model gains traction, new empirical ethics questions must be answered to preserve public trust in all forms of tissue donation and (...) in the practice of medicine while respecting the legacy of the deceased and the rights of donor loved ones. This article suggests several topics for immediate investigation to understand the attitudes and experiences of researchers, clinical collaborators, donor loved ones and the public to ensure research involving the recently deceased advances ethically. (shrink)

Arguing for a pro-democratic approach in authoritarian times, this book challenges the focus on age in identifying children in child rights. It argues that, even for the purposes of a benevolent rights regime, adopting a monist construction of child identity artificially separates the law from reality, potentially foreclosing children's democratic deliberative agency in self-identification. An essential feature of other human rights regimes is the scope for a claimant to argue one's identity, or foundationally 'I am a human being;' (...) but such a contention is foreclosed when identification as a child is decided uniquely by reference to age. Drawing on Critical Race Theory's narrative method and inspired by W.E.B. DuBois' identity construction, Professor Grahn-Farley advocates a new theoretical understanding of the child and of child rights, cognisant of social interaction and democratic participation. This book will appeal to researchers in child and human rights, and to sociologists, legal theorists and activists.__This title is part of the Flip it Open programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details. (shrink)

Over twenty years after the 1989 General Assembly voted to open the Convention on the Rights of the Child for signature, the United States remains only one of two UN members not to have ratified it. The other is Somalia. This book explores the reasons for this resistance. The book highlights the priority of ethical human rights over legal human rights. Part One includes contributions by educators and child psychologists who favor and use the Convention even when it (...) is not ratified. Part Two includes two chapters by opponents of the Convention by home-schooling advocates. Part Three examines child rights in the developing world. (shrink)

A reader confronting this collection of essays might wonder if something went awry in Jacksonville, Florida, in February 2014, when conference organizers gathered pediatric bioethicists and international child rights advocates to discuss the application of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child to the work of clinical bioethics in the United States. Surely a document proclaiming a worldwide consensus on child rights would strengthen the hand of ethicists advising clinicians and researchers who face difficult decisions. (...) Yet the conference discussion—and resulting manuscripts—depict a deep divide: bioethicists largely rejected the notion that the CRC is a useful.. (shrink)

Background: Hospitalized children have the right to “partake in practices related to their treatment and care.” Midwives and nurses have important roles and responsibilities regarding the protection and enforcement of these rights, such as providing information and advocating for children. Objectives: This study aims to determine the attitudes of midwives and nurses toward their roles and responsibilities in the implementation of child rights in healthcare services and the factors affecting their attitudes. Methods: This descriptive cross-sectional study included 122 (...) midwives and nurses in total. The data were collected through a questionnaire. Ethical considerations: Written permission was obtained from an ethics committee in the center of the city where the research was conducted. Results: The mean age of the participants was 36.70 ± 8.03 years; 58.9% of midwives and nurses stated that they understood the child’s consent about the treatment by looking at the child’s facial expression; 36% of midwives and nurses stated that children could not participate in decisions regarding their own health. It was observed that obtaining the child’s consent in matters related to treatment does not make any difference between midwives and nurses. The rate of the midwives stating that they would report suspicious violence-neglect and abuse was found to be higher. Conclusion: The variables of the unit of employment, the state of having children, choosing the profession and practicing in it willingly, and getting training on children’s rights make a difference in terms of children’s rights in healthcare services. Midwives and nurses should be reminded of child rights in healthcare services through regular in-service training programs. (shrink)

The case of Baby G raises some of the most difficult decisions confronting parents and health-care professionals. Given the context-specific nature of most medical decisions affecting children, the principles and standards of child rights and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child will not clearly articulate the best interests of the child in every situation. A child rights–based approach will, however, provide the factors that must be considered, methods for their analysis, and the procedural (...) safeguards that must surround decision-making related to complex medical situations facing children, families, and providers. This approach can facilitate both.. (shrink)

Despite the progress made in pediatrics over the past decades, nearly every metric of children’s health and well-being in the United States has deteriorated relative to other high-income Western democracies. This is in part due to American pediatricians’ slow response to the impact of social and environmental determinants on children’s health. It is well established that social and environmental determinants of health—the social, economic, political, environmental, and cultural conditions that influence the health and well-being of individuals and communities—are the primary (...) drivers of contemporary child and adult health and health disparities (ACE Study 2015; CDC 2015; Marmot.. (shrink)

International child rights law has the potential to change the way children are viewed and engaged by all social actors. It provides a child-centered perspective on all areas of children’s lives, including research with neonates. It differs from some bioethical perspectives by clearly articulating affirmative obligations owed to children and requiring rigorous monitoring mechanisms. The CRC’s focus on affirmative obligations and establishment of monitoring mechanisms provide additional useful elements that are not present in the dominant form of American (...) pediatric bioethics.An in-depth introduction to child rights and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is presented by Lansdown.. (shrink)

The "best interest of the child" standard is central to both pediatric bioethics and the child rights community. In pediatric bioethics in the United States, the best interest of the child standard is cited as the guidance principle for parental decision-making.1 Likewise, in the child rights community, the best interest of the child standard is "of paramount consideration" ). Both approaches also recognize parental rights and responsibilities and support a role for the maturing child (...) in the decision-making process. Why, then, do members of the pediatric bioethics community and the child rights communities not speak the same language?This article was developed out of... (shrink)

With more than a year to reflect on the accomplishments of the Symposium on “The Interface of Child Rights and Pediatric Bioethics in the Clinical Setting,” what remains is to synthesize what we have learned as a framework for further inquiry into the intersection of pediatric bioethics and children’s rights. Considered individually, the articles in this issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine present a kaleidoscope of seemingly disparate perspectives. However, viewed as a collective work, this issue provides a (...) balance of tonality and nuance and point and counterpoint with respect to the integration of ethics and rights—and we hope, as Jeffrey Brosco suggests, that “intelligent disagreement can produce.. (shrink)

The manuscripts in this issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine reflect the work of an international group of pediatric bioethicists and child rights advocates who convened in March 2014 to pursue several questions related to the intersection of pediatric bioethics and child rights. The prequel for the Symposium involved several years of dialogue between the editors of this volume—dialogue through which it became clear that there was much to be learned about our respective disciplines and how they (...) might inform our heretofore mutually exclusive work.The principles of pediatric bioethics have been used for decades to analyze and help resolve challenging clinical situations in pediatrics, but there has been.. (shrink)

Child Labour in Kashmiri Society: A Socio-human Rights Study The Constitution of India guarantees fundamental rights and the full freedom to enjoy childhood. In spite of that millions of children are being put to arduous work for short and narrow gains. By 1989, the standards concerning children were brought together in a single legal instrument agreed to by the international community. It unambiguously spelt out the rights to which every child is entitled, regardless of place of birth, descent, (...) sex, religion, or social origin. A number of aspects, such as gender, family background, cultural acceptance, issues of health and recreation, the legal aspect and so on, have been covered. The life worlds of working children, legal protection to children from exploitation and the human rights perspective of child labour is the main focus of this article. (shrink)

The principle of the child's right to an open future was first proposed by the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg and developed further by bioethicist Dena Davis. The principle holds that children possess a unique class of rights called rights in trust—rights that they cannot yet exercise, but which they will be able to exercise when they reach maturity. Parents should not, therefore, take actions that permanently foreclose on or pre-empt the future options of their children, but leave them (...) the greatest possible scope for exercising personal life choices in adulthood. Davis particularly applies the principle to genetic counselling, arguing that parents should not take deliberate steps to create physically abnormal children, and to religion, arguing that while parents are entitled to bring their children up in accordance with their own values, they are not entitled to inflict physical or mental harm, neither by omission nor commission. In this paper, I aim to elucidate the open future principle, and consider whether it is applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision of boys, whether performed for cultural/religious or for prophylactic/health reasons. I argue that the principle is highly applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision, and conclude that non-therapeutic circumcision would be a violation of the child's right to an open future, and thus objectionable from both an ethical and a human rights perspective. (shrink)

A compelling argument for the morality of limitations on procreation in lessening the harmful environmental effects of unchecked populationWe live in a world where a burgeoning global population has started to have a major and destructive environmental impact. The results, including climate change and the struggle for limited resources, appear to be inevitable aspects of a difficult future. Mandatory population control might be a possible last resort to combat this problem, but is also a potentially immoral and undesirable violation of (...) human rights. Since so many view procreation as an essential component of the right to personal happiness and autonomy, the dominant view remains that the government does not have the right to impose these restrictions on its own citizens, for the sake of future people who have yet to exist.Sarah Conly is first to make the contentious argument that not only is it wrong to have more than one child in the face of such concerns, we do not even retain the right to do so. In One Child, Conly argues that autonomy and personal rights are not unlimited, especially if one's body may cause harm to anyone, and that the government has a moral obligation to protect both current and future citizens. Conly gives readers a thought-provoking and accessible exposure to the problem of population growth and develops a credible view of what our moral obligations really are, to generations present and future. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to provide a better foundation for the legal rights of children than what now exists. The first part of the book describes the current legal status of children and critically discusses the traditional arguments for denying certain legal rights to children while granting them others. The second part describes and defends a general theory of children's rights, based on the principles of utility and egalitarian justice. The third part shows how the theory justifies significant (...) change in the current legal system. (shrink)

This article provides a philosophical analysis of a putative right of the child to have their expressed views considered in matters that affect them. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 is an influential and interesting statement of that right. The article shows that the child’s ‘right to a voice’ is complex. Its complexity lies in the problem of contrasting an adult’s normative power of choice with a (...) child’s weighted views, in the various senses in which we might consider the child’s views, and in the questions of how to weight those views and how their weighting makes a practical difference in coming to a decision. In so doing we criticise other accounts that simply regard a child’s views as having consultative value. We also make better sense of how we might weight a child’s views. The philosophical issues addressed in the article carry implications for how we might understand Article 12 that are not satisfactorily identified and addressed in the voluminous literature on Article 12 within childhood studies. These issues also have implications for how we might understand the distinction between adults and children in respect of powers of personal choice. We conclude by emphasising the importance and value of the right that Article 12 seeks to formally identify. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that children enjoy some form of a right to bodily integrity. However, there is little agreement about the precise nature and scope of this right. This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the child's right to bodily integrity, in order to further elucidate the relationship between the child's right to bodily integrity and considerations of autonomy. Following a discussion of Leif Wenar's work on the structure and justification of rights, I (...) first explain how the adult's right to bodily integrity can be distilled into separate elements that may plausibly be justified by different moral considerations. In particular, I claim that this analysis suggests that whilst the adult's right to bodily integrity is not wholly reducible to bodily autonomy, autonomy nonetheless remains entwined with our understanding of this right in a number of ways. On the basis of this discussion, I go on to outline three important complexities that arise when we consider the child's right to bodily integrity, before particularly focusing on the question of how third parties should determine whether or not to perform a physical interference upon a child who lacks decision-making capacity. Here, I raise some objections to Earp and Mazor's recent attempts to answer this question, before briefly defending an ‘autonomy-based interests’ account of permissible interference, an account that shares in what I take to be the spirit, if not the precise letter, of these earlier views. (shrink)

This article provides a philosophical analysis of a putative right of the child to have their expressed views considered in matters that affect them. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 is an influential and interesting statement of that right. The article shows that the child’s ‘right to a voice’ is complex. Its complexity lies in the problem of contrasting an adult’s normative power of choice with a (...) child’s weighted views, in the various senses in which we might consider the child’s views, and in the questions of how to weight those views and how their weighting makes a practical difference in coming to a decision. In so doing we criticise other accounts that simply regard a child’s views as having consultative value. We also make better sense of how we might weight a child’s views. The philosophical issues addressed in the article carry implications for how we might understand Article 12 that are not satisfactorily identified and addressed in the voluminous literature on Article 12 within childhood studies. These issues also have implications for how we might understand the distinction between adults and children in respect of powers of personal choice. We conclude by emphasising the importance and value of the right that Article 12 seeks to formally identify. (shrink)

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned (...) by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned (...) by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve. (shrink)

Although deeply committed to the model of nondirective counseling, most genetic counselors enter the profession with certain assumptions about health and disability—for example, that it is preferable to be a hearing person than a deaf person. Thus, most genetic counselors are deeply troubled when parents with certain disabilities ask for assistance in having a child who shares their disability. This ethical challenge benefits little from viewing it as a conflict between beneficence and autonomy. The challenge is better recast as (...) a conflict between parental autonomy and the child's future autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the ethical implications of genetic enhancement within the specific framework of the “child’s right to an open future” argument (CROF). Whilst there is a broad ethical consensus that genetic modifications for eradicating diseases or disabilities are in line with – or do not violate – CROF, there is huge disagreement about how to ethically understand genetic enhancement. Here, I analyze this disagreement and I provide a revised formulation of the argument in the specific (...) field of genetic enhancement. First, I argue that CROF is not in contrast with every kind of enhancement. I subsequently discuss whether CROF requires some moral obligations to enhance progeny. My argument is that parents do not have the moral obligation to open as many options as possible for their children. Rather, they should provide them with a reasonable range of opportunities. Finally, I contend that the moral obligations required by CROF are directly dependent on what Allen Buchanan calls the ‘dominant cooperative framework’ in a given society. I conclude by claiming that, at present, parents are not morally obliged to genetically enhance their children since a non-enhanced person already might have access to a reasonable range of opportunities. However, the moral obligation to enhance progeny might arise if a structural modification of the dominant cooperative framework occurs. (shrink)

This work reviews the progress of children's rights 25 years since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It studies the progress of that human rights instrument as part of an ongoing process. It examines how recent past, present and future generations will benefit or suffer as part of the process in which outcomes cannot be predicted. It does not project into the future. Its emphasis is on a review of the period after 1989 (...) and it comments on what has happened and offering guidance on how children's rights might progress. The book presents a realistic but not always critical review of two and a half decades of intensive activity in the field of children's rights worldwide. It includes both failures and examples of good practice and positive experiences. It offers a review of progress and lack of progress in child rights and welfare in the twelve countries used as case studies in its predecessor, The Next Generation. Finally, the volume considers the impact of current geopolitical and economic realities on children's rights in the early years of the twenty-first century. The book is a tribute to Judith Ennew and pays homage to all of the people who have contributed so much to children's rights over the years and wishes to encourage others to take up the cause. (shrink)

Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child-abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights-talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I briefly respond (...) to the charge that my suggestions were illiberal. (shrink)

This book begins with an overview of the current legal status of children under U.S. federal and state law, It includes an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and an extended critique of the philosophical arguments for treating children differently from adults under the law. Sections in the book include discussions of the need for a theory of juvenile rights, the moral arguments that prop up such theories, Professor Houlgate's proposal for a theory, and a final discussion of the applications (...) of his theory to the debates about status offenses, child neglect, and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. (shrink)

There are too many people on the planet. This isn’t a popular thing to say, but it’s becoming more and more obvious that it’s true, and that we need to do something to address it. Even in our radically unjust world, where billions of people do not have adequate access to food, water, energy, and other resources, we’re still living unsustainably—overcharging our ecological credit card and torching the climate. But discussing the link between these environmental problems and the population is (...) uncomfortable, because many people believe that procreation is an essentially private act that is morally and politically off-limits. In her new book, One Child, Sarah Conly argues that this belief is false: If... (shrink)

My primary aim is to call into question an influential notion of paternal responsibility, namely, that fathers owe support to their children due to their causal responsibility for their existence. I argue that men who impregnate women unintentionally, and despite having taken preventative measures, do not owe child support to their children as a matter of justice; their children have no right against them to support. I argue for this on the basis of plausible principles of responsibility which (...) have been used to defend abortion rights. I then consider the morally relevant differences between men and women, arguing that while in some cases these differences may justify differential treatment, their import should not be overstated - in many cases, the burden of child support will be too great to impose justly on fathers. This conclusion is not as undesirable as it may seem: I suggest feminist considerations in favor of revising the notion of paternal responsibility and considering alternative arrangements of child support. (shrink)

This article explores how abortion bans in states with large Black populations will exacerbate existing racial inequities in those states’ child welfare systems.

Child Law starts with the question "Who is the Child?" In direct contrast to the CRC, which calls for putting the interests of the child first in all policies dealing with children, it appears that the interests of others are the major consideration de facto. In law, children's right to protection is severely limited by the presence of a maximum age limit, with no consideration of the starting point: current and ongoing scientific research has demonstrated the (...) effects of this non-consideration in a number of abnormalities and diseases, not only in children, but in adults and the elderly. The WHO has published a number of studies to that effect, and the 2012 Report on Endocrine Disruptors more than confirms this claim. This and other scientific insights that have largely been ignored show the flaws and inadequacies of the legal regimes intended to protect children, in a number of areas, from the basic public health to the right to normal development; child labor law conventions; in conflict situations; as a result of climate and other events; children as illegal migrants; and as inmates in prison camps. (shrink)

People in liberal societies tend to feel a little uncomfortable talking about male genital cutting, but generally do not think it is morally abhorrent. But female genital cutting is widely consider...

In Child Abuse, Family Rights, and the Child Protective System: A Critical Analysis from Law, Ethics, and Catholic Social Teaching, Stephen M. Krason gathers essays by leading scholars and practitioners to comment through the prism of Catholic social thought, on the plight afflicting American families and the role of the child protective system. Here readers will find critical essays on the deleterious effect of the 1974 passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act; assessments of (...) current American policies on child abuse and neglect and the role of the CPS within the context of prevailing international human rights principles and Catholic social teaching; a survey of the enforcement of CPS policies from a legal and constitutional perspective; research data disputing the CPS principle that all parents are potential abusers and illustrating the greater prevalence of abuse and neglect in broken, “blended,” and “untraditional” families; and arguments for poverty and unemployment as the prime culprits in the mistreatment of children. Also included are the amicus curiae briefs that the Society of Catholic Social Scientists submitted in two U.S. Supreme Court cases on parental rights, the CPS, and state control over the family. (shrink)