This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view (...) apart from a “realist” theory of ethics. The reality of which he speaks is the reality of human life. (shrink)

Slightly revised version of the author's habilitation--Universitèat Gèottingen, 2014.

In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” (...) that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way. (shrink)

In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” (...) that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way. (shrink)

Es ist schwierig, Kant in der Frage der Willensfreiheit eine der heute üblichen philosophischen Sichtweisen zuzuordnen. Mithilfe des »transzendentalen Idealismus« meint Kant im Ergebnis die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Naturnotwendigkeit begründen zu können. Zugleich hält er an einem Verständnis von Freiheit fest, demzufolge Freiheit »absolute Spontaneität« verlangt und deshalb nicht im Naturnotwendigen aufgehen kann. Seine Antwort verweist mit der Unterscheidung von »Ding an sich« und »Erscheinung« auf zwei verschiedene »Welten« oder »Standpunkte«, von denen aus unser Handeln beschrieben werden kann – (...) einerseits als absolut frei, andererseits als naturnotwendig. Wie wichtig Kant gerade dieses Ergebnis seiner Kritik war, wurde von ihm wiederholt unterstrichen und in der Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft sogar zum eigentlichen Ziel des kritischen Projekts erhoben. Doch obwohl die kantische Philosophie sich einer verbreiteten Anerkennung erfreut, sind heutzutage die wenigsten bereit, Freiheit in einer Welt der »Dinge an sich« zu verorten. Die Gründe dafür liegen zum Teil in einer Neigung zum philosophischen Naturalismus, zum Teil in einem veränderten Verständnis von Freiheit, vor allem aber in einer grundsätzlichen Skepsis im Hinblick auf ehrgeizige metaphysische Theorien. Der vorliegende Band diskutiert Kants Freiheitstheorie in exegetischer und systematischer Hinsicht. Die Autoren stellen unter anderem folgende Fragen: Was genau hat Kant mit der Unterscheidung von »Ding an sich« und »Erscheinung« im Sinn? Wie soll sie die Möglichkeit transzendentaler Freiheit sichern? Gelingt das, wenn man die Unterscheidung akzeptiert? Ist der transzendentale Idealismus überhaupt eine kohärente Theorie? Was bleibt von Kants Freiheitstheorie und seiner Metaphysik des transzendentalen Idealismus? Inhaltsübersicht: Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, Bernd Ludwig: Einleitung - Dietmar H. Heidemann: Über Kants These: »Denn, sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten« - Tobias Rosefeldt: Kants Kompatibilismus –Jochen Bojanowski: Ist Kant ein Kompatibilist? - Andree Hahmann: Ist Freiheit die »Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit«? Das Ding an sich als Grund der Erscheinung bei Kant – Geert Keil: Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie – Mario Brandhorst: Woran scheitert Kants Freiheitstheorie? – Kenneth Westphal: Kants positive Verteidigung der Urteils- und Handlungsfreiheit, und zwar ohne transzendentalen Idealismus - Heiner Klemme: Spontaneität und Selbsterkenntnis. Kant über die ursprüngliche Einheit von Natur und Freiheit im Aktus des Denkens – Bernd Ludwig: Was weiß ich vom Ich? Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786 – Reinhard Brandt: »Sei ein rechtlicher Mensch « – wie das? - Dieter Schönecker: Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS III 457,25-458,5 – Susanne Brauer: Alternative zu Kant? Freiheit nach Hegel in den Grundlinien zur Philosophie des Rechts. (shrink)

Das Buch entwickelt und verteidigt eine Form des ethischen Naturalismus. Es kreist um zwei Fragen, die durch einen Leitgedanken eng verbunden sind. Dieser Leitgedanke lautet, dass das Leben, das wir führen, mit allen seinen ethischen Aspekten als Teil der Natur anzusehen ist. Die erste Frage lautet, wie dieser Leitgedanke näher zu verstehen ist. Die zweite Frage lautet, was aus diesem Leitgedanken, so verstanden, folgt. Wie könnte das ethische Leben im Verlauf der Evolution des Menschen entstanden sein? Welche Folgen hätte das (...) für uns? Die Untersuchung setzt bei Darwins Grundeinsichten an, die sie durch die weitere Entwicklung der Theorie der Evolution durch natürliche Selektion und moderne Hypothesen zur Erklärung der Entstehung des ethischen Lebens bis zum aktuellen Stand der Diskussion verfolgt. Wie sich zeigt, ist eine naturalistische Deutung nicht nur mit ethischem Denken und Handeln vereinbar, sondern trägt auch dazu bei, dessen Strukturen zu erklären. Relativiert werden dagegen die Ansprüche vieler Moraltheorien, die von überzogenen Erwartungen im Hinblick auf die Objektivität oder die Formalisierbarkeit des Ethischen geleitet sind. Den Abschluss bildet eine Fallstudie zur Menschenwürde, die nach der Deutung dieses Buchs zwar naturalistisch umgedeutet werden muss, aber als eine zentrale ethische Idee erhalten bleiben kann. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungHumes Enquiry concerning Human Understanding entfaltet eine Konzeption von Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit, der zufolge beides mit der These der »Notwendigkeit« vereinbar ist. Hume wirft dabei die Frage auf, ob ein Mensch oder Gott für moralisch böses Handeln dieses Menschen verantwortlich ist, wenn Gott existiert und als Schöpfer der Welt auch das Handeln von Menschen bestimmt. Der Aufsatz untersucht, welche Antwort Hume auf diese Frage gibt und welche Folgen sich aus seiner Antwort für eine angemessene Konzeption von menschlicher Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit (...) ergeben. Wie deutlich wird, legt Hume sich darauf fest, dass in dem Fall, den er beschreibt, sowohl der Mensch als auch Gott frei und verantwortlich Handelnde sind. Wenn das zutrifft, müssen die Kriterien für Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit grundsätzlich anders aufzufassen sein, als es der Forderung nach einem »ersten« oder »absoluten« Anfang oder einer »letzten« oder »wahren« Verantwortlichkeit entspricht. Humes Diskussion verdeutlicht, dass wir diese Forderung in Frage stellen sollten. (shrink)

This article discusses two general strategies that have been pursued to explain how moral thought and moral institutions might have emerged. The first is found in the tradition of those whom Nietzsche calls "English psychologists"; the second is Nietzsche's own. I begin by giving an account of the resources of "English" genealogy as represented by Paul Rée and especially Charles Darwin. On the basis of that discussion, I consider Nietzsche's objections to English genealogy in detail. I argue that as they (...) stand, these objections are inconclusive; while they are, at least to a certain extent, effective against Rée, they fail as objections to the fundamental insights of Darwin. Moreover, I argue that on reflection, the rival genealogy that Nietzsche puts forward is not nearly as well supported and cannot plausibly bear the weight of explanation alone. Finally, I ask what this entails for our conception of ethical emotion. (shrink)

Few will dispute that the sciences were of special importance to Nietzsche. The natural and human sciences had a significant influence on his thought from the very beginning, and his writings probe and engage with them, exploring their interrelations as well as their place in an adequate broader view of our existence. By contrast, it is less clear whether Nietzsche had, or thought that we could have, something that amounts to a philosophy of science. To the extent that he did, (...) we must ask what its content and value may be. This involves asking whether his thought can help to explain what natural science is, what it can and cannot do, and how it relates to other areas of enquiry. Similarly, we must ask how it can .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article discusses two general strategies that have been pursued to explain how moral thought and moral institutions might have emerged. The first is found in the tradition of those whom Nietzsche calls “English psychologists”; the second is Nietzsche’s own. I begin by giving an account of the resources of “English” genealogy as represented by Paul Rée and especially Charles Darwin. On the basis of that discussion, I consider Nietzsche’s objections to English genealogy in detail. I argue that as (...) they stand, these objections are inconclusive; while they are, at least to a certain extent, effective against Rée, they fail as objections to the fundamental insights of Darwin. Moreover, I argue that on reflection, the rival genealogy that Nietzsche puts forward is not nearly as well supported and cannot plausibly bear the weight of explanation alone. Finally, I ask what this entails for our conception of ethical emotion. (shrink)

In “Correspondence to Reality in Ethics”, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein's target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue that Brandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, that Brandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity (...) is distorted by a Platonist picture and that he misinterprets the passage which he takes to support a Wittgensteinian case against objectivity. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is often a starting point for students of philosophy. It forms the basis for much of Continental thought, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. Descartes’ text invites readers on a philosophical journey and this brief overview by Kurt Brandhorst is designed to prepare and accompany them. Brandhorst guides first-time readers through Descartes' language and offers pathways to a clear understanding of his method, ideas, and conclusions, while at the same time stimulating serious meditation on (...) this deeply influential philosophical text. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and (...) political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are meaningful but (...) that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)

We present strategies how to reconstruct (estimate) properties of a quantum channel described by the map E based on incomplete measurements. In a particular case of a qubit channel a complete reconstruction of the map E can be performed via complete tomography of four output states E[ρj] that originate from a set of four linearly independent “test” states ρj (j = 1,2,3,4) at the input of the channel. We study the situation when less than four linearly independent states are transmitted (...) via the channel and measured at the output. We present strategies how to reconstruct the channel when just one, two or three states are transmitted via the channel. In particular, we show that if just one state is transmitted via the channel then the best reconstruction can be achieved when this state is a total mixture described by the density operator ρ = I/2. To improve the reconstruction procedure one has to send via the channel more states. The best strategy is to complement the total mixture with pure states that are mutually orthogonal in the sense of the Bloch-sphere representation. We show that unitary transformations (channels) can be uniquely reconstructed (determined) based on the information of how three properly chosen input states are transformed under the action of the channel. (shrink)

This essay addresses the relationships between prescription and description in legal rules. The analysis will focus on the culture-laden connotations of factual categories implied in all legal sentences and/or provisions. This investigation is spurred by the need to assess the impact of cultural difference in people’s understanding of legal imperatives and, symmetrically, how that impact is to be considered in the application of law. Differences in ways of categorizing the world could position the cultural pre-understanding required by law, and the (...) pluralism recognized and protected by constitutional principles and human/fundamental rights discourse, at a crossroads. Hence, even when we find an illegitimacy or an ignorance about what legal rules do not explicitly state but instead implicitly presuppose, this does not exclude that behind that ignorance there may be something worthy of legal protection. A question emerges: is it legitimate and reasonable to consider the ignorantia facti resulting from differing ways of categorizing the factual world as automatically and uncritically subject to the principle ignoratia legis non excusat? The essay continues with an assessment of the possible consequences of ignorantia facti in the administration of justice in multicultural societies and migration contexts. For this purpose, the opportunity for an intercultural use of law—including within national law—will be considered as a means of avoiding the discriminatory application of ignorantia facti. This topic will be addressed by leveraging both semiotic and cultural-anthropological analytical tools, including the well-known greimasien “contrat de véridiction”. (shrink)

Background The perception of organ donation and brain death among Syrian population has not been previously explored. The goal of this study is to evaluate the attitude and knowledge of organ donation among Syrians and the willingness of this population to donate their organs. Methods We conducted a survey-based cross-sectional study in four hospitals in Aleppo, Syria in November 2019. Patient demographic, awareness of brain death; and attitude toward organ donation were collected and analyzed. Results A total of 350 individuals (...) were invited to participate in the survey among whom 303 agreed to participate in the study. The majority of our participants heard about organ donation with television, social media, and the internet being the most common sources of information. When assessing knowledge about brain death, only 40% answered 3 or more questions correctly. Fifty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the idea of organ donation and 183 would like to donate their organs one day. The leading motivation to organ donation was the desire to help, while the most common reason to refuse donation was the refusal to disfigure a dead body by removing an organ. Religious reasons were cited as motivation for organ donation by 43% of participants, and a reason for refusing to donate organs by 24%. Most respondents were unaware of the laws and legislations related to organ donation in Syria. When asked if religion and law were encouraging organ donation, 76% of respondents would donate their organs. Although more positive attitude was found in those with better brain death knowledge, this did not translate into more willingness to donate organs in this group of participants. Conclusions The promotion of organ donations from deceased donors is a necessity given the rising shortage of organs. The information provided by this study could help policy makers build future strategies to promote deceased organ donation programs and overcome current obstacles preventing such initiatives from achieving their goals. (shrink)

Biomedical research, on the one hand, contributes to important goals from generation of knowledge about the human body to the development and testing of therapeutics of all kinds. On the other hand, it can produce serious and sometimes unforeseeable consequences. In the ethical analysis of these two aspects of biomedical research, two important argumentative strategies play a major role. First, slippery slope arguments are used to warn of potential risks and to highlight knowledge-based limitations. Second, a dual-use problem describes the (...) challenge that already established techniques can be used for both morally wrong and morally right purposes. These two argumentative strategies appear to share several similarities, which will be investigated in this article. For this purpose, the article will first provide clear working definitions for both types of argument. This lays the foundation for the further ethical analysis. In a second step, and in order to investigate the similarities and differences of the argumentative strategies with an example from current ethical debates, CRISPR-Cas9, a currently very promising tool of genome editing, will be examined. The extent to which the possible applications of this genome editing tool can be addressed by slippery slope arguments or the dual use problem will be investigated. For this purpose, selected studies involving the use of CRISPR-Cas9 will be examined. Based on this two-step, analytic and example-based comparison of slippery-slope argumentation and dual-use considerations, the article will detail the ethically relevant difference between the two argumentative strategies and at the same time contribute to the ongoing ethical debate about CRISPR-Cas9. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest (...) on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency. (shrink)

Shame is one of our most central feelings and a universal human characteristic. Why do we experience it? For what purpose? How can we cope with excessive feelings of shame? In an elegant exposition informed by many years of helping people to understand feelings of shame, leading Jungian analyst Mario Jacoby provides a timely and comprehensive exploration of the many aspects of shame and shows how it occupies a central place in our emotional experience. Jacoby shows a lack of (...) self-esteem is often at the root of excessive shame. As well as providing practical examples of how therapy can help, Jacoby draws upon a wealth of historical and cultural scholarship to show how important shame is for us in both its individual and social aspects. (shrink)

Let M be an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field. Let G be a definably compact definably connected abelian n-dimensional group definable in M. We show the following: the o-minimal fundamental group of G is isomorphic to ℤn; for each k>0, the k-torsion subgroup of G is isomorphic to n, and the o-minimal cohomology algebra over ℚ of G is isomorphic to the exterior algebra over ℚ with n generators of degree one.

The contrast between the past-future symmetry of mechanical theories and the time-arrow observed in the behaviour of real complex systems doesn’t have nowadays a fully satisfactory explanation. If one confides in the Laplace-dream that everything be exactly and completely describable by the known mechanical differential equations, the whole experimental evidence of the irreversibility of real complex processes can only be interpreted as an illusion due to the limits of human brain and shortness of human history. In this work it is (...) surmised that in the description of real events it would be more reasonable to renounce exactness and completeness of mechanical differential equations, assuming that also further effects exist in nature, governed by different kinds of rules, in spite of being so weak to be directly unobservable in single motions. This surmise can explain not only the time-arrow, but also why, in particular cases, it can happen that approximate and/or statistical models represent an improvement of mechanical theories instead of an approximation: this happened for Boltzmann gas-model and also for the famous work of Max Planck on blackbody-radiation. And it also appears as a more promising “working hypothesis”, stimulating and guiding us to learn more about limits and origin of the basic equations, and also about the nature of chance and the meaning of probability, which is nowadays not clear in spite of the fundamental role it plays in physics. Particularly that kind of probability which gives the connection between quantum–mechanical differential equations and observable events. (shrink)

Building on an illustrative case of a systemic environmental threat and its multi‐stakeholder response, this paper draws attention to the changing political impacts of corporations in the digital age. Political Corporate Social Responsibility (PCSR) theory suggests an expanded sense of politics and corporations, including impacts that may range from voluntary initiatives to overcome governance gaps, to avoiding state regulation via corporate political activity. Considering digitalization as a stimulus, we explore potential responsibilities of corporations toward public goods in contexts with functioning (...) governments. We show that digitalization—in the form of transparency, surveillance, and data‐sharing—offers corporations’ scope for deliberative public participation. The starry sky beetle infestation endangering public and private goods is thereby used to illustrate the possibility of expanding the political role of corporations in the digital sphere. We offer a contribution by conceptualizing data‐deliberation as a Habermasian variation of PCSR, defined as the (a) voluntary disclosure of corporate data and its transparent, open sharing with the public sector (b) along with the cooperation with governmental institutions on data analytics methods for examining large‐scale datasets (c) thereby complying with existing national and international regulations on data protection, in particular with respect to privacy and personal data. (shrink)