(2006). Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational Federation. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 419-444.

In this essay, then, I would like to address what I believe are the most compelling epistemic arguments against the notion that literature (and art more broadly) can function as an instrument of education and a source of knowledge.

This article explores several views on the relation of humour, especially tendentious humour, to morality, including comic amoralism, comic ethicism, comic immoralism, and moderate comic moralism. The essay concludes by defending moderate comic moralism.

“Forget Taste” rejects the classical notion of taste as a viable concept for the exercise of critical evaluation and proposes an alternative approach to critical evaluation based crucially on the idea of the constitutive purpose of the artwork. The goal of this paper is to advance an approach—which I call the purpose-driven approach—to the critical evaluation of artworks that develops from and refines the views of art evaluation presented in my previous work. This approach, in virtue of its focus on (...) the constitutive purposes of artworks, regards the artwork as typically singular. For that reason, it follows that this approach is pluralistic in contrast to the hedonic conception of the taste model popularized in the eighteenth century and which still recurs today, if sometimes only subconsciously, and that reduces critical evaluation to feelings of pleasure. I argue that the hedonic taste model, which is noncognitive and reductive, should be abandoned in favor of one that is cognitivist and pluralistic, namely, the purpose-driven approach. (shrink)

This article defends the content approach to aesthetic experience. It begins by sketching this approach to aesthetic experience. It then rehearses certain recent criticisms of the view by Alan Goldman and attempts to rebut them. One of those criticisms raises a long-standing concern about the author's account that has recently been called the “qua” problem. The article concludes by putting this issue to rest.

Drawing on his knowledge of the worlds of art, criticism, and philosophy, Noèel Carroll argues that appraisal and evaluation of art are an indispensable part of the conversation of life.

There seem to be at least two leading conceptions of art appreciation. The first, and by far the most popular, it seems to me, regards “appreciation” as a synonym for “approbation,” which itself can be a synonym for affection or even love. “To appreciate,” in this sense, is “to cherish.” This is the notion of appreciation that most plain speakers have in mind when they say things such as “I appreciate what you’ve done with your garden.” They mean “I like (...) what you’ve done with your garden.” Call this “appreciation-as-liking.” Although I’ve claimed that this is the popular construal of appreciation, it also possesses some estimable philosophical credentials. David Hume, for example, seems to hold a... (shrink)

In this article, “Narrative Closure,” a theory of the nature of narrative closure is developed. Narrative closure is identified as the phenomenological feeling of finality that is generated when all the questions saliently posed by the narrative are answered. The article also includes a discussion of the intelligibility of attributing questions to narratives as well as a discussion of the mechanisms that achieve this. The article concludes by addressing certain recent criticisms of the view of narrative expounded by this article.

Regarded for decades as a fallacy, intentionalist interpretation is beginning to attract a following among philosophers of art. Intentionalism is the doctrine that the actual intentions of artists are relevant to the interpretation of the artworks they create – just as actual intentions are relevant to the interpretation of the everyday words and deeds of other people. Although there are several forms of actual intentionalism, I defend the form known as modest actual intentionalism, which holds that the correct interpretation of (...) an artwork is compatible with the author's actual intention, which itself must be supported by the artwork. Looking at literary works specifically, I consider criticisms of actual intentionalism – for example, the contention that such a stance substitutes paraphrase for a reading of the text. In particular, I argue against hypothetical intentionalism, which maintains that the correct interpretation of an artwork is constrained by the best hypotheses of the artist's intentions. As I show, the methodology of this position is in fact designed to track the author's actual intentions, and furthermore, hypothetical intentionalism does not accurately depict existing interpretive practices. (shrink)

Toward the end of his book Jokes, perhaps the best known philosophical treatment of the subject, Ted Cohen includes a notorious joke about a group of young Black men who are deterred from committing a gang rape by being thrown a basketball. This is a joke that perplexes Cohen and that he admits plays into stereotypes that presuppose the mindless obsession of Black youths with basketball as well as their unbridled sexuality. He agrees that the joke is morally bad and (...) that it would be a better world without it. But he denies that its evil compromises its alleged funniness. He writes: “Wish that there were no mean jokes. Try remaking the world so that such jokes will have no place, will not arise. But do not deny that they are funny. That denial is a pretense that will help nothing.” In this paper, I want to challenge the claim that the moral defectiveness of a joke, especially a racist joke, cannot ever compromise its capacity to be funny. (shrink)

INTRODUCTIONFor the last two and a half decades – perhaps spurred onwards by R. W. Hepburn's seminal, wonderfully sensitive and astute essay “Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty” – philosophical interest in the aesthetic appreciation of nature has been gaining momentum. One of the most coherent, powerfully argued, thorough, and philosophically compelling theories to emerge from this evolving arena of debate has been developed over a series of articles by Allen Carlson. The sophistication of Carlson's approach – especially (...) in terms of his careful style of argumentation – has raised the level of philosophical discussion concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature immensely and it has taught us all what is at stake, logically and epistemologically, in advancing a theory of nature appreciation. Carlson has not only presented a bold theory of the aesthetic appreciation of nature; he has also refined a methodological framework and a set of constraints that every researcher in the field must address.Stated summarily, Carlson's view of the appreciation of nature is that it is a matter of scientific understanding; that is, the correct or appropriate form that the appreciation of nature – properly so called – should take is a species of natural history; appreciating nature is a matter of understanding nature under the suitable scientific categories. (shrink)

At present, one of the most recurrent views in the philosophy of history claims that historical writing is interpretive and that a primary form that this interpretation takes is narration. Furthermore, narration, according to this approach, is thought to possess an inevitably fictional element, viz., a plot, and, in this regard, the work of the narrative historian is said to be more like that of the imaginative writer than has been admitted heretofore. The upshot of this philosophically, moreover, is the (...) assertion that historical narrations, qua narrative interpretations, are to be assessed, in large measure, in terms of the kind of criterion of truth that is appropriate to literary works. And a subsidiary, though far less tendentious, consequence is that our understanding of historical interpretation can profit from literary or “discourse” analysis. (shrink)

The overlap between virtue epistemology and the philosophy of education has been dominated by discussions of the epistemic qualities of good learners, that is, the intellectual virtues that must be nurtured in students. Not much has been said about the epistemic qualities of good teachers expressed in virtue-theoretic terms. This paper offers a preliminary account of such qualities, which are designated as pedagogical virtues. I use Battaly's pluralist conception of intellectual virtue as a starting point, then describe a pedagogical virtue (...) as an intellectual virtue with an other-regarding success or motivational component. I end with an elucidation of the pedagogical versions of two mainstream intellectual virtues, perseverance and inquisitiveness. (shrink)

The subject of this essay is the way in which literature, by engaging our emotions, contributes to our emotional intelligence. In reading works of literature, we are almost constantly called upon—or mandated—to mobilize our emotions in the process of understanding the text. In this way, the literary text ineludibly guides us through a rehearsal of the pertinent portions of our affective repertoire.For example, we do not fully understand Iago unless we despise him, nor do we understand Dorothea Brooke adequately without (...) being saddened by the way in which she is entrapped in her marriage to that stick, Casaubon—that is, unless we lament "what a waste." Moreover, in order to be absorbed in a plot, we need to align... (shrink)

This article attempts to provide a basic characterization of stand-up comedy—that is, a minimal portrait of what comes to mind when one learns that one is about to see a stand-up comic. To that end, the focus will be primarily on the relation of stand-up comedy in terms of themes of temporality, including the structure of stand-up comedy, its rhythm, its delivery, and its contemporaneity.

We listen to a cacophony of voices instructing us how to think and feel about nature, including our own bodies. The news media, wildlife documentaries, science magazines, and environmental NGOs are among those clamouring for our attention. But are we empowered by all this knowledge or is our dependence on various epistemic communities allowing our thoughts, sentiments and activities to be unduly governed by others? Drawing on over 30 years on research into the 'social constitution of nature', Making Sense of (...) Nature shows that what we call 'nature' is made sense of for us in ways that make it central to social order, social change and social dissent. By utilising insights and extended examples from anthropology, cultural studies, human geography, philosophy, politics, sociology, science studies, this interdisciplinary text asks whether we can better make sense of nature for ourselves, and thus participate more meaningfully in momentous decisions about the future of life - human and non-human - on the planet. This book shows how 'nature' can be made sense of without presuming its naturalness. The challenge is not so much to rid ourselves of the idea of nature and its 'collateral concepts' (such as genes) but instead, we need to be more alert to how, why and with what effects ideas about 'nature' get fashioned and deployed in specific situations. (shrink)

This chapter critically explores the notion of medium specificity both in its classical form, as represented by figures such as Rudolf Arnheim and André Bazin, and in its current revised versions as proposed by philosophers such as Berys Gaut, Dominic Lopes, and Ted Nannicelli. The thesis of this entry is that the idea of medium specificity is flawed in all of its variations.

ABSTRACTFrom its origins in antiquity to the emergence of neoliberalism, democracy had always been thought of as a fragile institutional construct, comprising two complementary dimensions: an objective dimension, and a subjective one. Appeared in the 1970s, the Law and economic doctrine has undermined this bases of democracy by assimilating the enactment of laws to negotiation on a market, and reducing democracy to a ‘market of ideas’. The specific status of speech in the democratic area fades out, paving the way for (...) ‘post-truth politics’ and ‘democratic dictatorships’. (shrink)

Abstract:This article examines two approaches to aesthetic experience, especially with respect to the practice of art criticism. The two approaches are (1) aesthetic experience construed as experience necessarily valued for its own sake and (2) aesthetic experience characterized in terms of its content. In this article, the content approach is defended as the one most suitable to the practice of art criticism.

Intellectual character education has been primarily expressed in terms of educating for intellectual virtues (EFIV). This aim of teaching intellectual virtues has received some challenges, such as how it fails to articulate adequate action guidance through exemplarist pedagogy, and how it neglects the pervasiveness of intellectual vice among students. To respond to these challenges, this paper considers the aim of educating against intellectual vices (EAIV) – teaching students not to develop intellectual vices or weakening those that they have already developed (...) – which comes with the emergence of vice epistemology. More specifically, I look at how negative epistemic exemplars can be used as a classroom strategy for EAIV, and demonstrate how this could address the aforementioned weaknesses of EFIV. (shrink)

This remarkable collection contains Isaiah Berlin's appreciations of seventeen people of unusual distinction in the intellectual or political world, sometimes both.

In “Movies, Narrative and Emotion” there is an attempt to suggest the ways in which a certain form of narrative organization, to which we can call “erotetic narration,” This can be co-ordinated with the emotional address of the motion picture in terms of what can be called “criterial prefocusing.” On this view, the primary way in which the emotions are engaged is character-directed, the protagonist’s goals providing grounds which generate the narrative questions that the movie goes on to answer.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to defend feminist film studies of the image of women in film approach, where that is understood as having no necessary commitment to psychoanalysis.

Far from being haphazard, Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay on cinema and 1953 notes on cinema for the lectures at the Collège de France are a precursor of a genuine phenomenology of cinema. Accordingly, in this paper I shall demonstrate that a phenomenology of movement and space tacitly appears in films, since cinema is the art of motion on screen and therefore the art of intersubjectivity par excellence. Moreover, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontological conception of the chiasm between the visible and the (...) invisible resembles the interlacing of the “two spaces” mentioned by Noël Burch. Likewise, the interpretation of the world as the “something else” that is simultaneously present and absent in every appearance corresponds, in cinema, to Alain Bergala’s “présence in absentia” of the off-screen on the screen – i.e., to the opening up of off-screen space by means of eyeline match and characters exiting and entering the frame. I finally claim that the use both of long take and depth of field, as analysed by film theorist André Bazin, and of specific camera movements, as analysed by neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese, preserves the continuity of reality and give the impression that the film is a perceptual experience that happens within reality’s space-time continuum.Loin d’être incohérent, l’essai de 1945 de Merleau-Ponty sur le cinéma et ses notes sur le cinéma pour son cours au Collège de France en 1953 sont les précurseurs d’une vraie phénoménologie du cinéma. Dans ce texte, je démontre qu’une phénoménologie du mouvement et de l’espace apparaît tacitement dans les films puisque le cinéma est l’art du mouvement à l’écran et par conséquent l’art de l’intersubjectivité par excellence. Par ailleurs, je montre que la conception ontologique de Merleau-Ponty du chiasme entre le visible et l’invisible ressemble à l’entrelacement des « deux espaces » mentionnés par Noël Burch. De même, l’interprétation du monde comme le « quelque chose d’autre » simultanément présent et absent dans toute apparition correspond, au cinéma à la « présence in absentia » du hors champ dans le champ d’Alain Bergala – à savoir l’ouverture de l’espace du hors champ par la technique du eyeline match et des personnages qui entrent et sortent du cadre. Je soutiens enfin que l’usage à la fois du plan long et de la profondeur de champ, analysés par le théoricien du cinéma André Bazin, ainsi que de mouvements spécifiques de caméra, analysés par le neuroscientifique Vittorio Gallese, préserve la continuité de la réalité et donne l’impression que le film est une expérience perceptive qui se produit à l’intérieur du continuum de l’espace temps de la réalité.Lungi dall’essere interventi estemporanei, i saggi di Merleau-Ponty sul cinema del 1945 e le sue note sul cinema per il corso al Collège de France del 1953 sono precursori di un’autentica fenomenologia del cinema. In questo articolo intendo mostrare come nei film si delinei tacitamente una fenomenologia del movimento e dello spazio, poiché il cinema è l’arte del movimento sullo schermo e per eccellenza l’arte dell’intersoggettività. Inoltre, intendo mettere in luce come la concezione ontologica merleau-pontyana del chiasma di visibile e invisibile si accosti all’intreccio dei “due spazi” menzionati da Noël Burch. In modo analogo, considererò l’interpretazione del mondo come il “qualcos’altro” che è al contempo presente e assente in ogni apparizione come corrispondente, nel cinema, a quella che Alain Bergala definisce la presenza “in absentia” del fuori campo sullo schermo, ossia all’apertura dello spazio fuori campo per mezzo del raccordo sullo sguardo e dell’ingresso e dell’uscita dei personaggi rispetto all’inquadratura. Infine, sosterrò che tanto l’impiego del long take e della profondità di campo, descritti dal teorico del cinema André Bazin, quanto l’uso di specifici movimenti di macchina, analizzati dal neuroscienziato Vittorio Gallese, preservino la continuità del reale e forniscano l’impressione che il film sia un’esperienza percettiva che si svolge entro il continuum spazio-temporale della realtà. (shrink)

Theory appears to have played the ideological-institutional role of enfranchiser, even if the role was ulti-mately an epiphenomenal one. Furthermore, the expectation of gold in "them thar hills" also encouraged too many university presses to invest in film publications, especially when the arcane peregrinations of Theory facilitated their rationalization of their relaxation of their traditional role as academic gatekeepers. Hence film studies has been flooded with repetitive decoctions of the Theory in search of the same market in much the same (...) way that con-sumers are confronted with so many marginally differentiated shampoos. (shrink)

This essay offers a critique of environmental ethics and argues that a post-environmental ethics may be unavoidable. It does so by exposing and questioning the ontological assumptions common to otherwise different modalities of environmental ethics. These modalities, it is argued, rest upon an implicit or explicit 'material essentialism'. Such essentialism entails the belief that putatively 'environmental' entities have discrete and relatively enduring properties. These properties 'anchor' ethical claims and permit the objects of ethical considerability to be named. Against this, it (...) is argued that a non-essentialist ontology is preferable. This ontology presumes neither that environmental phenomena are simply environmental nor that their properties can be 'fixed' under some determinate description. Drawing on recent 'hybrid' research in human geography and elsewhere, it is suggested that the motility and mutability of ostensibly environmental entities be recognised. This recognition, I conclude, desta bilises conventional environmental ethics and calls for a more supple mode of ethical reasoning. (shrink)

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In this essay, I am concerned with the representation of groups in popular culture. My interest has to do with the politics of representing people. The couplet beauty/nonbeauty (or, more specifically, beauty/ugliness) frequently figures importantly in the representation of groups, including most notably, for my purposes, ethnic and racial minorities. This couplet can be politically significant because beauty is often associated in our culture with moral goodness. . . . Thus, beauty and non beauty can serve as a basis for (...) political rhetoric. . . . If one concept of human beauty (which is connected to ideas of goodness) sees beauty as the instantiation or near approximation of the concept human being, then the related idea of human ugliness (which is connected with ideas of moral degradation) is rooted in problematic exemplifications of the concept of the human. These "problematic exemplifications" can take many forms. The two that will preoccupy me in this essay are the imperfect exemplifications of the human found in the popular genres of horror and humor. (shrink)