The entry aims to explain a core feature of otherwise different variants of romanticism: the commitment to “the primacy of aesthetics.” This commitment is often expressed by the claim that the “aesthetic”—most broadly that which concerns beauty and art—should permeate and shape human life. The entry proposes that this romantic imperative should be understood as a structural or formal demand. On that reading, the romantic imperative requires that we model our epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, political, social and scientific pursuits according to (...) the form of the aesthetic comportment to the world, exemplified in poetry. Rather than aiming to replace “real” life, science and philosophy with poetry, the romantics urge human beings to fashion their ordinary lives and to do science and philosophy according to the model provided by poetry. Philosophy, science and everyday life need not be poetry, but poetic or poetry-like. Structurally, they should become similar. Why so? The main task of this entry is to offer an answer to this question and to show that the reasons for “poeticizing” life, science and philosophy are themselves philosophical. (shrink)

Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist-philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach - a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy of science. Bixby's approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection to conceptions of scientific (...) progress. (shrink)

Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist-philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach - a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy of science. Bixby's approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection to conceptions of scientific (...) progress. (shrink)

This article considers a long-neglected episode in the disciplinary evolution of the border sciences in Germany: the so-called animism versus spiritism debate. While historians have long acknowledged the significance of this dispute, which introduced a range of new hypotheses and nomenclature to the field, there has been little detailed analysis of it. Looking closely at the arguments of the main combatants, this article attempts to highlight not just the complex multi-frontal conflicts that took place during the late 19th (...) class='Hi'>century between academic psychologists, spiritists and psychical researchers over the parameters and proper objects of the nascent field of psychology, but also the epistemological and methodological battles between spiritists and psychical researchers over the nature of both psychology and the unconscious. It is concluded that researchers such as Hartmann and Aksakow in their pursuit of a new scientific psychology based on the phenomena of the unconscious were just as representative of contemporary psychology as were Wundt and his colleagues. (shrink)

In his The Poverty of Historicism 1 K.R. Popper and before him F. Kaufmann2 distinguish two broad classes of epistemological and methodological positions held in the social sciences: Antinaturalistic positions and pronaturalistic positions. These positions are distinguished with respect to their attitude regarding the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences, or rather what the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions assume to be the method of the natural sciences. According to Popper and Kaufmann the representatives of antinaturalistic (...) positions hold that the methods of the natural sciences can not be applied in the social sciences, whereas the representatives of the pronaturalistic positions have the opposite view. This of course raises the question what views the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions embrace with respect to the methods of the natural sciences. It is interesting to note, however, that Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism, indicates those views only briefly, the reasons presumably being the special tasks and aims he set himself in that analysis. These are primarily to show the disastrous political and social consequences of a false social science methodology and the invalidity of the ideas of historical necessity and that of laws of historical development. But it is well known that Popper analysed and discussed the methods and the philosophy of science with great rigour and acumen in his other books and articles and that he triggered a philosophical revolution in that field.3 Before Popper the prevailing. (shrink)

At the end of the 19th century, most professional historians – wherever they existed – deemed history to be a form of knowledge ruled by a method that bears no resemblance with those most commonly traceable in the natural sciences. The bulk of the historian’s task was then frequently regarded as being the application of procedures frequently referred to as ‘historical method’. In the context of such an emerging interest on historical methods and methodology, at least three textbooks (...) stand out: Johann Gustav Droysen’s Grundriss der Historik (Outline of the Theory of History), Ernst Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (Handbook of Historical Method), and Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos’s Introduction aux études historiques (Introduction to the Study of History). These books were quite influential in Germany, France, and elsewhere, and they very much helped promote a general idea of historical method that would become relatively consensual among historians of many nationalities by the early 20th century. Such a relative agreement on historical method sponsored both the communication and the development of a sense of disciplinary identity among historians trained within different and sometimes conflicting national traditions. It was then partially extended, partially challenged, and surely made more complex when, from the 1920s on, social and economic historians became a good part of the historiographical establishment in many countries. -/- The three books by Droysen, Bernheim, and Langlois and Seignobos were already pieced together by Rolf Torstendahl, who studied them as a group of texts that, despite their differences, contributed to shape the developments outlined above. However, Torstendahl’s primary aim was to show how Droysen, Bernheim, and Seignobos all resorted to ‘method’ as a way to circumvent skepticism against the possibility of historical knowledge, rather than investigate the internal interrelationships between the three texts. In this chapter I follow precisely this latter, not yet taken, road, focusing on crucial cross-references between the Grundriss, the Lehrbuch, and the Introduction. I intend to show that, at a general level, the schemes of historical method found in these texts are largely convergent, and that this convergence is due to Bernheim’s reading of Droysen and to Langlois and Seignobos’s reading of Bernheim. I will attempt to do it through a regressive approach that starts with an analysis of the Introduction. Aspects of the editorial history and circulation of the three texts will also be briefly addressed, as a way to illustrate their special importance within the framework of early 20th century historical theory. Because my argument calls for a focus on the most general lines of Droysen’s, Bernheim’s, and Langlois and Seignobos’s schemes of historical method, I will, for the sake of consistency, refrain from analysing in-depth the complex epistemological and ontological arguments in which those schemes are nested. (shrink)

In 19th century Germany, the number of publications in the history of philosophy increased dramatically. According to Ulrich Schneider’s calculations, from 1810 through 1899, 148 original textbooks by 114 authors were published in German. The aim of this article is to analyse how the documented in these publications canonic vision of 19th century German philosophy evolved. An analysis of 66 treatises published from 1802 through 1918 allows dividing 19th century philosophers into groups based on (...) the frequency of their names across the tables of contents, describing the changes in the leading group composition and in the share of attention received by a given philosopher over time. The paper presents thus a formal analysis of how historical reputations of philosophers were made, how they stabilised, or faded. The authors claim that the current understanding of the history of 19th century philosophy differs significantly from the one recorded in the German textbooks of the era. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses (...) of Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists. (shrink)

This book examines several epistemological regimes in studies of numerical data over the last four centuries. It distinguishes these regimes and mobilises questions present in the philosophy of science, sociology and historical works throughout the 20th century. Attention is given to the skills of scholars and their methods, their assumptions, and the socio-historical conditions that made calculations and their interpretations possible. In doing so, questions posed as early as Émile Durkheim’s and Ernst Cassirer’s ones are revisited and the concept (...) of symbolic form is put to the test in this particular survey, conducted over long period of time. Although distinct from a methodological and epistemological point of view, today these regimes may be found together in the toolbox of statisticians and those who comment on their conclusions. As such, the book is addressed to social scientists and historians and all those who are interested in numerical productions. (shrink)

This thesis is a study of the relationship between Schopenhauer and the biology in the early nineteenth century. Schopenhauer improved Kant’s epistemology based on the findings of the brain physiology of the time and extended the area of the apriority and rationality. The brain paradox is based on the interpretation that Schopenhauer insists on both materialism and idealism. But what Schopenhauer received in French physiology is not materialism but vitalism. This view of Schopenhauer is also revealed by his (...) suggesting primordial animal, which is not mechanistically explained, to Lamarck’s physicalism. Schopenhauer’s ethics does not presuppose mechanistic materialism or idealism. Schopenhauer sets the limits of natural science only to criticize the mechanical materialism. One identical being presupposed by his ethics is accepted by natural sciences. (shrink)

With his talk on the limits of natural knowledge in 1872 ("Ignorabimus! We will never know!"), Emil du Bois-Reymond stirred up a controversy (the Ignorabimus-Streit), which spread widely beyond German-speaking countries. It concerned the very possibility to set boundaries to knowledge, the development of the sciences, their attainable results, and concept formation. In this volume, the philosophical value of the Ignorabimus controversy is critically examined. The historical matter and its theoretical implications are assessed with regard to the mutual relationships between (...) philosophy and the sciences in the 19th century and beyond. (shrink)

Explicitly dismantling or decommissioning existing sociotechnical systems seems to be unimaginable both within dominant public imaginaries and in academic thought. Indeed, ‘gee whiz’ journalistic narratives regarding emerging technoscience abound as many members of the public appear to eagerly await any new innovation coming out of Silicon Valley. At the same time, most science and technology studies (STS) research focuses on the creation of new technoscience, not its destruction or temporary decommissioning. Yet, lay citizens clearly engage in forms of Luddism: schoolchildren (...) and overworked professionals take digital ‘detoxes’, a number of cities have dismantled their urban highways, and a growing movement of parents have opted their children out of their state’s standardized testing requirements. While all such efforts are rooted in the rejection of a technology, they vary in terms of their resemblance to 19th century English Luddism as well as with respect to Langdon Winner’s concept of epistemological Luddism. How might STS scholars better make sense of 21st century Luddism? This article conceptualizes a number of contemporary examples of technological dismantling with regard to their epistemological and political characteristics. We end with a call for research to better understand lay technological refusal, especially in comparison to elite-driven forms of disruption. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify the epistemological foundations of the Freudian energetics model, starting with a historical review of the 19th century scientific context in which Freud's research lay down its roots. Beyond the physiological and anatomical references of Project for a Scientific Psychology, the physiology Freud makes reference to is in reality primarily anchored in an epistemological model derived from physics. Whilst across the Rhine, the autonomy of physiology in relation to physics was far from being accomplished, (...) as a counterpoint, in France, the revolution in physiology driven by Claude Bernard established itself autonomously from physics,. In contrast, Freud's scientific landscape is entirely dominated by the physics elevated to the rank of an ideal science. The influence of Helmholtz, who is both a medical doctor and a physicist, has a determining influence on Freud's training. The discoveries in physics at that time, in particular the formulation of the principle of 'conservation of force' - first principle of thermodynamics - will constitute the points of reference upon which Freud will elaborate his energetics model, then subsequently, the idea of economy in his metapsychology. In this way we can trace both the historic and epistemological path that led Freud from a concept based on physics, and more specifically thermodynamic energy, to an idea of nervous energy that constitutes the basis of the concept of "quantity" as it is stated as 'first fundamental idea' in Project for a Scientific Psychology. This notion will subsequently evolve, and lead Freud to the introduction of the concept of 'psychical energy,' this time in a purely metapsychological sense. (shrink)

Probabilistic epistemology holds that probability is an essential ingredient of science and human knowledge at large, and that induction is a necessary constituent of the scientific method. Developed in some detail by a number of authors including Patrick Suppes, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, this view has been embraced by so many, as to gradually become predominant. While probabilistic epistemology has been growing, awareness of its origins was somehow left behind. Probabilistic epistemology is usually seen as a (...) product of the encounter of logical empiricism with American pragmatism. Without denying the impact of such an encounter, it is argued that the probabilistic approach was already part of the European scenario before the dissolution of logical empiricism in the late 1930s. Notably, such an approach is not linked to a particular interpretation of probability, having been endorsed by upholders of different probability notions, including Janina Hosiasson, Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, Harold Jeffreys, and Hans Reichenbach, to mention only those authors whose contribution is addressed here. The list could extend to the French probabilists Émile Borel and Maurice Fréchet, and others not considered in this survey. The work of so many authors operating at the four corners of Europe in the first decades of the 19th century reflects a European tradition in probabilistic epistemology, somewhat overshadowed in the literature by the attention paid to logical empiricism. (shrink)

The question of the applicability of mathematics is an epistemological issue that was explicitly raised by Kant, and which has played different roles in the works of neo-Kantian philosophers, before becoming an essential issue in early analytic philosophy. This paper will first distinguish three main issues that are related to the application of mathematics: indispensability arguments that are aimed at justifying mathematics itself; philosophical justifications of the successful application of mathematics to scientific theories; and discussions on the application of real (...) numbers to the measurement of physical magnitudes. A refinement of this tripartition is suggested and supported by a historical investigation of the differences between Kant’s position on the problem, several neo-Kantian perspectives, early analytic philosophy, and late 19th century mathematicians. Finally, the debate on the cogency of an application constraint in the definition of real numbers is discussed in relation to a contemporary debate in neo-logicism, in order to suggest a comparison not only with Frege’s original positions, but also with the ideas of several neo-Kantian scholars, including Hölder, Cassirer, and Helmholtz. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive reference source on 18th-century authors writing in the English language about philosophical ideas and issues. It features authors taken from 1689 through to the mid-19th century, the period beginning with John Locke and ending with Dugald Stewart. The word philosophical is used in a wide, 18th-century sense. Therefore, the Dictionary includes epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, education, politics, rhetoric, science, medicine, biology, geology, chemistry and theology.

This article traces the historical co-evolution of microbiology, bacteriology, and virology, framed within industrial and agricultural contexts, as well as their role in colonial and national history between the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. The epistemology of germ theory, coupled with the economic interests of European colonies, has shaped the understanding of human-microbial relationships in a reductionist way. We explore a brief history of the medical and biological sciences, (...) focusing on microbes and the difficulty of implementing germ theory outside of biology laboratories. Furthermore, we highlight the work of Lynn Margulis, who conceptualized microbes within their ecological contexts. Such research shows the active role microbes play in handling life-sustaining biological and biochemical processes. We outline how the industrial and technological advancements of the last two centuries not only impacted almost all human societies, but also changed the world on microbial, biological, and geological levels. The narration of these histories is a complex task, and depends on how national, international, and intergovernmental institutions (such as the World Health Organization) conceive of the selective environmental pressures exerted by industry and biotechnological companies. (shrink)

The chapter begins with a sketch of the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical background to nineteenth-century theories of perception, focusing on visual perception. It then considers German sensory physiology and psychology in the nineteenth century and its reception. This section gives special attention to: assumptions about nerve–sensation relations; spatial perception; the question of whether there is a two-dimensional representation in visual experience; psychophysics; size constancy; and theories of colour perception. The chapter then offers a brief look at the interaction (...) between perceptual theory and philosophical issues in epistemology and the metaphysics of mind in Britain and America, focusing on: the notion of a muscle sense; the problem of the external world; and forms of perceptual realism. It ends with an overview of psychological theories of perception in the early twentieth century and the Gestalt reaction, culminating with J. J. Gibson. (shrink)

This paper is the second part of our recent paper ‘Historical and Epistemological Reflections on the Culture of Machines around the Renaissance: How Science and Technique Work’. In the first paper—which discussed some aspects of the relations between science and technology from Antiquity to the Renaissance—we highlighted the differences between the Aristotelian/Euclidean tradition and the Archimedean tradition. We also pointed out the way in which the two traditions were perceived around the Renaissance. The Archimedean tradition is connected with machines: its (...) relationship with science and construction of machines should be made clear. It is enough to think that Archimedes mainly dealt with three machines: lever, pulley and screw. As underlined in the first part, our thesis is that many machines were constructed by people who ignored theory, even though, in other cases, the knowledge of the Archimedean tradition was a precious help in order to build machines. Hence, an a priori idea as to the relations between the Archimedean tradition and construction of machines cannot exist. In this second part we offer some examples of functioning machines constructed by people who ignored any physical theory, whereas, in other cases, the ignorance of some principles—such as the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile—induced the attempt to construct impossible machines. What is very interesting is that these machines did not function, of course, as a perpetuum mobile, but anyway had their functioning and were useful for certain aims, although they were constructed on an idea which is completely wrong from a theoretical point of view. We mainly focus on the Renaissance and early modern period, but we also provide examples of machines built before and after this period. We have followed a chronological order in both parts, starting from the analysis of the situation in ancient Greece. Therefore, in the first part, we have examined the relations between the Aristotelian/Euclidean and Archimedean traditions from ancient Greece to the early modern age. In this second part, we analyse the relations of Archimedean tradition/ construction of machines from ancient Greece to the 19th century, focusing on the mentioned period. We remind the reader that our aim is to prove an epistemological thesis, not to provide a complete historical endeavour. As a correlated article, the reader will find three previous paragraphs in the first above-mentioned article. (shrink)

This Open Access book combines philosophical and historical analysis of various forms of alternatives to mechanism and mechanistic explanation, focusing on the 19th century to the present. It addresses vitalism, organicism and responses to materialism and its relevance to current biological science. In doing so, it promotes dialogue and discussion about the historical and philosophical importance of vitalism and other non-mechanistic conceptions of life. It points towards the integration of genomic science into the broader history of biology. It (...) details a broad engagement with a variety of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century vitalisms and conceptions of life. In addition, it discusses important threads in the history of concepts in the United States and Europe, including charting new reception histories in eastern and south-eastern Europe. While vitalism, organicism and similar epistemologies are often the concern of specialists in the history and philosophy of biology and of historians of ideas, the range of the contributions as well as the geographical and temporal scope of the volume allows for it to appeal to the historian of science and the historian of biology generally. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter traditionally has been attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, the traditional view has been challenged by the new claim that Duhem’s opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories at the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper, I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem’s opposition to (...) atomism, and provide a new framework in which to understand Duhem's rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem’s philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem’s resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics has been accused of paying insufficient attention to mathematical practice: one way to cope with the problem, the one we will follow in this paper on extensive magnitudes, is to combine the `history of ideas' and the `philosophy of models' in a logical and epistemological perspective. The history of ideas allows the reconstruction of the theory of extensive magnitudes as a theory of ordered algebraic structures; the philosophy of models allows an investigation into the way (...) class='Hi'>epistemology might affect relevant mathematical notions. The article takes two historical examples as a starting point for the investigation of the role of numerical models in the construction of a system of non-Archimedean magnitudes. A brief exposition of the theories developed by Giuseppe Veronese and by Rodolfo Bettazzi at the end of the 19th century will throw new light on the role played by magnitudes and numbers in the development of the concept of a non-Archimedean order. Different ways of introducing non-Archimedean models will be compared and the influence of epistemological models will be evaluated. Particular attention will be devoted to the comparison between the models that oriented Veronese's and Bettazzi's works and the mathematical theories they developed, but also to the analysis of the way epistemological beliefs affected the concepts of continuity and measurement. (shrink)

Methodological disputes in economics have been with us since Mill and Senior fought over the nature of economic science in the first half of the 19th Century. Progress has been extremely slow, and there is good reason for this as the present essay hopes to show. Three important methodological positions are examined critically: the “ultra-empiricism” of T.W. Hutchison, the “moderate empiricism” of Milton Friedman, and the “extreme a priorism” of Lionel Robbins and Ludwig Von Mises. The argument between (...) Guttierrez and Block inTheory and Decision over praxiology is discussed in connection with the last mentioned position. The paper concludes that “extreme a priorism,” though very much out of fashion is not without its resources. The work of the contemporary German philosopher, Paul Lorenzen, is enlisted to bolster this position. (shrink)

Pictet’s experiment was front and center in the 18th/19th century debate concerning whether heat is a wave, or a particle. Pictet’s experiment is best understood by realizing that thermal radiation energy plays a significant role in heat transfer. It is argued that this readily ignored experiment should have long ago alerted us to issues concerning our understanding of thermodynamics. This questions the rationale behind modern statistical thermodynamics, which describes all of a gaseous system’s energy purely in terms of (...) the kinematics of that system’s gas. Not only is the philosophy of statistical mechanics now questioned but so too are those associated with entropy and its mathematical accomplice the second law. After raising questions, a simpler explanation as to what is witnessed will be discussed. An explanation that relegates statistical mechanics to a valid approximation for sufficiently dilute closed systems of gas, such as those often used in experiments. An explanation that remains void of the mathematical simplifications that statistical mechanics provides. Ultimately, the accepted epistemology of our sciences will be verbally challenged. (shrink)

With his influence on the development of physiology, physics and geometry, Hermann von Helmholtz – like few scientists of the second half of the 19th century – is representative of the research in natural science in Germany. The development of his understanding of science is not less representative. Until the late sixties, he emphatically claimed the truth of science; later on, he began to see the conditions for the validity of scientific knowledge in relative terms, and this can, (...) in summary, be referred to as hypothesizing. Already in the past century, HeImholtz made first approaches to an understanding of science, which were incompatible with his own former position and which pointed to the modern age to an astonishingly large extent. A comparison with Karl R. Popper's logic of research will illustrate how closely he nevertheless approached modern understanding of science. In Popper's logic of research, hypothesizing of scientific knowledge is definitely much more advanced than in Helmholtz's theory of science. What begins vaguely to emerge with Helmholtz has already become an explicitly formulated programme with Popper. Although HeImholtz and Popper are not on a direct line of epistemological development and Popper refers to HeImholtz only rarely and casually, there are in fact surprising points of contact which have not been taken notice of so far and which appear above all if one looks at Helmholtz's understanding of science against the background of Popper's logic of research. (shrink)

The paper describes that period of the Hungarian philosophy, in which it became professionalized, namely the Kant argument, which was the first step the Hungarian philosophy took towards its being public. The question has to be answered whether Kant’s thought could become a part of it. Due to political developments as well as the pressure of the church the turn of the century witnessed the shift from epistemology to the issues of moral philosophy and theology. Thus the conditions (...) for the reception of Kantianism and post-Kantian philosophy in the 19th century have been created. The fundaments for the development of axiology were laid as well. The paper covers the main phases of the debate with their leading representatives. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to understand an important passage in the history of the sciences of the psyche: starting from the psychiatric problematization — and the consequent emergence — of the concept and the object called ‘sexuality’ in the second half of the 19th century, it attempts to show a series of continuities and discontinuities between this kind of reasoning and the birth of psychoanalysis in the first years of the 20th century. The particular focus (...) is therefore directed on two texts: Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The argument runs along three intertwined axes: (1) an historico-epistemological analysis of the concepts and their transformations in the field of the science of sexuality; (2) an analysis of the power relationships between patients and physicians; and (3) an account of the psychiatric technologies of the self that have as an effect the emergence of new forms of ‘objective’ knowledge of the subject. The broader goal is to trace a map of the simultaneous and correlate coming into being and transformations both of new forms of objects and of new forms of subjects through the mediation of scientific concepts and techniques. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the legal epistemology that is advocated within Twelver Shi'ite usul al-fiqh (legal theory). It critically surveys the epistemological underpinnings upheld by post-19th century Uṣūlīclerics that impel them to mainly deduce and interpret Sharia using scripture and literalist hermeneutical methods. An evaluation of these underpinnings uncovers the important juxtaposition that exists between the seminarian discourses of usul al-fiqh and philosophy. The book hypothesises that usul al-fiqh has both space and historical precedence to accept (...) alternative epistemological theories that may enable orthodox Shi'ite clerics to display greater dynamism in deducing and interpreting Sharia. (shrink)

For most of the 20th century, analytic epistemology has been narrowly focused on the concept of knowledge and on closely-related issues like justification. But decades of work on Gettier problems, lottery paradoxes, and the like, have given mainstream analytic epistemology the appearance of a degenerating research program. In response, some analytic epistemologists have begun to investigate other cognitive states, like wisdom and understanding, that many pre-analytic philosophers valued as much or more than knowledge. In fact, Linda Zagzebski (...) has argued that Western philosophy exhibits the following historical pattern: in eras given to skeptical worries, philosophers have focused on certainty and justification; in eras less exercised by skepticism, philosophers have focused on understanding and the related issue of explanation. My aims are two-fold. First, I add to Zagzebski’s picture by showing that metaphysical and metaphilosophical issues have also contributed to this historical pattern. Second, I use the expanded picture to explain (i) the 19th century advent of verstehen as a term of art, (ii) the analytic tradition’s lack of interest in understanding, and (iii) the revival of interest in understanding in recent analytic epistemology. I conclude that the pro-verstehen movement of the 19th century and the pro-understanding movement of the 21st were motivated by similar concerns pertaining to the epistemic strictures of scientism, strictures which bear a complex relationship to skepticism. (shrink)

This book delves deep into the Social Construction of Theory, comparative epistemology and intellectual history to stress the interrelationship between diverse cultures during the colonial period and bring forth convincing evidence of how the 19th century was shaped. It approaches an interesting relation between the linguistic studies of 19th century’s scientific world and subsequent widespread acceptance of the empirically weak theory of the Aryan invasion. To show entangled history in a globalized world, the book draws (...) on the Aryan Invasion Theory to highlight how different socio-religious parties commonly shape a new theory. It also explores how research is affected by the so-called social construction of theory and comparative epistemology, and deals with scholarly advancement and its relation with contemporary socio-political demands. The most significant conclusion of the book is that academic studies are prone to comparative epistemology, even under the strict scrutiny of the so-called scientific methods. (shrink)

The fertility of contemporary social theory is matched only by its problematic relationship to its past. The future of social theory therefore lies with a renegotiation of that relationship. I begin by unearthing the theological origins of theorizing and its secularization as epistemology in the 19th century. I then provide an account of the recent renaissance in social theory - epitomized by the various `structure-agency' debates - that reveals its intellectual kinship to scholastic theology. I diagnose this (...) scholasticism in terms of sociology's current social exigencies and conclude that the historiography of sociology implicit in scholasticism needs to be overturned so that social theorists may come to recover the concrete social contexts that historically have called forth the need to theorize. (shrink)

The Genotype-Phenotype (G-P) distinction was proposed in the context of Mendelian genetics, in the wake of late 19th century studies about heredity. In this paper, we provide a conceptual analysis that highlights that the G-P distinction was grounded on three pillars: observability, transmissibility, and causality. Originally, the genotype is the non-observable and transmissible cause of the phenotype, which is its observable and non-transmissible effect. We argue that the current developments of biology have called the validity of such pillars (...) into question. First, molecular biology has unveiled the putative material substrate of the genotype (qua DNA), making it an observable object. Second, numerous findings on nongenetic heredity suggest that some phenotypic traits can be directly transmitted. Third, recent organicist approaches to biological phenomena have emphasized the reciprocal causality between parts of a biological system, which notably applies to the relations between genotypes and phenotypes. As a consequence, we submit that the G-P distinction has lost its general validity, although it can still apply to specific situations. This calls for forging new frameworks and concepts to better describe heredity and development. (shrink)

Scientific interest in hysteria began in Mexico at the end of the 19th-century, as the medical profession expanded. The Mexican doctors studied madness, drawing on what was confidently regarded as a firm basis of epistemological knowledge. Using modern physiology they entered a discussion that had begun some time before in Europe. Encountering hysteria, an illness presumed to be caused by ‘over-civilization’, they searched for a universal definition. The doctors tried to impose a unifying concept onto the diverse symptoms (...) of hysteria, and, although imitating European ideas, the discourse became distinctive in its attempts to relate hysteria to science and modernity so that all three would make sense. My interest in this article is the feminine; not a reconstruction of the relationship that medicine established between hysteria and the feminine, but a search for a space within the discourse that deconstructs identity and stereotypes. The feminine appears when the coherence of medical discourse is ruptured and when, to explain the illness, the doctors stop attempting to define it. This eventually occurs when the medical discourse considers the subject as unidentifiable and deceptive. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in the context of 19th century epistemology. In particular, I argue that, even though Nietzsche shows the ontological lack of content of truths (both on the theoretic and on the moral plane), he nevertheless leaves the space for a practical use of them, in a way that can be compared with William James' pragmatism. I thus deal with Nietzsche's and James' concept of "truth", and show their relationship (...) with some outcomes of Ernst Mach's epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role played by Ernst Mach on Nietzsche’s thought. Starting from the contents of his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, I’ll show the close similarities between their view on both human knowledge and the scientific world description. In his writing on science Nietzsche shares Mach’s critique to the 19th century mechanism and its metaphysical ground, as much as his way of defining the substantial notions such as matter, ego and free will. Moreover, my (...) investigation will make it clear that Mach cannot be seen as a direct source of Nietzsche’s thought, since the latter wrote many times on the same subjects long before his first reading one of his works. Rather, it is possible to consider the writings of Lange, Spir and Spencer as the first sources of Nietzsche’s views on the main themes Mach dealt with in his work from 1886. (shrink)

The article considers the influence of the scientific world picture on the forms and modes of the existence of art. The author reveals the epistemological function of art in various historical periods of changing scientific paradigms, outlines the role of art in the Middle Ages (pre-scientific knowledge), the Renaissance, the New Age (classical scientific paradigm), and the period of the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries (non-classical scientific paradigm). Particular attention is paid to modernism, in the (...) art of which the epistemological function is largely realized, and artists embody the achievements of the contemporary scientific world picture in new forms, reflecting the complexity of new scientific theories that an ordinary person must take for granted. (shrink)

Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible conceptions of (...) merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined. (shrink)

Does theology belong within the academy or the church? How do Christian teachings - on God, revelation, and humanity - contribute to the activity of knowing? This volume offers a fresh reading of Bavinck's theological epistemology and argues that his Trinitarian and organic worldview utilizes an eclectic range of sources. Sutanto unfolds Bavinck's understanding of what he considered to be the two most important aspects of epistemology: the character of the sciences and the correspondence between subjects and objects. (...) Writing at the heels of the European debates in the 19th-20th century concerning theology's place in the academy, and rooted in historic Christian teachings, Bavinck's argument remains fresh and provocative. He argued that because the universe was created by the God as described in Christian thought as the Trinity (One God in three Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and thus a God who is absolute unity-in-diversity) knowledge of the universe can be characterized as a singular organism. This volume, exploring archival material and heretofore untranslated works, then applies this reading to current debates on the relationship between theology and philosophy, nature and grace, and the nature of knowing. (shrink)

The book offers a collection of essays on various aspects of Leibniz’s scientific thought, written by historians of science and world-leading experts on Leibniz. The essays deal with a vast array of topics on the exact sciences: Leibniz’s logic, mereology, the notion of infinity and cardinality, the foundations of geometry, the theory of curves and differential geometry, and finally dynamics and general epistemology. Several chapters attempt a reading of Leibniz’s scientific works through modern mathematical tools, and compare Leibniz’s results (...) in these fields with 19th- and 20th-Century conceptions of them. All of them have special care in framing Leibniz’s work in historical context, and sometimes offer wider historical perspectives that go much beyond Leibniz’s researches. A special emphasis is given to effective mathematical practice rather than purely epistemological thought. The book is addressed to all scholars of the exact sciences who have an interest in historical research and Leibniz in particular, and may be useful to historians of mathematics, physics, and epistemology, mathematicians with historical interests, and philosophers of science at large. (shrink)

This article provides a rigorous defense of innate true belief in the Meno, to my knowledge, the first of its kind. While several commentators have proposed innate true belief in the past, the position has never been defended or explained in detail. Instead, the most thorough discussions of Plato’s innatism have opted for different innate objects. I defend my proposal against these recent alternatives by showing that the passages often thought to imply innate knowledge can arguably be better read in (...) other ways. I then argue that they should be so read, because of an “awareness condition” Plato had on knowledge at the time. (shrink)

For men of the 19th century, the world was ordered by a whole system of concrete universals: ideals and the empirical world were simply two aspects of the same reality; ideals described an empirical reality which included them as its actual cohesive power. This character is reflected in the fact that the most influential thinkers of the last century combined, despite the rise of the specialized disciplines, sociological, historical and philosophical approaches to a reality which in social, (...) temporal, and cosmic aspects they conceived to be homogeneous. This unity has been dissolved in 20th century thought. The results of sociological and historical investigations of social reality have undermined the absolute validity of ideals. Epistemology has tended to undermine the meaningfulness of the objective world. Even so, attempts to revivify the old ideals by re-synthesizing ideas and existence are still being made. Historicism has been continuously concerned with its own Ueberwindung by the establishment of an absolute value; sociology has continued to search for general meanings, whether in the form of a sociology of knowledge or the culture-dynamics of a Sorokin; philosophy has concentrated its attention upon existence or experience or process: and the prominence of the philosophy of history and of philosophy as history which these developments imply are testimony of the tendency to replace nature by man so that man is the arena in which the re-integration of the different levels of reality is to be sought. Values which took a hard and fast form in the connection between general idea and particular existence in the 19th century have been disengaged through dissociation. The examination of historical and social experience and ideas in their own terms has made possible a new assessment of what is essential and what contingent in the general concepts of western man. At the same time even the subsequent integrative procedure, i.e. the historizing of ideas and the philosophizing of experience, has contributed further to such an assessment by including as the necessary basis for thought all of man's history and experience within its purview. (shrink)

Since the 19th century the theory of evolution has been the guide not only of biological research, but of the explanation of man's psychic and mental abilities, too. In particular Herbert Spencer's and Charles Darwin's works gave rise to an evolutionary view of human mind (evolutionary psychology). This view was generalized to the explanation of epistemic structures like science and was adopted by many philosophers and scientists, e. g. Boltzmann, Mach, and others. Under the influence of Darwin's theory (...) of natural selection a selective elimination model was established in order to explain epistemic activities. Thus, in the 19th century we find expressed the basic ideas of today's evolutionary epistemology. The modern evolutionary theory of (human) knowledge therefore turns out to be the more precise and elaborated formulation of the fundamental postulates of an evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

Historians in the 19th-century were not the first to discover the importance of source materials kept in archival depositories. More than their predecessors, however, scholars working in the historical discipline that the 19th century saw emerge tended to equate professional historical knowledge with knowledge based on primary source research, that is, practically speaking, on knowledge gained from source material that was usually kept in archives. While previous scholarship had paid ample attention to the methods that (...) class='Hi'>19th-century historians employed for the study of such archival material, to the epistemologies they developed in tandem with these methods and to the institutions they created for the study of archival records, this special issue explores the influence that archives, in a classic, institutional sense, exerted on the practices of 19th-century historiography. How did the archival turn affect historians’ working manners? How contested was this archival research imperative, with its underlying autopsy principle? And how did it spread geographically, in and outside Europe? (shrink)

This article investigates the emergence of the archive as the primary venue for the production of historical knowledge in the 19thcentury. The turn to archival research, the article argues, may be considered as a response to the discussions about the problems of testimony that dominated 18th- and early 19th-century German writings on the methodology and epistemology of historical research. These discussions, especially regarding the epistemic virtues of witnesses, also helped create the particular culture of knowledge-making within German (...) historical scholarship that enabled the archival turn. The article illustrates these developments through the examples of Johann Peter von Ludewig, who was one of the most prominent historians of the early German Enlightenment, and Leopold von Ranke, who is normally considered the founder of the modern historical discipline and the most important advocate of the 19th-century archival turn. (shrink)

During the second decade of the 20th century Hans Kleinpeter, an Austrian scholar devoted to the development of the modern science, published some brief papers on Nietzsche’s thought. Kleinpeter has been one of the main upholders of Mach’s epistemology and probably the first who connected his ideas with the philosophy of Nietzsche. In his book on Der Phänomenalismus (1913) he described a new world view that arose in the 19th century, a perspective that ‒ according to (...) him ‒ completely contrasted the mechanistic and metaphysical world view of the old school of scientific inquiry. The main outcome of the scientists whose name was related with this perspective (e.g. Clifford, Maxwell, Kirchoff and, obviously, Mach himself) has been the refusal of the absolute value of any “truth”. Kleinpeter’s statements on this topic are a good example of the rising of a Scientific Philosophy, whose development involved many scientists and thinkers that later set up the Verein Ernst Mach and the Wiener Kreis. On the other hand, his interest on Nietzsche is a relevant case of reception of the latter’s thought, that Kleinpeter puts into the context of the contemporary epistemology. In fact, he considers Nietzsche as one of the main upholders of the phenomenalistic world view, and states that he «took part at the same renewal of philosophical investigation that arose from the latest results of scientific inquiry» during the 19th century. A renewal whose main outcomes has been presented by John Stallo in his book on The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881), which Kleinpeter translated in German and published in 1901. According to Kleinpeter, in Nietzsche’s writings (mostly unpublished) one can find a theory of knowledge quite close to the one presented by both Mach and the new born Pragmatism, i.e. the complete refusal of an absolute truth and, therefore, the development of an antimetaphysical world view. In my paper I’ll discuss the main statements presented by Kleinpeter on this topic and show which of Nietzsche’s ideas has actually been in compliance with the main outcomes of late 19th century science. Thus, I’ll carry out a reconstruction of an unfamiliar side of the first period of reception of the philosophy of Nietzsche and its relevance to the development of a new (scientific) world view. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to a comparison between Ernst Mach's and Friedrich Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical approach to scientific and philosophical concepts. By making reference to Mach’s early essay on the conservation of energy (Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit, 1872), I argue that Nietzsche shares with him the idea that the concepts we adopt are only useful fictions developed during the history of humankind and its culture. This idea is fundamental for the development of modern (...) science, since Mach’s epistemology contributed to give up the mechanistic (Newtonian) view of physics. (shrink)

The archival turn in 19th-century historical scholarship – that is, the growing tendency among 19th-century historians to equate professional historical studies with scholarship based on archival research – not only affected the profession’s epistemological assumptions and day-to-day working manners, but also changed the persona of the historian. Archival research required the cultivation and exercise of such dispositions, virtues, or character traits as carefulness, meticulousness, diligence and industry. This article shows that a growing significance attached to these (...) qualities made the archival turn increasingly contested. As the case of the German-Austrian historian Theodor von Sickel and his critics shows, it was not the necessity of archival research as such on which historians in late 19th-century Europe came to hold different views. Sickel’s critics were rather concerned about the potentially detrimental effects that the increasingly philological ethos of archival studies could have on the historian’s character. What was primarily at stake in late 19th-century debates on the gains and losses of increased commitments to archival study was the persona of the historian – his character traits, his dispositions and the virtues and skills in which he excelled. (shrink)