Je reviens dans cet article sur certaines configurations conceptuelles propres à la logique stoïcienne et concernant le traitement stoïcien de la signification qui, comme on le sait, se découple en signifiant et signifié. La question que je pose est la suivante : à quelles certitudes est-on susceptible de parvenir avec les textes dont nous disposons sur la question des rapports entre signification, donc signifiant, σημαῖνον et signifié, σημαινόμενον, et λεκτόν? À l’occasion de cette interrogation, j’en viens à réouvrir l’enquête sur (...) la part éventuelle de modalité associée au λεκτόν et je propose d’analyser la signification stoïcienne tout en prenant en compte des concepts associés ou solidaires, comme les concepts de πρᾶγμα et de πτῶσις. (shrink)

Je reviens dans cet article sur certaines configurations conceptuelles propres à la logique stoïcienne et concernant le traitement stoïcien de la signification qui, comme on le sait, se découple en signifiant et signifié. La question que je pose est la suivante : à quelles certitudes est-on susceptible de parvenir avec les textes dont nous disposons sur la question des rapports entre signification, donc signifiant, σημαῖνον et signifié, σημαινόμενον, et λεκτόν? À l’occasion de cette interrogation, j’en viens à réouvrir l’enquête sur (...) la part éventuelle de modalité associée au λεκτόν et je propose d’analyser la signification stoïcienne tout en prenant en compte des concepts associés ou solidaires, comme les concepts de πρᾶγμα et de πτῶσις. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 315-335 Reid: Conception, Representation and Innate Ideas ROGER D. GALLIE Section I of this paper begins with a presentation of Thomas Reid's doctrine of the signification of words, of what words signify or represent. That presentation serves to introduce a problem of interpretation, namely, what Reid thinks the connection is between conceiving something and grasping what a term for it (...) signifies. It is pointed out that even if Reid maintains that what a word signifies is conceived by both speaker and hearer when that word is understood, this is a far cry from the position that he takes the stronger view, whether for all or only for some things, that their being conceived involves the understanding of a term or terms. The position that he does indeed take this stronger, although moderate, view is defended in sections II, III and IV. In sections II and III it is argued that, in Reid's view, for an adequate conception of an individual, real or imaginary, a conception of its attributes is needed. In section IV it is argued that the possession of general conceptions (in distinction from their formation), without which conception of attributes is impossible, requires appropriate understanding of general terms. So since for the conception of an individual a conception of its attributes is needed, and since for the conception of attributes appropriate understanding of general terms is required, we arrive at a textually well-founded position: for the conception of most things, in Reid's view, understanding of terms is indispensable. Roger D. Gallie is at the Department of Philosophy, Nottingham University, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD UK. email: [email protected] 316 Roger D. Gallie The remainder of the paper considers the following question: to what extent, if any, Reid is committed to acceptance of nativist views on concept possession? To answer, in section V we consider to what extent Reid's moderate position on the possession of conceptions commits him to accepting Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM) for propositional attitudes. It is clear that the view that a propositional attitude state such as belief involves some relation between a person and a representation such as a significant word, phrase or sentence of a natural language such as English can fairly be attributed to Reid. But it is also clear that Reid cannot be an adherent of the view that persons have a functional cum computational relation to Fodorean mental representations, so he cannot be an adherent of any nativism ex- plicitly contained in such a view. But it is to be noted that in his Inquiry, Chapter IV, Reid argues by a different route that in order to acquire a language such as English prior mastery of a system of significant signs is required. In section VI Keith Lehrer's argument in criticism of a reductionist interpretation of a position such as Fodor's is presented: that for a sign to signify something to someone presupposes that that person has a conception of what is signified. It is however pointed out that since there is a case for not viewing Fodor's position as reductionist overall Fodor can accept Lehrer's argument. Lehrer's innatist position, which he both claims to follow easily from this critical argument and to be a correct interpretation of Reid, is then presented: that we must presuppose an innate understanding of some signs to account for our learning the meaning of any signs. The objection that Reid too must accept the alleged innatist implications of Lehrer's critical argument in view of the implications of his moderate position on the possession of conceptions is considered and rebutted. In section VIII argue that while Lehrer makes a respectable case for innate principles of formation of conceptions such as that of hardness, something that Reid clearly endorses in his Inquiry, Chapter V, he does not succeed in making a case for there being any innate possession of conceptions. Finally, in section VIII, Reid's mature views in the Intellectual Powers, Essay VI, on how conceptions come to be possessed are expounded, and are fleshed out with some... (shrink)

Constatant que nos étudiants italiens de FLE ont contracté, au cours des années, de mauvaises habitudes de prononciation, souvent dues à un enseignement lacunaire de la connaissance correcte des sons, et que le temps d’enseignement universitaire est réduit d’année en année, notre propos est de chercher à récupérer le temps perdu en insistant, au début de l’année d’un cours de Langue et Traduction française, sur l’oralité. Partant du poème et du jeu sur les signifiants et jonglant avec les signifiés, nous (...) essayerons de motiver les étudiants, peu enclins à la lecture de la poésie et qui, en outre, négligent de se mettre quotidiennement devant un miroir durant quatre ou sept minutes, temps prescrit par les méthodes phonétiques et phonologiques, et nécessaire pour acquérir de nouvelles habitudes phonatoires. Une partie de cet article sera dédiée aux poètes pour montrer comment la force orale du poème peut devenir un atout majeur pour une bonne prononciation ; une autre, à partir d’un vers, sera une sorte de « cahier de création » phonique, sémantique voire poétique. (shrink)

Cet article vise à réintégrer la question du langage intérieur dans les idées linguistiques de l’énonciation, notamment celles sur le mode de signifiance et l’opération énonciative. En nous référant aux études de Benveniste, de Merleau-Ponty et de Culioli, nous examinons dans quelle mesure le langage intérieur se distingue du monologue intérieur au sens de se parler à soi-même : ce langage intérieur en tant qu’expression pure et naturelle du sens général, implique une réflexivité non consciente et non verbale, dans la (...) genèse du sens ainsi que dans la construction dynamique des formes discursives. Eu égard à ces valeurs, nous procédons à l’analyse énonciative du discours littéraire de la conscience. Plusieurs faits de discours, liés à la non-coïncidence entre le mot et la chose vécue dans la conscience, tels que la nomination, l’indéfinition, la négation, manifestent les traces du langage intérieur global, non construit, inconscient et silencieux, qui mobilise le langage extériorisé. (shrink)

En 1936, Hubert Elie publiait une these remarquable: Le complexe significabile, accompagnee de l'edition et de la traduction du Traitee de l'infini de Jean Mair. Sous le terme technique de complexe significabile se trouve abordee la question du signifiable par complexe, c'est-a-dire du signifie de la proposition et de son statut objectif. L'ouvrage propose ainsi une double approche de la notion de signification et de ses rapports a la reference ontologique: l'analyse classique depuis Gregoire de Rimini a Leibniz, les points (...) de vue contemporains tels que Meinong ou Russell. (shrink)

La plupart des approches développées en philosophie adop-tent la notion de représentation pour expliquer la relation entre l’esprit, le langage et le monde. L’idée générale est que les pensées représentent les faits du monde via des concepts et que le langage sert d’intermédiaire entre les deux en exprimant les pensées. Le lien est tissé par la signifi-cation. Certains pensent que la signification peut être analysée en termes des pensées des locuteurs. Comme pareilles pensées sont essentiellement intentionnelles, on explique la signification (...) à partir de l’intentionnalité et donc le langage à partir de l’esprit. Pour d’autres, l’esprit et le langage sont interdépendants. La structure de la pensée est déterminée en ana-lysant la structure profonde du langage. Les agents lient les contenus propositionnels au monde lorsqu’ils pensent ou parlent. Par contre, certains philosophes sont opposés aux deux conceptions antérieures. Ils refusent l’idée d’expliquer la signification en termes de pensées inten-tionnelles. Ils l’expliquent en termes de comportement langagier, mais sans pour autant faire référence au mental. Le langage est alors possible sans la pensée. Le but général de ce travail est de montrer pourquoi les approches philosophiques traditionnelles ont misé sur l’idée de représen-tation ou de signification pour expliquer l’interaction entre l’esprit, le langage et le monde. Plus particulièrement, j’explique pourquoi la théorie des actes de discours adopte une approche intermédiaire. Selon elle, l’esprit fonde le langage. Il y a donc primauté de la pensée sur le langage. Mais le principe d’exprimabilité exige une interdépendance entre pensée et langage. (shrink)

Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental propositions is developed into (...) several specific thesis about mental propositions: a) it is not judgement which gives its unity to mental propositions, but judicative acts always follow some previous apprehensive act that is simple in its own right; b) this simplicity is compatible with a certain kind of complexity, that can be explained in terms of the "causal history" of the acts of knowing; c) traditional conceptions about subject and predicate must be recast, while keeping their usual explicative power concerning logical properties; d) of course, the traditional conception about the copula has been modified, giving rise to a fully innovative conception of the nature of mental propositions. Nevertheless, this innovative conception of mental language seems still infected by certain "common sense" prejudices, which lead Pardo to propose also a provocative conception of vocal language, which I consider unnecessary. (shrink)

Goodman gave us resources for recognizing art; he enumerated “symptoms of the aesthetic” or features which explain something’s functioning as a work of art. But that’s not enough to tell us how a work of art signifies or bears meaning. I apply Goodman’s notion of exemplification to address the question of how dances signify. It is too often assumed that if dance doesn’t fit the model of natural language then it can’t have cognitive content; this essay is concerned with showing (...) how it can. I consider Yvonne Rainer’s dance Trio A, an archetype of the pedestrian postmodem dance of the 1960s. Although at first sight it appears to be an instance of ordinary movement, Trio A is not ordinary movement simpliciter. I argue that Trio A conveys what it does by representing something we take to be pedestrian movement, and it represents by exemplifying certain features we associate with ordinary movement. Representation and signification cannot be equated and what is signified depends not only on what is represented but on how it comes to be represented by the work. (shrink)

Goodman gave us resources for recognizing art; he enumerated “symptoms of the aesthetic” or features which explain something’s functioning as a work of art. But that’s not enough to tell us how a work of art signifies or bears meaning. I apply Goodman’s notion of exemplification to address the question of how dances signify. It is too often assumed that if dance doesn’t fit the model of natural language then it can’t have cognitive content; this essay is concerned with showing (...) how it can. I consider Yvonne Rainer’s dance Trio A, an archetype of the pedestrian postmodem dance of the 1960s. Although at first sight it appears to be an instance of ordinary movement, Trio A is not ordinary movement simpliciter. I argue that Trio A conveys what it does by representing something we take to be pedestrian movement, and it represents by exemplifying certain features we associate with ordinary movement. Representation and signification cannot be equated and what is signified depends not only on what is represented but on how it comes to be represented by the work. (shrink)

Dire précisément ce que signifient littéralement certaines expressions est souvent important. La compréhension satisfaisante de nombreuses expressions normatives en effet, qu’elles soient juridiques, morales, religieuses, poétiques ou autres, suppose de comprendre ce qu’elles signifient à la fois littéralement et non littéralement. Malgré des recherches pourtant sérieuses et durables sur la nature du « sens littéral », depuis les anciennes théories religieuses jusqu’aux théories linguistiques et philosophiques contemporaines, une explication généralement satisfaisante des significations supposées littérales des phrases normatives peut s’avérer étonnamment (...) insaisissable. À partir des échanges serrés entre Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett et Ian Hacking, j’aborde un cas de compréhension du littéral dans un discours normatif artistiquement représenté qui est tout aussi difficile à éclaircir. À la différence de Davidson, toutefois, je ne me concentrerai pas sur les aspects qui sont les conditions de vérité des significations littérales supposées des contenus propositionnels de phrases bien assurées et présentées de manière littéraire. J’aimerais plutôt attirer une attention renouvelée sur plusieurs aspects problématiques des significations présumées littérales, spécialement dans des phrases interrogatives présentées sous un jour littéraire lors de conversations normatives lourdes d’un poids éthique.Saying just what some expressions mean literally is often important. For understanding satisfactorily many normative expressions, whether legal moral religious poetic or whatever, requires understanding what these normative expressions mean both literally and non-literally. Despite however serious, protracted investigations of the nature of “the literal sense” from ancient religious theories to contemporary linguistic and philosophical theories, a generally satisfactory account of what the supposed literal meanings of normative sentences might come to remains surprisingly elusive. Taking my cue from Donald Davidson’s closely argued exchanges with Michael Dummett and Ian Hacking, I take up a puzzling instance of understanding the literal in artistically represented normative discourse. Unlike Davidson, however, I will focus not on the truth-conditional aspects of the supposed literal meanings of the propositional contents of literarily represented assertive sentences. Rather, I would like to call renewed attention to several puzzling communicative aspects of supposed literal meanings, especially in literarily represented interrogative sentences in ethically charged normative conversations. (shrink)

Gillett argues that there are unexpected confluences between the tradition of Frege and Wittgenstein and that of Freud and Lacan. I counter that that the substance of the exegeses of Frege and Wittgenstein in Gillett's paper are flawed, and that these mistakes in turn tellingly point to unclarities in the Lacanian picture of language, unclarities left unresolved by Gillett. Lacan on language is simply a kind of enlarged/distorted mirror image of the Anglo-American psychosemanticists: where they emphasize information and representation, he (...) emphasizes evocation and connotation. Neither contrasting emphasis is remotely adequate to linguistic action-in-the-world. Is "the unconscious", as Lacan claims, a "network of signifiers"? Arguably, yes; but most ordinary / actual language does not involve such "signification". Words primarily "signify" concepts or things only in exceptional circumstances; normally, words are transparent, and nothing at all is meant by them except in an actual situation of use of a sentence. Second, is "the unconscious" structured like a language? Again, yes-- if we understand by "language" what Lacan asks us to. "The unconscious" arguably is structured like a language--as Lacan (inadequately) understands language. (shrink)

Thomas Bradwardine's solution to the semantic paradoxes, presented in his Insolubilia written in Oxford in the early 1320s, turns on two main principles: that a proposition is true only if things are wholly as it signifies; and that signification is closed under consequence. After exploring the background in Walter Burley's account of the signification of propositions, the question is considered of the extent to which Bradwardine's theory is compatible with the distribution of truth over conjunction, disjunction, negation and the conditional.

Le glissement de l’attention du langage parlé vers le langage intérieur dans la philosophie médiévale est bien connu. Ce qui n’a jamais été remarqué est le rôle joué par la reconnaissance des paradoxes et problèmes de signification posés par les caractéristiques physiques du langage parlé. Cet essai examine ces paradoxes et les solutions apportées dans les écrits de Pierre Abélard, de ses contemporains, et de quelques auteurs du début du xiii e siècle.

Short description: Part A : Philosophy, Literature, and Knowledge – Chapter I : Idealism and the Absolute – A. J. B. Hampton: “Herzen schlagen und doch bleibet die Rede zurück?” Philosophy, poetry, and Hölderlin’s development of language suffi cient to the Absolute – P. Sabot: L’absolu au miroir de la littérature. Versions de l’Hégélianisme’ chez Villiers de l’Isle Adam et chez Mallarmé – P. Gordon: Nietzsche’s Critique of the Kantian Absolute – Chapter II: Philosophy and Style – J.-P. Larthomas: Le (...) cas Kierkegaard (1813-1855) ou l’écriture comme dialectique de l’écoute – S. Hüsch: Style et signifi cation. Intériorité et communication indirecte chez Søren Kierkegaard – A. Milon: La question du style en philosophie: la grammaire non-style – C. Van Lerberghe: La question du style dans la phénoménologie asubjective de Jan Patocka – Chapter III: Poetry and Philosophy – J.-B. Dussert: Martin Heidegger en ses poèmes – C. de Roche: The poem and the monad: On the reception of Leibniz‘ monadology in Paul Celan’s poetics – M. de Jesus Cabral: Entre théâtre et philosophie : notes sur la poétique de Maurice Maeterlinck – Chapter IV : Literature, Philosophy, and (new) Mythology – A. Martinengo: La raison hors de soi. Herméneutique et mythe chez Paul Ricoeur – G. Boggio Marzet Tremoloso: Démythologisation comme acte mythopoïétique: le cas de Jason de Elisabeth Porquerol. – G. Coulter: Jean Baudrillard: The Literary / Poetic Philosopher – Chapter V : Literature and Ethics – J. Azoulai: L’Éthique de Spinoza dans Bouvard et Pécuchet: un vertige philosophique et littéraire – I. Vendrell: Can Literature be Moral Philosophy? A sceptical view on the Ethics of Literary Empathy – F. Picon: Envisager Todorov: Poétique, éthique et humanisme contemporain – Chapter VI : Philosophy and Textuality – E. Lecler: La littérature : la mort de la philosophie – J. A. Gosetti- Ferencei: Writing in Philosophy and the Literature and Philosophy of Writing (Plato, Mann, Blanchot) –W. Cristaudo: Bringing Back Character and Grammar: Freeing Literature from Excessive Reliance on Philosophy and Theory – C. Alfano: Parenthesising Cracks into the Ground of Philosophy: The Textuality of Stanley Cavell’s Philosophical Writing – Part B: Perspectives of a Dialogue between Philosophy and Literature: Philosophical Refl ections in Literary Creation – Chapter VII : Philosophical Dialogue and Literature – A. Baillot: Tieck et Solger, un dialogue philosophicolittéraire – V. Altachina: Le dialogue philosophique chez Diderot et chez Dostoïevski – Chapter XIII : Bergsonien Infl uences in Literature – C. Dewas: Bergson et Katzantzakis. Les limites du langage comme condition d’une métaphysique de la littérature – E. Pesenti Rossi: La philosophie à l’épreuve de la poésie : Bergson et Ungaretti – Chapter IX : Wittgenstein and Literature – G. Valdemarca: La revanche du sens commun : Wittgenstein, Musil et la chute de la certitude – A. Leaker: From the ‘numinous glow’ to ‘gut squalor’: Transcendence and the Ordinary in Wittgenstein and Don DeLillo’s Underworld – A. den Dulk: Wallace and Wittgenstein: Literature as Dialogue Concerning the Real World – Chapter X: Borges and Semprun: Writers and Philosophers – J.-F. Mattéi: Borges et la philosophie – T. Capmartin: Voyage au bout de la représentation dans Fictions: Quelques remarques ménardiennes sur Borges et le stoïcisme – V. Capdevielle- Hounieu: Jorge Semprún et l’hybridation du littéraire et du philosophique : pour une ‘fi ction essayistique’ – Chapter XI : Literary (Mis-) Readings of Philosophy – P. Lasarte: Misreadings of Arthur Schopenhauer in Sin Rumbo by Eugenio Cambaceres – S. Roldan: Qu’est-ce qui est fort comme la mort selon Maupassant? La détermination ultime d’Olivier Vertin vue sous l’angle de Schopenhauer – B. Nickel: L’infl uence de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) sur la poésie concrète – Chapter XII: The Impact of Philosophy on 20th Century Literature and Poetry – B. Ertugrul: Walter Benjamin et Ingeborg Bachmann entre littérature et philosophie – J. Leclercq / M. Watthee-Delmotte: Michel Henry : pour un langage de la subjectivité. La pensée du roman Le Fils du roi – J. Hobus: “The happiness of the concentration camps”: Reading Imre Kertész’ Novel Fatelessness with Albert Camus’ Concept of the Absurd – S. Frogel: Man without God: Nietzsche, Kafka and Camus Der Herausgeber Sébastian Hüsch, Studium der Philosophie, Geschichte,. (shrink)

L’éthique de Wittgenstein, bien que difficile à saisir, est essentielle à sa philosophie. Afin de la comprendre, nous devons réfléchir tant à la valeur qu’au langage visant à exprimer, tandis que ce dernier échoue dans son entreprise même. Selon Wittgenstein, l’éthique est « surnaturelle » : une pleine saisie de la signification de ce terme exige une compréhension du caractère « accidentel » de tout ce qui est, i.e. qui tout ce qui appartient au monde. Nous verrons aussi comment Wittgenstein (...) utilise la notion de « solipsisme », pour signifier l’intrication entre l’individu et la réalité en tant que tout. En ce qui concerne le langage, l’impossibilité de propositions éthiques, centrale dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus, initie, dans la Conférence sur l’éthique, un regard réflexif sur la tendance à « affronter les murs de notre cage ». Ce n’est que sur cet arrière-plan éthique que nous pouvons comprendre la place de la religion chez Wittgenstein: Dieu (comme la valeur) réside en dehors du monde et il y a une identité entre « bon » et « divin ». (shrink)

Au Roland Barthes critique, celui des analyses litteraires des Essais critiques, du Sur Racine ou des constructions theoriques nourries par la linguistique et le structuralisme comme le Degre zero de l ecriture, S/Z, le Systeme de la mode; au Roland Barthes ecrivain, sachant meler, avec une originalite inimitable, fiction et reflexions analytiques dans le Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes ou les Fragments d un discours amoureux, il faudrait ajouter un Roland Barthes, moins connu et moins analyse, celui de l - (...) amateur - d art. Il n aura pas fallu attendre son dernier livre, La Chambre claire, pour savoir que Roland Barthes aimait les uvres d art visuel et qu il pratiquait lui-meme, avec grand plaisir et serieux, la peinture. Des ses premiers textes rassembles dans les Essais critiques, il associe a des etudes sur Tacite, Chateaubriand, Baudelaire ou Robbe-Grillet, un essai sur Pieter Saenredam avec lequel il ouvre un recueil pourtant consacre a la litterature. Tout au long de son uvre, que cela soit sous la forme de preface de catalogues consacres a des artistes contemporains (Bernard Requichot, Daniel Boudinet, Cy Twombly), d articles sur des artistes classiques (Arcimboldo, Artemisia Gentileschi) ou de reflexions plus generales sur l art (le kitsch, le cinema, l abstraction, la musique), Roland Barthes a accorde une attention toute particuliere aux images. Elles etaient, a ses yeux, bien plus qu un passe-temps, un delassement intellectuel qui l eloignait de son veritable travail critique. L image, et l imaginaire qui lui est lie, possede une vertu que le texte ne semble pas pouvoir revendiquer: meler le langage expressif au discours critique, faire emerger la - substance sous le concept - et pousser la question de la signification jusqu a sa limite la plus extreme. Sans s embarrasser des regles methodiques dictees par l histoire de l art, en se voulant - sauvage et sans culture - devant ces uvres d art qui venaient a lui comme par - inadvertance -, qui l incitaient a l - aventure -, Roland Barthes a elabore une - esthetique - qui demeure une des plus singulieres et utiles contributions a l etude des images. Le - troisieme sens - et son correlat, la - signifiance - (cet - au-dela - du sens), l - imaginaire de l image - ou bien encore le celebre couple Punctum/ Studium avec lequel il precise la dimension subjective de tout commerce avec les uvres sont autant de propositions methodiques que l auteur reconsidere attentivement afin de tirer toute la force heuristique de cette - lecon de l image - a laquelle nous convie Roland Barthes. La - lecon de l art - que Barthes retient de son commerce constant avec les uvres d artistes contemporains (Cy Twombly, Daniel Boudinet, Bernard Requichot) ou anciens (Saenredam, Arcimboldo) a permis de developper une reflexion singuliere sur le fonctionnement des images. - En elaborant des notions comme la - signifiance -, le - troisieme sens - ou le fameux - punctum - afin de traduire les effets que les images provoquaient sur lui, Barthes a compose une veritable esthetique qu il est temps de lire avec autant de serieux que de plaisir.". (shrink)

Aristotle says at the start of the De interpretatione that words symbolise thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. The present paper argues that he is speaking here primarily of the signification of whole sentences, and at most secondarily of the semantics of individual words. This proposal is defended by drawing attention to a shift in the meaning of ‘sign’ and cognate terms that occurs in the course of the first chapter, one which enables us to separate the way (...) in which words ‘signify’ thoughts (declarative, interrogative, etc.), by expres­sing them, from the more narrowly semantic way in which, subsequently, they are said to signify things. Aristotle’s famous opening state­ment finds its main application, not in the rudimentary grammar of nouns and verbs that follows in chapters 2-3, but later in the treatise, and above all in chapter 14, where it is invoked to establish for dialectical purposes that the relation between a sentence and its negation is the strongest of all contrarieties. Aristotle’s insis­tence, in this same treatise, on the conventional character of language is also explained: for in chapters 8 and 11 it is because of the conventionality of language, and its consequent failure to map systemati­cally onto the divisions between things, that what is in surface grammar a single sentence may turn out to be in reality two or more sentences, in other words, to signify (i.e. express) two or more different thoughts. Aristotle’s primary focus on the meanings of entire sentences is thus explained by the role of the De interpretatione as a work ancillary to dia­lectic, a discipline for which the relation between contradictory pairs of assertions is fundamen­tal. In addition, such a focus is argued (with a comparison to the Stoic lekton) to reflect Aris­totle’s teleological frame of thought. (shrink)

In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, (...) also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain, it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded and plausible. (shrink)

Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings, of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more familiar themes in (...) empiricist reflections on language, among them the signification of things (as opposed to ideas); the signifying role of whole propositions; and the possibility of reference to an “external” world. (shrink)

Partant du débat qui oppose les orientations sémiologique et esthétique, l'auteur propose une troisième voie qui, comme les deux autres, vise à rendre compte de la perception esthétique du film, mais, au lieu de s'enfermer dans l'antinomie discours-figure, ou représentation-visibilité, problématise le fait de " l'impossible à représenter " dans sa confrontation avec le langage et le visible. Ce projet peut être considéré, selon l'auteur, comme une poétique, en un sens plus radical que la notion traditionnelle ou son prolongement chez (...) les formalistes russes, étant donné le thème de " l'articulation des signifiants à l'impossible " - une poétique qui procède de la crise de la représentation dans certains films (Duras) et trouve ses principaux instruments dans la psychanalyse. La première partie du livre explore deux propositions majeures de poétique, comme étude du discours et comme approche du sensible, puis les met à l'épreuve du cinéma de Duras, avant d'utiliser les conclusions de cette partie pour instaurer un débat épistémologique autour de la théorie psychanalytique du sujet divisé, laquelle permet d'accéder à la problématique centrale du livre : la rencontre avec le réel comme impossible. Cette perspective renvoie aux travaux de Jacques Lacan sur lesquels l'auteur se fonde pour introduire sa contribution la plus personnelle : le projet d'une nouvelle poétique du cinéma. (shrink)

THAT DESCARTES WAS INTERESTED from the very start of his philosophic career in developing a method for problem-solving that could be applied generally to the solution of "unknowns" is well known. Also well known is the further development of the method by the introduction of the technique of hyperbolic doubt in his mature, metaphysical works, especially in the Meditations. Perhaps less widely appreciated is the important role that accounts of systems of signs played in the development of his early accounts (...) of a method; it is crucial to the method that the elements of problems be identified and signified by simple and convenient signs that can then be arranged to display the relations among the known elements and the unknown solution. Commentators such as Michel Foucault have brought this interest in signification to our attention and shown the widespread importance of such projects in the seventeenth century. Few, however, have examined the relation between the early projects of signification and the later, metaphysical works. I suggest that one way to understand Descartes' metaphysical turn in his mature work is as an attempt to ground the accounts he has offered of signification in something further: representation, particularly mental representation. From the start, Descartes explains signification by reference to mental representation: a word, figure, or symbol signifies its objects by prompting the mind to think of those objects. Although Descartes offers detailed and comprehensive accounts in works such as the Rules for the Direction of the Mind of what constitutes effective and convenient systems of signification by way of the relations between signifying element, system, and the objects signified thereby, the mental operations that allow signification to operate, especially that of the "intuition of simple natures," is never fully explained. It remains to the mature phase of Descartes' career to crack open the basic operations of our thought by developing the full-fledged doctrine of ideas--a doctrine that makes explicit how an object is represented to a subject. (shrink)

Students of later medieval semantics are familiar with the controversy that developed at the end of the thirteenth century over the signification of names. The debate focused on the signification of common nouns such as ‘man’ and ‘animal’: Do they signify an extramental thing or a mental representation of an extramental thing?Some authors at the end of the thirteenth century also discussed another question concerning what names signify, that is, whether they signify the composite of matter and form or only (...) the form of the composite. This second debate will not be considered in this article. Duns Scotus is commonly recognized as having played an important role in this debate.See Costantino Marmo, “Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus,” in Umberto Eco and Costantino Marmo, ed., On Medieval Theory of Signs, (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1989), pp. 161–63; and esp. Dominik Perler, “Duns Scotus on Signification,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3 (1993): 97–120. On the topic in general, see Paul Vincent Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1982), pp. 188–90; Jan Pinborg, “Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts,” in Albert Zimmermann, ed., Der Begriff der Repraesentatio im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1971): 238–81; Elizabeth J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 43–53; Claude Panaccio, “From Mental Word to Mental Language,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 125–47. In his Ordinatio, he alludes to a magna altercatio among his contemporaries concerning signification.John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1.27.1–3 n.83, in Commissio Scotistica, ed, Opera omnia 6 (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis, 1963), p. 97. What is more, he gives, in his two commentaries on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias, a detailed and fair analysis of the two contrasting positions on this issue.John Duns Scotus, Super Peri hermeneias 1.2, and Super Peri hermeneias 2.1, in Opera omnia 1 (Paris: L. Vivès, 1891), pp. 540–44, 582–85. Scotus’s logical commentaries are usually thought to have been composed before his theological writings, in the last decade of the thirteenth century. (shrink)

Des Anglophones peuvent éprouver quelques difficultés à comprendre la différence entre « langue » et « langage », car en anglais il existe un seul mot pour les deux, à savoir « language ». L’œuvre de Pierre-Yves Raccah est caractérisé par une très grande précision et rigueur ; cela est bien illustré par la terminologie qu’il a établi selon laquelle le terme « langue » correspond à une langue naturelle comme le Français ou l’Anglais ; alors que le terme « (...) langage » renvoie à un langage formel, le langage de la logique. Les énoncés dans une langue naturelle sont généralement des « phrases », ce qui signifie que leur interprétation appelle toujours une négociation et dépend fortement de la situation contextuelle. Par contre, les énoncés dans un langage formel prennent la forme de propositions logiques, qui possèdent apparemment une seule interprétation – quoique, il convient de le préciser, cette apparence dépend en réalité d’un contexte bien particulier, celui qui est établi par la communauté des logiciens. Raccah a déployé cette distinction importante dans un article qui constitue le point focal de cette contribution. Raccah y présente un argument bien structuré, qui le conduit à conclure que « la métaphore n’existe pas ». La raison est que dans les langues naturelles, tous les mots sont normalement des métaphores ; il s’ensuit que « la métaphore », comme trope particulier qui appelle une explication, n’existe effectivement pas. Dans ma contribution, je propose de présenter une approche complémentaire, prenant comme cadre le paradigme de l’Énaction en Sciences Cognitives, qui conduit à une conclusion sensiblement identique. Finalement, je propose de formuler une nouvelle question qui se pose si l’on considère que « la métaphore » est normale ; il s’agit du statut des « énoncés littéraux » qui, par une ironie du sort suite au renversement de la situation, deviennent à leur tour problématiques. (shrink)

Les problèmes de classification des noms de parenté tels que papa, maman, tonton, fiston, etc., comme noms propres ou comme noms communs, prennent une nouvelle dimension si l’on intègre, d’une part, certains emplois sans déterminant du nom commun tel que bébé (ex : Si maman va bien, bébé va bien), et d’autre part certains emplois sans déterminant de noms déposés (ex : Restez zen, Twingo maintient la pression de freinage automatiquement). L’objectif principal de cet article est d’utiliser ces emplois pour (...) faire évoluer les théories des noms, propres et communs. A partir de la proposition d’Alan Gardiner, qui fait jouer un rôle central au signifiant du nom propre, complétée par le concept de « sphère de validité » inspiré de Benoit de Cornulier, ce travail jette les bases d’une description unifiée. (shrink)

I examine a sixteenth-century development of the anti-realist propositional semantics which is based on the notion of ‘mode’. Pardo uses this notion to offer a personal interpretation of the Buridanian criticism of complexe significabilia. He develops a middle way between the reduction of the significate of propositions to particular things and the postulation of non-standard entities which are only complexly signifiable. The key to this middle way is Pardo's understanding of the notion of ‘mode’ as connoting a relation between individual (...) things. He offers a new interpretation of the signification of syncategorematic terms, and a definition of ‘comparative’ notions, by which something is known ‘relatively’ with respect to some other thing. And a real relational correlate is postulated for these relational ways of knowing. Relations are thus used to grant a specific significate of propositions, without renouncing the strict Buridanian rejection of any extra-categorial complexe significabilia. The role of r... (shrink)

While Descartes's status as a "representationalist" is often a subject of vehement debate, what exactly he means by "representation" is not. I look to Descartes's early work to show that he first conceives of representation through signification, in which the sign and the signified are isomorphic; on this view, relations of representation can be arbitrary and are to be distinguished from relations of resemblance. I then examine images to show the possibility of an image constructing a relation to its viewer, (...) or "subject-position," in which that subject-position fails to display the attributes of extended things. Such a construction might be applied to the "I" of the Meditations--distinct from all extended substances, it nonetheless has direct access to them through its non-objectified sense-ideas. On this basis, I propose a "model" of representation for ideas: an idea represents its object O to a subject-position S through a vehicle of representation X under some relation R. I argue that this model can explain the uses Descartes makes of "represent," particularly for ideas. But it must be understood properly: Descartes comes to conceive of the vehicle of representation simply as the form taken by the direct interaction of the mind and the things objectively present to it--but a form that can take on a life of its own, giving rise to the possibilities of clarity and distinctness or of confusion in ideas. But what is truly novel about Descartes's conception is the mind's ability to form higher-order representations that represent the conditions of representation itself, thereby achieving certainty for some mental representations without starting from any incorrigible, immediate perceptions. This possibility is realized most clearly in the understanding of my nature as a thinking and representing being, where I can represent myself as the subject-position distinct from all extended things, but also can represent myself as joyfully and representatively united with a body all my own. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Dans la tradition logique de la philosophie analytique, comprendre la signification d’un énoncé, c’est comprendre ses conditions de vérité. Dans la tradition du langage naturel, la signification est liée à l’usage du langage. Depuis Grice, elle est liée aux attitudes et aux actions des interlocuteurs. Selon Austin, Searle et Vanderveken, signifier c’est utiliser des mots avec l’ intention d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Pareils actes ont des conditions de félicité plutôt que des conditions de vérité. Selon nous, signifier c’est (...) essentiellement tenter d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Et comme toute tentative est une action intentionnelle plutôt qu’une attitude, signifier c’est agir intentionnellement. ABSTRACT: In the logical tradition of analytical philosophy, to understand the meaning of an utterance is to understand its truth conditions. In the tradition of natural language analysis, meaning is related to language use. Since Grice, meaning is linked to speakers’ attitudes and actions. Following Austin, Searle, and Vanderveken, to mean is to use words with the intention of performing illocutionary acts. Such acts have felicity conditions instead of truth conditions. The aim of my work is to clarify the nature of meaning in the second tradition. In my view, to mean something is mainly to attempt to perform illocutionary acts. Any attempt is an intentional action rather than an attitude. (shrink)

Le terme « totalitaire » est issu d’un réseau discursif indissociable d’actes meurtriers. D’où le sens donné à l’expression de « langage totalitaire » : un langage de coercition, lié à la violence, au meurtre et à la terreur. Les communications présentées à Cerisy-la-Salle tentent de caractériser un tel langage. Chercheurs en communication, en sciences du langage, en sociologie ou en littérature, philosophes et psychanalystes s’interrogent sur la tyrannie logique du discours de la terreur et les manipulations mortifères mises en (...) œuvre d’hier à aujourd’hui. Les analyses de Victor Klemperer sur le discours nazi et ses observations scrupuleuses sur les signes de ce régime sont une référence primordiale. Les diverses études montrent comment se met en place une logique d’assujettissement à partir du matériau signifiant et de sa mise en scène. L’interrogation porte enfin sur les formes de résistance à opposer à ce langage.The term « totalitarian » is a product of a discursive system that is inseparable from acts of murder, hence the meaning given to the expression « totalitarian language » as a language of coercion linked to violence, murder and terror. The papers given in Cerisy-la-Salle attempt to characterise this language, through the reflections of researchers in communication, language sciences, sociology and literature on the logical tyranny of the discourse of terror and its murderous manipulations, both past and present. Victor Klemperer’s analyses of Nazi discourse and his scrupulous observations on signifiers in the Nazi regime are references of paramount importance. The different studies show how the logic of subjection takes hold as it spreads from a body of signifying material and the representations given to it. Finally, the question is raised of forms of resistance to language of this kind. (shrink)

Dans le dialogue philosophique sur le Maitre, Augustin soutient devant son fils Adeodat la these qu'aucun homme ne peut rien apprendre au moyen du langage. Selon lui, loin de montrer ce qu'ils signifient, les signes ne font qu'avertir celui qui les percoit de consulter ses sens, sa memoire ou le Maitre interieur, c'est-a-dire la verite, qui enseigne immediatement a l'esprit tout ce qu'il peut comprendre. Le present commentaire s'attache a eclairer la demonstration d'Augustin en la situant dans l'ensemble de son (...) oeuvre. Il etudie ses emprunts aux principales doctrines antiques de la signification (grammaire ancienne, semantique stoicienne, critique sceptique des signes) et montre comment ceux-ci sont refondus dans une oeuvre originale, qui est sans doute le chef-d'oeuvre de l'Antiquite sur le langage. Au-dela de l'horizon antique, la perspective s'ouvre a des thematiques contemporaines. L' image augustinienne du langage presentee par Wittgenstein au debut des Recherches philosophiques sert de modele pour apprecier la pertinence de la critique du pouvoir des signes menee dans le Maitre, ou l'on voit Augustin s'interroger sur la signification des parties du discours, mettre en evidence la reflexivite du langage et delimiter le domaine de competence des mots et de la definition ostensive. (shrink)

Certains auteurs germanophones contemporains exploitent la discordance entre la présence attendue du déterminant du groupe nominal (GN) en allemand et l’absence d’actualisateur pour coder une variété germano-turque, désignée par le terme Kiez, qui signifie métonymiquement « langage des quartiers ». Un exemple en est la menace rituelle « ich mach dich messer », qu’on pourrait traduire littéralement par : « je te fais couteau » et qui correspond pragmatiquement à une signification de type « tu vas avoir affaire à mon (...) couteau ». L’absence de tout déterminant pour le substantif Messer met en scène une langue inhabituelle pour le lecteur germanophone. La contribution analyse les réalisations et leurs effets chez deux auteurs germano-turcs contemporains : Feridun Zaimoglu dans le recueil Kanak Sprak, écrit dans cette « langue de canaques », et Emine Sevgi Özdamar dans l’ensemble de titre Mutterzunge, « Langue de la mère ». (shrink)

Philosophie du langage et philosophie de l'esprit constituent désormais un tout indissociable. Les expressions linguistiques «signifient». Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? François Recanati distingue trois réponses possibles. Selon la première, signifier c'est (pour une expression linguistique) être associée à des représentations mentales. Selon la deuxième, signifier c'est «faire référence» et renvoyer à quelque chose dans le monde – une réalité extralinguistique. Selon la troisième, enfin, signifier, c'est jouer un rôle distinctif dans cette activité sociale qu'est la parole. La première réponse (...) renvoie aux représentations mentales. Mais qu'est-ce, pour une représentation mentale, que d'avoir un contenu? La vraie question, est-on tenté de penser, est plus générale : qu'est-ce que signifier ou avoir un contenu? Qu'est-ce qu'une représentation (linguistique ou mentale)? Les philosophes contemporains recherchent une théorie du contenu qui soit suffisamment générale pour s'appliquer à la pensée aussi bien qu'au langage. François Recanati nous introduit à leurs efforts, et conclut en faveur de l'approche «pragmatique» inspirée de Wittgenstein. Ce qui fait que la pensée et le langage représentent le monde, c'est avant tout le fait que la pensée et le langage sont dans le monde, qu'ils y ont leur place et y jouent leur rôle. (shrink)

La theorie de la signification a joue un role central dans le developpement de la phenomenologie. Jocelyn Benoist essaye d'en donner un expose systematique, y decelant le paradoxe que represente l'influence decisive d'un auteur qui n'utilise pas le concept d'intentionalite (Bolzano), relu et reinterprete par Husserl au moyen de ce meme concept. L'oeuvre de Husserl se situe au croisement de Bolzano et de Brentano, d'une pensee du sens et d'une pensee de l'acte, de l'objectivisme logique et de la description psychologique (...) et pragmatique: c'est le principe de lecture adopte ici. Cette enquete sur la theorie de la signification de Husserl conduit a revisiter tous les lieux classiques de la philosophie du langage et de la logique contemporaine, mis en vedette depuis par la philosophie analytique: theorie du sens, de la grammaire, de la verite, de la proposition, du nom propre, de l'indexicalite, des performatifs, etc. On mesure ainsi le point auquel la pensee de Husserl etait deja installe de plain-pied dans ces problematiques, et ce qu'elles-memes ont, aujourd'hui, a gagner a un retour sur elle. (shrink)

English summary: This book offers a historical and critical study of one of the most important questions in contemporary philosophy: what does signify mean? The author applies Husserls phenomenology, reflecting on the existence of intentional objects, to demonstrate the ontological status of signification that has eluded psychological and referential theories. French description: Le present ouvrage propose une etude historique et critique d'une des questions les plus importantes de la philosophie contemporaine et des sciences humaines : qu'est-ce que signifier veut dire? (...) L'auteur envisage la theorie de la signification dans l'ensemble du corpus husserlien et prend en compte ces differents aspects (discours scientifique et theorique, langage ordinaire). En inscrivant la theorie husserlienne dans son contexte historique (psychologie de Brentano, logique de Bolzano), ce travail s'attache ainsi a eclairer d'un jour nouveau un moment cle de l'histoire de la philosophie. Pour Husserl, la signification n'est ni un acte immanent de la conscience, ni l'objet - reel, fictif ou ideal - auquel il se rapporte, mais une objectite categoriale. En tant que telle, elle est une espece d'objet intentionnel : le correlat de l'activite categoriale, autrement dit l'objet tel qu'il est pense, a distinguer soigneusement de l'objet qui est pense et des vecus psychiques et linguistiques au moyen desquels il est pense et exprime. C'est a partir d'une reflexion sur le mode d'etre de l'objet intentionnel que la phenomenologie de Husserl a pu devoiler le statut ontologique de la signification qui avait echappe aux theories psychologiques et referentielles. (shrink)

Sur le modèle des représentations et des propositions en soi de Bolzano, Husserl a envisagé les significations comme des unités idéales-objectives qui sont accessibles à plusieurs consciences et qui perdurent au-delà des actes psychiques passagers dans lesquels elles se réalisent. Indépen­dantes des opérations subjectives, les unités sémantiques seraient donc transcendantes, c’est-à-dire extérieures à la conscience. Cependant, en posant la subjectivité transcendantale comme un absolu par rapport auquel tout objet, réel ou idéal, se définit, la phénoménologie transcendantale-constitutive est finalement incapable de (...) rendre compte de cette transcendance dont elle nie le caractère absolu au profit de la conscience : une fois que les unités de sens sont définies comme des formations logiques issues de l’activité catégoriale, leur « transcendance » n’est plus qu’un sens d’être intention­nellement constitué. Dès lors, peut-on expliquer la « transcen­dance » des unités de sens, sans vider ce concept de son contenu essentiel, sans retirer aux significations leur indépendance et leur extériorité vis-à-vis de la conscience ? L’hypothèse la plus simple consisterait à dire qu’avant de traduire la manière dont les objets sont représentés par la conscience, les significations conceptuelles sont liées aux propriétés que la pensée a arra­chées à leurs substrats pour en faire des marques distinctives. Mais cet ancrage ontologique soulève à son tour de multiples difficultés, si bien que Husserl, pour expliquer la transcendance des significations sans contrevenir à ses principes idéalistes, n’a pas d’autre choix que d’invoquer un ancrage linguistique : une fois consignées dans des signes extérieurs, les pensées sortent de la sphère privée, acquièrent une extériorité, une publicité et une solidité en vertu desquelles elles se conservent au-delà des vécus passagers, et sont à tout moment accessibles à toute conscience. Cependant, si le langage commun apparaît, pour les consciences, comme l’ultime condition de possibilité de la transcendance des significations, il n’en demeure pas moins que la transcendance qui leur revient avant qu’elles ne soient exprimées — car pour Husserl les significations, dont l’unité s’oppose à la multiplicité des signes susceptibles de les transcrire, ne sont pas nécessaire­ment exprimées — demeure un postulat métaphysique qui pourrait bien s’effondrer avec l’hypothèse d’une traductibilité translinguistique du sens qui lui sert de corollaire. (shrink)

« Qu’est-ce que le langage et à quoi sert-il ? » -/- « Qu’est-ce qu’un signe linguistique et en quoi consiste sa signification ? » -/- « Quels sont les effets que les expressions linguistiques produisent, les contraintes qu’il faut respecter et les précautions qu’il convient de prendre lorsqu’on les utilise ? » -/- Ce complexe de questions, dont on peut retracer l’origine dans un certain nombre de textes de l’Antiquité, oriente depuis les enjeux fondamentaux de la réflexion sur la (...) nature et le sens des expressions linguistiques ainsi que sur les conditions effectives de leur utilisation. Au fil des débats philosophiques, littéraires et autres, cette compréhension du langage s’est déclinée en une variété de manières d’entendre ce que, pour une expression linguistique ou une suite d’expressions linguistiques données, « signifier » veut dire. Les contributions de ce numéro thématique se sont concentrées sur les idées linguistiques que les auteurs de langue et culture grecque – confrontés, plus ou moins explicitement, à la question « comment penser le langage ? » – ont développées afin de rendre compte du phénomène complexe de la signification comme propriété des signes linguistiques, corrélat d’un contenu de pensée ou encore comme produit d’une pratique réglée d’échanges. (shrink)

Locke seems to have conflicting commitments: we know individual ideas and all knowledge is propositional. This paper shows the conflict to be only apparent. Looking at Locke’s philosophy of language in relation to the Port Royal logic, I argue, first, that Locke allows that we have non-ideational mental content that is signified only at the linguistic level. Second, I argue that this non-ideational content plays a role in what we know when we know an idea. As a result, we can (...) see our knowledge of an idea as a form of knowledge by acquaintance: there is a direct epistemic relation between a mental object and a knowing subject. But owing to Locke’s logic, that knowledge has a tacit propositional structure expressing the truth of the idea, which gains full signification only linguistically. (shrink)

Peut-on interpréter le Cratyle sans recourir aux développements du Théétète et du Sophiste sur la proposition verbale ? L'exigence analytique, présentée pour la première fois par G. Ryle, autorise à examiner la prétention soit des noms, soit de leurs éléments phonétiques à jouer le rôle de « signifiants » authentiques. Could we give an interpretation of Cratylus without looking at the later dialogues (Theaetetus and Sophist) which carry Plato on to the concept of verbal proposition ? The requirements of analytical (...) philosophers (first, G. Ryle) lead us to examine the claim of the word or of its phonetic elements as genuine « significantes ». (shrink)

To talk about the sociology of literary representation is, first and foremost, to propose to historicize representational activity at that crucial point where its social and linguistic dimensions intersect.1 The troublesome incongruity between these two dimensions need not be minimized, but it can be grappled with as soon as the presuppositions of either the hegemony of the subject or that of language itself are questioned. In this view, the position of George Lukács tends to ignore the state of extreme vulnerability (...) and recurrent jeopardy in which representation has always found itself, just as Michel Foucault’s diametrically opposed view of the ultimate hegemony of discourse obliterates or displaces a lot of unbroken contemporary representational practice. Even more important, both these quite different approaches may be said to appear monistic in that the gaps and links between what is representing what is represented are viewed either in terms of closure and continuity or in terms of rupture and discontinuity. But as I shall proceed to glance at some representational strategies in the late modern period, the question needs to be faced whether it is not precisely in these gaps and links, and in the way in which, simultaneously, the gaps are closed and the links are broken up, that historical activity can be seen to assert itself.If the contradiction of system and event, of predetermination and performance can be seen to affect representational activity, and if this contradiction can at all be formulated in terms of a sociological Erkenntnisinteresse, issue of historicity must be discussed on more than one level: not only on the level of what is represented but also on the level of rupture between them as well as their interdependence) together and to attempt to interconnect the semiotic problematic of signification and the extratextual dimension of representativeness, as involving changeful relations of writing, reading, social reproduction, and political power. In this view, the use of signs, although never quite reducible to a referential function, must be reconsidered and this question needs to be asked: under which conditions and in which respects would it be possible to talk of sociology in that area of instability itself which marks the relations between signifier and signified, between the author’s language and the reader’s meaning? Robert Weimann is professor of English and American literature at the Zentralinstitut für Literaturgeschichte, Akademie der Künste, Berlin DDR. His books in English include Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in Theater and Structure and Society in Literary History. His most recent book-length study in German is Shakespeare und die Macht der Mimesis: Repräsentation und Autorität im Elisabethanischen Theater. (shrink)

Although Hume appeals to the representational features of perceptions in many arguments in the Treatise, his theory of representation has traditionally been regarded as a weak link in his epistemology. In particular, it has proven difficult to reconcile Hume's use of representation as causal derivation and resemblance (the Copy Principle) with his use of representation in the context of impressions and abstract ideas. This paper offers a unified interpretation of representation in Hume that draws on the resources of Berkeley's doctrine (...) of signs. On this account, while the Copy Principle still occupies the core of Hume's "content empiricism," the manner in which any perception represents is understood as involving a relation of sign to thing signified. A sign/signified interpretation has the virtue of allowing Hume to remain within the strictures of his empiricism, while underwriting the various senses in which an impression or idea could possess content. Such an interpretation is not only adequate to account for the role that mental representations play in everyday behavior, but also for the purposes of elaborating the foundations of civil society that are Hume's concern in Book 3 of the Treatise. (shrink)

I argue that maps do not feature predication, as analyzed by Frege and Tarski. I take as my foil (Casati and Varzi, Parts and places, 1999), which attributes predication to maps. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi’s own semantics militate against this attribution. Casati and Varzi emphasize what I call the Absence Intuition: if a marker representing some property (such as mountainous terrain) appears on a map, then absence of that marker from a map coordinate signifies absence (...) of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. Predication elicits nothing like the Absence Intuition. “F(a)” does not, in general, signify that objects other than a lack property F. On the basis of this asymmetry, I argue that attaching a marker to map coordinates is a different mode of semantic composition than attaching a predicate to a singular term. (shrink)

L’article propose l’analyse de trois formes de manifestation de ce que nous avons appelé l’implicite argumentatif : à visée discursive, à visée sémantique et à visée lexicale. Dans la perspective théorique de la Sémantique des Possibles Argumentatifs, nous avons défini ce phénomène sémantico-discursif, comme la reconstruction, dans l’interprétation du sens d’un énoncé ou d’un ensemble d’énoncés, d’un élément signifiant ou d’une configuration d’éléments signifiants relevant de la nature argumentative de la signification d’un mot, présent ou absent de cet énoncé ou (...) de cet ensemble d’énoncés. L’article défend, illustre et argumente les fondements sémantiques de ces trois types d’implicite argumentatif, ancrés dans le potentiel discursif de la signification des mots et dans le potentiel du sens produit dans les instances de parole, de proposer des significations lexicales régénérées. (shrink)

L’article propose l’analyse de trois formes de manifestation de ce que nous avons appelé l’implicite argumentatif : à visée discursive, à visée sémantique et à visée lexicale. Dans la perspective théorique de la Sémantique des Possibles Argumentatifs, nous avons défini ce phénomène sémantico-discursif, comme la reconstruction, dans l’interprétation du sens d’un énoncé ou d’un ensemble d’énoncés, d’un élément signifiant ou d’une configuration d’éléments signifiants relevant de la nature argumentative de la signification d’un mot, présent ou absent de cet énoncé ou (...) de cet ensemble d’énoncés. L’article défend, illustre et argumente les fondements sémantiques de ces trois types d’implicite argumentatif, ancrés dans le potentiel discursif de la signification des mots et dans le potentiel du sens produit dans les instances de parole, de proposer des significations lexicales régénérées. (shrink)

Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles, dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries from his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict what Whitaker, in his iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, dubbed “The Rule of Contradictory Pairs”, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Whitaker argued that, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory (...) pair, in which one statement affirms what the other denies of the same thing, Aristotle himself gave counterexamples to the rule. This gives some credence to Swyneshed’s claim that his solution to the logical paradoxes is not contrary to Aristotle’s teaching, as many of Swyneshed’s contemporaries claimed. Insolubles are false, he said, because they falsify themselves; and their contradictories are false because they falsely deny that the insoluble itself is false. Swyneshed’s solution depends crucially on the revision he makes to the acount of truth and falsehood, brought out in his first thesis: that a false proposition can signify as it is, or as Paul of Venice, who took up and developed Swyneshed’s solution some sixty years later, puts it, a false proposition can have a true significate. Swyneshed gave a further counterexample to when he claimed that some insolubles, like future contingents, are neither true nor false. Dialetheism, the contemporary claim that some propositions are both true and false, is wedded to the Rule, and in consequence divorces denial from the assertion of the contradictory negation. Consequently, Swyneshed’s logical heresy is very different from that found in dialetheism. (shrink)

Hartry Field's revised logic for the theory of truth in his new book, Saving Truth from Paradox , seeking to preserve Tarski's T-scheme, does not admit a full theory of negation. In response, Crispin Wright proposed that the negation of a proposition is the proposition saying that some proposition inconsistent with the first is true. For this to work, we have to show that this proposition is entailed by any proposition incompatible with the first, that is, that it is the (...) weakest proposition incompatible with the proposition whose negation it should be. To show that his proposal gave a full intuitionist theory of negation, Wright appealed to two principles, about incompatibility and entailment, and using them Field formulated a paradox of validity (or more precisely, of inconsistency). The medieval mathematician, theologian and logician, Thomas Bradwardine, writing in the fourteenth century, proposed a solution to the paradoxes of truth which does not require any revision of logic. The key principle behind Bradwardine's solution is a pluralist doctrine of meaning, or signification, that propositions can mean more than they explicitly say. In particular, he proposed that signification is closed under entailment. In light of this, Bradwardine revised the truth-rules, in particular, refining the T-scheme, so that a proposition is true only if everything that it signifies obtains. Thereby, he was able to show that any proposition which signifies that it itself is false, also signifies that it is true, and consequently is false and not true. I show that Bradwardine's solution is also able to deal with Field's paradox and others of a similar nature. Hence Field's logical revisions are unnecessary to save truth from paradox. (shrink)

Olivier Boulnois argues that a radical shift occurred in metaphysics at the end of the thirteenth century, a shift completed and systematized by Duns Scotus. The shift concerns being, the subject of metaphysics: from God to a universal exhibited by God and creatures alike . This shift went hand in hand with an account of signification as representation: signs, rather than being in some sense identical with the things they signify, merely represent these things. According to Boulnois—and this is where (...) the thesis becomes original—the basic motivation for the shift in opinion on the nature of metaphysics lay in the insight of Roger Bacon that spoken and written signs signify things directly, without the mediation of concepts. This means that there is no place for an analogy of being, since “being” is a sign either of things that fall under one concept or of things that together fall under many different concepts . “Being”—the object of thought—is identified by Scotus as non nihil, whatever is logically possible, and in this sense is univocal to the Aristotelian categories and to God. But identifying being in this way means that metaphysics does not restrict its study to the actually existent. It studies anything that is logically possible. But the logically possible is whatever can be represented: so the representable is in some sense the subject of metaphysics. Concepts are signs of the representable, and thought becomes a sort of semantics, a mental language of representational concepts whose objects are the representable, the logically possible. So ultimately the univocity of being can be traced too to the insights about representation: the status of being as the representable entails the univocity of being. Knowledge of the representable considered independently of actual existence is abstraction; knowledge that attends to the actual existence of the representable is intuition—though in both cases to know something is for a representation of it to inhere in the mind. The ultimately representable object is the divine essence, which somehow contains in itself all other representable objects—it contains “ideas” of everything other than the divine essence. As representable objects, however, these ideas depend for their existence on the divine essence: to this extent, God's mental contents are caused totally by himself. God does not require representations in order to cause; he causes the representable objects and thus causes his representations of them.Clearly, if Boulnois is right, the sorts of innovation usually associated with Wolff can be traced not merely to Suarez but in fact to Scotus and his contemporaries. And the relation with Kant is obvious enough, though the medievals would been unhappy with the Kantian twist—the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal.The importance of the book in the history of science is to some extent tangential: in this case, more a matter of circumscribing areas of disciplinary competence and relevance—determining the domain of physics by showing what metaphysics pertains to. And there are some faults: a failure to engage with the latest Scotist scholarship on the question of the relation between the possible and the thinkable and, likewise, a failure to consider with sufficient clarity the extent to which Scotus really agrees that spoken signs signify extramental reality directly. But overall Être et représentation is a significant achievement, essential reading for anyone interested in the history of metaphysics. (shrink)

Although a fascination with language is a familiar feature of 20th-century empiricism, its origins reach back at least to the early modern period empiricists. John Locke offers a detailed (if sometimes puzzling) treatment of language and uses it to illuminate key regions of the philosophical topography, particularly natural kinds and essences. Locke's main conceptual tool for dealing with language is 'signification'. Locke's central linguistic thesis is this: words signify nothing but ideas. This on its face seems absurd. Don't we need (...) words to signify things as well? But its very absurdity – our inclination to dismiss Locke as a 'linguistic idealist'– should signal to us that we have not yet understood Locke. Doing so must begin with an analysis of signification. Each of the three main interpretations on offer allows Locke to escape the charge of linguistic idealism, although they do so in very different ways. Locke's text also offers an influential account of linguistic particles, words like 'is', 'and' and 'if'. These signify, not ideas, but acts of the mind. These acts can either take place within a proposition, uniting its constituent ideas into a thought that admits of a truth-value, or they can take propositions as their objects, in which case they express attitudes like doubt, assertion and so on. Even this seemingly innocuous sketch of Locke's view is controversial, and many writers, from J.S. Mill onwards, have argued that Locke cannot make sense of propositional attitudes. Apart from the intrinsic interest of these questions, understanding how Locke thinks language works is a prerequisite for understanding his arguments against scholastic essentialism. It also illuminates later discussions of language in Berkeley, Hume and Mill. Author Recommends: 1. Losonsky, Michael. 'Language, Meaning, and Mind in Locke's Essay. ' The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay . Ed. Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 286–313. In addition to making some original points, Losonsky provides an excellent overview of the three main competing positions on Lockean signification: the Fregean reading, the Scholastic reading and the Indicator theory (see entries 2–5 in the following). 2. Kretzmann, Norman. 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory.' Locke on Human Understanding . Ed. I. C. Tipton. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 123–40. Kretzmann's influential paper offers a broadly Fregean analysis, according to which primary signification is sense and secondary, reference. Locke can then avoid the charge of linguistic idealism, as it is not the case that words signify only ideas. 3. Ashworth, E. J. 'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 299–326. Ashworth rejects Kretzmann's view, partly on the grounds of anachronism, and sets Locke in his historical context. As she reads Locke, he holds a scholastic position, according to which signification amounts to 'making known' or 'expressing'. This preserves the portmanteau analysis of Kretzmann: words can primarily signify or express ideas, while secondarily signifying things. 4. Lowe, E. J. 'Language and Meaning,' chapter 4. Locke . London: Routledge, 2005. This is a spirited defense of Locke's claim that words signify ideas against contemporary prejudices. Like Ian Hacking (see entry 7 in the following), Lowe argues that Locke is not offering a semantic theory in anything like the contemporary sense; rather, he is concerned with explaining human communication. 5. Ott, Walter. Locke's Philosophy of Language . Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. On the interpretation offered in chapter 1, Lockean signification is indication: words signify ideas in the same sense in which clouds signify rain. If this view is correct, Locke is departing from the particular scholastic tradition Ashworth focuses on, and embracing instead a tradition running from the Stoics through Thomas Hobbes. http://www.springerlink.com/content/xv362655719101n3/ 6. Winkler, Kenneth. 'Signification, Intention, Projection.' Forthcoming, Philosophia . http://www.springerlink.com/content/xv362655719101n3 Although previous commentators acknowledge the role of intentions in Locke's view (see especially Kretzmann's argument from the uses of words), Winkler claims that they are far more central to Locke's view than has been supposed. In particular, Winkler uses these considerations to criticize the indicator interpretation. 7. Hacking, Ian. Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975. Much broader in focus than these other works, Hacking's classic text has much to say about early modern views on language. Hacking argues that Hobbes and Locke do not, properly speaking, even have theories of meaning. Online Materials The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Locke, by William Uzgalis: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/ > The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Locke, author unknown: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/l/locke.htm > Sample Syllabus Weeks 1–2: What is Locke's linguistic thesis? Is it a semantic thesis at all? Ashworth, E. J. 'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 299–326. Kretzmann, Norman. 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory.' Locke on Human Understanding . Ed. I. C. Tipton. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 123–40. Locke, Essay III. i–iii. Lowe, E. J. 'Language and Meaning,' chapter 4. Locke . London: Routledge, 2005. Week 3: Propositions and attitudes Locke, Essay III. vii. Ott, Walter. 'Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy.' Dialogue 41 (2002): 1–18. Owen, David. 'Locke on Judgment.' The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay . Ed. Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 406–35. If one wanted to explore whether and how Locke applies his semiotic theory in his anti-essentialist argument, one might add (or perhaps replace Week 3 with): Week 4: Applications Bolton, Martha. 'The Relevance of Locke's Theory of Ideas to his Doctrine of Nominal Essence and Anti-Essentialist Semantic Theory.' Locke . Ed. Vere Chappell. Oxford: OUP, 1998. pp. 214–225 Locke, Essay III. vi; III.xi. 4–22. Ott, Walter. 'Locke's Argument from Signification.' Locke Studies 2 (2002): 145–76. Focus Questions 1. What is a semantic theory? What do we want out of such a theory, and does Locke even purport to provide one? 2. What are the differences among the three main competing readings of Locke? What is at stake here? What, if anything, turns on which of them accurately captures Locke's view? 3. How does Locke think his linguistic thesis tells against competing views, such as those of the scholastics? 4. What is the difference between a proposition and a list? Can Locke account for this difference? 5. There is clearly a difference between merely thinking that the cat is on the mat and asserting that it is. Can Locke account for this difference? (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas says that the eucharistic words of consecration – ‘This is my body’ (‘Hoc est corpus meum’) – are uttered by the consecrating priest both ‘significatively’ (‘significative’) and ‘recitatively’ (‘recitative’). This allows him to simultaneously account for the reference of the indexicals ‘this’ and ‘my’, the first of which must apply to some present substance, and the second of which must refer not to the priest but to Christ. This joint significative and recitative use can be distinguished from other (...) semantic and pragmatic features that the words exhibit, which I call significative productivity and instrumental representation: the words produce what they signify, and the speaker acts as an instrument of another, whom the speaker represents. Other sacramental forms share these features. What’s distinctive about the words of consecration is how they exhibit them – as a recitation. This recitative use can be explained by distinguishing between the sacramental gesture (such as the pouring of holy water or the anointing with oil) and the sacramental speech act (that is, the uttering of words that signify and produce the sacrament). In the eucharist, the sacramental gesture and sacramental speech act are one and the same. Despite identifying this intriguing linguistic phenomenon, Aquinas doesn’t fully explain. Puzzles linger, one of which concerns whether the recited words are also asserted. (shrink)