Constatant que nos étudiants italiens de FLE ont contracté, au cours des années, de mauvaises habitudes de prononciation, souvent dues à un enseignement lacunaire de la connaissance correcte des sons, et que le temps d’enseignement universitaire est réduit d’année en année, notre propos est de chercher à récupérer le temps perdu en insistant, au début de l’année d’un cours de Langue et Traduction française, sur l’oralité. Partant du poème et du jeu sur les signifiants et jonglant avec les signifiés, nous (...) essayerons de motiver les étudiants, peu enclins à la lecture de la poésie et qui, en outre, négligent de se mettre quotidiennement devant un miroir durant quatre ou sept minutes, temps prescrit par les méthodes phonétiques et phonologiques, et nécessaire pour acquérir de nouvelles habitudes phonatoires. Une partie de cet article sera dédiée aux poètes pour montrer comment la force orale du poème peut devenir un atout majeur pour une bonne prononciation ; une autre, à partir d’un vers, sera une sorte de « cahier de création » phonique, sémantique voire poétique. (shrink)

A major inspiration for the leaders of both the American Revolution and the French Revolution, Jean-Jacques Rousseau continues to be a widely read and referenced philosopher, novelist, and political theorist. This title devotes two chapters to Rousseaus eventful life, another to a detailed discussion of his 1762 work "The Social Contract," and a fourth to the impact that he had on the Founding Fathers of the United States. While "The Social Contract" is explored in the greatest depth, other of his (...) worksincluding his passionately argued Discourses, wildly popular novels, successful opera, and genre-shaping "Confessions"are also covered. (shrink)

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than ...

Manifeste de la philosophie cartésienne, le Discours de la méthode (1637) est tout à la fois le récit d'un cheminement intellectuel et l'illustration magistrale d'un projet : fonder l'unité des sciences et constituer une science universelle. Foyer d'une oeuvre foisonnante, le Discours revendique les droits de la raison contre toute tradition et toute autorité. C'est pourquoi il assigne à la philosophie une tâche : s'élever à 1a certitude. La présente édition, augmentée d'un dossier, entend mettre en évidence le jeu de (...) résonances qui relie le Discours aux autres textes de Descartes. (shrink)

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be (...) taken as consent- communicating. (shrink)

The problem of moral disagreement has been presented as an objection to contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, since it is not clear that contextualism can accommodate or give a convincing gloss of such disagreement. I argue that independently of our semantics, disagreements over ‘ought’ in non-cooperative contexts are best understood as indirect metalinguistic disputes, which is easily accommodated by contextualism. If this is correct, then rather than posing a problem for contextualism, the data from moral disagreements provides some reason to adopt (...) a semantics that allows contextual variance in the meanings of ‘ought’. (shrink)

Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents' entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can (...) take. (shrink)

The global demand for information has brought in new developments in the publicity of discursive practices of many professional areas. This study takes the professional practice of International Commercial Arbitration, a mechanism to resolve business disputes outside the courts and traditionally considered as private, to explore the process of resemiotization of information, from the strategies used by corporations in their press releases to the news reports published by national and international media. It takes the theoretical concept of interdiscursivity in critical (...) genre analysis to show that texts are the result of a combination of a very complex range of resources brought about by genres, professional practices and professional cultures, which derive not only from the ‘local’ representation of the transnational arbitration process, but also from the different corporate identities and their ways of coping with the increasing publicity of the facts of arbitration. (shrink)

Riassunto: Gli sviluppi recenti nell’ambito della ricerca sui processi decisionali relativi ai cosiddetti effetti di incorniciamento hanno ricevuto particolare attenzione da parte di quell’ambito della filosofia morale che si occupa di spiegare i dilemmi morali classici legati al famoso problema del carrello. Alcuni filosofi sostengono che illusioni cognitive come l’ effetto di incorniciamento mettano seriamente in discussione alcuni punti di vista classici della filosofia morale come, per esempio, l’ etica normativa e l’ intuizionismo morale. L’obiettivo di questo articolo è cercare (...) di mostrare se, alla luce della ricerca empirica sugli effetti di incorniciamento, possiamo mantenere un punto di vista intuizionista o meno e, più in generale, che cosa implichino questo genere di dati per la filosofia morale. Parole chiave: Filosofia morale; Intuizionismo; Effetti di inconiciamento; Dilemmi morali; Teoria del prospetto Should we Abandon Moral Intuitionism? Framing Effects and Moral Dilemmas: Recent developments in experimental research on decision-making have received attention from moral philosophers trying to explain classical moral dilemmas. The class of cognitive illusions known as framing effects have received particular attention because they appear to play a role in explaining the famous trolley-problem. Some philosophers maintain that cognitive illusions such as framing effects seriously undermine classical point of views in moral philosophy such as normative ethics and moral intuitionism. This essay investigates whether, in light of empirical research on framing effects, we can still maintain an intuitionist point of view, and what the available data imply in general for moral philosophy. Keywords: Moral Philosophy; Intuitionism; Framing Effects; Moral Dilemmas; Prospect Theory. (shrink)

If philosophy is to be faithful to her calling to serve truth and humankind, she must remain a pupil, open to the enrichment that other sciences bestow on her. This paper highlights some insights from J. H. Newman and C. S. Peirce that can shed light on our understanding of philosophy as a servant to the truth. Newman and Peirce are suitable guides for this discussion since both cultivated their intellect in various disciplines, which informed their philosophical contributions. It begins (...) by exploring how Newman and Peirce conceived philosophy as a science. Then, it discusses their views on the unity of science, which further qualify their thoughts on philosophy. Finally, it enounces some consequences for the study of philosophy which their contributions suggest. Among many others, Newman and Peirce stand out as courageous defenders of the truth and have much to contribute to the timeless conversation of philosophy. (shrink)

Some of the most relevant problems today both in Science and practical problems involves Coupled Socio-ecological Systems, which are some of the best examples of Complex Systems. In this work we discuss groundwater-management as an example of these Coupled Socio-ecological System, also known as Coupled Human and Natural Systems. We argue that it is possible and even necessary to construct a contextual statistical theory of groundwater management. Contextuality implies some very different statistical features as entanglement and complementarity. We discuss some (...) interpretation about statistical entanglement and statistical complementarity in terms of groundwater flow theory and extraction equation. To this end, we propose a non-Kolmogorobian approach following the Växjö school of thought. One of the most straightforward conclusions is that in this way, a statistical-contextual treatment of groundwater management may not only give place to new flow equations, but it could have a profound impact in resource management. Then the new basic unity of analysis should be the indivisible pair. We should not talk any more about aquifer dynamics or resource management plans by themselves. Physical and social systems are coupled in a statistical-contextual fundamental way, and a socio-hydrogeological theory should be developed. (shrink)

Sometimes speakers within a linguistic community use a term that they do not conceptualize as a slur, but which other members of that community do. Sometimes these speakers are ignorant or naïve, but not always. This article explores a puzzle raised when some speakers stubbornly maintain that a contested term t is not derogatory. Because the semantic content of a term depends on the language, to say that their use of t is semantically derogatory despite their claims and intentions, we (...) must individuate languages in a way that counts them as speaking our language L, assigns t a determinately derogatory content in L, and still accommodates the other features of slurs’ linguistic profile. Given the difficulty of doing this, there is some reason to give a non-semantic analysis of the derogatory aspect of slurs. The author suggests that rather than dismissing the stubborn as semantically incompetent, we would do better to appeal to expected uptake as moral reasons for the stubborn to adjust their linguistic practices. (shrink)

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if (...) there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today. (shrink)

A regulative norm for permissible defense distinguishes the conditions under which we will hold defenders to be innocent of any wrongdoing from those in which we hold them responsible for assault or manslaughter. The norm must strike a fair balance between defenders' security, on the one hand, and other agents’ legitimate claim to live without fear of suffering mistaken defensive harm, on the other. Since agents must make defensive decisions under high pressure and on only partial information, they will sometimes (...) make mistakes. We have reason to want a norm that considers a mistake permissible when it was highly likely on the evidence that defense was proportionate and necessary to avert a threat. However, adopting an evidentialist norm under non-ideal conditions is treacherous business. I briefly survey empirical data suggesting that the type and extent of bias prevalent in the US renders a straightforward evidentialist norm unjust, and thus since the legal practice in the US relies on such a norm, we must explore avenues for reform. Preferably this will take the form of adopting a modified evidential norm, and I explore some promising options. If this proves impossible, however, then we have to accept a strict regulative norm (which does not consider any mistakes permissible), as the sole just alternative. (shrink)

In this paper we evaluate and confirm the effectiveness of including curriculum training on career management as a component of university studies. The behaviour of the students in this study was modified by the uncertainty created by the crisis in the labour market due to the pandemic.Our results confirm that universities need to develop the generic and academic skills demanded by the labour market in order to provide their students with comprehensive training while also taking joint responsibility for developing their (...) students’ career management skills. (shrink)

Both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union believe that information and communication technologies have potential to transform the way in which we work. Many organizations, including those of the Third Social Sector, have to incorporate the web 2.0 tools and social software into their structures and their daily activity. The aim of this article is to analyze whether these tools are regularly used by institutions of the Third Social Sector in Catalonia in an attempt to (...) transform their daily tasks and move towards a change in their organizational culture. (shrink)

A popular informal argument suggests that statistics about the preponderance of criminal involvement among particular demographic groups partially justify others in making defensive mistakes against members of the group. One could worry that evidence-relative accounts of moral rights vindicate this argument. After constructing the strongest form of this objection, I offer several replies: most demographic statistics face an unmet challenge from reference class problems, even those that meet it fail to ground non-negligible conditional probabilities, even if they did, they introduce (...) new costs likely to cancel out any justificatory contribution of the statistic, but even if they didn’t, demographic facts are the wrong sort to make a moral difference to agents’ negative rights. I conclude that the popular argument should be rejected, and evidence-relative theories do not have the worrisome implication. (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy. Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the (...) alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering. (shrink)

Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired (...) capacity. Fourth, I analyze empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data show that in order to be appropriate moral demands have to acknowledge the target's autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if they can adequately respond to the moral demands. (shrink)

While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unitifed cognitive map, this this volume offers novel, even paradoxical views of the relationship. Touching on various disciplines, it considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence.

The coming of bioethics -- The coming of bioethicists -- "Choices on our conscience": the inauguration of the Kennedy Institute of Education -- "Hello, Dolly": bioethics in the media -- Celebrating bioethics and bioethicists -- Thinking socially and culturally in bioethics -- Reminiscences of observing participants -- Bioethics circles the globe -- Bioethics in France -- The development of bioethics in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan -- The coming of the culture wars to American bioethics.

This study evaluated the integration of psychology ethics into an introductory psychology course. Students in two general psychology sections were exposed to an infusion of psychology ethics in teaching, research, and clinical practice, whereas students in two sections were exposed to traditional course content. Students completed a pre and post-test assessment including a psychology ethics questionnaire and open-ended responses to three ethics case studies. Students in the ethics group displayed a statistically significant increase in scores on both measures from pre (...) to post-test. However, students in the traditional group showed no improvement in scores. (shrink)

I give a class forcing that adds a real which is Pi-1-2 and for which no forcing extension (by a set of conditions) can destroy this definability.

In social psychology, the concept of implicit attitudes has given rise to ongoing discussions that are rather philosophical. The aim of this paper is to discuss the status of implicit prejudices from a philosophical point of view. Since implicit prejudices are a special case of implicit attitudes, the discussion will be framed by a short discussion of the most central aspects concerning implicit attitudes and indirect measures. In particular, the ontological conclusions that are implied by different conceptions of implicit attitudes (...) will be scrutinized. The main question to be discussed involves whether implicit prejudices are mental states at all, or whether they are rather dispositions to behave in a certain way. This question will be discussed against the background of principles for belief ascription, which requires ascribed mental states to fulfill some specific explanatory role. We defend a conception of implicit prejudices that... (shrink)

It is often assumed that trolling is an intentional action. The aim of the paper is to argue for a form of unintentional trolling. Firstly, we outline minimal conditions for intentional actions. Secondly, an unintentional trolling example is introduced. Thirdly, we will show that in some cases, an utterance can be expressive, while it is perceived as descriptive. On the basis of the justification-suppression model, we argue that the introduced trolling example is such a case. In order to bypass social (...) sanctions for expressing prejudices, agents unintentionally express their prejudices through stories that appear to be descriptive. Thereby, the characterized behavior does not fulfill the minimal conditions for intentional action. Fourthly, we give criteria that can be used to identify unintentional trolls. Finally, after unintentional trolling is analyzed, the trolls’ behavioral goals are considered. In conclusion, an analysis of unintentional trolling is given, which has explanatory benefits in contrast to the classic intentional trolling concepts. (shrink)

Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by . Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 (...) ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect. (shrink)

A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.

​I evaluate a suggestion, floated by Kimberly Ferzan (this volume), that the twitter hashtag campaign #BelieveWomen is best accommodated by non-reductionist views of testimonial justification. I argue that the issue is ultimately one about the ethical obligation to trust women, rather than a question of what grounds testimonial justification. I also suggest that the hashtag campaign does not simply assert that ‘we should trust women’, but also militates against a pernicious striking-property generic (roughly: ‘women make false sexual assault accusations’), that (...) distorts our evaluation of women’s testimony concerning sexual assault. I conclude #BelieveWomen does not demand that we believe against the evidence, or uncritically, or be more trusting than we have evidential justification to be. Rather, it aims to bring our trust closer to what is merited by the base-rate of reliable testimony from women concerning sexual assault. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have developed indirect measurement procedures to predict suicidal behavior. A prominent example is the Death/Suicide Implicit Association Test (DS-IAT). In this paper, I argue that there is something special about the DS-IAT which distinguishes it from different IAT measures. I argue that the DS-IAT does not measure weak or strong associations between the implicit self-concept and the abstract concept of death. In contrast, assuming a goal-system approach, I suggest that sorting death-related to self-related words takes effort because death-related (...) words trigger avoidance-impulses, which suicide ideation weakens. The DS-IAT taps into weakened automatic responses from the self-preservation system. Additionally, the suggested cognitive structure, illuminated with the selfish-goal theory, explains predictable suicidal behavior. (shrink)