This paper examines the astrological and religious thinking of Moshe ben Nahman (also known as Ramban or Nahmanides) and the intellectual connections in this field with two of the most outstanding Christian thinkers of his time, Ramon Llull and Arnau de Vilanova. Nahmanides, like many medieval scholars, admitted an astral influence, but he did not accept astrology as a divinatory science. He incorporated astrological doctrines in his exegetical works, assuming that Israel is not determined by any star because (...) it only responds to God. Yet the study of medieval medicine and its application cannot be separated from astrology practice because it was considered that the stars had a direct influence not only on the development of the human body, from birth to death, but also in the disease processes which affect it. Ramban and his disciple Solomon ben Adret accepted and practiced astrological medicine. Llull and de Vilanova also devoted themselves to this discipline. All of them agree on the influence of the stars on humankind but condemned astral magic. Like Ramban, Llull rejects other astrological methods considered non-scientific in his time, such as prediction through horoscope. Thus, these thinkers tried to develop an astrology that was not in contradiction with divine omnipotence or free will. (shrink)

This volume introduces an original philosophy of Jewish religious thinking as devotional intelligence. It establishes the intellectual warrant of such thinking in light of two related principles: relativity v. intelligence—the metaphysical principle that knowing is of being—and the normative principle of sacral attunement.

Through an analysis of key themes in Heidegger's work, the book challenges the traditional theological appropriation of Heidegger and the usual characterizations of religious thinking in terms of faith or belief in, or experience of, some ultimate reality. Heidegger, it is argued, offers a unique approach to a variety of issues and problems in contemporary religious thought and philosophy of religion that results in understanding religious thinking as a resolute openness to the holiness and meaningfulness (...) of the world. (shrink)

The book is an epistemological monograph written from a multidisciplinary perspective. It provides a complex and realistic picture of cognition and rationality, as endowments aimed at making sense and reacting smartly to one's environment, be it epistemic, social or simply ecological. The first part of the book analyzes scientific modeling as products of the biological necessity to cope with the environment and be able to draw as many inferences as possible about it. Moreover, it develops an epistemological framework which will (...) be exploited in both the second part of the book, focusing on social cognition and cognitive niche construction, and the third part, dealing with the apparent irrationality of magical and religious belief. The book also discusses how both social networking and online religion influence cognition, rationality and irrational belief. (shrink)

The Soul is considered, both for religions and philosophy, to be the immaterial aspect or essence of a human being, conferring individuality and humanity, often considered to be synonymous with the mind or the self. For most theologies, the Soul is further defined as that part of the individual, which partakes of divinity and transcends the body in different explanations. But, regardless of the philosophical background in which a specific theology gives the transcendence of the soul as the source of (...) its everlasting essence – often considered to survive the death of the body –, it is always appraised as a higher existence for which all should fight for. In this regard, all religious beliefs assert that there are many unseen battles aiming to take hold of the human soul, either between divinity and evil, or between worlds, or even between the body and the soul itself. These unseen battles over the human soul raging in the whole world made it the central item of the entire universe, both for the visible and the unseen worlds, an item of which whoever takes possession will also become the ruler of the universe. Through this philosophy, the value of the soul became abysmal, incommensurable, and without resemblance. The point for making such a broad overview of the soul in religious beliefs is the question of whether we can build an interfaith discourse based on the religions’ most debated and valuable issue, soul? Regardless of the variety of religious beliefs on what seems to be the soul, there is always a residual consideration in them that makes the soul more important than the body. This universal impression is due to another belief or instead need of believing that above and beyond this seen, palpable, finite life and the world should exist another one, infinite, transcendent, and available all the same after here. This variety stretches from the minimum impact that soul has on the body, as being the superior essence that inhabitants and enlivens the matter, to the highest impact in which soul has nothing to do with matter[1] and is only ephemeral linked to it, but its existence is not at all limited, defined or depended on the matter [2], or even placed to the extreme, as the very life of the matter thus this seen universe is merely a thought in the soul/mind [3]. In this extensive variety of soul overviews, the emphasis of the soul’s importance gives an inverse significance to the body/matter, from being everything that matters to a thin, dwindle item that has no existence at all outside consciousness. (shrink)

This article discusses the use of metaphor in human attempts to communicate religious experience and insight. In particular, it argues that, all too often, metaphors are misunderstood because they are interpreted literally. Examples of primary school children's writing are provided to illustrate the problem of literalism in religious understanding. The article concludes by recommending the extensive teaching of metaphor throughout education.

Review of Sandu Frunză, Experien ţa religioasă în gîndirea lui Dumitru Stăniloae. O etică relaţională. 2nd edition, București: Eikon, 2016, 262 pag.

When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in (...) conjunction with factual statements, pointing to two different understandings of claims made with these two terms. These patterns do not appear to reflect low-level differences based on the amount of consensus surrounding a particular claim, the extent to which the truth of a particular claim is known to the participant, or linguistic differences between religious and factual statements. We discuss implications of these findings for religious cognition (e.g., as supporting the theory that religious credences are qualitatively distinct from factual beliefs) as well as cognitive processes more broadly. Finally, we relate the present findings to prior theoretical work on differences between factual belief and religious credence. (shrink)

The principles offered by beliefs affect the thinking styles of individuals. Although it has been argued in recent studies that believers and non-believers have different thinking styles, there are few studies examining the relationship between belief and cognitive styles in Muslim groups. In this study, the relationships between intrinsic religious motivation and "critical thinking", which is one of the most desired thinking skills today, and " dichotomous thinking", which can be expressed as black-and-white (...) class='Hi'>thinking and primarily associated with negative structures, were examined. The study was carried out with 395 university students, and the data was obtained by a socio-demographic information form, the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale, the Critical Thinking Disposition Scale, and the Dichotomous Thinking Scale. Findings suggested a positive significant relationship between intrinsic religious motivation and critical thinking and dichotomous thinking, and a positive significant relationship between critical thinking and dichotomous thinking. Regarding the relationship between dichotomous thinking and critical thinking, intrinsic religious motivation had a mediating role. The Islamic faith often invites reasoning and thinking and affirms this way of thinking; at the same time, it offers various conceptual tools for dichotomous thinking with discourses such as heaven-hell, good-evil, dark-light, and faith-denial. Although critical thinking and dichotomous thinking are seen as opposite constructs, the findings have been interpreted as the Islamic belief supporting both critical thinking and dichotomous thinking at the same time, thus reducing the rigidity of dichotomous thinking. The findings were discussed in the light of the relevant literature, and suggestions were made for further research. (shrink)

C ontemporary religious terrorism propels in the forefront of philosophical, sociological, anthropological and political discussions and analysis the issue of religious violence. The violence belongs to the nature itself of religion? If so, what mechanisms can be activated to reduce violence? How to reconcile Christianity's central idea - the love of our neighbor - with the sacred violence thesis? How can the idea of religious violence be reconciled with the idea of religious love? Weak thinking, (...) that is the logic of a weak thinking may be a solution? We try to answer to such questions by appealing to the debate of ideas offered by the French anthropologist René Girard and the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. (shrink)

It has been shown that counterintuitive ideas from mythological and religious texts are more acceptable than other world knowledge violations. In the present experiment we explored whether this relates to the way they are interpreted. Participants were presented with verification questions that referred to either the literal or a metaphorical meaning of the sentence previously read, in a block-wise design. Both behavioral and electrophysiological results converged. At variance to the literal interpretation of the sentences, the induced metaphorical interpretation specifically (...) facilitated the integration of religious counterintuitions, whereas the semantic processing of non-religious counterintuitions was not affected by the interpretation mode. We suggest that religious ideas tend to operate like other instances of figurative language, such as metaphors, facilitating their acceptability despite their counterintuitive nature. (shrink)

Recently, there have been at least five best sellers critical of religion and religious belief. It seems, at least among readers in the U.S., that there is great interest in questions about the rationality of religious belief. Ironically, critical thinking texts seldom examine the topic. After reviewing a series of previous arguments that people have an ethical duty to think critically, this paper will evaluate a number of arguments intended to exempt religious belief from the sorts (...) of rational critique covered in critical thinking classes. After critiquing each argument, I conclude that the proper scope of critical thinking should include religious beliefs. In summary, if people have an ethical duty to think critically about important beliefs and religious beliefs are indeed important, then people have an obligation to think critically about religious beliefs. Nothing in the paper addresses the question of whether it is or is not rational to endorse a religion. (shrink)

While many ground religious tolerance on a sense of unity or enrichment resulting from religious diversity, the acclaimed scholars contributing to this volume place under scrutiny a fascinating alternative proposal for a pathway to religious tolerance: that the serious consideration of religious diversity tends to reveal the weakness of support many have for their religious commitments and that the humility produced tends to result in religious tolerance. The authors illuminate the debate within philosophyabout the (...) way beliefs are supported, the controversy between internalism and externalism, and disagreement about how humility and tolerance are related. (shrink)

The opposition in which many phenomenologists of religion stand to the above remarks is clear. Religious consciousness of the world, in being tied to the language of a particular faith, requires conceptual mastery for its emergence. Linguistic and non-linguistic skills in the use of concepts must be developed through fledgling attempts and repeated practice. In noticing this, attention has been called to the fact that such consciousness is far from being man's natural inheritance. It is acquired through instruction and (...) learning, and the concepts which generate Christian consciousness of the world make demands upon a person which go straight against his grain. Using the Christian concepts as tools in handling the various situations along life's way requires strenuous and repeatedly renewed effort. There remains a certain Christian distance from ordinary ways of doing commerce with the world. The way, after all, is said to be narrow. So to become conscious of the world in a Christian manner is to submit oneself to the rigors of the concepts. It is to permit one's life to be guided and ruled thereby in his regard for the world.In making these observations, it becomes clear, too, that the Christian life and consciousness is one in which a man chooses to be enmeshed. It is a matter of human decision. In so choosing, a man makes his life determinate; he gives it shape. The specificity or concreteness demanded in and with the language of faith should be contrasted with the rather diffuse and indeterminate character of the religious awareness thought to be so deep and abiding by phenomenologists. Because of its lack of particularity in contour, this notion of religious consciousness is virtually inconsequential. That which is increasingly common to all men begins to wane in significance within the life of the single individual. Comparatively speaking, the choice to reduplicate Christian avenues of thinking and acting is replete with ramifications and differences which are clearly discernible. By virtue of the specificity required, however, it is also the case that one must renew that decision daily, seek to nurture it, train and discipline himself in it. Making the faith one's own, abiding in it day and night--these lead down different pathways. But the distinctive patterns of living and thinking add up after a while with a cumulative effect. Through the acquisition and practice in exercising'Christian concepts, one earns a consciousness of the world which is Christian in scope and nature. (shrink)

The opposition in which many phenomenologists of religion stand to the above remarks is clear. Religious consciousness of the world, in being tied to the language of a particular faith, requires conceptual mastery for its emergence. Linguistic and non-linguistic skills in the use of concepts must be developed through fledgling attempts and repeated practice. In noticing this, attention has been called to the fact that such consciousness is far from being man's natural inheritance. It is acquired through instruction and (...) learning, and the concepts which generate Christian consciousness of the world make demands upon a person which go straight against his grain. Using the Christian concepts as tools in handling the various situations along life's way requires strenuous and repeatedly renewed effort. There remains a certain Christian distance from ordinary ways of doing commerce with the world. The way, after all, is said to be narrow. So to become conscious of the world in a Christian manner is to submit oneself to the rigors of the concepts. It is to permit one's life to be guided and ruled thereby in his regard for the world.In making these observations, it becomes clear, too, that the Christian life and consciousness is one in which a man chooses to be enmeshed. It is a matter of human decision. In so choosing, a man makes his life determinate; he gives it shape. The specificity or concreteness demanded in and with the language of faith should be contrasted with the rather diffuse and indeterminate character of the religious awareness thought to be so deep and abiding by phenomenologists. Because of its lack of particularity in contour, this notion of religious consciousness is virtually inconsequential. That which is increasingly common to all men begins to wane in significance within the life of the single individual. Comparatively speaking, the choice to reduplicate Christian avenues of thinking and acting is replete with ramifications and differences which are clearly discernible. By virtue of the specificity required, however, it is also the case that one must renew that decision daily, seek to nurture it, train and discipline himself in it. Making the faith one's own, abiding in it day and night--these lead down different pathways. But the distinctive patterns of living and thinking add up after a while with a cumulative effect. Through the acquisition and practice in exercising'Christian concepts, one earns a consciousness of the world which is Christian in scope and nature. (shrink)

When Susan Sontag addresses the problem of pornography and relates it to Hegel, she is not merely describing a path in European philosophy aimed to construct a new language, but she is also committing this aim to the importance of re-reading culture. The fashion in which pornography describes reality is meaningful when we are trying to approach Hegel in his aim to construct a post-religious language that finally will make ready-to-hand life as life. Politics, and society, being two essential (...) elements to understand reality, become singularly interesting when analyzed through the gaze of Sontag in combination of Hegel’s philosophy. The conservative morals that reign over what we understand as pornography, and the cultural moment of Europe since the most progressive moments of the 19 th century, describe a fatalist landscape for the future of society and politics. Yet, the learnings from Hegel remain meaningful. In this paper I examine how a post-religious philosophy, aimed long ago by Hegel’s contribution to philosophy, can serve to the understanding of a post-pornographic society: a society that is able to learn from the contributions of Frankfurt’s school with regards to an efficient cultural tissue, and defeat the old religious morals that are inserted in the backbone of politics and philosophy still today. (shrink)

William James states “Immortality is one of the great spiritual needs of man,” yet the arguments presented in his LECTURE ON IMMORTALITY, while interesting and ingenious, are somewhat less than conclusive in proving that human beings can survive bodily death. Therefore I attempt to clarity the notion of “individual survivor” through an analysis and discussion of various approaches to the problem, before returning to a further examination of James’ thought in the “Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher,” the THEORY OF (...) THE SOUL, the PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, the VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE and a PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE. James’ often neglected Christian position provides the key to a better understanding of his thought on the topic, and allows me to conclude on a cautiously optimistic note on the possibility of a philosophical proof for human survival. (shrink)

Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2019, Page 211-216.

The replicability and importance of the correlation between cognitive style and religious belief have been debated. Moreover, the literature has not examined distinct psychological accounts of this relationship. We tested the replicability of the correlation (N = 5284; students and broader samples of Canadians, Americans, and Indians); while testing three accounts of how cognitive style comes to be related to belief in God, karma, witchcraft, and to the belief that religion is necessary for morality. The first, the dual process (...) model, posits that analytical thinking is recruited in overriding intuitions related to supernatural beliefs. The second, the expressive rationality model, posits that analytical thinking is recruited in supporting already-held beliefs in an identity-protective manner. And the third, the counter-normativity rationality model, posits that analytical thinking is recruited to question beliefs supported by prevailing cultural norms. In Study 2, we tested the replicability of our results in a re-analysis of published data. The association between analytic thinking style and beliefs was replicated. We conclude that whereas the counter-normativity rationality model was contradicted by the data, both the dual process and expressive rationality models received varying degrees of empirical support, but neither model fully accounted for all the patterns in the data. (shrink)

In the debate volume, ’Knowledge of God’, co-authored with Alvin Plantinga, I argued that there is an inductively sound version of the argument from evil, and recently, several popular books criticizing religious belief have appeared, often focusing on that issue of the existence of God. In the present essay I argue, however, that to help ordinary people think more critically about religious beliefs, it is better to focus on beliefs associated with specific religions, such as Christianity. I then (...) go on to look briefly at Jesus, and I offer reasons for concluding that Jesus was neither wise nor morally admirable. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Rejection of Belief in God versus Rejection of Christianity Jesus and Christianity Jesus: A Brief Examination Conclusion References.

Over the last few years, there have been five best sellers critical of religion and religious belief. It seems that there is great interest in questions about religious belief. Ironically, critical thinking texts seldom examine the topic. This paper will evaluate eight arguments to exempt religious belief from rational critique. I conclude that the topic of religious belief should not be exempt from critical thinking classes.

Translation of “De vier religieuze grondthema’s in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken van het avondland” by Herman Dooyeweerd (1941), Philosophia Reformata 6 (4), pp. 161–179.

Introduction to the translation of “De vier religieuze grondthema’s in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken van het avondland” by Herman Dooyeweerd (1941), Philosophia Reformata 6 (4), pp. 161–179.

Da ficção científica para a ficção religiosa: ideias para pensar o cinema de ficção científica como o culto da religião vivida (From Science Fiction to Religious Fiction: ideas to think on Science Fiction cinema as the cult of lived religion). DOI - 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n26p552 Este artigo tem como objetivo refletir sobre a chamada religião vivida como uma forma de repensar o papel da teologia e das ciências da religião na contemporaneidade. O estudo da religião vivida será investigado na relação entre (...) o cinema de ficção científica e a religião, propondo que, nesta relação, há uma forma de religião vivida intensa e viva. Sugere-se, assim, que o cinema seja hoje uma forma de culto e ritual, cumprindo parte do papel que os mitos e ritos sagrados desempenham na vida das pessoas, ao longo dos tempos. O artigo contém quatro partes: introdução sobre a religião vivida; religião vivida no caso específico do cinema; o cinema de ficção científica como uma forma de religião; aplicação da teoria no filme “Contato” (Robert Zemeckis, USA 1997); conclusões sobre a vivência religiosa em forma de mito e rito nos filmes de ficção científica e as consequências disso para a teologia e as ciências da religião. Palavras-chave : Cinema de ficção científica. Religião. Culto e rito. Religião vivida.: This article aims at reflecting about the so-called lived religion as a way of rethinking the role of theology and religion in contemporary society. The study of the lived religion will investigate the relationship between the cinema of science fiction and religion, suggesting that, in this relation, there is particular and intensive form of lived religion. The present article suggests that cinema today is a form of cult and ritual which performs part of the role that sacred rites play in the lives of people along the time. The article contains four parts: introduction about the lived religion; lived religion in the specific case of cinema; the cinema of science fiction as a form of religion; the application of theory in the movie “Contact” (Robert Zemeckis, USA 1997); conclusions on the religious experience in the form of myth and rite in science fiction movies as well as the consequences for theology and religious studies. Keywords : Science fiction cinema. Religion. Cult and rite. Lived religion. (shrink)

In this issue of the journal “Lee Elder”,1 a pseudonymous dissident Jehovah's Witness , previously an Elder of that faith and still a JW, joins the indefatigable Dr Muramoto2–5 in arguing that even by their own religious beliefs based on biblical scriptures JWs are not required to refuse potentially life-saving blood transfusions. Just as the “official” JW hierarchy has accepted that biblical scriptures do not forbid the transfusion or injection of blood fractions so too JW theology logically can and (...) should permit the transfusion of whole blood when this is medically required.Few doctors would argue that they should override the adequately autonomous decisions of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions even if they are likely to die as a result of such transfusions. However, there is a case to be made for doctors asking such patients to reflect on their potentially fatal refusal of blood and for drawing to these patients' attention the reasoning of members of their own faith that justifies acceptance of potentially life-saving blood transfusions. What is that case? Simply that doctors' primary professional duty to try to benefit the health of their patients entails trying to save their patients' lives when and if doing so will benefit their patients' health. Of course this is not an absolute duty overriding all other duties; in particular if patients who are adequately autonomous to do so refuse such life-prolonging treatment doctors must generally accept such refusal, however sadly. This editorial endorses that view in the case of adequately autonomous legally competent JWs. (In another paper in this issue of the journal Professor Shimon Glick argues that ethics committees should be empowered—as they now are in Israel—to override even competent refusals of life-prolonging treatment where the committee judges that …. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how (not what) we should think about human rights and religious arguments. Thinking about this relationship is today particularly important, because conflicts over human rights in practice often turn around their theoretical problems. Should religious arguments be used to justify human rights? Or do we want human rights to be free from any partisan endorsement so as to avoid divisive interpretations of universal principles? Underlying these hard questions is the issue of (...) justification in view of a plurality of cultural and religious traditions around the globe. If human rights can be transformed so as to defy the charge of Euro-centrism (of being parochially rooted in only one cultural and religious tradition), they need to creatively draw on, not pit themselves against, this plurality. This paper suggests a framework for such a positive and inclusive engagement with various cultures and religions that goes beyond the mainstream liberal model of “public reason”. (shrink)

Better understanding the psychological factors related to certainty in one’s beliefs (i.e., dogmatism) has important consequences for both individuals and social groups. Generally, beliefs can find support from at least two different routes of information processing: social/moral considerations or analytic/empirical reasoning. Here, we investigate how these two psychological constructs relate to dogmatism in two groups of individuals who preferentially draw on the former or latter sort of information when forming beliefs about the world- religious and non religious individuals. (...) Across two studies and their pooled analysis, we provide evidence that although dogmatism is negatively related to analytic reasoning in both groups of individuals, it shares a divergent relationship with measures of moral concern depending on whether one identifies as religious or not. Study 1 showed that increasing levels of dogmatism were positively related to prosocial intentions among the religious and negatively related to empathic concern among the nonreligious. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by showing that perspective taking is negatively related to dogmatism in both groups, an effect which is particularly robust among the nonreligious. Study 2 also showed that religious fundamentalism was positively related to measures of moral concern among the religious. Because the current studies used a content neutral measure to assess dogmatic certainty in one’s beliefs, they have the potential to inform practices for most effectively communicating with and persuading religious and nonreligious individuals to change maladaptive behavior, even when the mode of discourse is unrelated to religious belief. (shrink)

Does religious thinking stand in opposition to postmodernity? Does the existence of God present the ultimate challenge to metaphysics? Strands of continental thought, especially those running from Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, focus on individual consciousness as the horizon for all meaning and provide modern philosophy of religion with much of its present ferment. In Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics, 11 influential continental philosophers share the conviction that religious thinking cannot afford to disengage from (...) the challenges of modern European philosophy. Together they provide a rich and intriguing set of answers to questions surrounding the meaning of religious experience. Topics include subjectivity, selfhood, and rationality; language, community, and ethics; the influence of Jewish and eastern religions on religious experience; God as phenomenology; and religion in the postmodern age. These lucid and arresting essays bring together many of the leading voices in the contemporary continental debate on God and religion. (shrink)