Locke: Philosophy of Religion, Misc

Locke scholarship has been flourishing in Japan for several decades, but its output is largely unknown to the West. This collection makes available in English for the first time the fruits of recent Japanese research, opening up the possibility of advancing Locke studies on an international scale. Covering three important areas of Locke's philosophical thought – knowledge and experimental method, law and politics, and religion and toleration – this volume criticizes established interpretations and replaces them with novel alternatives, breaking away (...) from standard narratives and providing fresh ways of looking at Locke's relationship with philosophers such as Boyle, Berkeley and Hume. The specific topics that have been selected are ones that continue to have important contemporary moral and political implications, from constitutionalism and toleration to marriage and the death penalty. Applying Locke's views to 21st-century questions, this collection presents provocative readings of the defining aspects of Locke's philosophical thought, stimulating current debates and heralding a new era of collaborative work for Locke scholars around the world. (shrink)

in their famous correspondence, Stillingfleet objects that Locke's definition of knowledge, by limiting certainty to the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, lessens the credibility of faith. Locke replies that his definition of knowledge does not affect the credibility of an article of faith at all, for faith and knowledge are entirely different cognitive acts: The truth of the matter of fact is in short this, that I have placed knowledge in the perception of the agreement or disagreement (...) of ideas. This definition of knowledge, your lordship said, "might be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which you have endeavored to defend." This I denied, and gave this reason for it, viz.... (shrink)

In late October 1688 John Locke wrote, as part of a continuing and lengthy correspondence, to his friend the French biblical critic, Nicholas Toinard. Replying to enquiries about Richard Simon’s recent work the Histoire Critique he noted, “as soon as I get hold of this new critique I shall read it through carefully to see what it is made of, though the columnar book that I should compare it with is not here. That book is carefully put away: for it (...) is the one out of all I possess that I am most anxious to preserve safe and sound.” The other book Locke was concerned to preserve was a critical harmony of the Scripture, possibly written by Toinard himself. His intention was to cross reference Simon’s philological criticisms of Scripture with the scholarly edition to verify the claims of the Frenchman’s scholarship. This process of reading shaped Locke’s convictions about religious truth. Even a casual trawl through Locke’s private letters would throw up many more examples of similar exchanges with learned men concerning the accuracy and authenticity of received Scripture. It is this picture of John Locke poring over the text of the New Testament and comparing the most up to date works of biblical criticism with the private critical researches of friends like Toinard, Le Clerc, and Newton, that should frame this contribution. Biblical criticism was an ambivalent enterprise, easily degenerating from piety to desecration. (shrink)

John Locke's treatises on government make frequent reference to the Hebrew Bible, while references to the New Testament are almost completely absent. To date, scholarship has not addressed this surprising characteristic of the treatises. In this book, Yechiel Leiter offers a Hebraic reading of Locke's fundamental political text. In doing so, he formulates a new school of thought in Lockean political interpretation and challenges existing ones. He shows how a grasp of the Hebraic underpinnings of Locke's political theory resolves many (...) of the problems, as well as scholarly debates, that are inherent in reading Locke. More than a book about the political theory of John Locke, this volume is about the foundational ideas of western civilization. While focused on Locke's Hebraism, it demonstrates the persistent relevance of the biblical political narrative to modernity. It will generate interest among students of Locke and political theory; philosophy and early modern history; and within Bible study communities. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both Essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke’s view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While other views (...) of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God’s will, I show how this view is consistent with the Essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue Locke’s view is a relatively attractive version of Essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles. (shrink)

This article turns to early modern and Enlightenment advocates of tolerance in order to discover and lay bare the line of argument that informed their commitment to free speech. This line of argument will subsequently be used to assess the shift from free speech to the contemporary ideal of free self-expression. In order to take this assessment one step further, this article will finally turn to Immanuel Kant’s famous defense of the public use of reason. In the wake of Katerina (...) Deligiorgi’s readings of Kant, it will show that the idea of free speech requires a specific disposition on behalf of speakers and writers that is in danger of being neglected in the contemporary prevailing conception of free speech as freedom of self-expression. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the main arguments in John Locke’s first political writings, the highly rhetorical, and often obscure, Two Tracts on Government . The Tracts support the government’s right to impose religious ceremonies on its people, an astonishing fact given Locke’s famous defense of toleration in his later works. The reconstruction of the Tracts developed here allows us to see that rather than a pessimistic view of the prospects for peace under religious diversity, what mainly animates the young Locke is (...) a desire to defend the rule of law against an anarchical conception of religious freedom. The article also argues that the evolution of Locke’s thinking on religious freedom was in large part governed by Locke’s attempt to interpret religious freedom in a way that avoids its having anarchical implications. (shrink)

Many commentators have argued that Locke understood laws of nature as causally efficacious. On this view the laws are causally responsible for the production of natural phenomena. This paper argues that this interpretation faces serious difficulties. First, I argue that it will be very difficult to specify the ontological status of these laws. Proponents of the view suggest that these laws are divine volitions. But I argue that this will be difficult or impossible to square with Locke’s nominalism. Second, I (...) argue that it will be difficult to specify the manner in which these laws operate. The view runs the risk of collapsing into occasionalism and Locke has measured critiques of the occasionalist position. The only way to maintain that laws are causally efficacious divine volitions while avoiding occasionalism is to have God engage in what I call ‘brute fact-making’. But brute fact-making is difficult to square with Locke’s remarks on God’s action in the world and with his standards for explanation in natural philosophy. (shrink)

According to John Locke, the conditions of human happiness establish the content of natural law, but God’s commands make it morally binding. This raises two questions. First, why does moral obligation require an authority figure? Second, what gives God authority? I argue that, according to Locke, moral obligation requires an authority figure because to have an obligation is to be accountable to someone. I then argue that, according to Locke, God has a kind of parental authority inasmuch as he is (...) bound by covenant to guide us by revealing the content of the moral law. (shrink)

Berkeley's main aim in his well-known early works was to identify and refute "the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and irreligion." This appears to place Berkeley within a well-established tradition of religious critics of Locke's epistemology, including, most famously, Stillingfleet. I argue that these appearances are deceiving. Berkeley is, in fact, in important respects an opponent of this tradition. According to Berkeley, Locke's earlier critics, including Stillingfleet, had misidentified the grounds of irreligion in Locke's philosophy while all the while endorsing the (...) true grounds of irreligion themselves. Locke's epistemology is innocent; matter and abstraction are to blame. (shrink)

John Locke's comments on experimental natural philosophy can plausibly be seen as a part of the physico-theological project of certain Christian virtuosi of the Royal Society to show that the workings of nature reveal the existence of a providential God. As I make clear, Locke thinks that God providentially designs us with limited epistemic capacities in order to check our pride and to motivate us to seek perfection in God. Locke maintains that a true science of nature is possible, but (...) he is pessimistic about the prospects of realizing such a science, given our epistemic limitations. I argue that this seeming tension can be resolved by appreciating that the horizon for obtaining this science is eschatological. In other words, Locke thinks that we will have a true science of nature in a state of perfection, as God transforms the probable knowledge we have of bodies into certain and comprehensive knowledge. (shrink)

A “recent consensus” has emerged in Locke studies that has sought to place theology at the center of Locke's political philosophy, insisting that the validity and cogency of Locke's political conclusions cannot be substantiated independently of the theology that resides at their foundation. This paper argues for the need to distance Locke from God, claiming that not only can we “bracket” the normative conclusions of Locke's political philosophy from their theological foundations, but that this was in fact Locke's own intention, (...) intent as he was to justify these conclusions to a diverse political audience often divided by faith. In other words, this “recent consensus” in Locke studies is premised on an erroneous understanding of Locke's political philosophy, even as advanced by Locke himself. Locke's own philosophical discourse bears witness to the very “bracketing” of his political conclusions from their theological foundations that these Locke scholars claim is impossible. (shrink)

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke maintains that ?Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing,? including matters of religious faith, and this commitment to the primacy of reason is not abandoned in his later religious writings. This essay argues that with regard to the relation between reason and religious faith, Locke is primarily concerned not with evidence, but with consistency, meaning, and how human beings ought to respond to their inclinations, including their inclinations to believe. (...) Leibniz, on the other hand, stakes out an alternative conception of the relationship between faith and reason that assigns to faith the role of a primary truth. For Leibniz, some religious propositions can be believed immediately and without an additional examination and evaluation by reason. The essay maintains that the differences between the two regarding faith and reason are tied to a broader disagreement about how much of the human understanding is due, in Locke's words, to ?Labour, Attention and Industry? (shrink)

With the publication of Locke?s early manuscripts on toleration and the drafts for the Essay, it is possible to understand to what extent Locke?s ideas on religious toleration have developed. Although the important arguments for toleration can already be found in these early texts, Locke was confronted with a problem in his defence of toleration that he needed to solve. If faith, as a form of judgement, is involuntary, as Locke claims, how can one be held accountable for the faith (...) one has? In answer to this question reason comes to play a more prominent role in Locke?s notion of faith and in his defence of religious toleration, and in his philosophy in general. This notion of reason is not the reason we use for mathematical demonstrations. It is rather reason as we use it in discussion, and is thus fallible. It is precisely this kind of reason that played a central role in the Remonstrant religion to which Locke was closely connected at the time he developed a new argument for religious toleration when he was in the Netherlands. (shrink)

the three topics named in the title of this book: Christianity, antiquity, and Enlightenment, are not meant merely to describe the contents of the various chapters it contains. a narrative is implied in their selection and arrangement, and embedded ...

John Perry connects the 'Johannine liberalism' of Locke and Rawls to contemporary debates about the place of religion in public life, arguing that disputes such as the culture wars must be understood theologically as fundamental conflicts of loyalty.

It is typically thought that miracles, if they occur, can provide evidence for the truth of religious doctrine. But what if different miracles occur attesting to the truth of different and incompatible religions? How is one to decide between the truth of the supposed revelations? Much of Locke’s short work, A Discourse of Miracles, is concerned with this question. Here I summarize and evaluate Locke’s answer.

In Reasons of Redemption, the author, departing from Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia carries out a philosophical investigation into the Lockean concept of reason throughout Locke's oeuvre, in order to see how Locke finally applies it in his New Testament theology, The Reasonableness of Christianity . The author first enquires into the Aristotelian concept of νοῦς, showing that the conception of rationality of the early Locke, in his manuscript Essays on the Law of Nature is describable with Peripatetic terminology. The author (...) then discusses the several meanings the term 'reason' could carry in philosophical contexts in the works of Culverwel, Locke, Toland and Wollaston, emphasizing Culverwel's role in the formation of the English Enlightenment concept of reason . In the next points, the double nature of reason in the Lockean conception is examined: reason is human in that it is finite and does not intuit the real essence of substance, but divine insofar as it is universal, unchangeable and derives from God as an efficient though not as a material cause. The author finally analyzes Locke's arguments for the reasonableness of Christianity,suggesting that the infinite mercy of God, the ultimate 'reason' of redemption, may notbe qualified as 'rational' but is the infinite surplus and difference of God's essence. (shrink)

John Locke's theory of toleration has been criticized as having little relevance for politics today because it rests on controversial theological foundations. Although there have been some recent attempts to develop secular; or publicly accessible, arguments out of Locke's writings, these tend to obscure and distort the religious arguments that Locke used to defend toleration. More importantly, these efforts ignore the role that religious arguments may play in supporting the development of a normative consensus on the legitimacy of liberal political (...) principles. Bracketing the search for publicly accessible justifications makes it possible to appreciate the continued relevance of Locke's religious arguments for toleration. (shrink)

Locke considers miracles to be crucial in establishing the credibility and reasonableness of Christian faith and revelation. The performance of miracles, he argues, is vital in establishing the "credit of the proposer" who makes any claim to providing a divine revelation. He accords reason a pivotal role in distinguishing spurious from genuine claims to divine revelation, including miracles. According to Locke, genuine miracles contain the hallmark of the divine such that pretend revelations become intuitively obvious. This paper argues that serious (...) tensions exist in Locke's position regarding miracles, which impact on the reasonableness of the assent to Christianity which he presumes they provide. (shrink)

Introductory study of the Biblical politics of John Locke is both theological and political in its inspiration, as it considers Locke's interest in scripture and how that interest unfolds in the development of his political philosophy.

This dissertation undertakes a moral inquiry into the right to religious freedom that draws upon a critical examination of John Locke's writings on the subject. Two central theses are defended. The first is that Locke provides a justification for the right to religious freedom that appeals to the value of individuals practicing a sincere religion; the second, is that Locke's justification forms the basis for an attractive account of this right that is of contemporary relevance. In defending these two theses, (...) the dissertation is structured as follows. ;Chapter one outlines the conceptual terrain of the inquiry by defining what the right to religious freedom involves, and by providing a critical survey of several types of justification for this right. After rejecting these justifications, I turn to a discussion of Locke's views on religious freedom in chapters two through four. Each of these chapters focuses on one text by Locke: Two Tracts on Government , An Essay on Toleration and the Letter Concerning Toleration . By placing Locke's views about sincerity and religion at the center of his writings on religious freedom, I suggest that we are able to gain new insights into his settled convictions about religious freedom. Chapter five then draws upon this interpretation of Locke to develop an independent account of the right to religious freedom. This account holds that the right to religious freedom is justified to the extent that it protects the value of integrity. A person's integrity depends on his being able to live in line with his moral duties as he sees these for himself. Since the moral duties a person sees for himself may be religious, the value of integrity can ground a right to freedom of religious conduct. ;Like Locke's appeal to sincere religion, my account grounds the right to religious freedom in the value of the motivational dimension of a person's religious experience. In both cases, special importance is accorded to an individual's ability to fulfill his own conception of his moral duties, and it is argued that the law should accommodate conduct so motivated. (shrink)

This paper illuminates Leibniz’s conception of faith and its relationship to reason. Given Leibniz’s commitment to natural religion, we might expect his view of faith to be deflationary. We show, however, that Leibniz’s conception of faith involves a significant non-rational element. We approach the issue by considering the way in which Leibniz positions himself between the views of two of his contemporaries, Bayle and Locke. Unlike Bayle, but like Locke, Leibniz argues that reason and faith are in conformity. Nevertheless, in (...) contrast to the account that he finds in Locke’s Essay, Leibniz does not reduce faith to a species of reasonable belief. Instead, he insists that, while faith must be grounded in reason, true or divine faith also requires a supernatural infusion of grace. (shrink)

This is a concise and profound book from one of the world's leading political and legal philosophers about a major theme, equality, and the proposition that humans are all one another's equals. Jeremy Waldron explores the implications of this fundamental tenet for law, politics, society and economy in the company of John Locke, whose work Waldron regards 'as well-worked-out a theory of basic equality as we have in the canon of political philosophy'. Throughout the text, which is based on the (...) Carlyle Lectures given in Oxford in 1999, Jeremy Waldron discusses contemporary approaches to equality and rival interpretations of Locke, and this dual agenda gives the whole an unusual degree of accessibility and intellectual excitement, of interest to philosophers, political theorists, lawyers and theologians around the world. (shrink)