In this essay, “The Principle of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Its Rise and Fall,” Pauline Kleingeld notes that Kant’s Principle of Autonomy, which played a central role in both the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, disappeared by the time of the Metaphysics of Morals. She argues that its disappearance is due to significant changes in Kant’s political philosophy. The Principle of Autonomy states that one ought to act as if (...) one were giving universal laws through one’s maxims. The criterion of just legislation that Kant accepted in the mid-1780s does not require any actual consent on the part of the citizens—genuine universality is sufficient for a law to be just. Hence, at that time, Kant could indeed explicate the criterion governing the moral permissibility of one’s maxims by drawing an analogy with the criterion governing the justice of political laws. In the Metaphysics of Morals and in other works in the 1790s, however, he added the further condition that laws must be given with the consent of the citizens. With this further condition, the moral criterion was no longer fully analogous to the criterion for political laws being just. Accordingly, Kleingeld argues, Kant dropped the Principle of Autonomy, which was firmly based on that analogy. (shrink)

In two recent articles I have argued that Kant’s legal and political philosophy can shed new light on his much-contested account of moral autonomy and that important changes in his political theory help to explain why in his later work the Formula of Autonomy disappears. In the present essay, I respond to comments by Sorin Baiasu and Marie Newhouse, who argue that the changes in Kant’s political theory fail to explain the disappearance of the Formula of Autonomy, (...) since in both phases Kant held that laws are given by the people’s representatives. I offer additional support for my original argument by developing a more detailed account of Kant’s conception of the relation between the legislating representatives and the people they are taken to represent. I argue that Kant’s conception of the proper representation relation changed, and that it changed so fundamentally that the analogy at the basis of the Formula of Autonomy was no longer apt, thus providing a plausible explanation for its disappearance. I also address several related comments and propose an explanation for why Kant dropped the very idea of autonomy as a property of the will. (shrink)

The power of new medical technologies, the cultural authority of physicians, and the gendered power dynamics of many patient-physician relationships can all inhibit women's reproductive freedom. Often these factors interfere with women's ability to trust themselves to choose and act in ways that are consistent with their own goals and values. In this book Carolyn McLeod introduces to the reproductive ethics literature the idea that in reproductive health care women's self-trust can be undermined in ways that threaten their autonomy. (...) Understanding the importance of self-trust for autonomy, McLeod argues, is crucial to understanding the limits on women's reproductive freedom. -/- McLeod brings feminist insights in philosophical moral psychology to reproductive ethics, and to health-care ethics more broadly. She identifies the social environments in which self-trust is formed and encouraged. She also shows how women's experiences of reproductive health care can enrich our understanding of self-trust and autonomy as philosophical concepts. The book's theoretical components are grounded in women's concrete experiences. The cases discussed, which involve miscarriage, infertility treatment, and prenatal diagnosis, show that what many women feel toward themselves in reproductive contexts is analogous to what we feel toward others when we trust or distrust them. -/- McLeod also discusses what health-care providers can do to minimize the barriers to women's self-trust in reproductive health care, and why they have a duty to do so as part of their larger duty to respect patient autonomy. (shrink)

This paper responds to recent criticisms of the idea that true causal claims, satisfying a minimal “interventionist” criterion for causation, can differ in the extent to which they satisfy other conditions—called stability and proportionality—that are relevant to their use in explanatory theorizing. It reformulates the notion of proportionality so as to avoid problems with previous formulations. It also introduces the notion of conditional independence or irrelevance, which I claim is central to understanding the respects and the extent to which upper (...) level explanations can be “autonomous”. (shrink)

This article critically examines the transition from Marx to Spinoza within Antonio Negri’s postoperaist thought and explores a potential alternative rooted in Mario Tronti’s concept of the ‘autonomy of the political’. In Negri’s postoperaismo, the embrace of Spinoza reevaluates Marx’s critique of political economy through an optimistic lens, suggesting a tendency beyond capitalism. However, Negri’s embrace of a Spinozian plane of immanence entails a problematic affirmation of what exists. The article argues that Negri’s worldview, despite its beginnings, ends up (...) resembling deterministic historical materialism. While critical theory exposes flaws in Negri’s theory, it falls short in providing a practical alternative. Returning to Negri’s interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Treatise uncovers earlier arguments, rooted in paradoxes inherent to practical politics. However, reliance on the concept of the multitude highlights deeper issues in Negri’s approach. Rather than adhering to postoperaismo or critical theory, the article suggests an alternative in Tronti’s journey from operaismo, particularly in the concept of the ‘autonomy of the political’. Notwithstanding critiques, this attempted liberation from Marxist determinism allows for a clearer confrontation with politics. The article concludes that Hardt and Negri’s recent critical engagement with this concept advances their arguments but does not entirely overcome inherent limitations in their approach. (shrink)

Haskell Curry’s philosophy of mathematics is really a form of “structuralism” rather than “formalism” despite Curry’s own description of it as formalist (Seldin 2011). This paper explains Curry’s actual view by a formal analysis of a simple example. This analysis is extended to solve Keränen’s (2001) identity problem for structuralism, confirming Leitgeb’s (2020a, b) solution, and further clarifies structural ontology. Curry’s methods answer philosophical questions by employing a standard mathematical method, which is a virtue of the “methodological autonomy” emphasized (...) by Curry (1951, 1963) and more recently with greater clarity by Maddy (1997, 2007). (shrink)

In this introduction we explore a number of puzzles that arise concerning epistemic autonomy, and introduce the sections and chapters of the book. There are four broad types of puzzles to be explored, corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first set of puzzles concerns the nature of epistemic autonomy. Here, questions arise such as what is epistemic autonomy? Is epistemic autonomy valuable? What are we epistemically autonomous about? The second set of puzzles concern (...) epistemic paternalism. Paternalistic acts interfere with an agent’s autonomy. Here, questions arise concerning the permissibility of epistemic paternalism as well the extension of epistemically paternalistic acts. The third set of puzzles concerns the relation of epistemic autonomy to epistemic value and to intellectual virtues and vices. Is there epistemic value to being epistemically autonomous? How does epistemic autonomy relate to different intellectual virtues and vices? Finally, the fourth set of puzzles concerns the role of epistemic autonomy within a social epistemology. How does epistemic autonomy square with a reliance on expertise? Does thinking about epistemic autonomy add to the debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement or epistemic injustice? (shrink)

The ideal of autonomy has a positive and a negative aim. Its positive aim is to create the conditions in which more and more people can be more and more autonomous. Its negative aim is to prevent actions that cause serious harm and are normally both immoral and criminal. These two aims are incompatible. Increasing autonomy increases the frequency of crimes and decreasing the frequency of crimes requires decreasing autonomy. The incompatibility of these two aims has radical (...) implications for much current thinking about criminal justice. (shrink)

Most of us are more or less dissatisfied with some aspect of our present self and want to change it to a better future self. This makes us divided beings. The beliefs, emotions, and motives of our present self prompt us to act in one way and our desired future and better self often prompts us to act in another way. This makes us ambivalent. One of the shibboleths of the present age is that the key to overcoming our ambivalence (...) is to cultivate autonomy. This Kantian ideal is defended, developed, and somewhat revised by Christine Korsgaard, who constructs an ideal theory of self-constitution. This theory is untenable. Its very nature makes it incapable of addressing the concrete problems ambivalence presents to us in our very different individual circumstances. It unreasonably claims that either we meet arbitrary, unrealistic, and mind-bogglingly complex requirements, or disqualify ourselves from being rational and moral agents. And it optimistically assumes that by becoming more autonomous, we become more rational and moral, rather than merely continue to act in the ways we have been acting before. The failure of this latest ideal theory does not show that there is something wrong with autonomy. It shows that the extravagant claims Korsgaard makes for autonomy are groundless. The way to cope with our ambivalence is not to follow a theory, but to think better and harder about what we – individuals in individual circumstances – are, and want to be. (shrink)

In this chapter I develop and motivate and account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual character virtue. In Section one, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue and character intellectual virtues in particular. In Section two, I clear away some misconceptions about epistemic autonomy to better focus on our target. In Section three, I examine and evaluate several extant accounts of the virtue of epistemic autonomy, noting problems with each. In Section four, I provide my positive (...) account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy and explain how it meets the desiderata for such an account while avoiding the problems with extant accounts. Finally, in Section five, I fill the account out by digging into the factors that guide epistemically autonomous agents in having an appropriate reliance on their own thinking. (shrink)

The principal aim of this volume is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re ...

The unfortunately vast history of paternalism in both medicine and clinical research has resulted in perpetually increasing respect for patient autonomy and free choice in Western health care systems. Beginning with the negative right to informed consent, the principle of respect for autonomy has for many patients evolved into a positive right to request treatments and expect accommodation. This evolution of patient autonomy has mirrored a more general social attitude of market liberalism where increasing numbers of patients (...) have come to embody the role of the “consumer.” This paper explores this transformation and critiques the current way in which respect for patient autonomy is put into practice. Ultimately, this paper concludes that the consumer view of patient autonomy is dysfunctional. Moreover, this paper argues that, based on the inherent goals of medicine, some form of paternalism is required in any meaningfully therapeutic relationship. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT were trained on human conversation, but in the future they will also train us. As chatbots speak from our smartphones and customer service helplines, they will become a part of everyday life and a growing share of all the conversations we ever have. It’s hard to doubt this will have some effect on us. Here I explore a specific concern about the impact of artificial conversation on our capacity to deliberate and hold ourselves accountable (...) to reason – that is, to be autonomous, in Kant’s sense of the term. I develop ideas from psychologist Jean Piaget to show how chatbots are autonomy traps: their deference to our commands tempts us into venting authoritarian whims, ultimately weakening our own self-control. I argue that the Kantian tradition, including Piaget and sociologist Emile Durkheim, offers powerful conceptual resources for resisting this slide. But it will require us to do something that may seem bizarre: we will need to treat mindless chatbots as if they are autonomous persons too. (shrink)

This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patient’ autonomy has value over and beyond its instrumental value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing. It argues that this view should be rejected and concludes that patients’ autonomy should be taken to have only instrumental value in medicine.

Respect for patient autonomy can apply at two levels: ensuring that patient care reflects their considered values and wishes and honoring patient preferences about how to make momentous decisions. Caregivers who seek to respect patient autonomy in the context of some end-of-life decisions face a dilemma. Because these decisions are fraught, patients may prefer to approach them sequentially, only making decisions at the time they arise. However, respecting patients’ preferences for a sequential approach can increase the likelihood that (...) surrogates and care teams wind up in situations in which they lack information needed to ensure patients receive care that conforms to their considered values after they are no longer competent to make decisions for themselves. Sequential decision-making can thus conflict with the goal of ensuring care reflects the wishes of patients. After illustrating how this dilemma can arise in the use of life-sustaining “bridge” technologies, we argue that care teams may be warranted in requiring patients to articulate their wishes in an advance care plan before treatment begins. In some cases, care teams may even be permitted to refuse to undertake certain courses of care, unless patients articulate their wishes in an advance care plan. (shrink)

Formal views of autonomy rule out substantive rational capacities (reasons-responsiveness) as a condition of autonomous agency. I argue that such views face a number of underappreciated problems: they have trouble making sense of how autonomous agents could be robustly responsible for their choices, face the burden of explaining why there should be a stark distinction between the importance of factual and evaluative information within autonomous agency, and leave it mysterious why autonomy is the sort of thing that has (...) value and ought to be promoted. Moreover, I argue that the alternative view that includes substantive rational capacities need not have the unacceptable political implications it is sometimes thought to have. (shrink)

The paper tries to understand the relationship between the individual and the community where the individual belongs within Wittgenstein’s notion of the self. Wittgenstein denied the existence of the objective self, the self as an independent entity, to define human subjectivity throughout his writings. However, he has not given any positive idea about the self. The rejection of self can be seen as a denial of the autonomy of the individual, which can be understood as an individual is an (...) aggregate of facts and a fabrication of society based on the rules and world-picture she inherits. Nevertheless, there is evidence in his writings and remarks that he accepted that the individual is free to choose and make decisions concerning religion and ethics, which he considered very important in life. This paper explores how these two seemingly contrary notions can exist together. It also examines the idea of autonomy and subjectivity advocated by the early and later Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In The Handmaid’s Tale and The Testaments, Margaret Atwood vividly portrays a dystopia from a woman’s point of view. The themes she explores are familiar, they are not shocking fictional devices designed to keep readers surprised and engaged. Instead, the stories describe how our own world might have been or, even worse, how it might be. It explores the dangers of treating women’s bodies as resources to be regulated and commodified. The series emphasizes the value of autonomy and highlights (...) the ways in which it can be eroded by oppression until it no longer exists in any meaningful way. This chapter will explore the theme of autonomy as it arises in The Handmaid’s Tale and The Testaments. It will situate these stories as part of a long philosophical tradition of sorting members of society into groups based on their perceived skills and abilities, allowing no room for transcendence or self-creation. It will explore how manipulation of love and relationships, religion, the use of language, and opportunities to think critically can, without bars or shackles, imprison a population by diminishing their capacity for self-determination. The story of The Handmaid’s Tale and The Testaments is cautionary. This chapter will explore the nature of the lesson that story teaches. (shrink)

The article aims to distinguish autonomy from integrity. I claim that integrity is different from a form of autonomy at least, but that integrity and autonomy overlap considerably. Integrity itself is a form of autonomy: what ethicists call ‘moral autonomy.’ (They tend to distinguish between personal and moral autonomy.) Autonomy is the genus, one might say, with integrity (i.e., moral autonomy) and personal autonomy being species of it.

Patients have to be respected with dignity as the masters of their own lives. The problem, however, is that autonomy may become so dominant and the fundamental value of caring in professional nursing that the patient’s dignity is affected. The aim of this article is to point out some of the issues with the interplay between autonomy, also called self-management and dignity. Given voice to the patient perspective the background is provided by cases from research conducted through qualitative (...) interviews with patients and expanded by summarizing empirical research concerning the interplay between autonomy and dignity. The search strategy and the research question gave five empirical research papers and three theoretical studies and concept analyses. A concise overview of the relevant research contains information about all the major elements of the studies. The background research and an interpretative summary address new issues to be taken into account in dignity conserving care. (shrink)

Feminists have disagreed about whether women can choose gendered subordination autonomously. Less attention has been paid, however, to the socio-ontological questions that underlie this debate. This article introduces novel cases of ‘thwarted autonomy,’ in which women pursue autonomy but in ways that reinforce gendered subordination, in order to challenge dominant proceduralist and substantivist views, as well as motivate an expressivist view of the social self as a promising foundation for an account of autonomy. On this view, which (...) draws on the Hegelian tradition, agents must embody their desires and values in the social world to achieve self-understanding. Social meanings and norms therefore mediate the form an agent’s expressive activity takes, and the sense of self she develops. An expressivist view, I argue, allows us to reinterpret women’s outward acquiescence to gendered subordination as an attempt to express autonomy in an oppressive social context. It also points towards a robustly social conception of autonomy to aid in the diagnosis and redress of patriarchal oppression. (shrink)

Therapeutic misconception involves the failure of subjects either to understand or to incorporate into their own expectations the distinctions in nature and purpose of personally responsive therapeutic care, and the generic relationship between subject and investigator which is constrained by research protocols. Researchers cannot disregard this phenomenon if they are to ensure that subjects engage in research on the basis of genuine informed consent. However, our presumption of patient autonomy must be sustained unless we have compelling evidence of serious (...) misunderstanding. This article argues that the mere expression of aspects of therapeutic misconception should not necessarily displace the presumption of subject autonomy or undermine ethical inclusion in research for at least three reasons. First, some interpretations of the empirical data do not suggest misunderstanding. Second, assessment of misestimation and optimism are delicate and value-laden, and turn quickly from questions of autonomy to questions of judgment. Third, incomplete understanding may yet be sufficient to allow a subject to engage in a substantially autonomous decision-making process. Our point is not to dismiss the possibility of genuine therapeutic misconception, but to question its frequency and fatality to the consent process. (shrink)

Georg Lukács wrote that "there is autonomy and 'autonomy.' The one is a moment of life itself, the elevation of its richness and contradictory unity; the other is a rigidification, a barren self-seclusion, a self-imposed banishment from the dynamic overall connection." Though Lukács' concern was with the conditions for the possibility of art, his distinction also serves as an apt description of the way that Hegel and Hegelians have contrasted their own interpretations of self-determination with that of Kant. (...) But it has always been difficult to see how elevation is possible without seclusion, or how rigidification can be avoided without making the boundaries of the self so malleable that its autonomy looks like a mere cover for the power of external forces. Yeomans explores Hegel's own attempts to grapple with this problem against the background of Kant's attempts, in his theory of virtue, to understand the way that morally autonomous agents can be robust individuals with qualitatively different projects, personal relations, and commitments that are nonetheless infused with a value that demands respect. In a reading that disentangles a number of different threads in Kant's approach, Yeomans shows how Hegel reweaves these threads around the central notions of talent and interest to produce a tapestry of self-determination. Yeomans argues that the result is a striking pluralism that identifies three qualitatively distinct forms of agency or accountability and sees each of these forms of agency as being embodied in different social groups in different ways. But there is nonetheless a dynamic unity to the forms because they can all be understood as practical attempts to solve the problem of autonomy, and each is thus worthy of respect even from the perspective of other solutions."Everyone recognizes the importance of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality as empty, but until now there has not been a fully worked out presentation of how Hegel's views in his discussion of Sittlichkeit actually provide the missing content. Yeomans has finally provided us with a reconstruction of Hegel's mature position that makes good on all the promissory notes that Hegel gives in his famous descriptions of his alternative to Kantian ethics. Yeomans offers a compelling account of Hegel's view of individuality, societal differentiation and its roots in Kantian and Fichtean moral theory. The book will be a major contribution to the scholarship on Hegel's practical philosophy." - Dean Moyar, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University -/- "Yeomans' book is a subtle, detailed and original explication of some key ideas having to do with how Hegel's general philosophy of action relates to his social and political philosophy. It is attentive to Hegel's texts, and it ties its discussions into all the relevant contemporary themes in philosophy. It is very ambitious in its attempt to make Hegel's theory into a real competitor to other views that are currently in wide play in the philosophical world. It will very likely become one of the key texts in the secondary literature on Hegel." - Terry Pinkard, University Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University. (shrink)

American bioethicists lack the theoretical resources to work in cross‐cultural settings. All we have are two approaches to ethics—principles vs. narratives—that are mostly at odds, and neither of which is up to the job. If moral principles are too abstract to be useful, and if stories cannot provide moral authority, then where do we find our moral norms?

Theories of autonomy commonly make reference to some form of endorsement: an action is autonomous insofar as the agent has a second-order desire towards the motivating desire, or takes it to be a reason for action, or is not alienated from it. In this paper I argue that all such theories have difficulty accounting for certain kinds of agents, what I call ‘Woody Allen cases’. In order to make sense of such cases, I suggest, it is necessary to disambiguate (...) two distinct forms of endorsement, both of which contribute to autonomy. (shrink)

This international collection forms a response from 22 educators to our changing political environment and to the reassessment they provoke of the principles shaping educational thought and practice. The philosophical discussion, however, remains clearly rooted in the world of educational practice and its political content.

In her paper “Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony” Elizabeth Anderson (2011) identifies a tension between the requirements of responsible public policy making and democratic legitimacy. The tension, put briefly, is that responsible public policy making should be based on the best available scientific research, but for it to be democratically legitimate there must also be broad public acceptance of whatever policies are put in place. In this chapter I discuss this tension, with a strong focus on (...) the issue of climate change. My aims are twofold. First, I argue that the tension is harder to resolve than Anderson supposes because some ways of securing acceptance for science-based policies will themselves be democratically illegitimate. Second, I take a closer look at the role intellectual autonomy plays in the tension. Many think that what I call “science marketing” methods for securing broad(er) acceptance of scientific claims are illegitimate because they infringe on our intellectual autonomy. I argue that it is less clear that this is true than many suppose. This is because, put roughly, judicious use of targeted science marketing methods need not stop us from developing the ability to think about scientific issues for ourselves. In fact, they may even aide us in developing this ability. While this doesn’t quite resolve the tension identified by Anderson, it does some of the necessary groundwork for resolving it. (shrink)

The family poses problems for liberal understandings of social justice, because of the ways in which it bestows unearned privileges. This is particularly stark when we consider inter-generational inequality, or ‘class fate’ – the ways in which inequality is transmitted from one generation to the next, with the family unit ostensibly a key conduit. There is a recognized tension between the assumption that families should as far as possible be autonomous spheres of decision-making, and the assumption that we should as (...) far as possible equalize the life chances of all children, regardless of background. In this article I address this tension by way of recent liberal egalitarian literature, and consideration of the different dimensions of class fate. I argue, firstly, that the tension may not be of the a priori nature which liberals have tended to identify – and secondly, that as well as distributive and recognition-based aspects, the notion of contributive justice provides a particularly illuminating way of analyzing what is wrong about class fate, and the role of the family in promoting it. (shrink)

Seminari a càrrec del Dr. Steven Wall de la University of Arizona sobre l'Autonomia com una perfecció.