Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Sa célébrité a comme masqué sa spécificité, créant une sorte de doctrine officielle de la passivité qui a, en fin de compte, peu de choses à voir avec la pensée et les intentions de Husserl. En effet, là où les phénoménologues contemporains voient dans la passivité la zone (...) d'ombre où le programme d'une phénoménologie transcendantale et subjective s'effondrerait, Husserl considère, de son côté, qu'elle appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les « sources » des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient sans reste pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal et ne le destitue donc pas de sa position centrale et primordiale. Ce travail s'attache ainsi à suivre cette genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive et à montrer qu'elle entre dans le projet général, qui a été toujours celui de Husserl, d'asseoir la phénoménologie transcendantale sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde. Remerciements Avant-propos Remarques Chapitre premier. Le sens phénoménologique de la passivité Chapitre II. La refondation méthodologique de la phénoménologie Chapitre premier. La formation du concept husserlien de « synthèse passive » Chapitre II. La constitution passive de l'expérience dans les Analysen zur passiven Synthesis Chapitre III. Le rôle de l'affection dans la formation de l'unité sensible Chapitre IV. La phénoménologie de l'inconscient Chapitre premier. Les présupposés fondamentaux de la généalogie de la logique Chapitre II. L'analyse généalogique du jugement prédicatif Chapitre III. L'origine de l'erreur dans la passivité Conclusion.Le conflit des fondements Bibliographie Index nominum. (shrink)

First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...) Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one’s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator’s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty_ _by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. (shrink)

A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ( phantasy ) and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique (...) of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives. (shrink)

A one-of-a-kind reference to the international vocabulary of the humanities This is an encyclopedic dictionary of close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms and concepts that defy easy—or any—translation from one language and culture to another. Drawn from more than a dozen languages, terms such as Dasein (German), pravda (Russian), saudade (Portuguese), and stato (Italian) are thoroughly examined in all their cross-linguistic and cross-cultural complexities. Spanning the classical, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary periods, these are terms that (...) influence thinking across the humanities. The entries, written by more than 150 distinguished scholars, describe the origins and meanings of each term, the history and context of its usage, its translations into other languages, and its use in notable texts. The dictionary also includes essays on the special characteristics of particular languages—English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. Originally published in French, this one-of-a-kind reference work is now available in English for the first time, with new contributions from Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many more.The result is an invaluable reference for students, scholars, and general readers interested in the multilingual lives of some of our most influential words and ideas. Covers close to 400 important philosophical, literary, and political terms that defy easy translation between languages and cultures Includes terms from more than a dozen languages Entries written by more than 150 distinguished thinkers Available in English for the first time, with new contributions by Judith Butler, Daniel Heller-Roazen, Ben Kafka, Kevin McLaughlin, Kenneth Reinhard, Stella Sandford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Tylus, Anthony Vidler, Susan Wolfson, Robert J. C. Young, and many more Contains extensive cross-references and bibliographies An invaluable resource for students and scholars across the humanities. (shrink)

Les thèses freudiennes appuyées par la clinique ont requalifié ce que l’on entendait traditionnellement par « psychique », ainsi que la ségrégation entre conscience et inconscient thématisée dans le champ de la philosophie moderne. Alors que l’inconscient avait été conçu comme une négation ponctuelle de la conscience, Freud opère un renversement radical de situation en soutenant que le psychique est de part en part inconscient, alors que la conscience n’est qu’une qualité ponctuelle et intermittente de celui-ci. Dès lors, une philosophie (...) centrée sur la vie de la conscience, telle la phénoménologie, loin de pouvoir faire abstraction de cette révolution freudienne, doit, au contraire, en prendre pleinement la mesure. Les textes réunis dans ce volume cherchent à montrer que la phénoménologie est susceptible de trouver dans la question de l’inconscient non seulement une limite, mais aussi un lieu inédit de réflexion à partir duquel bon nombre de ses propres questions peuvent être relancées et réélaborées. Die auf die Klinik gestützten Thesen Freuds haben das traditionelle Verständnis des „Psychischen“ ebenso neu bestimmt wie die strikte Trennung zwischen Bewusstsein und Unbewusstem, die auf dem Gebiet der modernen Philosophie thematisiert wird. Während bis dahin das Unbewusste als eine punktuelle Negation des Bewusstseins verstanden wurde, führt Freud eine radikale Umkehrung der Situation herbei, indem er die Auffassung vertritt, dass das Psychische durch und durch unbewusst ist, während das Bewusstsein nur eine punktuelle und intermittierende Eigenschaft des Unbewussten ist. Folglich kann eine Philosophie wie die Phänomenologie, die das Leben des Bewusstseins zum Gegenstand hat, auf keinen Fall von dieser Freud’schen Revolution absehen, im Gegenteil, sie muss sie voll und ganz zum Maßstab nehmen. Die im vorliegenden Band vereinigten Texte versuchen zu zeigen, dass die Phänomenologie imstande ist, in der Frage des Unbewussten nicht nur eine Grenze, sondern auch einen noch unerforschten Ort der Reflexion zu finden, von dem ausgehend eine beträchtliche Anzahl ihrer eigenen Fragen neu aufgeworfen und erarbeitet werden können. (shrink)

Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the _body_ to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others. Perhaps above all, Merleau-Ponty's (...) insights about the embodied mind are a bold and refreshing challenge to the new era of virtual reality and artificial intelligence, as scientists and psychologists discover the centrality of the body to mind and intelligence. (shrink)

As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter appended to the original German publication of Hussed's Ideas II, I this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back (...) to Hussed himself. Indeed, the final" clean copy" for publication, prepared by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master three times and emended by him in detail on each occasion. Nevertheless, in the end the work was in fact not submitted for publication, and after Hussed's pen last touched the manuscript in 1928 it was set aside until posthumously edited and published by the Hussed-Archives in 1952. The story of the composition of Ideas II begins with the "pencil manuscript" of 1912. This is the ultimate textual source for both Ideas II and Ideas III. 2 It has been preserved as a folio of 84 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberger system, written mostly with a pencil. It was composed by Hussed "in one stroke" immediately after the completion of I Edmund Husser!: Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phiinomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus NijhofT, 1952 (Husserliana IV). (shrink)

In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.

What makes this work so important is that it returned the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato.

Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others.

"Le problème de la passivité: le sommeil, l'inconscient, la mémoire", éd. scientifique et transcription Stéphanie Ménasé, p.155-297; "L'Institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique" éd. scientifique et transcription Dominique Darmaillacq, p. 31-122; Préface Claude Lefort.

Explicit measures of human memory, such as recall or recognition, reflect conscious recollection of the past. Implicit tests of retention measure transfer (or priming) from past experience on tasks that do not require conscious recollection of recent experiences for their performance. The article reviews research on the relation between explicit and implicit memory. The evidence points to substantial differences between standard explicit and implicit tests, because many variables create dissociations between these tests. For example, although pictures are remembered better than (...) words on explicit tests, words produce more priming than do pictures on several implicit tests. These dissociations may implicate different memory systems that subserve distinct memorial functions, but the present argument is that many dissociations can be understood by appealing to general principles that apply to both explicit and implicit tests. Phenomena studied under the rubric of implicit memory may have important implications in many other fields, including social cognition, problem solving, and cognitive development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This article presents an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's notion of pre-reflective intentionality, explicating the similarities and differences between his and Husserl's understandings of intentionality. The main difference is located in Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl's noesis-noema structure. Merleau-Ponty seems to claim that there can be intentional acts which are not of or about anything specific. He defines intentionality by its ``directedness'', which is described as a bodily, concrete spatial motility. Merleau-Ponty's understanding of intentionality is part of his attempt to rewrite the relation (...) between the universal and the particular. He claims that meaning is intrinsic to the phenomenal field and impossible to analyse by a distinction between form and matter. Still, Merleau-Ponty's notion of meaning and philosophy is strictly opposed to any naturalized philosophy. This becomes explicated at the end of the article, where his attempt to embody intentionality is compared to Daniel Dennett's corresponding approach. (shrink)

The work of Hussefl and Freud had common sources in the philosophy, psychology and physiology of the nineteenth century. Herbart, Brentano, Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt and Mach were among the towering figures in their common background who had influence on their respective work. 1 Although contemporaries who had little concern for the other's professional interest, Husserl and Freud nevertheless struggled with some common problems. One of these is the relationship of sensation to memory and to the experience of time. The concepts (...) of sensation, memory and time were, in fact, artifacts which the empirical methods of nerve-physiology, the psychophysical testing of sensory thresholds, as well as the metaphysics and positivism of the late nineteenth century had left them. (shrink)

This book contains the unfinished manuscript and working notes of the book Merleau-Ponty was writing when he died.

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, (...) but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience & to the way in which it is connected to judgments & cognition. Students of phenomenology will find this work indispensable.

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines Semesters (...) in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

Memory. There may be nothing more important to human beings than our ability to enshrine experience and recall it. While philosophers and poets have elevated memory to an almost mystical level, psychologists have struggled to demystify it. Now, according to Daniel Schacter, one of the most distinguished memory researchers, the mysteries of memory are finally yielding to dramatic, even revolutionary, scientific breakthroughs. Schacter explains how and why it may change our understanding of everything from false memory to Alzheimer's disease, from (...) recovered memory to amnesia with fascinating firsthand accounts of patients with striking—and sometimes bizarre—amnesias resulting from brain injury or psychological trauma. (shrink)

"This book contains phenomenological analyses of each dimension of temporalizing consciousness, turning primarily to Husserl's later manuscripts on time.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous (...) literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud. (shrink)

Institution in personal and public history. Introduction -- Institution and life -- Institution of a feeling -- The institution of a work of art -- Institution of a domain of knowledge -- The field of culture -- Historical institution: particularity and universality -- Summary for Thursday's course: Institution in personal and public history -- The problem of passivity: sleep, the unconscious, memory. The philosophy and the phenomenon of passivity -- For an ontology of the perceived world -- Sleep -- Perceptual (...) consciousness and imagining consciousness -- Symbolism -- Dreams -- The Freudian unconscious -- Delusions: gradiva -- The case of Dora -- The problem of memory -- Appendix: three notes on the Freudian unconscious -- Summary for Monday's course: the problem of passivity: sleep, the unconscious, memory. (shrink)

Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.

Edward S. Casey provides a thorough description of the varieties of human memory, including recognizing and reminding, reminiscing and commemorating, body memory and place memory. The preface to the new edition extends the scope of the original text to include issues of collective memory, forgetting, and traumatic memory, and aligns this book with Casey's newest work on place and space. This ambitious study demonstrates that nothing in our lives is unaffected by remembering.

Is a phenomenology of sleep possible? If sleep is the complete absence of experience, including the self-experience of consciousness itself, how can phenomenology, as a description of lived experience, have access to a condition that is neither lived nor experienced? In this paper, I respond directly and indirectly to Jean-Luc Nancy’s challenge that a phenomenology of sleep is impossible. As an indirect response, my sketch of the contours of phenomenology of sleep investigates Husserl’s employment of the distinction between sleep and (...) wakefulness as a metaphor. Specifically, the metaphorical characterization of retentional consciousness is assessed. On the basis of this metaphorical characterization of time-consciousness in terms of sleep and wakefulness, I turn to Husserl’s account of the constitution of sleep. I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness remains incomplete without an account of “sleep-consciousness”(by which we mean, in a restricted manner, dreamless sleep）. In pursuing Husserl’s phenomenological account of sleep, falling asleep and waking up within the context of his genetic phenomenology, I offer a suggestion for how to understand the sense in which consciousness (temporarily) constitutes itself as sleep--as the absence of itself. I conclude with an analogy with Husserl’s investigations into the imaginary: in both instances, consciousness induces within itself its own suspension or self-abstention. In the particular instance of sleep, consciousness disengages itself entirely from the complex of interests while also immunizing itself to the force of affectivity. (shrink)

Je lui ai associÉ un court extrait d'une revue de questions portant sur le même thème. Implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate perf on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those expces. Explicit memory is revealed when perf on a task requires conscious recolelction of previous expces. Il s'agit de defs descriptives qui n'impliquent pas l'existence de deux systs de mÉmo sÉparÉs. Historiquement Descartes est le premier ˆ faire mention de phÉnomènes de mÉmo (...) implicites, Leibniz, Maine de Biran, Bergson en ont Également parlÉ. Korsakoff (1889) avec ses travaux sur les amnÉsiques montre qu'ils sont capables d'utiliser de l'info qu'ils ont acquises dans des Épisodes rÉcents sans pour autant manifester le moindre souvenir de l'Épisode. L'interprÉtation de ces phÉnomènes Était alors que ça renvoyait ˆ des traces en mÉmoire trop tÉnues pour accèder jusqu'au champ de la conscience. Cette interprÉtation va pouvoir être ÉcartÉe par les travaux rÉcents. Thorndike a Également conduit un nbre important de travaux sur MI. Les trauvaux un peu plus rÉcents ont montrÉ qu'un apprentissage antÉrieur pouvait faciliter une perfce sans qu'il y ait ref explicite à l'Épisode d'apprentissage. On a montrÉ aussi l'effet de stimuli subliminaux, qui en tant que tels ne peuvent pas être rappelÉs consciemment, mais qui influencent la conduite ou les jugts ultÉrieurs. Par ex, la prÉsentation de formes sur des temps très courts qui excluent la possibilitÉ d'une perception consciente influence significativement lechoix de formes dans une pÉreuve ultÉrieure de choix forcÉs où les sjts doivent indiquer la forme qu'il prÉfère entre deux. Ils choisissent prÉfÉrentiellement celles qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes de manière subliminale. De même Bargh et al. ont montrÉ que des sjts soumis de manière subliminale ˆ des mots hostiles portent ultÉrieurement des jugts plus nÉgatifs sur une personne target. Il ya Également eu des travaux sur l'apprsge ou le condt without awareness en particulier apprsge implicite de règles de grammaire (ie le sjt peut construire de nouvelles phrases conformes ˆ la syntaxe de celles qui lui ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes sans pour autant petre capables d'noncer les règles de grammaire qu'il utilise) Rem: N'est ce pas un pbe de typemÉtacognition??? Enfin, tous les travaux sur le priming sont des elts en faveur de MI: Facilitation in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with the same stimulus. Type de perfce sur lesquels les effets de priming ont ÉtÉ dÉmontrÉs: -T‰ches de dÉcision lexicale: Le sjt doit dire si la cha"ne de caractères qu'on lui prÉsente est un mot ou pas: Le temps de latence est beaucoup plus court si la cha"ne a dÉjˆ ÉtÉ prÉsentÉe une première fois. -Mesures de temps d'identification de mots en rpÉsentation tachitoscopiques -ComplÉmentation de mots: les sjts ont tendance ˆ complÉter pour crÉer les mots qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉs antÉrieurement. L'intÉrêt pour le paradigme de priming se retouve chez les gens qui s'intÉressent ˆ: -reconnaissance de mots et organisation lexicale. les effets de priming permettent de faire des hyps sur l'accès lexical et la reprÉsentation. -M. Épisodique: travux sur les amnÉsiques qui ne se souviennent pas qu'on vient de leur prÉsenter des mots mais qui manifestent une mÉmoire implicite lorsqu'on leur fait faire de la complÉmentation de mots. DISSOCIATION ENTRE M.I. ET M EXPLICITE 1-Si de nombreux travaux montrent que la M explicite est influencÉe par le travail d'Élaboration (profondeur de traitement) en jeu pendant la première phase d'Étude des stimuli, il semble que la MI ne le soit pas. 2-Le changt de modalitÉ (par ex auditif -> visuel) entre la phase d'Étude et la phase de test provoque une attÉnuation importante de l'effet de priming si le test est un test de MI mais pas si c'est un test de ME. 3-Les effets de primings persistent assez largement sur plusieurs jours ce qui n'est pas le cas des perfces ˆ une Épreuve de reconnaissance. 4-Les perfces sur des tests de MI ne semblent pas influencÉes par des manipulations d'interfÉrences proactives ou rÉtroactives dont on sait qu'elles influencent les perfces en ME. 5-Absce de corrÉlation entre perfces ˆ des tests de reconnaissance et perfces ˆ une Épreuve de complÉmentation de mots. SIMILARITES ENTRE PRIMING ET REMEMBERING 1- A certaines conditions les durÉes de rÉtention on des effets parallèles sur les effets de priming et les mesures de ME (REm: en partie contradictoire avec 3 ci dessus) 2-La manipulation du contexte de la liste lors de la phase d'Étude affecte ˆ la fois les perfces en reconnaissance et en identification de mots. 3- ME et MI sont influencÉes par des associations nouvellement acquises entre des paires de mots non reliÉes (Rem: contradictoires avec 4 ci dessus ??) 4- Rem: Le contraire de 1 du pt "dissociation" !!!! dans une manip particulière 5-Johnston et al. ont montrÉ que des mots identifÉs plus rapidement Étaient plus svt jugÉs comme 'old' dans une t‰che de reconnaissance que les mots identifiÉs plus lentement. Il n'est pas exclu que les phÉnomènes que l'on interprètent comme relevant de MI soient parfois de la ME involontaire cad des cas o les cues fournis dans le test conduisent ˆ un souvenir involontaire mais totalement conscient. LES INTERPRETATIONS THEORIQUES DE MI 1-Les effets de priming sur des test de MI sont attribuables ˆ l'activation temporaires de reprÉsentations ou structures de K prÉ-existantes . Cette activation est supposÉe avoir lieu de manière automatique, indÉpendamment des processus d'Élaboration nÉcessaires pour Établir de nouvelles traces Épisodiques. 2- les difÉrences entre ME et MI sont dues ˆ la nature et aux relations entre les processus d'encodage et de rÉcupÉration. Une version de cette approche est celle qui s'appuie sur la distinction entre processus dirigÉs par les donnÉes et processus dirigÉs par les concepts. Ces derniers reflètent des activitÉs initiÉes par le sjt comme l'Élaboration, l'organisation et la reconstruction, c'est sur ce type de processus que reposerait la ME alors que la MI reposerait sur des processus data-driven. 3-ME et MI renvoient ˆ des systs sous jacents diffÉrents. Pour Cohen & Squire (1984), la ME est supportÉe par une M DECLARATIVE , syst qui est en jeu dans la formation de nouvelles reprÉsentations. La MI repose sur un syst PROCEDURAL dans lequel la M se manifeste par des modifications on line de procÉdures ou opÉrations de traitement. Le syst de M Épisodique est vu comme la base pour le souvenir explicite d'evts rÉcents tandis que la M sÉmantique est responsable des perfces sur des tests de MI. Chacune de ces approches est conforme ˆ certaines des donnÉes recueillies mais pas ˆ d'autres. (shrink)