Intelligence without representation – Merleau-ponty's critique of mental representation the relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):367-383 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Body.David Morris - 2008 - In Rosalyn Diprose & Jack Reynolds (eds.), Merleau-ponty: Key Concepts. Acumen Publishing. pp. 111-120.
Representation and deliberate action.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Houston Studies in Cognitive Science 1.
Merleau-ponty and the mystery of perception.Taylor Carman - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):630-638.
Body‐intentionality.Corbin Collins - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (December):495-518.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
564 (#30,612)

6 months
72 (#60,683)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hubert Dreyfus
Last affiliation: University of California, Berkeley

References found in this work

Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945/1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.

View all 7 references / Add more references