The question of toleration matters more than ever. The politics of the twenty-first century is replete with both the successes and, all too often, the failures of toleration. Yet a growing number of thinkers and practitioners have argued against toleration. Some believe that liberal democracies are better served by different principles, such as respect of, or recognition for, people's ways of life. Others argue that because the liberal state should be entirely neutral or indifferent towards people's ways of life, it (...) can no longer be tolerant - it has no grounds on which it can object, and so there is nothing left to tolerate.Respecting Toleration provides a new, original, and provocative take on the question of toleration and its application to the politics of contemporary diversity. The volume demonstrates how toleration - despite its critics - is essential to any liberal political order. Peter Balint argues that from a conceptual viewpoint, toleration is entirely compatible with liberal politics; and from a normative viewpoint, it is utterly essential. The volume argues that if one cares about people living divergent lives, then it is liberal toleration that should be respected by legislators and policy makers, and not people's differences. It is a book that will shape the debate and demand a response from all who are interested in which political structures most fairly accommodate the competing ways of life that characterise contemporary diversity.Key Features:Develops a new framework of political tolerationProvides a clear demonstration and analysis of complex concepts and argumentsProvides extensive practical and theoretical examples. (shrink)

Almost all philosophical understandings of tolerance as forbearance require that the reasons for objection and/or the reasons for withholding the power to negatively interfere must be of the morally right kind. In this paper, I instead put forward a descriptive account of an act of tolerance and argue that in the political context, at least, it has several important advantages over the standard more moralised accounts. These advantages include that it better addresses instances of intolerance and that it is able (...) to makes sense of state acts of tolerance. (shrink)

Abstract A growing number of theorists have argued that toleration, at least in its traditional sense, is no longer applicable to liberal democratic political arrangements—especially if these political arrangements are conceived of as neutral. Peter Jones has tried make sense of political toleration while staying true to its more traditional (disapproval yet non-prevention) meaning. In this article, while I am sympathetic to his motivation, I argue that Jones’ attempt to make sense of political toleration is not successful. Content Type Journal (...) Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11158-012-9177-3 Authors Peter Balint, The University of New South Wales, Canberra, ACT 2602, Australia Journal Res Publica Online ISSN 1572-8692 Print ISSN 1356-4765. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify what is both meant and entailed when the notion of respect is invoked in relation to the issues of diversity. A distinction is introduced between two types of respecting agents: the state and the citizen. The paper then distinguishes respect in relation to a commonality – in this case citizenship – from respect in relation to specific difference. The importance of respect in relation to a commonality is stressed, whilst the distinction between the state and (...) the citizen as the respecting agent is used to raise questions about respect of difference. The latter part of the paper looks at Peter Jones’ compromise position of ‘mediated recognition,’ and suggests the possibility of ‘mediated accommodation.’. (shrink)

The building and maintaining of a tolerant society requires both a general policy of toleration on the behalf of the state, as well as a minimal number of acts of intolerance by individual citizens towards their fellow citizens. It is this second area of citizen‐citizen relations that is of most interest for education policy. There are those who argue that the best way to achieve a tolerant society is by encouraging, or even requiring, the respect and appreciation of difference amongst (...) a citizenry. In this paper I argue that using education to encourage the respect and appreciation of difference is deeply problematic for both adults and children. I argue that it is a poor servant of those whose differences it is meant to protect, and crucially that it cannot be justified on the key liberal premise of protecting the freedom of individuals to live their (non‐harming) lives as they see fit. I conclude by putting forward the educational alternative of respecting the basic rights of citizens irrespective of your view of their differences. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is a ‘Tolerant Society’? Respect and Appreciation of Difference Alternatives for Education Notes References.

In contrast to multicultural theory, which in discussions of respect for difference has primarily focussed on the state as the agent of respect, multicultural policy has instead tended to focus on citizens themselves as the potential agents of this sort of respect. This article examines the plausibility of this type of respect (which is advocated by some theorists too), and argues that is not a reasonable or necessary demand. While there are several different ways of understanding respect — most of (...) which focus on respecting persons — none seem capable of doing the work required for it to enable either the adequate or reasonable accommodation of diversity in a liberal society. More specifically, I use Darwall's influential distinction between appraisal and recognition respect — the latter in a broad non-moralised sense — to make my case. While appraisal respect for difference may be theoretically easy to dismiss, it is not uncommon in multicultural policy. On the other hand, recognition respect — which is more behavioural than attitudinal — may appear a more plausible candidate. Yet it too remains overly demanding for individual citizens, especially, and most importantly, in difficult cases. I conclude that tolerance of difference (coming out of respect for citizenship) is a more appropriate demand on the individual. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally focused onjus ad bellum(the justiceofwar) andjus in bello(justiceinwar). What has been neglected is the question ofjus ante bellum, or justicebeforewar. In particular: Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a polity topreparefor war by militarizing? When (if ever) and why (if at all) is it morally permissible or even obligatory to create and maintain the potential to wage war? What are the alternatives to the military? And if we do have militaries, how should they be (...) arranged, trained, and equipped? These considerations are not about whether warmakingis justified, but about whether warbuildingis justified.InEthics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos argues that we have not sufficiently calculated the true (noneconomic) costs of the military, and that if we did, having a standing defense force would not seem like as good an idea. Dobos pushes us to reflect on something we have taken for granted: that one of the biggest institutions in our society, which is supposed to keep us safe and allow us to lead our own lives, may in fact pose great dangers and risks to us physically, morally, and culturally. The essays in this symposium take Dobos's work as a starting point and show the importance, complexity, and richness of this new strand of ethical inquiry. (shrink)

Given that cities are now bearing the brunt of migration and integration, it might seem that we should shift our normative focus away from the state towards the city. This is the suggestion of Avner de Shalit’s (2018) Cities and Integration: Political and Moral Dilemmas in the New Era of Migration. In this article, we suggest that this move is not so straightforward. Other levels, including the global, the state, and the neighbourhood, on top of the city, are also impacted (...) by migration and so also have claims for normative priority, which need to be addressed. And even if the city is responsible for integration, we argue that de Shalit’s promotion of Amsterdam’s ‘Milkshake Model’ – a form of respect and appreciation of difference – is, despite its clear initial appeal, not an ideal for accommodating diversity. (shrink)

The building and maintaining of a tolerant society requires both a general policy of toleration on the behalf of the state, as well as a minimal number of acts of intolerance by individual citizens towards their fellow citizens. It is this second area of citizen‐citizen relations that is of most interest for education policy. There are those who argue that the best way to achieve a tolerant society is by encouraging, or even requiring, the respect and appreciation of difference amongst (...) a citizenry. In this paper I argue that using education to encourage the respect and appreciation of difference is deeply problematic for both adults and children. I argue that it is a poor servant of those whose differences it is meant to protect, and crucially that it cannot be justified on the key liberal premise of protecting the freedom of individuals to live their (non‐harming) lives as they see fit. I conclude by putting forward the educational alternative of respecting the basic rights of citizens irrespective of your view of their differences. (shrink)

State-sponsored breastfeeding promotion campaigns have become increasingly common in developed countries. In this article, by using the tools of liberal political theory, as well as public health and health promotion ethics, we argue that such campaigns are not justified. They ignore important costs for women, including undermining autonomy, fail to distribute burdens fairly, cannot be justified neutrally and fail a basic efficacy test. Moreover, our argument demonstrates that breastfeeding campaigns are a rare case that bridges the fields of public health (...) ethics and the ethics of health promotion campaigns. This demonstrates the need to consider the ethics of state promotion of both voluntary and coercive behavioural change that benefits third parties. (shrink)

In defending toleration against its many critics, Respecting Toleration has both conceptual and normative aims. Conceptually, I defend and explain the coherence of political toleration. This involves, in part, highlighting a distinction between two forms of toleration; one of which always involves objection, and one which does not. Normatively, I defend a particular understanding of toleration as the best way of accommodating contemporary diversity. In brief, the state should be guided by an active ideal of neutrality, and citizens must at (...) minimum engage in forbearance tolerance with each others’ differences. In this paper, I respond to four main lines of criticism. The first is that my understanding of toleration – in which objection is not always necessary – is too broad, and that my non-moralised understanding of forbearance tolerance requires additional context. Second, my discussion of neutrality runs together the distinction between an active/passive state with a large/small state; wrongly fails to distinguish between mere preferences and deeply held beliefs; and is really a concern about equality. Third, my freedom-based justification for toleration is too limited; and may, in fact, enable recognition rather than resist it. Fourth, my rejection of inter-citizen respect for difference is too quick. (shrink)

Multiculturalism has become a political touchstone in many countries around the world. While many of those on the right oppose it, and many of those on the left embrace it, things are not this simple. For those who defend them, multicultural policies are generally seen as key to the fair and successful integration of minorities, many of whom are immigrants, into diverse democratic societies. For those who oppose multiculturalism, who have become part of the so-called "backlash" against multiculturalism, they are (...) charged with generating segregation rather than inclusion, undermining national cultures, reinforcing difference, and privileging minority groups. Around the world, we see failing attempts at migrant integration, persistent religious intolerance and racial and ethnic discrimination, resurgent national minorities, emboldened majorities, permanent minorities, continuing social isolation, and increasing extremism, including in the form of white nationalism. But is multiculturalism the solution to these problems or does it just make them worse? In this for-and-against book, two prominent scholars of multiculturalism put forward different answers to this important question. While Patti Tamara Lenard argues for minority rights as both the consequence of a right to culture and a way to redress the effects of nation-building, Peter Balint rejects minority rights altogether, instead arguing for a re-imagined liberal neutrality. This theoretical disagreement plays out in real-world policy disagreement. Lenard, for example, argues strongly in favor of exemptions from general rules for minority cultures including the right of Sikhs to be exempt from helmet laws, and for Jews and Muslims to be exempt from bans on male circumcision. She also defends the right of minority cultures to have government-supported separate spaces. Balint, on the other hand, argues directly against these types of exemptions and government support. He is opposed to any form of differentiation based on culture, religion, or ethnicity. The book uses a wide range of real-world examples to demonstrate their significant theoretical disagreement, and to recommend very different policy proposals. (shrink)