Neurowetenschappen en de Illusie van Vrije Wil

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3):339-358 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Neuroscience and the Illusion of Free WillCurrently, few neuroscientists and philosophers still defend the claim that neuroscience has shown the brain ‘decides’ what we do and that free will is an illusion. This does not imply, however, that this kind of neuroscientific researchcould notsay anything about the existence of free will. Neuroscience can offer insights in the unconscious causes and underlying processes of our actions and, because of this, could perhaps show whether we act out of free will or not. In this paper I will argue that in this regard the possibilities of neuroscientific research are limited. I understand free will, in line with Dana Nelkin and Susan Wolf, as the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. I will show that whether someone acts intentionally, what it is that she is doing, and for which reasons she acts cannot be determined by studying unconscious causes or other unconscious processes related to the action. The action and reason necessarily depend on the perspective of the acting agent. Furthermore, neuroscientific research cannot show us whether the reasons and the actions areright. It could perhaps offer a unique contribution when it comes to the question of whether we areableto the right thing for the right reasons. To what extent it can remains an open question.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Role of Unconsciousness in Free Will.Paula Droege - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5-6.
Neuroscience, Free Will and Responsibility.Walter Glannon - 2009 - Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4:1-6.
There Is No Free Won't: The Role Definitions Play.L. Asma - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):8-23.
Beyond Button Presses.Robyn Repko Waller - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):441-462.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
Acting on Phantasy and Acting on Desire.E. Galgut - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):132-142.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-24

Downloads
31 (#503,056)

6 months
8 (#342,364)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lieke Asma
Munich School of Philosophy

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Choking and The Yips.David Papineau - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.
Knowledge in intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.
Choking and The Yips.Massimiliano Cappuccio - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.

View all 8 references / Add more references