In Stavros Ioannidis, Gal Vishne, Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Cham: Springer (forthcoming)

Authors
Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
The aim of this expository paper is to give an informal overview of a plausible naturalistic case for free will. I will describe what I take to be the main naturalistically motivated challenges for free will and respond to them by presenting an indispensability argument for free will. The argument supports the reality of free will as an emergent higher-level phenomenon. I will also explain why the resulting picture of free will does not conflict with the possibility that the fundamental laws of nature are deterministic, and I will address some common objections.
Keywords Free will  Indispensability argument  Naturalism  Compatibilist libertarianism  Determinism  Indeterminism  Levels  Non-reductive physicalism
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